Mike Mills
Green democracy has, perhaps surprisingly, now become controversial. When such controversies appear the tendency is to search for principles or values that, when consistently applied, may properly guide our behaviour and our thoughts.
This chapter is no exception and seeks to look for those principles within green political theory and environmental ethics itself. By looking, very briefly, at two branches of green political theory which do, indeed, compete in their use of democracy (ecoauthoritarianism and what I will call ecoradicalism), I will suggest that both suffer by failing adequately to consider two things. First, and most importantly, both advance policy prescriptions without purposefully expanding the moral community to which that policy should be addressed. My argument will be that however we characterise what greens believe or what they want to do, the question of the moral community—its expansion and the implications of its expansion—is logically prior to all others. Second, I will argue that green political theory (in both its ecoauthoritarian and its ecoradical sense) has been perhaps too concerned with outcome, and could risk being more concerned with process. I hope to make it clear that this will have a number of distinct advantages over taking a more consequentialist line. First it will help protect against autocracy; second, it is much easier to reconcile with a fundamentally green (ecocentric) ethic; and third, it is very useful in helping to promote the idea that democracy of various forms and at various levels is, indeed, absolutely central to green political theory.
ECOAUTHORITARIANISM AND ECORADICALISM
Ecoauthoritarianism
Whether it argues the perils of over-population (Hardin 1968) or of scarcity more generally (Ophuls 1977; Ophuls and Boyan 1992) the thrust of ecoauthoritarianism appears to remain the same. There are ecological imperatives which have to be addressed and the political organisation necessary to resolve them may not be particularly democratic. Primarily, this disorientation towards democracy is a function of two things; first, a strongly Hobbesian conception of human nature which implies that individuals will not, of their own free will, make
selfless, co-operative personal choices; and second, an apparently overwhelming orientation towards ends-based policies, structures and institutions, rather than means-based ones. In other words, ecoauthoritarians take a very consequentialist moral line in which stark and mutually exclusive choices exist based upon either avoiding the ecological crisis through authoritarian measures, or suffering it. In Hardin’s case he argues for ‘mutual coercion mutually agreed upon’ (1968); in Ophuls’ case he argues for some kind of competent aristocracy to distribute scarce resources. Yet, a generous interpretation of Ophuls’ model of scarcity politics would lead us to conclude that although he sees democracy as constrained at higher levels—perhaps national or regional—he is very keen on democracy lower down because he sees that type of freedom (at the micro-level) as differentiating his eco- society from other authoritarian regimes. Although this does not rescue the theory as a whole it should sensitise us to the fact that different types of democracy can exist at different levels.
The major problem with taking this sort of line is the internal inconsistency of the arguments themselves. To my mind, any theory which accepts a Hobbesian version of human nature and then argues that political power should be wielded (by Hobbesians) without cursory political checks and balances (or the equivalent) is asking for trouble. In other words, the very arguments given by ecoauthoritarians to justify the circumvention of democracy will do quite as well in arguing the complete opposite—the greater the problem, the more severe the risk, the more pressing the imperative, the more necessary it becomes that democracy becomes extended, entrenched and practised. As Sagoff has argued:
Democracy, as everyone knows, is susceptible to abuse and has all kinds of problems, but I know of no other mechanism for making policy decisions that has this ethical underpinning (citizens having the opportunity to present their views to legislators).
(Sagoff 1988:115) The counter-argument to this given by Saward (directed against the ecoradicals, 1993) is that even if democracy is desirable (whether for intrinsic or instrumental reasons) it is simply incompatible with other green goals. Although I cannot resolve this question fully now, this point depends entirely on what these goals are. If green political theory is goal or ends oriented (as the ecoauthoritarians are) then this argument has some validity although it will depend on the extent to which we accept that democracy can exist within ecological constraints. However, it is not only possible, but also perfectly reasonable, to argue that green political theory should be more process oriented, in which case democracy becomes not only compatible with, but also essential to, green political theory.
Without labouring the critique, let me just make one more point, the full importance of which will also become more evident as we go on. For ecoauthoritarians the ecological crisis presents us with the need to manage the finite resources of the planet effectively to trust in political or technocratic decisions
that will, presumably, secure and distribute goods and control the ecological effects of their consumption. I would argue, however, that our ability to manage on the scale envisaged by ecoauthoritarians must be limited. In this respect then, it may be better to ensure that whatever solution we find to the ecological crisis (and to the centrality of democracy to green political theory), it had better be a process- oriented one, that is, one which minimises the need for management on the basis of inadequate information.
Ecoradicalism
Ecoradicals, on the other hand, are a much messier proposition. My central point will simply be that ecoradicals (if we take ecoradicals to belong in part to green parties and radical green movements) could afford to be more concerned with political processes (as opposed to political ends) and this in turn would help to resolve problems of green democracy. I will not be able to resolve these arguments, however, until later on. Goodin (1992) suggests that while there is a great deal of policy prescription within green programmes (as you would expect) there is actually very little on institutional change and on political processes. He notes that
‘it is ecological values that form the focus of the green programme’ (1992:183) and in this respect, green politics and political theory posits a largely holistic view of both problems and their solutions. In this, Goodin suggests that it is the non- discriminatory nature of green values and their push for diversity which lead them
‘positively [to] embrace pluralism’ (1992:199) and ‘cherish diversity in its social every bit as much as in its biological form’ (1992:199).
There is, apparently, some gap between principles (values) on the one hand and policies on the other because there does not seem to be much on the question of policy or political processes to join the two, even at a theoretical level. In the economic programme there is an onus on individuals to act, as Goodin notices (and as rallying calls like ‘think globally, act locally’ imply), and for policy and lifestyle to become one and the same thing in places. In economic relations, as in politics, the green message appears to be the same and appears, still, to imply the type of political (democratic) relations necessary for individuals to take control.
Dobson (1990, 1993) sees decentralisation as the central green prescription and sees the guiding principles of ecologism as subsumed under the broad headings of limits to growth (which implies interdependence, finite resources, the paucity of technological solutions) and ecologism’s commitment to non-anthropocentric principles and policies. As far as the principle goes, Dobson, quite rightly, says that:
‘much of ecologism’s momentum is controversially engaged in widening the community of rights holders to animals, trees, plants and even inanimate nature’
(1993:223). This provides us with our first tentative link between democracy on the one hand and philosophy on the other.
Ecoradicals, at a philosophical level, though, fall into a variety of camps.
Eckersley, for example, distinguishes three varieties of ecocentrism—autopoietic intrinsic value; transpersonal (deep) ecology; and ecofeminist (1992:60–74).
Dobson’s (1989) major distinction is between those who advocate the ‘state of being’ (deep ecology) approach to ethics and those who see nature as having intrinsic value. Both appear to agree that the transpersonal/deep ecology approach (which sees our perceptions, attitudes and behaviour toward the environment as changing with changes in consciousness, experience and intuition) is problematic as the basis of a political theory largely because it is itself non-axiological (Eckersley 1992; Dobson 1989). While Mathews (1988) is I believe, quite right in arguing, that a commitment to deep ecology is not a fatalistic, do-nothing choice, nevertheless, I will proceed on the basis that if green political theory is ethically informed, then it is primarily some version of intrinsic value rather than deep ecology that is likely to be most useful.1
The criticisms levelled at ecoradicals focus on the internal consistency of their ideas. One observation made by Saward (1993) concerns the relationship between direct democracy and other green goals such as intrinsic value and holism. Here, he makes the point, rightly, that it is difficult to work to imperatives on the one hand and have a fairly arbitrary decision-making process such as democracy on the other hand. The fact that the green movement does have a perception of a Good Life (Dobson 1990:14) would seem to reinforce the point that the ecoradicals have a problem—how can you go for the Good Life when your democracy may not take you there? Given, in addition, that there clearly is a bottom line green commitment to political liberalism as seen in ‘diversity’ and ‘direct democracy’
for example, then Sagoff’s point is relevant:
Liberal political theory cannot commit a democracy beforehand to adopt any general rule or principle that answers the moral questions that confront it; if political theory could do this, it would become autocratic and inconsistent with democracy.
(Sagoff 1988:162) Of course, we are not dealing with an exclusively liberal political theory, but green theory does have liberal political elements which make the principle the same in both theories. In fact liberal political theory does commit us to certain rules and principles which are thought to be, in some sense, prior to the democratic process itself. Mostly, these revolve around who or what might be considered as worthy of participation in such a process—who decides over these moral questions?
Liberal political theory does, then, have something to say about the nature of the democratic process, it is simply reticent about policy outcomes. Indeed, although Paehlke (1988) has quite rightly argued that democracy can be enhanced by environmental policy, nevertheless, it is also true to say that the ecoradicals have few safeguards against the triumph of one laudable principle, say, sustainability, over another, decentralisation for example. Dobson observes that:
It has been suggested that ecologism’s commitment to principles such as liberty and democracy is compromised by apparently laying such great emphasis on the ends rather than the means of political association.
(Dobson 1993:234) I will be arguing that both of these points are correct, and that they are related. In other words, philosophically, greens have been concerned to expand the community of rights holders (or something similar) and they have also been concerned with ends rather than means. A commitment to some form of liberalism may help in counteracting some forms of strongly prescriptive ideology but it is likely that democracy will suffer unless other safeguards are built in.
Of all the difficulties with the ecoradical’s view of democracy, that is by far the most difficult to surmount. Yet in a broader philosophical sense, ecoradicals are far from as consequentialist as their programmes suggest; they lean quite strongly towards doing what is ‘right’, as much as they do towards what is ultimately ‘good’.
Certainly in terms of their views on the political system, we can see fairly clearly that their support for participatory democracy and decentralisation denotes a view of how people can develop, grow and take control which is independent of what outcomes that might entail.
Ecoauthoritarians and ecoradicals do display some of the same problems, but in different degrees. Primarily, we can see that both do not necessarily protect (or even advance) a position on democracy which is defensible against strongly asserted and pressing political, economic and social goals. While in the case of ecoauthoritarians I would argue that they are perhaps a little more democratic than we sometimes give them credit for, nevertheless, there is little room theoretically for a consistent commitment to democracy. Ecoradicals, on the other hand, do emphasise democracy but fail to reconcile it with broader imperatives.
Such a reconciliation is possible if we change the emphasis of their thinking away from goals and direct it more towards political mechanisms.
Both approaches, to my mind at least, have not taken on board the consequences of their very starting point sufficiently. Before all else, for both, comes the assertion that the ecological crisis is primarily a crisis of our ethical system. Although we may perceive our current problems as those of over-population, resource depletion, and food scarcity, these are first and foremost symptoms of an ethical crisis. Environmental philosophers have been criticised for not providing the types of guidelines to political action which political theorists prefer (see, for example, Dobson 1989) but it has to be said that there is plenty to be getting on with if an ethically based green political theory is what theorists are after.
THE EXPANSION OF THE MORAL COMMUNITY
If we consider what greens argue is distinctive about their ideology, their political theory and their practical concerns, it is invariably the case that these can be reduced to a concern to expand the moral community.2 Eckersley (1992) argues
that the fundamental characteristic of green political theory is the fact that it is ecocentric and this ecocentricity is logically prior to all other political considerations:
A non-anthropocentric perspective is one that ensures that the interests of non-human species and ecological communities… are not ignored in human decision making simply because they are not human or because they are not of instrumental value to humans.
(Eckersley 1992:57) By accepting that humans are not the only ones with value or the only measure of value, we accept that our moral community expands because it is now necessary to accommodate others within our ethical choices. Eckersley, here, has made two interrelated points—one is that the non-human world should be given consideration and the second is that such consideration can be ensured only when a non-anthropocentric perspective is taken. This is a position I would support, indeed, my argument makes it essential that a non-anthropocentric approach is adopted—without this there is only a contingent expansion of the moral community, and if that happens, then democracy cannot be secured either. Goodin (1992) continues this line of argument when he says that it is ‘naturalness’ that greens value. If it is naturalness that has value, then presumably natural things should be given moral consideration. Dobson too (1990), as we saw earlier, took as a fundamental axiom of ecologism the idea that we should look toward a biocentric, or ecocentric (non-anthropocentric), basis for our political theory.
In terms of theory, we can see our ethical responsibilities shifting away from a largely human-centred approach to be ecocentric. These have been the primary terms of the debate and it is perhaps because of this that the political consequences of expanding the moral community—which I take to be a corollary of switching to an essentially ecocentric ethic—have not received the attention they might deserve. The 1992 General Election Manifesto of the British Green Party, for example, can illustrate this point quite well, not because there is no evidence of a shift, but rather because it surfaces in a rather ad hoc way and is not, to any large extent, directed at political variables.
From what we have said so far, we would expect to find the core axiology —that the Green Party was ecocentric and this entailed greater moral considerability of non-human species—represented somewhere within the manifesto itself, or at least an indication of such. And, indeed, it is perfectly possible to find such indications, but they tend to come in very specific forms. Largely, these are either in the forms of policy prescriptions (for example, rapidly phasing out factory farming or the greater protection of the soil) or in terms of changing the basis upon which future decisions will be made:
[the Green Party] would revolutionize the system of national accounts by rigorously identifying real costs and real benefits in our industrial society.
In so doing we would attribute equal value to the natural capital on which we depend (topsoil, water, clean air, fossil fuels etc.) as we do to the financial capital which greases the wheels of the world economy.
(Green Party 1992:11) To the extent that decision making would change (in terms of values and outputs at least) then clearly this change is in line with a broadening of the moral community. However, green political theory might suggest that concomitant changes might also occur in the political system more broadly —for example, in the attribution of rights to non-humans on the basis of their having value. This type of analysis is not in the manifesto, the overtly political provisions are aimed largely, although not exclusively, at resolving problems of the British political system. Without wishing to labour the point, the critique of Saward (1993) and the warning of Sagoff (1988) still remain. If there is to be an essentially goal- oriented policy-making process (and one based on ecological imperatives) then the Green Party may have problems with democracy. The commitment that the manifesto shows to ends might need to be matched by a similar commitment to the reform of the process of politics in a non-anthropocentric way which would ensure that green goals did not take precedence over due process.3
A more consistent application of the holistic principle, and the greater incorporation of non-human interests into the political features of the state would make green positions defensible against the accusation that highly deterministic, imperative-driven, consequentialistic policy runs the risk of forsaking democracy.
If we accept that value exists non-anthropocentrically, then it clearly is the case that what political movements (and philosophies) do should reflect this change and should find more things morally considerable. We can see in these programmes the obvious wish to expand the moral community but this is invariably associated with ends-based policies, rather than means-based processes.
So, greens propose the expansion of the moral community for very particular reasons (non-anthropocentric) and although such a position (which will be expanded below) does exist theoretically, in practice there are two problems. The first is that programmes are not necessarily informed by ecocentrism and holism and the second is that only certain formulations of this ethic will actually serve the dual function of both securing the democratic basis of green politics and the ethical basis that greens want. Importantly, greens appear to prefer, as you might expect, to argue their case in terms of policy ends, rather than in terms of the more deontological (axiological) premises of the policy process.
ACHIEVING THE EXPANSION OF THE MORAL COMMUNITY
The expansion of the moral community can be achieved in a number of different ways depending, to a great extent, upon how far we want to go and what arguments we are going to use along the way. I have already argued that the type of expansion