Wouter Achterberg
The main thesis of this chapter is that sustainability cannot be achieved without institutional changes in liberal democratic societies. The institutional changes explored have been proposed in other contexts by theorists of associative democracy and are supposed to broaden and enhance the democratic character of society. Two approaches to sustainability are discussed in the first section—the concepts of a sustainable society and of sustainable development. There is something common to these different concepts: both share an inescapable moral commitment, particularly to intergenerational and intragenerational justice or fairness. Realising sustainability could therefore imply a heavy burden of redistribution for rich countries. Because social acceptance of substantial redistribution requires mutual identification between all concerned and because the ties of community or, at least, mutual identification between citizens are rather weak in contemporary societies, the required redistributive measures might turn out to be a serious stumbling block on the route to a more sustainable and more just society. The importance of community for the realisation of sustainability will be explored in the second section.
In the third section, associative democracy will be discussed. I consider associative democracy to be mainly an institutional supplement to liberal democracy, which I take to mean representative democracies with market economies that are regulated to some degree. Nevertheless, different conceptions of associative democracy have been proposed, some of which have a more liberal inspiration while others draw more on socialist or social-democratic ideas. I will discuss two representative variants: the theory of Cohen and Rogers (1992), which represents the liberal perspective, and the more ambitious theory of Hirst (1994), which betrays a clearly socialist inspiration. The hypothesis will be put forward that the institutional changes proposed by adherents of associative democracy, which are sometimes rather minimal, will strengthen community ties and thereby make it more probable that sustainability will be achieved.
SUSTAINABILITY
Since the publication of the Brundtland Report Our Common Future (WCED 1987) sustainable development has broken through internationally as the umbrella
objective of environmental policy. The glorious career of sustainable development reached a height at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as the Earth Summit; Rio de Janeiro 1992).
But, in the mean time, the meaning of the concepts of sustainability and sustainable development has become, if anything, more unclear. For a clear understanding of what is at stake in pursuing sustainability, it might be helpful to go further back in time than 1987. Important aspects of the meaning of this idea will be unearthed in this way.
Roughly, we can distinguish two lines of development in the history of sustainability, both going back at least to the beginning of the 1970s. The first line starts with increasing concern in western countries about environmental degradation and the incompatibility between our industrial way of life and the continued existence of a safe, healthy, clean and rich environment. The other dates from the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 5–
16 June 1972). At this conference, the poorer countries stubbornly resisted a view of the environment and of desirable environmental policy which bore too much of the stamp of western concerns. The first line has emphasised a sustainable society and a stationary economy. The second line resulted in a conceptual compromise, that is, the concept of sustainable development, which allowed for some economic growth.
The sustainable society
The concept of the sustainable society had its origin to a great extent in debates about the limits to growth of the economy and population which raged in the early 1970s. The stationary economy was often connected with the thought of zero economic growth or at least zero growth of material production. Somewhat defensively, some participants in the debate went on to soften zero growth to limited or slow or selective growth. There is no end yet in sight to this debate about the compatibility of economic growth (which and how?) with a sustainable use of the environment. In the mean time through the influence of the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987), it has become enriched with peculiar ideas such as sustainable growth. A prominent thought in that report is that economic growth is necessary, though more so in poor countries than in rich, to pay the costs of environmental policy and to achieve sustainable use of the environment.
Basic to the original idea of a sustainable society was the presupposition that a partially or completely different society to contemporary capitalist or industrial society would be necessary to cope successfully with the environmental crisis and to achieve sustainability. By now, this assumption has become marginalised and its remaining adherents are only to be found in the radical wing of the environmental movement. That is not as it should be and in this chapter a defence of the ‘radical’ presupposition will be offered. Nevertheless, a sustainable society is not a society which can survive indefinitely; no human society can do that.
Instead, a sustainable society is a society arranged in such a way that the tendency
to sustainable use of the environment is inherent to it, in much the same way as the tendency to unsustainability seems inherent to the capitalistic order. It was in this sense that the idea of a sustainable society was put forward by the Blueprint for Survival, written by the editors of the Ecologist magazine (Goldsmith 1972). It is worthwhile to recall some aspects of its vision.
The Blueprint begins with the summary judgement that ‘The principal defect of the industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion is that it is not sustainable’
(Goldsmith 1972:15). This way of life will end therefore, according to the authors of the Blueprint, either ‘in a succession of famines, epidemics, social crises and wars’ or because we will manage to create in a controlled and humane way a
‘sustainable society’ and so ensure that deprivation and cruelty will not be the fate of our children (1972:15). The sustainable society is a stable society, a society which
‘to all intents and purposes can be sustained indefinitely while giving optimum satisfaction to its members’ (1972:30). The four main conditions of a sustainable society are minimal disturbance of ecological processes; as much conservation of energy and resources as possible; a stable population (only replacement will take place); and a social system in which the well-being of the individual is not lessened by the other three. conditions. More specifically, a sustainable society will consist of ‘decentralised, self-sufficient communities, in which people work near their homes, have the responsibility of governing themselves, of running their schools, hospitals, and welfare services’ (1972:30), in fact, of ‘real communities’, which will presumably contribute much to our well-being. The chances are that we will in these circumstances develop a real identity, find a meaning in life, have an ordered set of values and be proud of our own achievements and those of the community.
These are all things difficult to be had in present-day mass societies. Clearly, the authors of the Blueprint see the environmental crisis as part of a much deeper crisis that challenges the whole industrial way of life.
One does not need to agree with these views to understand that without structural changes in industrial society a sustainable use of the environment will presumably not be achieved. Changes of individual lifestyle or changes of policy are not sufficient to realise sustainability. Structural changes concern the institutional pattern and/or the culture of a society.
Three basic assumptions ground the need for structural change: the fact that, in general, environmental capacity is limited or finite; the inherent tendency of industrial society, so far, to lose sight of these limits; and the moral insights that we ought to counteract this tendency and that society ought to fit within ecological constraints, not just for our own sake, or for the sake of our children, but also for the sake of future generations. It would be quite right to add: for the sake of nature.
The addition implies that nature has a moral weight of its own, instead of being just a precondition for the existence and evolution of human society. But in this chapter I will limit myself to the institutional aspects of the environmental issue.1
Sustainable development
The second tradition of thinking about sustainability goes back to ideas which gained some international recognition at the Stockholm Conference. This tradition leads to the Earth Summit by way of the World Conservation Strategy (WCS 1980) and Our Common Future (WCED 1987), with a non-anthropocentric version in the form of the World Charter of Nature (1982) and Caring for the Earth (1991), the successor of the WCS. It suffices here to summarise the basic assumption of this way of thinking: sustainability ought not to be achieved at the expense of the legitimate aspirations of poor(er) countries to reach a level of development and welfare comparable to that of the richer nations. In other words, and because poverty is an important cause of environmental degradation, development is a moral and practical condition for achieving sustainability.
Indeed, the point seems to be that it is simply a matter of justice if the rich, industrialised countries help the developing countries to catch up with them, preferably in ways which give the poor countries the opportunity and means to determine their own way of development. So, in addition to the basic assumptions of the first tradition, we have the principle that sustainable development is feasible and morally acceptable only in tandem with more just relations between rich and poor countries. Sustainability in one country is even more absurd, morally and practically, than socialism in one country! This means, in effect, that the main responsibility for ‘taking off’ to sustainability is placed with the rich countries.
Besides providing aid to the poor countries, the rich should set a shining example in structurally changing their own societies, especially by making their pattern of production and consumption sustainable. All this is said or implied in the Declaration of Rio (in particular the principles 3 and 5–8) and, more elaborately, in Agenda 21.2
COMMUNITY
Whatever assessment is made of the Earth Summit (and perhaps the safest judgement is that the conference was not a complete failure), the Declaration of Rio at least expresses a broad moral consensus about sustainable development and about a demanding programme of action and policy to implement the principles of sustainable development. We have much less reason to belittle this moral consensus, because basic principles of political morality lead to a similar vision. If we take as a starting point of political morality the view that people ought to be treated as equals and that they deserve equal concern and respect (Dworkin 1977:
180–2), then we have, according to Kymlicka (1990:5), set foot on the ‘egalitarian plateau’, which he rightly says should be the basis of every acceptable modern political morality. The validity of this starting point as to its scope is not limited to some specific nation, culture or generation. It can be elaborated in either a consequentialistic manner, resulting in a theory which recommends ‘protecting the vulnerable’ (Goodin 1985), whoever they may be and wherever and whenever
they live or will live, or in a deontological theory at the core of which are principles of inter- and intragenerational justice (Barry 1991). Moreover, according to both types of theory, redistribution may well be required morally in cases of an unequal redistribution of resources. Having accepted these starting points, we can leave moral theory and go on to consider the practical consequences of the pursuit of sustainability.
I take it that sustainability minimally implies establishing sustainable patterns of production and consumption. How and under what conditions will these patterns be achieved? From three different directions the answers to this question converge upon the role and importance of community in achieving sustainability.
First, the question of how sustainability is to be achieved. Regulation by central authorities and financial incentives (such as price signals) will be needed, but these cannot be the whole story. Central regulation and financial incentives are in fact the easiest part of environmental policy, at least so far as it is aimed at what has been called ‘ecological modernization’ (Weale 1992). For example, standards will have to be established for admissible pollution or for less intensive use of energy and more efficient use of resources, which means, among other things, recycling in production or, more generally, ‘closing of substance cycles in the chain of raw material —production process—product—waste and the associated emissions’, which in turn implies ‘integrated life cycle management’ (Ministerie van Volks- huisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer 1989:12 and 17). Different industries need to find out how to meet these objectives in their specific circumstances of production. On the other hand, it is not clear how the relevant standards will be enforced when this is necessary. In short, there will have to be much more coordination by central (or regional or local) authorities or other (semi-) public bodies, but also voluntary co-ordination and co-operation between firms, branches of industry, and employers and employees. Furthermore, achieving sustainable patterns of consumption cannot just be a matter of waiting for consumers to see the light, after exposure to specific media messages. Co- operation will therefore be neces sary between producers and organisations of consumers, and between government agencies and producers. So far, we have hardly begun to deal with the questions of how to reorganise the transportation of freight and passengers, and the collection and processing of domestic waste.
The required co-ordination and voluntary co-operation at different levels pre- suppose that citizens are sufficiently involved with each other, an involvement which, in turn, is based on a shared understanding of the meaning and value of sustainability in general, and of sustainability specific to particular contexts of activity. This type of mutual concern on the basis of a shared acceptance of certain values is an important component of what traditionally has been understood by community.
Second, there is another fundamental reason why pursuing sustainability presupposes community. This is because of the moral starting point mentioned earlier: even in the pursuit of sustainability people should be treated as equals. The implication is that a society should receive aid if it cannot manage to establish
sustainable patterns of production and consumption. Making equality our starting point therefore implies solidarity and redistribution between rich and poor. And yet, at present, this is not a remote possibility if we recall that even the basic needs of a substantial part of the world’s population go unmet. Indeed, redistribution already has a high priority on the list of conditions for achieving sustainability.
After all, the pursuit of sustainability implies very limited or selective possibilities for economic growth. The usual political strategy in welfare states—of keeping the social peace by redistributive measures funded by a growing economy—will have to be abandoned almost completely. Moreover, environmental policy often has regressive effects. If we add to that the aid or compensation owed to poor countries, it becomes clear that there will be insufficient public support for the pursuit of sustainability in rich countries, which are themselves often confronted with increasing inequality: unless, the level of community among members in society is sufficiently high or the extent of their mutual identification is great enough;
unless, that is, their solidarity is strong enough.
The crucial importance of redistribution for the solution of the environmental issue, at least in capitalist countries, is recognised by socialist or ecosocialist thinkers (see, for example, the descriptions in Eckersley 1992; Dobson 1990;
Pepper 1993). But its significance was also pointed out very forcefully by the
‘survivalist’ Heilbroner (1974:101–6) who saw it as the crucial test for capitalism.3 The relationship between achieving redistribution (on the basis of a principle of equality or distributive justice) and ties of community has been emphasised by communitarian philosophers like Sandel, Walzer and Charles Taylor. Walzer, for example, does not conceive of society as an organisation for mutual benefit. He proposes the following three principles: every political community ought to meet the needs of its members as they collectively define these needs; there should be distribution according to these needs; and equality of membership for all members (1983:184). Citizens need to reach an agreement about the extent of communal provision, ‘the sphere of security and welfare’. This agreement is, in fact, a kind of social contract aimed at the redistribution of:
the resources of the members in accordance with some shared understanding of their needs, subject to ongoing political determination in detail. The contract is a moral bond. It connects the strong and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the poor, creating a union that transcends all differences of interests, drawing its strengths from history, culture, religion, language, and so on. Arguments about communal provision are, at the deepest level, interpretations of that union.
(Walzer 1983:82–3) A similar relationship is recognised by Sandel in his criticism of the way in which Rawls explains and justifies the Difference principle of Justice (Sandel 1982: ch.
2), and by Taylor (1985). Taylor points out the ‘legitimation crisis’ which liberal democracies are undergoing at present: the maintenance of the welfare state
requires increasingly large transfers by citizens of parts of their personal incomes.
But they are increasingly less prepared to do that because, as Kymlicka summarises Taylor on this point, ‘they share less and less with those for whom they are making sacrifices. There is no shared form of life underlying the demands of the neutral state’ (Kymlicka 1990:225).
I want to use this communitarian insight without endorsing the communitarian position in toto. That is to say, at this point I don’t need to accept the underived value of community as an independent principle of political theory. For my purposes it suffices to adopt David Miller’s (1989:57) minimalistic argument for a certain kind of communitarianism as an essential part of socialism. Miller’s point of departure is that freedom, in the sense of ‘equality of effective choice’ (1989:51) is central in a modern, viable socialism. He argues that freedom in this sense depends on the distribution of resources.
To equalize effective freedom, we need a system of distributive justice. But such a system can’t be legitimized unless people see themselves as tied together communally. Politics enters the picture to prevent communal ties becoming merely traditional, to honour socialist demands for rationality.
(Miller 1989:72) He adds to this argument the empirical proposition that the more egalitarian the desirable distribution, the stronger the ties of community should be (1989:59).
What scope does the community intended by Miller have?
He does not mean the more or less localised community, based on face-to-face relations and unified by a way of life or a conception of the good life, a community which determines the identity of its members to a large extent, such as Sandel’s constitutive community (1982:150). This type of community can be a marginal phenomenon only in modern industrial societies since these are predominantly market societies characterised by increasing individualism and commercialisation (Hirsch 1976), materialism and self-interest, and acquisitiveness (Dryzek 1987).
But, nor does Miller’s community embrace humanity in its entirety either.
Although we could conceive of communities based on mutual recognition of impersonal principles of justice or beneficence, Miller says that this would ignore the particularism of communities (1989:68). Miller’s position seems correct to me, but I would add that the importance and strength of mutual identification, on the basis of a shared moral sense of the kind articulated in impersonal moral principles, should not be underestimated, especially in societies with ideological pluralism and chronic conflicts of interest (see also Hirst 1989:55–6). We cannot afford the luxury of not invoking this minimal kind of identification, but it is also very doubtful whether identification of this minimal type is strong enough on its own to support cooperation and redistibution when strong conflicts of interest are rampant.
Lastly, Miller points out that communities are not available on demand. If their existence is required by some purpose, the only option is to build on the present