Michael Saward
Is there something about being a democrat that entails being an environmentalist?
To what extent can democratic theory be pushed to green conclusions? If we are to deal with these questions, we must first jettison the view that ‘there is no democratic theory—there are only democratic theories’ (Dahl 1956:1). I begin with the assumption that democracy is a three-dimensional and self-sufficient political concept. According to this assumption we can build up a single-best theory of democracy without recourse to liberals, socialists, anarchists and environmentalists. This theory shows us the inescapable core of what professed democrats ought to believe. If the theory works, we can explore with confidence the degree to which there is a logical compulsion on democrats to be environmentalists, and what kind of environmentalists they should be. In the early part of the chapter, I shall defend the view that democracy ought to be understood as a political system in which government responds fully to the felt wishes of citizens. The more responsive a government is, the more democratic it is. Although I regard this as the best way to define democracy, those who do not share my view can at least regard it as providing us with a strong test case of the links between democracy and environmentalism, since this definition leaves no room for governments to pursue substantive goals—such as environmental goals—unless a majority of citizens votes for them. From this unpromising base, I shall argue that there are democratic rights, and that there is a case for a democratic right not to be harmed in certain ways by certain environmental risks. The case for such a democratic right is not watertight. Various objections are canvassed and assessed in the final part of the chapter. No full closure of the subject is intended; the chapter is a conjecture on the power of arguments that democrats must be environmentalists.
The ingredients of democratic theory
No democratic theory can be adequate without minimally convincing arguments concerning: (1) the basic meaning of the term democracy; (2) why democracy so defined is more desirable than non-democratic systems; (3) the decision rules appropriate to democracy; (4) the logical requirements of democracy; (5) the political units appropriate to democratic systems; and (6) the basis (if any) upon
which trade-offs might properly be conducted between democracy and competing values. Space restrictions prevent a full treatment of these areas. However. as we shall see, the crucial points about environmentalism emerge within areas (4) and (6).
Why is democracy a good thing?
Of all the arguments that can be offered in favour of democracy, only one is near- decisive. Familiar types of justification that fall short of the mark include: ‘basic principles’ arguments, such as that democracy is good because it is consistent with the self-evident principle of equality; ‘intrinsic benefits’ arguments, such as that participation in politics is inherently worthy; and ‘beneficial outcomes’ arguments, such as that democracy produces greater liberty, or constrains conflict.
The first involves a style of argument that requires that a founding principle ought simply to be accepted at face value, without a supporting argument as to why it ought to be accepted (aside from the fact that it commonly is). The second asserts as always true what can only be established empirically from case to case.
The third rapidly becomes lost in a fog of infinite regress, where the burden of justification is simply displaced onto yet another allegedly good thing.1 For Sir Karl Popper, a myriad confirmations of a hypothesis could be rendered invalid by one, devastating, falsification. Analogously, these three types of argument amount to confirmations, whose status remains necessarily contingent and uncertain. A stronger justification can be derived from an effort to (so to speak) falsify anti- democratic arguments. Consider the basis of anti-democratic challenges. All principled arguments favouring perpetual government of the many by the few are arguments from superior knowledge (Thorson 1962: 135; Walzer 1983:285;
Shapiro 1994:140). These arguments might be disguised in various ways; by virtue of their age, sex, race, class, virtue, military strength or whatever, these few have superior political knowledge such that they should rule the many.
Is such knowledge attainable? Even if it is, can we know when it has been attained? Commonly we do recognise many claims to superior knowledge, often in fields of technical or professional expertise. Doctors, lawyers, teachers and nuclear physicists are, normally, recipients of respect for superior knowledge within their fields. But knowledge of what is right in politics goes beyond such limited fields (though, depending on the issue, it may overlap with one or more of them). Certain politicians or administrators—even political philosophers—
may have special insights into the effective and efficient running of government.
That special expertise is, however, procedural; the ethical substance of state policies and actions is not something about which they can claim rightly an analogous superior knowledge. Knowledge of political rightness may encompass technical expertise from case to case, but always goes beyond this to embrace knowledge of values, and ultimately of what makes a good life. That is knowledge that no person, or group, can rightly claim to possess perpetually and with a higher degree of
certainty than all others. In this way, justifications for non-democratic rule fall, and can be resurrected only by unsavoury doses of wilfully tailored ideology.
If generic anti-democratic arguments fail, we are left with democracy, where it is the view of rightness of the many, and not the few, that counts as the sole justifiable form of political system. Of the many further arguments that can be mustered in support of this view, two are especially significant. The first is the fallibilist argument. With its classic roots in the work of John Stuart Mill (1975) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1940), and more modern accounts in the works of Popper and his followers, fallibilism is the doctrine that ‘our knowledge is never absolute but swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy’
(Peirce 1940:356). In Thorson’s words, ‘the principle of fallibilism does not say that we can never know the truth, but rather that we are never justified in behaving as if we know it…we are never justified in refusing to consider the possibility that we might be wrong’ (1962:122). While on factual or procedural grounds we might dispute the fallibility of some absolute knowledge claims (those of the mathematician, perhaps) and other relative knowledge claims (those of the doctor, etc.), in the realm of values, or substance, or in the defining of the good life, any argument against fallibilism is surely both fatally flawed and politically pernicious.
The second argument is about interests. If the few can rightly be said to have a special insight into the substantive interests of the many, then the fallibilist argument is weakened and this style of justifying democracy weakened with it.
Consider, however, what such a strong claim to know the best interests of others really entails. While we might concede that a political authority could have legitimate contingently superior knowledge of what is in the interests of a citizen with regard to one discrete political issue, the interests of that citizen at a given time reflect responses to a range of issues. Those issues will affect each other, often in complex ways, making an external judgement of our citizen’s fuller interests tougher still. This is leaving aside different citizens—millions of them, perhaps—
each with different responses and needs with respect to different issues. It also leaves aside changes in citizens’ interests over time. The claim that a political authority can know the ‘best interests’ of citizens generally is a massive claim indeed, one that must be treated with great suspicion.2
The argument about interests pushes us towards an assumption that people must be regarded as the best judges of their own interests (when it comes to value judgements at least). This is not to argue that individuals are the best judges of their own interests (see Goodin 1990). Sometimes they will be, sometimes not. It is an argument for regarding people as the best judges of their own interests in the absence of a more secure ground upon which to make such judgements.
These arguments might be thought self-defeating. If claims to superior knowledge of political values are inevitably fallible, so far as we can know, and if a political authority’s chances of knowing the better interests of citizens in any full sense are next to nil, then no prescriptions about politics are possible at all. In fact, they amount to a powerful argument for democracy, precisely because they reveal the hollowness of anti-democratic arguments, whatever form the latter take.
Assuming that all political communities will need to make some binding collective decisions, the only reasonable path to choose is the democratic one, since the alternatives require unacceptable claims about knowledge of the community’s political good. Clearly, other assumptions are at work in this argument. To address the question of ideal political arrangements for a community is implicitly to argue that each person is worthy of respect and consideration. The real work, however, is performed by the argument that instrumental knowledge is not substantive ethical knowledge.
Is it enough that the justification of democracy appears to be a kind of leftover, a last resort when all else is untenable? To return to the Popperian analogy, a hundred empirical confirmations of democracy’s positive worth leave the extent, and comparative power, of its worth deeply uncertain. Further, they are all too easy, often conveying a smugness born of certainty that standard, self-evident, principles lead seamlessly to democracy (see, for example, Pennock 1989). As Barber (1984) has shown, sceptical justifications for democracy can take on a highly positive tone by stressing the liberating effects of overturning rarely questioned theoretical myths.
It will not have escaped notice that I have not yet defined democracy; an odd way to proceed, surely? The reason for placing the task of definition on hold lies in the fact that justification and definition are two parts of the one process. A proper definition will be one that is rooted in, and implied by, a convincing account of why perpetual rule of the many by the few has no secure basis. One does not
‘justify democracy’ as such; the point is to justify a certain definition of democracy.
The best definition of democracy that follows is: there should be necessary correspondence between acts of government and the equally weighted express wishes of citizens with respect to those acts. This is a modified version of the definition offered by May (1978), who also adopts the shorthand version of
‘responsive rule’. Concentration on express wishes arises from the fallibilist principle applied to the sphere of substantive political knowledge. Inclusion of
‘citizens’ reflects the assumption of a given, bounded political community.
‘Necessary correspondence’ reflects the fall-back acceptance of the best-judge principle. ‘Acts of government’ are all political and administrative actions or non- actions. The main element that appears to have been smuggled in is equality. Why should the wishes of citizens be weighted equally?
If, as I have argued, there is no secure ground upon which the wishes of the one or the few can rightly be imposed upon the rest in perpetuity, it follows that there should be equal consideration, and equal effective registration, of the wishes of all.
This is not to say, for example, that some people’s preferences are not more informed, or more refined, than others’. Rather, it follows from the principle of political fallibilism; given the ultimately unknowable status of the good life from one to another, and given the absence of a secure ground upon which to rank moral preferences, the only reasonable course is to adopt an assumption of equality. The equality assumption is based on probabilities; it best captures the median position with respect to individuals’ capacities to know the political path
to the good life. To those who object that, given political fallibility, one individual can proclaim personal superiority and suitedness for dictatorial rule with no effective comeback from would-be subjects, my reply is: there is no rightful basis upon which the proto-dictator’s claims can rest. This person would wrongly deprive others of the opportunity effectively to register equally valid preferences about political values, thus vastly reducing the number of valid perspectives reaching decision-making procedures.3
THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRACY
If this were as far as the story goes, then compatibility between green imperatives and democracy could be little more than contingent (Saward 1993c). If democratic rule is responsive rule, then (to put it bluntly) the majority should get what it wants. If it does not want (vote for) green outcomes, so be it. However, responsive rule does not mean unlimited rule, or ‘tyranny of the majority’. Harrison (1993:
230) puts one of the key points clearly: ‘If democracy is a good, then its proper exercise is a good. Hence those things necessary for its proper exercise can be secured against itself. So we may properly have democratic rights which may not properly be removed by the vote of the majority…. Such things should be entrenched as rights not subject to control by the majority’ (see also Sunstein 1988).
Harrison does not put the argument in its strongest legitimate form, however. The crucial point is that unless certain rights are recognised and guaranteed on an equal basis to citizens, democracy will be under threat. The rights that are to be guaranteed are those which follow deductively from the equality assumption and the responsive rule definition. In Dahl’s (1989) language, these are primary, integral or internal rights; they do not exhaust the total set of legitimate possible rights, but they do exhaust those rights which citizens must have by virtue of democratic citizenship. I shall refer to them simply as democratic rights.
Taking all that has been said up to this point, we can deduce that there are fundamental democratic rights in each of the following areas: basic freedoms, such as freedom of speech or association or worship; participation, such as the equal right to vote and to stand for office; administration, such as freedom of information and adequate appeals and redress mechanisms; publicity, such as the right to be notified adequately of particular policy procedures and outcomes; and social provision, notably rights to adequate education and adequate health care. These are features necessary to the ‘proper exercise’ of democracy, and on that basis they give rise to rights that ought to be secured constitutionally.
All of this adds up to a democratic vision of a strongly participative, open and responsive polity. This is not merely a vision of ideal democracy; this is how democracy ought to be understood, since these features flow directly from the most compelling available justification of democracy. Greens or political ecologists who place faith in decentralisation, participative and/or direct democracy (for example, Sale 1985; Bookchin 1982; Porritt 1984; Carter 1993)4 may feel that in an open, educative and responsive democratic system of the type I have outlined
people will be more conscious of environmental problems and more willing and active in seeking solutions to them. If, for instance, as Barry has argued (see Chapter 6), ‘sustainability’ is a discursive notion, the details of which must be worked out in discussion and debate, then such a system would presumably be welcomed (see also Lauber 1978:212ff).
The fact remains, however, that such a democracy may not promote green outcomes if we think in majoritarian terms. Greens do not, it seems, have a democratic leg to stand on. However, fortunately for greens the preceding analysis opens up an alternative line of argument no less friendly to the concept of democracy. In a proper democracy, majorities cannot rightly transgress rights that are intrinsic to democracy (Dahl 1989). Standardly, these rights are set out in constitutional documents and overseen by a constitutional court (or system of courts). Can at least some substantive environmental concerns be built into the very structure of democratic theory via a ‘green democratic right’?
HEALTH CARE RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
The case for including what are normally understood as social rights, such as those to an adequate education and health care, among the set of democratic rights, rests on the interdependence of civil, political and social provisions. The
‘interdependence’ argument suggests that so-called positive (social) and negative (civil and political) rights exist as different points on a continuum, rather than as rights that are fundamentally different in kind. In their comments on Marshall’s notion of the historical extension of rights from the civil to the political to the social, Kymlicka and Norman note that ‘While this process can be seen as adding new rights, it can be seen as extending the earlier rights. Just as political rights are now seen as a way of guaranteeing civil rights, so social rights can be seen as providing the conditions for effective exercise of both civil and political rights’
(1992:11).
If democracy has value, then so does each of the conditions necessary for its persistence. Some key concerns that must be considered within the topic of adequate health care have a direct impact on a citizen’s physical mobility. Citizens’
physical mobility can play a central role in their capacity to associate, communicate, and to refine and register preferences.5 At one level, this capacity may condition the degree to which citizens may forge informed preferences on policy matters; no part of the responsive rule conception of democracy requires that preferences be informed in order to count, but clearly that is a desirable state of affairs on any criterion.
The idea of a right to adequate health care on the interdependence argument seems straightforward enough. In fact, it contains many hidden assumptions and ambiguities. To explore the scope and character of some of the key aspects of the supposed health care right, especially those that may give rise to green democratic rights, we must make a number of careful distinctions. To begin, it seems more than reasonable to assume that health care is not only exhausted in curative care,
but also centrally involves preventive care. It is in the area of preventive care that we may find grounds for positing a green democratic right to an undegraded environment.
Preventive care concerns a range of risks which, if realised in practice, stand a high probability of causing significant harm to a citizen or a group of citizens. Of course, risk is an elusive and contested category. For the moment, we can provide some focus by saying that positing a risk suggests that there is a greater or lesser probability that some specifiable harm may come to a person or people as a direct consequence of a definite, identifiable process or event.
Clearly, incurring a risk does not necessarily mean that one gains a right not to suffer a harm which may follow from an actualisation of that risk. Much depends on the nature of the risk in question. What features associated with a given risk could trigger a right not to suffer the associated harms? We can identify three criteria, ‘conceptual hurdles’ so to speak, to help us to pinpoint the appropriate features. The three questions to ask are:
1 Does the risk have an exogenous, or environmental, origin (in the sense that it was not voluntarily assumed)?
2 Is the risk reasonably preventable?
3 If actualised, would the risk diminish significantly citizens’ physical mobility and/or become a factor of life-consuming concern?
Let us deal with each of these briefly. If a given risk does not have an exogenous, or environmental, cause, we cannot reasonably say that it could give rise to a green democratic right. Many classes of hereditary disease, for example, do not have such a cause. Leukaemia contracted as a result of a person’s proximity to nuclear facilities is, however, another matter. If a given risk is not reasonably preventable then clearly we could not reasonably expect that anyone should feel (or suffer) an obligation to prevent it. Ought implies can. A risk of harm stemming from naturally occurring radioactivity may be a case in point. Asthma or emphysema arising from urban traffic pollution would, on the other hand, appear to stem from a reasonably preventable risk.
The third conceptual hurdle concerns the nature of the harm associated with a risk. Recall that when we are considering democratic rights, the key concern within a possible health care right centres on a citizen’s physical mobility. Now, in a number of possible examples, to speak of ‘physical mobility’ severely understates the matter. Death from leukaemia induced by man-made radiation sources, or poisoning stemming from water pollution induced by industrial processes would be relatively extreme examples. Lesser harms may induce health problems the character of which comes to consume the time, resources and attention of the sufferer. In tandem with risks to physical mobility, life-consuming risks are included here because they can be expected to impair severely a sufferer’s capacity to sort through, refine and register preferences on a range of related and unrelated political questions.