PHILIPPINES 1
Context and background
In November 2013, category 5 Typhoon Haiyan, known locally as Yolanda, made landfall in the coastal areas of the eastern Visayas, Philippines. It was among the most powerful storms ever recorded, with rainfall up to 30 mm per hour, winds reaching upwards of 315 km/h and massive storm surges up to 5 to 6 metres high. The typhoon caused massive damage and casualties in nine of the poorest regions of the Philippines, 44 provinces and nearly 600 municipalities,2 affecting almost 15 million people, including 4 million who were displaced.
Typhoon Haiyan flattened villages, towns and cities, with the islands of Leyte and Samar among the worst affected.
Over one million houses, government administrative and social service facilities were totally or partially destroyed, creating massive amounts of debris.
Although this disaster was truly catastrophic, it was not an isolated case, as typhoons and other disasters occur often. Waste management following a disaster goes through different phases, starting with the removal and management of high volumes of debris and construction and demolition waste to improve access, then moving to the rapid reinstatement of both healthcare waste management and municipal solid waste management and finally planning for the long-term sustainability of the system. This case study intends to share the work of, and lessons from, the Waste Management Component (WMC) implemented by UNDP as part of a coordinated international relief programme. The WMC not only
1 Case study prepared by Ainhoa Carpintero from information provided by Aiden Short and inputs from Ana Fonseca, Tim Walsh, and Thorsten Kallnischkies 2 OCHA (2014). Philippines – Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. Environmental Assessment.
Final report and Recommendations. http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/
system/files/documents/files/EFA%20Philippines%20Environmental%20 Assessment%20June%202014.pdf
undertook the necessary steps for managing the waste but also engaged the affected communities, generated local employment, supported local recyclers and, as a result, boosted local economies.
Overview of the WMC’s post-Haiyan initiatives3 As part of the humanitarian response activated immediately after the disaster, the UNDP’s WMC responded to the debris and waste management needs emerging in the provinces of Eastern Samar, Samar, Leyte, Biliran, Cebu, Palawan, Aklan, Capiz and Iloilo.
It focused on recovery and the disposal of typhoon debris and other waste, and on laying the foundations for long-term sustainable waste management through the interim and emergency rehabilitation of critical waste management infrastructure and strengthening the capacity of Local Government Units (LGUs) in the area of waste management.
Activities undertaken
Approximately 4 or 5 months after the disaster occurred, the WMC’s activities transitioned from clearing debris in order to facilitate access for relief work to a broader range of waste management activities.
Debris clearing
The priority task in the first days, weeks and in this case, months, after the disaster was debris and residual debris clearing.4 Basic public service buildings, including schools, hospitals, markets and local government buildings were prioritized in an attempt to restore a modicum of normality to life. Main streets were cleared
3 UNDP (2013). UNDP results: Typhoon Haiyan early recovery. http://www.ph.undp.
org/content/dam/philippines/docs/Typhoon%20Haiyan/UNDP%20Results%20 Typhoon%20Haiyan%20Early%20Recovery/UNDP%20Results_Typhoon%20 Haiyan%20Early%20Recovery_6%20December%202013_final.pdf 4 The debris clearance activity was considered a lifesaving activity as it provided
access to other humanitarian actors, enabling them to perform their work. In particular it also gave access to search and recovery teams including a UNDP- sponsored specialized cadaver recovery dog and handler team from the USA.
Disaster waste management following Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines 109
first. Once those were open to traffic, efforts were broadened to include outlying areas and smaller roads and villages.
Two aspects of the debris clearing efforts are noteworthy.
First, the debris clearing adopted a cash-for-work system involving labour-intensive debris collection by victims of the typhoon. These workers received both an occupation to take their minds off the disaster and a basic wage to enable them to reduce reliance on food handouts and begin to purchase their own necessities in the local markets, injecting much needed money into the local economies.5
The second noteworthy aspect is that it made use of backhoes, loaders and other rented heavy machinery along with dumper trucks that facilitated the transport of debris from city streets to temporary and long-term dumpsites. UNDP prioritized the hiring of equipment from local businesses, themselves heavily impacted by the disaster, rather than exporting the revenue to larger businesses outside the disaster area. The local contractors also proved to be far more motivated to work hard despite long hours, as they were clearing their own city.
Those employed under the cash-for-work arrangements cleared the areas inaccessible to heavy machinery and collected the rubble and debris in temporary dumpsites set up close to the debris generation points or at accessible areas such as the sides of roads, where the debris would be picked up by small trucks and taken to temporary dumpsites, including two main ones within Tacloban City which acted as transfer stations for larger trucks. An effort was made to ensure the material could remain accessible to the affected population for the longest possible time, thereby enabling the temporary dumpsites to function as crude open-air waste transfer stations accessible to everyone. The workers were also encouraged to keep and use any materials they would consider of value. This encouraged and maximized resource recovery and recycling of the debris to lumber, shelter or products such as furniture.
The debris clearing activities finished by March 2014.
The quantity of debris cleared across the eastern coast of Leyte was estimated at between 600,000 and 1,000,000 m3, depending on the estimating technique used.
5 The workers were employed for 15 working days (usually in six-day weeks).
They were usually selected by barangay captains (a barangay is the smallest unit of local administration), who were encouraged to assemble a fair breakdown of men and women within the cash-for-work groups.
© Thorsten Kallnischkies
Temporary dumpsite, Tacloban Abucay
Healthcare waste management
Another key priority was the management of healthcare waste. Hospitals were overwhelmed in the immediate aftermath, as they themselves had been very badly hit and were expected to treat a huge spike in the number of patients. A major concern was getting the minimal public health infrastructure in place. UNDP, together with partners like Australian Aid and the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) set up an emergency healthcare waste collection programme under guidance from WHO. This programme ultimately covered 14 hospitals in the affected area, including emergency tent hospitals run by such organizations as Médecins Sans Frontières, and ensured regular collection and safe disposal. It was implemented in phases. In the first phase, four trucks were used exclusively for hospitals to clear their backlogs, thereby facilitating the resumption of regular and immediate services. As backlogs were cleared, and pre-Haiyan procedures such as segregation within the wards were reinstated, efficiency savings made it possible for only one truck to service all the hospitals. As the programme was handed over, each LGU took control of the hospitals within its jurisdiction, and from that time onward, they each made their own arrangements.
The methods used for healthcare waste disposal also followed a phased approached based on safe burial practices (because of the lack of landfill in the area and the fact that incineration is banned in the Philippines due to the Clean Air Act). At first, dedicated pits approximately 4 m square and 3 m deep were dug on the dumpsite.
These were covered after each load was received and then capped when full. Due to inefficient segregation and the large amount of material, this technique was unsustainable, with each pit lasting only 2 to 3 days. As a result, a separate section of the dumpsite was selected and cordoned off purely for hospital waste. Daily cover was also stockpiled there. This allowed for immediate cover after each load was received.
Municipal waste management
Municipalities needed urgent assistance with collecting and safely disposing of growing piles of municipal solid waste that residents were dumping in the streets or at temporary dumpsites. Initially, with many civil servants looking after their own families, and many waste collection trucks destroyed or inundated with seawater, there were few resources to deal with household waste and the few accessible roads began to fill with rotting garbage and the like. In the absence of its own resources, Tacloban City hall requested that UNDP temporarily coordinate all actors and agencies in both municipal solid waste and debris clearance. Initial activities in this regard led UNDP to work closely with other local government units to establish routine household waste pickup and to make use of heavy equipment to clear out the temporary disposal sites that had cropped up around the city.6 Slowly the establishment, restoration and operationali- zation of solid waste management facilities got under way at the LGU level.
6 See http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/
2013/11/27/waste-management-for-disease-prevention-a-pressing-need-in- tacloban/ for further information.
Municipal waste disposal
One of the biggest impacts of large-scale debris clearance was the impact it had on the operations and the capacity of the local landfill and dumpsites. As well as coordinating waste collection, UNDP was tasked by the Tacloban government with managing the huge number of trucks dumping both debris and municipal waste at the local landfill each day. From its pre-disaster operations volume of a few dozen trucks a day, the landfill was struggling to cope with over 250 loads a day at the peak of the cleanup efforts. UNDP began coordinating the traffic flows and opening new landfill areas. Later UNDP worked to build the capacity of the operators and improve the safety of the facility by upgrading from an open dump to a controlled dumpsite, significantly reducing impacts on the environment. Assistance7 was also provided to the Ormoc landfill and dumpsites in other districts in Samar and Leyte such as Palo, Tolosa, Basey and Guiuan.
7 This assistance included support with heavy equipment and training and guidance for LGU employees working directly with site disposal.
© Thorsten Kallnischkies
Healthcare waste cell
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© Ana Fonseca
Overview of the active cell without any management – before UNDP WMC intervention, Ormoc landfill
© Ana Fonseca
Active cell partially managed: waste compaction, daily cover and vents in place –during UNDP WMC intervention
Demolition of structurally unsafe buildings
After the initial debris removal phase, there were a large number of buildings that were still standing but heavily damaged, often to the point where they constituted a public health and safety hazard. In a region frequently struck by strong winds and earthquakes, many of these buildings were at risk of collapsing and injuring or killing people living in or near them.
UNDP WMC set up two demolition teams, one team of trained long-term cash-for-work employees for manual demolition, including substantial deconstruction, and another team of people operating backhoes. A register of buildings earmarked for demolition was created and then prioritized, after which time the activities were coordinated at the LGU and barangay level. The two teams razed several dozen buildings, both large and small. While the primary objective was hazard control and safety for residents, another objective was to make way for new investments. In several cases the landowners had a reconstruction budget but no demolition budget, thus effectively blocking any progress in reconstruction.
Guiuan Municipal Hall, Balangiga Hospital and Tanauan secondary school all faced this budgetary situation.
The demolition of Guiuan Municipal Hall is an especially good example of the value of demolition activities supported by UNDP. Although the Guiuan LGU had a budget of over 900,000 USD for reconstruction, its lack of funds for demolition effectively prevented the project from going forward. The total demolition costs came to less than 20,000 USD, including both the deconstruction of window frames, air-conditioning systems, wiring, lighting, wood etc. done prior to demolition by the cash- for-work employees, and later the demolition itself with a backhoe equipped with a concrete crusher. Once the building was demolished, the LGU was able to invest in construction, thereby boosting the local construction economy and creating employment.
Sewage sludge disposal
Similarly in the initial stages of the emergency and recovery it became apparent that there was nowhere safe to dispose of the sewage sludge that was rapidly accumulating in evacuation centres. In partnership with Oxfam, UNDP, initially with the assistance of equipment provided by the Philippines military, and later with its own heavy equipment, dug sewage sludge ponds at the dumpsite that were lined with an impermeable membrane prior to receiving the cities’ surplus sewage sludge.
Development of operational waste management structures
From April 2014, activities started focusing on improvements to or transformation of interim dumpsites, undertaking activities such as waste rearrangement and soil collection to serve as cover material (Tacloban, Palo and Guiuan); construction of infrastructure similar to engineered cells (Basey, Guiuan); management of an existing sanitary landfill (Ormoc); support of MSW collection to make it more efficient; and improvements to healthcare waste collection and disposal.
Resource recovery market
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, small and medium “junk shops” or “scrap shops” were severely affected. Because they could not operate, opportunities for business and opportunities to recover materials and reduce pressure on final disposal sites were lost.8 In April 2014 UNDP launched the waste reprocessors programme, a support programme to 26 junk shops across the affected areas to provide them with assets which may have been destroyed or which would allow them to adapt their procedures to the changing waste characteristics. The assets delivered ranged from vehicles to balers and proved to be highly useful for market regeneration.
One lesson learned from this activity is that the injection of cash at an earlier stage than the assets may have
8 It also prevented individuals from selling damaged possessions for much needed cash.
been more cost efficient, due to the liquidity and flexibility it would have provided to reprocessors. A proposal for dealing with future disaster waste situations includes providing junk shops with cash grants or loans if the shops can prove that the funds will be used to restart their business, taking a “cash-for-business” modality.
It is anticipated that with these cash injections, junk shops may be able to cope better and conduct material recovery more efficiently.
Capacity building of local government units
Sixteen municipalities in Leyte and Samar received training on the entire waste management chain, on promoting appropriate techniques and technologies applicable in the local context of each target LGU and on improving occupational safety and health. They also received training for heavy equipment operators. In order to identify each municipality’s training needs, the trainers first conducted a full-day assessment in each municipality. This process highlighted a need to move away from the LGU- (and even barangay-) centric focus on SWM solutions towards a more regional and inter-LGU coordinated approach. With this in mind, the training was organized geographically to promote regionalized solutions to both common and distinct challenges.
The assessments led to draft recommendations to the Government of the Philippines to update the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act RA9003.
UNDP WMC also trained unskilled Haiyan victims in a six-week programme conducted by the Republic of Korea Army and the Philippine Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), enabling them to qualify as heavy equipment operators. Forty-eight former workers in the UNDP cash-for-work programme were granted a stipend to receive training in operating backhoes, bulldozers, wheel loaders, forklifts and so on, and 48 Tacloban City Hall staff members were supported with travel costs to be able to participate in the same training. The programme was organized to certify formerly unqualified workers to operate heavy equipment and work in a qualified job. Moreover, the overall capacity of the LGU was improved in the area of heavy equipment operation in the event of a future disaster.
In addition to this training, an asbestos expert conducted capacity building and awareness campaigns for LGUs, the Regional Environmental Management Bureau, NGOs and UN entities in Samar and Leyte. Part of his activities included sampling destroyed and damaged building sites to verify the presence of asbestos, and to assist and train demolition teams managed by UNDP and NGOs in asbestos awareness and general occupational health and safety matters.
Enabling environment
The intervention on debris removal and waste management activities was possible due to the funding
made available as part of an early recovery plan funded by the Governments of Japan, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia and by the Central Emergency Response Fund and UNDP.9 The later part of the intervention was funded through a 3.5 million USD UNICEF project running from April 2014 to February 2015. The WMC was mobilized by the SURGE facility of UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR), now the Crisis Response Unit (UNDP-CRU). Additional staff were provided by MSB, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, with funding from SIDA, the Swedish International Development Agency.
The project was also possible due to the close liaison of the UNDP WMC team with its main counterpart, the Environment Management Bureau (EMB), the implementing agency of the Philippines’ Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). As decentralization is an important aspect of Philippine governance, the team also worked very closely with each LGU. The team also worked in close coordination with other UN agencies, especially UNICEF, WHO and ILO, as well as local and international NGOs.
Although the waste management programme was scheduled to finish in February 2015, at the time this case study was prepared, a follow-up project in two municipalities was planned for the following 18 months to design and construct two sanitary landfills (SLFs), one in Basey and one in Guiuan. The new project is funded by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA).
Lessons to carry forward to future disasters
Things that worked well
• The combination of activities undertaken by the UNDP WMC made it possible to clear the debris caused by the typhoon, re-establish and improve waste management services and build the capacity of LGU officials dealing with waste management.
• The cash-for-work programme proved to be a great tool for and beyond the debris clearing phase since:
– It was an effective way to boost the local economy through the injection of cash directly at the community levels, allowing local market regeneration.
– It developed ownership of the recovery process.
– It allowed quick engagement for fast debris clearing (one month following the storm, the main streets were open to traffic in affected municipalities). This facilitated the restoration of other priority services.
– It accelerated the clearing of areas inaccessible to heavy machinery.
9 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery /projects_initiatives/Typhoon-Yolanda-Philippines/