Deregowski reveals several instances of cultural variation in the use of depth cues. He ascribes the label ‘2D perceiver’ to some (usually less formally educated) groups, reserving the term ‘3D perceiver’ to other (usually more formally educated) groups. These differences invite the conclusion that the perception of depth in pictures, which Deregowski regards as an ability, is regulated by cultural and environmental factors.
Yet as the key study also shows, some group preferences for split-style drawings suggest that cultural diversity in picture perception is not sim- ply a matter of understanding (or not understanding) depth cues. There are other aesthetic conventions to take into account. To achieve deeper insights into how people in different times and places view pictures, perhaps future researchers need to take greater account of diverse artistic styles. They may benefit from seeing picture production and perception through the eyes of diverse cultural groups.
Limitations of Deregowski’s work
1 Familiar materials. Certain features of the design used in these studies are questionable, such as the way pictures were presented.
Serpell (1976) points out that in Study 1 (key study) only selected depth cues were used. Crucially, the cue of density gradient was omitted. In Serpell’s (1976) Zambian replications of this test, with added depth cues of density gradient and colour, there were increases in 3D perceiving participants (from 54% to 64%, and 54%
to 76% respectively). It seems that under optimal testing conditions, when more participant-friendly materials are used, 3D perception is more widespread. Indeed, Deregowski (1968) himself has tested depth perception by asking participants to construct and manipulate wooden, 3D objects – rather than using the often unfamiliar paper- based methods. In a series of experiments in Namibia (Deregowski
& Bentley, 1986), the use of depth cues increased when 3D objects for manipulation were part of the research design.
2 Are depth cues universally desirable? Implicit in Deregowski’s con- clusions is the view that using depth cues illustrates an advanced ability to perceive pictures. He even suggests that while children in all societies may be naturally drawn to alternative aesthetic styles such as split-style drawing, the majority ultimately ‘come around’ to using depth cues. In most societies, he suggests,
aesthetic preference is sacrificed on the altar of effi- ciency in communication.
(cited in Gross, 1994, p. 20)
Here the assumption is that split-style drawing is a retro- grade means of communication, even though those who use it have pointed out that split drawing reveals more features of an object than do other styles of representation.
(Serpell, 1976) There is little doubt that the perception of pictures in general (and of illusions in particular) is in part culturally constructed. It is demonstrably influenced by the learning of codes and conventions that owe some- thing to our ecologies. Yet the ‘misinterpretation’ of pictures by respondents from different cultures should by no means be overplayed.
Common sense tells us that most of the time, most people worldwide interpret realistic, photographic representations of 3D worlds in fairly similar ways. Differing interpretations are perhaps most likely when 2D representations (pictures) are complex, unusual (in the case of visual illusions), lacking in certain depth cues, or perhaps simply presented on unusual materials.
Culture and intelligence
What is intelligence?
Your ideas of intelligent behaviour may differ from those of your friends and family. Likewise, the various definitions of intelligence within psychology and across different cultural contexts (see key concept) reveal the contested nature of the term. Many psychologists have squabbled over the meaning of intelligence and some notorious trans- atlantic disagreements typify these disputes. British author Charles Spearman (1904) espoused the idea of general intelligence (‘g’ factor) underlying all human intelligent thoughts and actions. In the US Louis Thurstone (1938) modelled intelligence as comprising seven primary mental abilities (PMAs), including perceptual speed, spatial ability and numeracy. For Thurstone, competence in one PMA didn’t guarantee success in others. The idea of multiple intelligences, residing in sev- eral, uncorrelated factors (abilities where success in one does not pre- dict success in another), resurfaced in the work of Gardner (1983), who takes the idea a step further. He extends intelligence beyond purely cognitive competences to encompass interpersonal (knowing others) and intrapersonal (knowing oneself) capacities, all traceable to separ- ate neurological locations. Just as competence in any of these factors is not predictive of success in others, damage to part of the brain
controlling, say, musical ability (Sacks, 2007) need not impair linguistic competence.
Transatlantic differences between (British) single-factor models and (American) multi-factor models are the tip of the iceberg of global dis- putes about what intelligence is and how it should be measured.
Indeed, the field of psychometrics has yielded as many devices for measuring psychological abilities such as intelligence as there are def- initions of it. All of which echoes Boring’s (1923) famous remark that intelligence is what is measured by intelligence tests.
What is measured by intelligence tests?
Many assume intelligence tests to be neutral measures of intellect. Yet since the first tests were administered at the start of the twentieth cen- tury (Binet & Simon, 1905), certain cultural and social groups have repeatedly outperformed others. Average differences between group scores suggest that factors other than individual intellect are being recorded during testing. Chapter 2 showed us how differences in test scores have been interpreted as evidence for correlations between race and inherent intellectual capacities (see Figure 2.3). Yet these