did not show up in groups that had been assigned low status. They often displayed out-group bias, which actually offers support for social dominance theory. Cultural differences in the minimal group effect have also emerged in a series of replications in Australasia, suggesting that the maximum difference strategy (see key study) is not universally pre- ferred across cultures. Compared with a European condition which did adopt this strategy, Polynesian participants from Maori and Samoan communities were more likely to select the more egalitarian maximum joint rewards strategy (Wetherell, 1982).
Contact
Does presence make the heart grow fonder? Cross-cultural testing of Allport’s hypothesis suggests that it might. Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) reviewed 2030 studies from various cultural settings, in workplaces,
KEY STUDY
schools and experimental laboratories. There was general support for the contact effect, with the authors concluding that optimal inter-group contact should be a critical component of any successful effort to reduce prejudice (cited in Berry et al., 2002, p. 375).
Building on such data, several worldwide policy initiatives have sought to improve relations by reducing inter-group segregation, notably among Northern Ireland’s Catholic and Protestant com- munities. Yet despite such efforts in the domains of education, sport and residence, census data still suggest that most citizens of the province prefer to socialise with in-groupers (Niens et al., 2003). Also, it seems that where inter-group friendships do exist they often do not translate into changes in attitudes towards the out-group (Trew, 1986).
Niens et al. (2003) investigated the potential positive effects of increased (quality and quantity of) contact between Catholics and Protestants. Their questionnaire data showed opportunities for inter- group contact to be frequent, yet inter-group friendships were infrequent. Nevertheless, statistical analyses revealed patterns that supported contact as a force for good. Quantity and quality of contact were both inversely related to inter-group anxiety. Also, increases in all types of contact were moderately associated with positive attitudes towards out-group members.
Social dominance
A social dominance orientation (SDO) involves high-status groups adopting a so-called ‘just world’ justification (I am up here because I deserve it) for their elevated social position. Indeed, this theory sees powerful and relatively powerless groups as both likely to identify with the upper echelons, for example by attributing the failures of low-status groups to internal dispositions (Smith et al., 2006). Using locally devised measures of prejudice, Pratto et al. (2000) tested this hypoth- esis in Canada, Israel and Thailand. As predicted, high- and low-status groups did identify more with those in power. In the light of such find- ings, we might expect out-group identification by those in low-status groups to generate a desire to ‘move into’ those groups (Smith et al., 2006).
In another telling example of ‘just world’ identification with powerful groups, Levin et al. (2003) asked Lebanese participants whether they supported the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. As social dominance theory might predict, the most fervent supporters of the attacks were those with the least pronounced social dominance (just world) orientation. This indicates that the less you identify with the powerful groups (the US), the more sympathy you might have for those who attack their power.
Realistic conflict
In line with Sherif’s hypothesis, inter-group prejudice does seem to intensify where an out-group is seen as encroaching on one’s material resources or symbolic values. For example, a perceived sense of threat among European Union citizens who felt their resources and values were being eroded correlated with high levels of prejudice against ethnic out-groups (Jackson et al., 2001). A sense of threat also predicated a desire to clamp down on immigration, for example against Mexicans in the US (Stephan et al., 2000). We should note, though, that within European or American samples, differing cultural contexts affect levels of out-group threat felt. For example, in Jackson et al.’s survey, French participants were significantly keener to reduce immigration than the Irish were.
Historical representations
Not satisfied that existing social psychological theories adequately explain inter-group prejudice in diverse cultures, Liu et al. (2003) urge us to view each site of conflict in relation to its inhabitants’
unique cultural context and their particular representations of history.
Liu and colleagues stress the influence of wars and land disputes on how we construe our identities in relation to other groups. For example, twelve cultural groups surveyed all identified the Second World War as the most important event in their history (Liu et al., 2003). Furthermore, it is argued that where different groups share a polemical (disputed) interpretation of such historical conflicts (as for example in Northern Ireland), this is a recipe for inter-group conflict and prejudice.
Limitations of research on culture and prejudice
1 Beware the imposed etic when applying imported theories
When assessing the replicability of theories of prejudice, we should remember that some of their key concepts – and the instruments used to assess them – were originally developed outside the replication context. Arguably, this gives rise to the setting up of experimental scenarios that, because they have not been devised with local knowledge, appear alien and meaningless to participants.
For example, in the case of the minimal groups replications we might wonder whether Polynesian participants’ responses to this unfamiliar experimental scenario could produce entirely valid findings (Smith & Bond, 1998).
2 The theories may receive global support, they may not be mutually exclusive
While models are presented here as discrete explanations for the origins of inter-group prejudice, applying them across cultures alerts us to the possibility that they perhaps should not be regarded as mutually exclusive or entirely in opposition to one another, since elements within them often overlap. For example, ascribing prejudice to conflict over scarce resources (Sherif, 1966) is not incompatible with seeing it as conflicting representations of historical events (Liu et al., 2003).
Having reviewed the cultural applic- ability of social psychological theories of prejudice and found that, though cul- tural and historical contexts clearly influence the emergence of inter-group conflict, certain psychological elements of prejudice do appear across cultures, we will now ask whether friendship and intimacy take similar forms in different cultures.
Culture, love and intimate relationships
Is love culturally relative? Not a very romantic title for a song, perhaps, but an interesting question for global psychology nonetheless. The various marriage permutations worldwide (romantic, arranged, monogamous, polygamous) suggest that how we define, express and institutionalise love and intimacy is affected by culture. Researchers have explored issues of love and cultural variation in a number of ways, for instance by asking whether perceptions of attractiveness are the same the world over.
Are we all looking for the same thing?
Evolutionary psychology (a branch of psychology focusing on gen- etic and biological antecedents of behaviour) predicts our taste in intimate partners to be dominated by the reproductive instinct, not by the vicissitudes of culture. Thus, the pursuit of physically and repro- ductively fit partners would supposedly be a culturally universal practice (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1993). Males would seek females with most