REFLECTIVE EXERCISE 15

who are furnished with experience gained in the wider international research community.

Outsider contributions might include methodological expertise gained from working in different settings, as well as the ability to com- pare findings and variables with those gained elsewhere. Very often this kind of outsider knowledge is provided by so-called bicultural researchers: practitioners who are indigenous to the region, but who trained elsewhere before returning home to practise (Stevens & Gielen, 2007).

Indigenous and cross-cultural psychologists can form mutually beneficial partnerships that draw on the unique contributions of insiders and outsiders. Cross-cultural outsiders can offer a degree of objectivity that is encapsulated in their third-person accounts as they test their theories in ‘other cultures’. Insiders provide local knowledge and first-person accounts that afford the people they study a degree of meaningful involvement and human agency. They literally become active participants (not subjects) in research, with influence over what is to be studied. This combination of third-person objectivity and first- person insight arguably adds scientific rigour to the enterprise of global psychology (Stevens & Gielen, 2007): rigour that would probably elude cross-cultural psychologists and indigenous psychologists who work exclusively of one another.

Limitations of the indigenous psychology movement

1 Global inequality. Visions of a level global playing field on which psychological researchers in the developing world challenge the power imbalance between them and the west are destined to

be clouded by wider issues of economic inequality. Funding for worldwide research facilities and peer-reviewed journals is sparse in regions with weak economies (Adair, 1995). Consequently, researchers from these regions can find themselves working in unequal collaborations with western researchers who command greater influence over the project’s direction (Allwood, 2005).

2 Reverse ethnocentrism. Sometimes what may appear to be an indigenous psychological concept (meaningful only in the value system of a particular cultural group) turns out to be universal after all. For example, Cheung et al.’s (2003) interpersonal relatedness personality dimension, originally posited as being indigenous to China, later showed a degree of validity with US participants (Smith et al., 2006). Similarly, the characteristically Japanese concept of amae (Doi, 1973), which relates to social situations where someone agrees to perform a rather demanding favour for a close friend, has also been observed in US and Taiwanese samples (Yamaguchi, 2004). Arguably, ‘pigeonholing’ (seemingly) indigenous concepts in global psychology may lead to a kind of reverse ethnocentrism (Stevens & Gielen, 2007), where such concepts are wrongly seen as being exclusive to particular regions.

3 The danger of fragmentation. While indigenous psychologies are invaluable in the struggle against a one-dimensional, western- dominated psychology, a proliferation of uniquely formulated psychologies with separate, local concerns is also undesirable (Poortinga, 1989). A fragmented universe of indigenous traditions would transform global psychology into a multiplicity of incoherent searches for diversity and difference. Arguably then, the contributions of indigenous traditions should be used to complement the work of those who concentrate on a more objective search for cultural universals.

So, is psychology ethnocentric?

There is no short, snappy answer. We can, though, propose some informed conclusions in the light of what has emerged from these pages. Broadly speaking, in terms of the global disproportion of psychology’s publishing and personnel, we do seem to have an ethnocentric science on our hands. If we consider ‘etically’ oriented research as representing the mainstream of cross-cultural psychology, a similar conclusion emerges. Yet if we toss emic research orientations and indigenous traditions into the mix, psychology doesn’t seem too ethnocentric after all.

Figure 4.4 summarises the evidence from this chapter to help you arrive at a balanced judgement about the level of culture bias in psychology. Ultimately, if you really want to know the answer to the question, scan the evidence and decide for yourself.

Figure 4.4 Is psychology ethnocentric? Yes and no

Summary

Chapter 4 tackles ethnocentrism – also known as ‘culture bias’ – in psychology. Claims that the science of human behaviour has long been restricted by a bias towards theories, research methods and publishing interests that are centred in Europe and North America are reviewed and debated. The proliferation of psychology publishing in selected global locations is examined. Global distribution of psychological practitioners is also examined. Are there really more psychiatrists in Argentina than anywhere else?

Perhaps more importantly, degrees of ethnocentrism in psychological research traditions also come in for scrutiny.

Distinctions between ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ research are identified and explored; the latter is widely seen as an attempt to challenge alleged ethnocentric tendencies of the ‘imposed etic’, sometimes seen as characteristic of mainstream cross- cultural psychology.

We explore the seldom publicised (in mainstream Euro- pean texts at least) development of indigenous psychology.

Research traditions from Asia, Australasia and the Americas are reviewed as an alternative to the dominance of Euro- American global psychology. Having sifted the evidence, there is an attempt to arrive at an answer to our starting question – is psychology ethnocentric?

Summary

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