One of the great spectacles of American politics is the presidential election process. Every four years people who pay only minimal attention to politics find themselves glued in front of a television watching states on electoral maps turn blue or red. It is the political equivalent of the Super Bowl. Yet, as shown in the next two chapters, the presidential election process is unique to say the least. In the next chapter, I discuss the Electoral College and its problems.
However, the Electoral College may not be the strangest aspect of presidential elections. The process to choose the major parties’ nominees is severely flawed, leading to an unnecessarily long and complicated election season. “Hardly anyone is a fan of the current presidential nominating process,” writes noted scholar and journalist Rhodes Cook. “The feedback one hears is sometimes colorful, nearly always critical, and ranges from a sense of exasperation to hopelessness that the process can ever be changed for the better.”1
The presidential nomination process is vastly different than the nomination process for other offices. If a candidate is running in a gubernatorial or con- gressional primary, all voters in the state or district go to the polls on the same day; at the end of the day the party’s nominee will be apparent.2 In the presi- dential nomination process, on the other hand, it can take weeks before the party’s candidate is known.3 Unlike in other primaries, voters in presidential primaries or caucuses—a gathering of party members who debate the pros and cons of each candidate and then vote in the open—do not directly vote for a candidate. Instead, they vote for delegates, usually local political activists, who pledge to that candidate. The elected delegates then convene at the party’s national convention in the summer to formally nominate the party’s candi- date.4 A candidate must receive a majority of the delegates to win the nomination.
In this chapter, I argue that major reforms are needed in presidential primar- ies, specifically all party primaries should be open, delegates should be allo- cated proportionally, and, most importantly, a national primary should be instituted that would significantly shorten the nomination season. First, a brief history of the presidential nomination process is needed to better understand how we have ended up with the system in place today.
King Caucus and the smoke-filled rooms
The presidential nomination process of today is quite different than the process at the time of the country’s founding. Initially, nominating party candidates was not a concern because there were no parties. It was clear that George Washington would be the first president; in fact, the founders conceived the position specifically for him. However, almost immediately the country split into two parties: the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, and the Democratic–Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. All of a sudden, how parties should nominate candidates became an issue.
Initially, the nomination process was undemocratic—rank-and-file members of the party had no say over who the party’s candidate would be. Instead, congressional leaders chose party nominees; this period is sometimes referred to as “King Caucus.” As the Federalists collapsed in the early 1800s and the Democratic–Republicans became the party of power in the country, people began to feel that the nomination of presidential candidates by political parties was too elitist. Rhodes Cook writes, “To its critics, the caucus was too small in number, too elitist in character, and often too secretive in its deliberations.”5
With the increasing democratic sentiment in the country and the contro- versy surrounding the election of 1824 where Andrew Jackson won both a plurality of the popular and electoral vote but ultimately lost to John Quincy Adams, King Caucus gave way to the infamous “smoke-filled room” nominat- ing conventions in which delegates from each state, chosen generally by state party leaders, determined the party’s nominee. The convention process was slightly more democratic than under King Caucus, but critics argued that the conventions were dominated increasingly by party bosses and special interests who cut deals out of the eyes of the general public, or the convention as a whole for that matter.
Not surprisingly, around the turn of the twentieth century the progressives started calling for a more open, democratic nomination process. The proposal advocated by the progressives was the direct primary. In primaries, rank-and- file members of the party, not party elites, choose delegates to go to the national convention. By 1916, 20 states, many of them heavily populated, had instituted a primary, but the decline of the progressive movement and the concern by party officials that the nomination process was being taken out of their hands quickly brought to an end this brief period of democratization in the nomination process. Although many states continued to hold primaries, they became a sideshow as the real nomination decisions were once again made by the party elites. Estes Kefauver won virtually every Democratic primary in 1952, only to lose the party’s nomination to Adlai Stevenson. In fact, running in primaries was considered a sign of weakness for presidential aspirants.
As the 1960s began, hope for meaningful primaries was on the horizon.
John F. Kennedy took his case directly to the people in states such as Wisconsin
and West Virginia and persuaded many voters that he would not be beholden to the views of the Pope. Without convincing performances in these states, Kennedy might not have won the Democratic nomination in 1960. The rise of television also added intrigue to the primaries as the major networks started covering election night results. It appeared that primaries would play a signifi- cant role in the 1968 Democratic nomination as well. Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy actively campaigned against the Vietnam War in the primaries, and President Lyndon Johnson’s poor showing in the New Hampshire primary against McCarthy was one reason Johnson decided not to run for reelection.6 However, the rising importance of the primaries quickly came crashing down that year at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. With television coverage of Vietnam protesters being beaten by police outside the convention hall, inside the hall the party nominated Vice- President Hubert Humphrey, a defender of US involvement in Vietnam, over McCarthy. Humphrey had not participated in a single primary.
The controversy over the 1968 Democratic nomination sparked the nom- ination process we have today. The problems at the 1968 convention led the Democrats to institute the McGovern–Fraser reforms, which, among other things, passed rules giving “teeth” to the primaries in the delegate selection process and pushed for delegates to reflect the demographics of the party’s rank-and-file in a state. The McGovern–Fraser Reforms did not simply affect the Democratic Party; the Republican Party followed suit regarding the pro- liferation of the importance of primaries in the nomination process. Today, it is virtually impossible for a candidate to earn a party’s nomination without the support of rank-and-file members.
Reforms to the presidential primary process
The rise in the number of primaries has made the nomination process far more democratic than was the case under the old systems. However, the increased significance of primaries raises several questions. In the remainder of this chapter I focus on three:
1 Who should be able to participate in a party’s primary?
2 How should delegates be allocated?
3 What should the primary schedule look like?
Who should be able to participate in a party’s primary?
Perhaps the first question that one must address when considering the ideal presidential nomination process is who should be able to participate in that process? Should voting be open only to party members? Should independents be able to vote? What about members of one party voting in the primary of another?
The rules of who can participate in a party primary vary by state. For example, some states hold closed primaries where only registered members of the party are allowed to vote. Others have semiclosed primaries that are open to members of the party and those who are not registered with another party.
Finally, some states have open primaries in which any registered voter can participate in a party’s primary. One variation of the open primary is the semi- open primary in which voters must declare their partisanship at the time they vote. Not surprisingly, parties prefer closed primaries to keep independents and members of other parties from influencing who their nominee will be. In 2000, for instance, John McCain won the Republican primaries in New Hampshire and Michigan, both of which had open primaries. In each case, the majority of McCain’s support came from independents and Democrats;
Republicans in both states overwhelmingly supported George W. Bush.
The decision regarding who should be able to participate in a primary is more complex than it may seem. From a democratic standpoint, open pri- maries are best because people have the greatest opportunity to participate and turnout is higher than in closed primaries.7 If a person is registered as a Democrat but really likes a Republican, or, conversely, if that person is regis- tered as a Republican and is enamored with a Democrat, should she have the opportunity to help that candidate make it into the general election?
Political parties would generally say “no.” Open primaries may make it easier to nominate a person who is unacceptable to the rank-and-file party members, even though this candidate may be more electable in a general election. More- over, the possibility of one party’s members sabotaging another’s primary is a concern for some. For example, if a Democratic candidate for Congress is running unopposed in the Democratic primary, but a competitive race exists on the Republican side, under open rules Democrats may skip their primary to vote for the candidate in the Republican primary who would be least electable in the general election.
As with the other issues I discuss in this chapter, there is a definite conflict between the states, which generally want open primaries because they are perceived as more democratic, and the parties, who generally want closed primaries for the reasons listed above. The courts have usually ruled on the side of the parties. Most notably, in Nader v. Shaffer (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of closed primaries.8 Two residents of Con- necticut challenged the state’s closed primary law as a denial of equal protec- tion, freedom of association, and the right to vote.9 The Court ruled that “the requirements were not sufficiently onerous to preclude [the plaintiffs] from registering as members of a major party and thereby being allowed to partici- pate in the party’s primary. The plaintiffs could, the Court said, register with a party but still make campaign donations or sign petitions for candidates outside the party for which they were registered.”10 What is most important here is that the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that their freedom of association was violated, instead ruling that it was the political party’s freedom
of association that mattered. The ruling was in the best interest of the party, not the citizen.
The Supreme Court also sided with political parties regarding the consti- tutionality of a different type of open primary, called the blanket primary, in which all candidates’ names for an office are listed on one ballot. In 1996, voters in California passed Proposition 198, which instituted the blanket pri- mary in the state. Alaska and Washington were already using similar versions of the blanket primary. Several Californian political parties, including both the state Democratic and Republican parties, challenged Proposition 198 on the grounds that it violated a party’s right to freedom of association, or, actually in this case, the freedom not to associate. The state contended that, among other things, a blanket primary would elect officials who are more representative of the general public and increase voter turnout. In California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000), the Court ruled on the side of the political parties arguing that the parties’ freedom of association trumped the benefits of the blanket primary argued by the state.11 As a result of the ruling, California went back to a closed primary. In Alaska, the state legislature voted in 2001 to abandon the blanket primary, while in Washington the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the precedent set in the Jones case to declare the state’s blanket primary to be unconstitutional.12
It is understandable why parties believe so strongly in freedom of associ- ation, but their concerns about the open primary are misguided. It seems highly unlikely that supporters of one political party would raid another party’s primary by supporting an unelectable candidate. Indeed, I can think of no case when this has occurred. If anything, a party benefits from open primaries because they may nominate a candidate that is more electable in the general election. In fact, the electability of Dwight Eisenhower was one reason why Republicans nominated him in 1952 over Robert Taft, even though Taft may have been the “truer” Republican. The goal of political parties is to win elec- tions. They cannot do this with ideological candidates who appeal only to partisans.
How should the delegates be allocated?
Who gets to participate in the nomination process is one debate; how the delegates should be allocated is another. Whether delegates should determine the nominee in the first place is questionable, as I will discuss shortly, but if delegates are going to do so, and there is no evidence that this will change anytime soon, then delegates must be allocated fairly.
The Democratic Party mandates that a state’s delegates be allocated pro- portionally, either by the state as a whole or by congressional district. Under a statewide proportional plan, if Candidate A receives 50 percent of the vote, Candidate B 30 percent of the vote, and Candidate C 20 percent of the vote, and there are 10 delegates at stake, then Candidate A would win five delegates
while Candidates B and C would win three and two delegates, respectively.
The same rationale applies under a district proportional system, sometimes called a “winner-take-more” system, except that the winner of the congres- sional district also receives a bonus delegate. However, a candidate must receive at least 15 percent of the vote, either in the state or the district, depend- ing on the rules, to win delegates.13 If a candidate earned only 10 percent of the votes, her votes would be discarded and the delegates would be allocated based on the remaining votes. To use another hypothetical example, pretend that of 100 people voting in a primary, 60 voted for Candidate A, 30 for Candidate B, and 10 for Candidate C, and there were nine delegates at stake.
Candidate C’s votes would not be counted because she did not reach the 15 percent threshold. This leaves 90 votes, of which Candidate A received two- thirds and Candidate B received one-third. Candidate A would then win six delegates and Candidate B three.
The Republican Party does not mandate national guidelines for their state parties, which leads to many different primary and caucus rules. Most notably, some Republican primaries and caucuses are winner-take-all by state; in other words, if a candidate wins by just one vote, she wins all of the state’s delegates.
Other state Republican primaries and caucuses use a winner-take-all by con- gressional district format, called a “loophole” primary, with bonus delegates going to the statewide winner. And, like the Democrats, some allocate their delegates proportionally, either by state or district.
The argument in favor of a winner-take-all system is that, theoretically, a nominee should emerge earlier in the primary process, something that parties prefer because they can begin the healing process of a potentially divisive pri- mary season and focus on the general election. Under proportional allocation, a candidate that wins 30 percent of the vote consistently could remain in the race longer because an upset win could put her within “striking distance” of the frontrunner. Under the winner-take-all scenario, this candidate would likely have received no delegates, making it likely that she would drop out of the race. Writing before the election of Bill Clinton, Emmett H. Buell, Jr. and Lee Sigelman argued that proportional representation prolongs divisive races
“well beyond the point of achieving meaningful unity at the nominating con- vention and may have contributed to Democratic losses in every election except two since 1968.”14
However, there is minimal evidence at best that nominees emerge earlier in winner-take-all systems. For example, the 2000 Democratic and Republican nominations were determined on the same day (March 9th) even though the parties operated under different rules. Moreover, the winner-take-all format could breathe life into a campaign if the candidate is able to pull an upset, as happened in the 1976 Republican nomination race between Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan. Reagan was able to obtain victories in California, Georgia, Montana, and Texas, several of which had a large number of delegates. His victories in these states prolonged the nomination season. Meanwhile, on the
Democratic side, Jimmy Carter’s status as the frontrunner was not threatened after losing primaries in Massachusetts and New York to Henry “Scoop”
Jackson. Because of proportional allocation, Carter still won a substantial number of delegates, which kept him as the Democratic candidate to beat.
Overall, according to political scientist Larry Bartels, Carter was essentially guaranteed the nomination after the California primary 20 weeks into the nomination season. Ford, on the other hand, still had not obtained the nom- ination at the same point. In other words, under a proportional system Carter secured the nomination more quickly than Ford did under mostly winner- take-all rules.15 Furthermore, in the past when Democratic candidates have remained in the race well into June (for example, Jesse Jackson in 1988 or Jerry Brown in 1992), it was not the proportional allocation of delegates that kept them in the race, but a belief that they had a message that needed to be heard. Whether delegates were allocated proportionally or by winner-take-all, these candidates would have continued their campaigns.
Allocating delegates proportionally—either by district or by state—more accurately reflects the wishes of voters and, as a result, should be adopted by the parties in all primaries and caucuses.16 As I discuss in the chapter on the Electoral College, winner-take-all systems exaggerate the mandate of the win- ner. For example, “in 1998, George H.W. Bush won 59 percent of the popular vote in states holding some type of winner-take-all voting on Super Tuesday but won 97 percent of the delegates.”17 As long as a threshold exists, the delegate allocation will never be perfectly proportional to the vote total because votes for the candidates who fail to meet the threshold will not be counted; but it is far more so than under a winner-take-all system. Further- more, parties actually benefit from allocating delegates proportionally because they nominate candidates who will likely have broader support in the general election under these rules.18
What should the primary schedule look like?
Even if proportional allocation of delegates keeps a frontrunner from emer- ging, a simple, smart reform would alleviate this problem. The current sched- ule of presidential primaries and caucuses needs to be scrapped; instead, we should nominate a party’s presidential candidate as we do for almost all other offices in almost all other elections, on a single day.19 In other words, we should move to a national primary.
Perhaps the strangest aspect of the presidential nomination process is the schedule in which the primaries and caucuses take place. Instead of deciding the nomination in one day, the current system spreads the nomination process over several weeks. Each state determines when their presidential primary or caucus will be. Some states combine the presidential primary with primaries for other offices; other states do not. As I discuss in greater detail momentarily, there is a mad rush for states to move their primaries or caucuses earlier in the