Here is a startling fact. In the 2000 presidential election, roughly 2 million people showed up on election day, but did not have a vote counted in the election.1 Some of these people purposely did not vote in the presidential election, but a substantial number—an estimated 1.5 million people—believed that they had voted when in fact they had not.2 Why were their votes not counted? Some may not have followed directions, but many people’s votes were not counted because of problems with the voting machines they used to cast their ballots.
Before 2000, only a handful of political scientists and practitioners paid attention to the pros and cons of various voting machine systems. As Stephen Ansolabehere and Charles Stewart III, two political scientists who had studied this issue, write, “The methods used to cast and count ballots is surely one of the most mundane aspects of elections.”3 Few people would have considered the types of voting machines jurisdictions used to be an integral aspect of debates over fairness of elections and the quality of electoral democracy. The 2000 presidential election, particularly in Florida, proved otherwise. The country was captivated as election officials in several Florida counties counted and recounted people’s ballots. Yet because of problems with the punch card ballots used in the counties, it was unclear on many ballots what the intentions of the voters actually were. In an election that was ultimately decided by 537 votes, it quickly became apparent that voting machines mattered. In the after- math of that election emerged a new wave of studies examining the reliability of different systems, most notably the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Pro- ject’s Voting: What Is, What Could Be and the General Accounting Office’s Statistical Analysis of Factors That Affected Uncounted Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election.4
In this chapter, I analyze the results of some of those studies. They clearly show that some voting machines work better than others, although some of the findings are contradictory. Based on the results of these studies, I argue that it is best if states move to newer technological systems and eliminate one kind of voting system in particular, the punch card ballot discussed in the preceding paragraph. While optical scan machines seem to be the best option
today, electronic voting, which has received much positive and negative press since the 2000 election, is also an enticing possibility. Most importantly, decisions about voting machines, whichever type is employed, should be made by states, not localities, to eliminate equal protection concerns raised by pre- cincts using different voting machines. Finally, states should require regular audits of elections to discover attacks or failures in the voting machines.
Different types of voting machines
Before getting into the strengths and weaknesses of various voting machines, it is essential to define a few terms that are needed to understand how well the systems perform. One also needs to be aware of the different types of voting systems that exist. In general, localities use one of five voting systems or a combination of them.
1 Paper ballot—This is the simplest, oldest, and least frequent voting sys- tem. Candidates’ names are simply listed on a piece of paper and voters then make their marks on the ballots. Paper ballots are counted manually.
By 2000, only 1.3 percent of people voted using a paper ballot.5
2 Mechanical lever machine—Around since the late 1800s, voters walk into a large steel booth, make their choices, and then pull a lever to cast their votes. The machine then tabulates the votes. Once by far the most dominant mode of voting, the number of counties using lever machines has dropped significantly over the last 25 years.6 In fact, lever machines have not been manufactured since 1982.7
3 Punch cards—With punch cards, voters remove a small circle, known as a
“chad,” when voting. Voters use a stylus that, in theory, should cleanly remove the chad. There are slightly different versions of punch card bal- lots, including Votomatic, Pollstar, and Datavote. Votomatic punch card ballots, for example, do not have the names of the candidates listed on the ballot, while Datavote punch card ballots do. Once the chads are removed, the ballot is then placed into a computer that reads the votes. In the 2000 presidential election, the largest percentage of the voting popu- lation used some form of a punch card.8 Because of the controversy in Florida, fewer jurisdictions use this system today.
4 Optical scan—Students who have taken a multiple-choice test are familiar with optical scan technology. With optical scan ballots, voters fill in an oval with machine-readable ink (or they must connect lines). Votes are then tabulated in optical scanning machines either at the precinct or in a central location. In the 2000 presidential election, over 40 percent of all counties used optical scan, more than twice the percentage of the next most frequently used system (punch cards).9
5 Electronic voting machines—With direct recording electronic (DRE) machines, people cast their ballots in a similar manner as they would if
they were taking money out of an ATM. They may press a button to vote for a candidate, or some machines allow the person to simply touch the candidate’s name on the screen. Votes are tabulated electronically, although some systems create what is essentially a receipt to keep a paper trail of votes in case a recount is needed or there is concern about fraud.
The number of counties using DRE machines has grown substantially over the past 25 years.10
6 Mixed voting systems—Some jurisdictions use a combination of the five voting systems just mentioned.
When evaluating voting machines, a person should know the residual vote rate, which is simply the percentage of all ballots cast in a geographical unit that did not record a vote for a certain elected office or initiative.11 For example, if 10 people showed up to vote, but only eight cast votes that were tallied, the residual vote rate would be 20 percent. A vote may not be recorded because of “overvotes,” when people cast more votes for an office than they should have—for instance, they voted for both John Kerry and Ralph Nader for president—or “undervotes,” when there is no vote apparent on an indi- vidual’s ballot. Although overvotes almost always indicate voter error, the same cannot be said for undervotes. Certainly some undervotes occur because the machine did not tabulate the vote correctly, like if the chad was not com- pletely removed from the ballot or because voters did not follow directions, but often people skip an elected office or initiative either because they do not know enough about the candidate or initiative, or because they do not care enough about either.12 This latter type of undervote does not indicate a prob- lem with the voting machine. Perhaps the best way to measure the residual vote rate is to examine presidential elections because, although certainly some people purposely do not vote in presidential elections, voter roll-off is usually lowest in these elections, providing a better indication of the number of votes that were not counted either because of human or machine error.
The problem with punch card ballots
As I will show over the next few pages, there is great debate and often con- flicting results over what is the most reliable voting machine. However, one result is remarkably clear: punch card ballots are consistently the least reliable of the five different kinds of voting technology when it comes to residual votes.
Punch card ballots became notorious after the 2000 presidential election because of the problems with recounts in several Florida counties. Terms like
“hanging,” “pregnant,” or “dimpled” chads became common jargon. The problems with punch card ballots should not have been surprising since several academic studies of voting machines find them to regularly have the highest percentage of residual votes. Analyzing residual vote rates as a percent of all ballots cast from 1988 to 2000, the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project
found that the residual vote rate for punch cards in presidential elections was 2.5 percent, compared to 2.3 percent for DRE, 1.8 percent for paper ballot, and 1.5 percent for optical scan and lever machines, respectively.13 The Caltech/MIT study is just one of several studies that discovered that punch cards are least reliable.14 Ansolabehere and Stewart estimate that had all the jurisdictions who voted with punch cards in 2000 used optical scanners instead, roughly 500,000 additional presidential votes would have been recorded.15
Another concern with punch card ballots is that while, contrary to con- ventional wisdom, there is little evidence that they are used predominantly in poorer counties,16 some people are more likely to commit errors using punch card ballots than others. In their examination of voting in the 2000 elections in Los Angeles County where all voters used punch card ballots, D.E. “Betsy”
Sinclair and R. Michael Alvarez find that minorities and women are more likely to cast under or over votes than whites and males.17 Studying elections in South Carolina and Louisiana in 2000, Michael Tomz and Robert Van Houweling come to a similar conclusion.18
Because of worries about the accuracy of punch cards after the 2000 elec- tion, Florida, as well as several other states and localities, moved to other voting systems. In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), a central component of which was subsidizing the replacement of punch card systems and lever machines in favor of more modern equipment. In his study of residual rates in the 2004 election, Stewart finds that the replacement of such equipment led to fewer voter errors. Overall, the residual rate fell from 1.9 percent in 2000 to 1.06 percent in 2004, the equivalent of about 1 million votes. Much of the decline in the residual rate is attributed to localities chan- ging from punch cards to either DRE or optical scan technology.19
The pros and cons of the remaining contenders
It is clear that punch card ballots are the most prone to voter error, and this fact has resulted in a significant decline in the number of jurisdictions using them. Another older technology, the lever machine, actually does relatively well regarding residual vote rates. Although performing poorly in races for governor or senator between 1988 and 2000, lever machines, along with the optical scan technology, had the lowest residual rate in races for president.20 Another study uncovers evidence that lever machines had the smallest percent- age of voided ballots during the 1996 presidential election.21 Furthermore, Tomz and Van Houweling find that lever machines lessen the racial gap in voided ballots that is common with punch card ballots.22 Even so, while they perform reasonably well on one measure of success for voting machines—
residual rate—they do not perform as well on another measure—getting people through the polls quickly. Moreover, it is impossible to determine if votes are recorded correctly and election officials cannot perform audits. As a result, lever machines are no longer produced making them an unviable option
as well. This leaves three possible alternatives: paper ballots, optical scan, and DRE. Here are some of the strengths and weaknesses of all three.
Paper ballots
Paper ballots are by far the least technologically advanced of any of the voting systems. Indeed, there is no technology involved at all. People simply make their marks on a ballot, which are then hand-counted by an election official. It is a system that has been in use longer than any other voting system. Perhaps it is most surprising, then, that, according to the Caltech/MIT study, paper ballots had the lowest percentage of residual votes in races for governor and senator from 1988 to 2000 and performed quite competitively with other types of equipment in presidential elections.23 Still, even with the success of paper ballots when it comes to residual votes, a very small percentage of counties use them.
Since paper ballots must be counted by hand, they put a large burden on local election officials. For some people, a goal of voting technology is to determine a winner quickly. Paper ballots perform less well on this criterion than do either the optical scan or electronic voting machines. More import- antly, ballot security is a worry. During the height of the party machines, stories about “stuffing the ballot box” were common. Additionally, paper ballots could be stolen or misplaced. There have been anecdotes of election officials accidentally bringing ballots home with them. In a country that is obsessed with technology, paper ballots are on their way to extinction.
Optical scan
Another voting equipment that has fared well when it comes to residual votes is the optical scan ballots, first introduced in the 1970s. According to the Caltech/MIT report, optical scan ballots had the lowest residual rates along with lever machines in presidential elections (1.5 percent) and trailed only paper ballots in races for governor and the Senate.24 A later study by Ansolabe- here and Stewart finds optical scanned ballots to have the lowest average residual rates in elections for president, governor, and Senate when counties are weighted by turnout.25 These results are especially positive given the fact that a plurality of counties uses optical scan equipment.
However, optical scan equipment is not perfect. Machines may still have difficulty reading a ballot if, say, an oval is not perfectly filled in (a reason that students should always check their scantron sheets with the correct answers on a test!). Tomz and Van Houweling find that optical scan equipment widens the racial gap in voided ballots.26 As with the paper ballots, election administration can be difficult because of the number of ballots that must be secured. Finally, optical scan machines are not immune from fraud. One recent study of Florida’s optical scan voting machines finds that “someone with only brief access to a
machine could replace a memory card with one preprogrammed to read one candidate’s vote as counting for another, essentially switching the candidates and showing the loser winning in that precinct.”27
DRE
The newest voting technology used on a wide basis—and, with the possible exception of punch cards, the most controversial—is the DRE machine.
Because of its ability to record and tabulate votes quickly, DRE machines became a popular choice of localities after the problems in the 2000 presiden- tial election. Although controversial, there are several positive aspects of elec- tronic voting. In addition to recording and tabulating votes quickly, it is easy to present ballots in several different languages. Furthermore, because the font size can change, elderly votes and the visually impaired may have less difficulty voting than they would on the much smaller optical scan ballots. Perhaps the most positive aspect of DRE machines is that, like the lever machines, they keep people from overvoting by not allowing a person to select more candi- dates than are allowed. In fact, two empirical studies find that electronic machines can eliminate the racial gap in voided ballots because they do not allow overvotes.28 Another plus of DRE machines is that some flash red lights above each contest and continue flashing until a person casts a vote for that office or initiative, so it can lessen undervoting. Yet, even with these advan- tages, DRE machines have performed poorly with regards to residual votes.
In the Caltech/MIT study, only punch cards had a greater residual vote percentage.29
What has led to the high residual vote percentages for electronic machines?
The problem seems to be a confusing interface that can make it difficult to vote. According to the Caltech/MIT study:
The mechanics of voting on [DREs] are often confusing. It is often not obvious how to undo a selection, how to check that all races have been voted, how to distinguish between the offices, and how to register the votes. Some interfaces are “too responsive”: a voter can push a button for the next page and more than one page will pass by without the voter seeing it. The formatting of the “ballot”—the presentation of choices—is often confusing as well. It is sometimes unclear where one office (a set of candidates to choose among) ends and the next one begins.30
While the interface of DRE machines can be confusing, certainly it can be improved. Indeed, it appears that DRE machine manufacturers are already doing so. In his study of residual vote rates in the 2004 election, Charles Stewart finds that DRE machines performed quite well, and that “the adop- tion of DREs turned out to produce the greatest drop in the residual vote rate.”31 Moreover, voters report a positive experience with electronic voting.
In their study of the Diebold Accu VoteTS voting system, a specific kind of electronic voting machine, Paul Herrnson and his colleagues note that voters were generally pleased with their experience using the machine. In a survey of 365 respondents, 81 percent said that their overall assessment of DRE was positive; only 9 percent reported a negative experience. More than 80 percent of respondents gave positive responses to questions regarding comfort using the system, the readability of characters, understanding terminology on the screen, the ease of correcting mistakes, and trusting that their vote was recorded. In a 2002 exit poll conducted in 23 precincts located in Prince George’s County and Montgomery County, Maryland, respondents were even more upbeat. In this instance, 91 percent of respondents reported having a positive experience while only 5 percent said that their experience was nega- tive.32 Additionally, Thad Hall and Michael Alvarez find in their survey of American attitudes about electronic voting that a plurality of respondents are most comfortable with electronic voting machines. Not surprisingly, Gener- ation Y voters (18–27 year-olds) like electronic voting more than those people 59 and older.33
Residual vote rates are not the biggest concern with the use of DREs, how- ever, but the security of such machines instead. “In a paper-based election, one might observe the ballots being counted,” writes computer scientist Earl Barr and colleagues. “But many electronic voting systems being used today record votes and ballot images as bits on flash card and in memory. They tally them and report totals. An observer cannot look inside a computer’s memory to verify that the ballots are recorded correctly or the votes tallied correctly because the bits are not visible.”34
Likewise, DRE machines may be susceptible to software attack programs, such as Trojan horses, that take over a voting machine and switch votes from one candidate to the other. Recently, computer scientists from California universities were able to hack into three electronic voting systems used in California and several other places in the country. Some DREs have wireless components, which make them more prone to fraud.35 Furthermore, there is no paper trail of votes with some electronic systems, and even those machines with a paper trail may be subject to manipulation.36 And, although they may not have been caused because of fraud, there are numerous examples of vote tallying errors with electronic machines, specifically those provided by Diebold Election Systems.37
In addition to fraud and errors, opponents of electronic voting argue that, with DRE machines, longer lines at the polls are likely since fewer machines can be purchased because of the cost. It is true that DRE machines are more expensive to purchase than optical scanners, but they are less expensive to operate. Over a 20-year period, the difference in cost between DRE machines and optical scan machines is a wash,38 although this assumes that the DRE machines will last the duration of the 20 years. Nevertheless, the startup costs of implementing DRE machines can be daunting for localities. Besides cost,