action, and he needs it to be the case that it should count as an intentional action. But those two things together, according to Stanley and Williamson, just aren’t plausible. So, it seems that Ryle’s argument just won’t work.
^If Stanley and Williamson are reading Ryle correctly, then it seems that Ryle’s argument rests on a mistake. The regress that Ryle tries to use against what he calls the “intellectualist legend” can’t even get started.
^The argument then seems to run as follows:
1 If your action is a knowledgeable one, then you perform that action on the basis of your knowledge-how.
2 Intellectualism is true.
3 So, then you must have a method on which your performance of the action is based, and you must guide your performance on the basis of your knowledge of the fact that your method is a way to perform the action.
4 If you guide your performance on the basis of your propositional knowledge, then that guidance itself must be knowledgeable.
^But now we have to apply the intellectualism thesis again, to the fourth premise, and so on. That looks like an infinite regress.
^This version of Ryle’s argument does not rest on any independently implausible theses concerning what is involved in employing knowledge- that, or propositional knowledge. In fact, it seems to employ only claims that a defender of the intellectualist legend would accept.
^The intellectualist would not object to the first claim. All it does is capture the difference between action on the basis of knowledge-how—i.e., knowledgeable action—and action that accidentally achieves the desired result.
^It also doesn’t seem that the intellectualist can reject the thesis of intellectualism, because the intellectualist will need that thesis to rule out the types of cases, like Carl, that motivated us to introduce the performative sense of knowledge-how in the beginning of the lecture.
^This is because for the intellectualist view of knowledge-how to work, intellectualists would have to claim that the only sort of knowledge-how is captured by the acquaintance sense of knowledge-how. Then, they could say this: When you perform an action on the basis of know-how, it’s because you’re acquainted with a method for performing that action and you know that the method you’re acquainted with is a way to reliably perform the action. That’s just what it means to say that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. And in fact, that’s exactly Stanley and Williamson’s view.
^That’s why it looks like the opponents of Ryle’s position would have to accept the intellectualism thesis—and the second step of the argument.
^The next step of the argument we have to consider is the fourth claim.
Why think that your guidance of your performance also has to be knowledgeable? The reason is that there has to be a connection between the acquaintance knowledge you have and your performance of the action.
Theories of Knowledge LECTURE 16 Know-how versus Propositional Knowledge
Otherwise, you wouldn’t actually be performing the action on the basis of your knowledge-how.
^We’ve covered all of the steps in the argument that the intellectualist could possibly try to criticize. It seems
that Ryle’s infinite regress argument is a strong one after all. And this means that there is a type of know- how, such as the procedural know- how possessed by Carl, that isn’t a form of propositional knowledge.
A s with our discussions of externalism, the discussion of the performative sense of know- how suggests that it would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on the role of our internal mental states in knowledge.
]Bengson and Moffett, eds., Knowing How.
Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests.
]
reAdings
yTheories of Knowledge LECTURE 16 Know-how versus Propositional Knowledge
QUIZ
1 H. M. had no long-term memory but was taught the mirror-drawing skill. H. M. doesn’t know that he has that skill and doesn’t remember learning the skill. Plausibly, we can describe his know-how as which of the following?
a Acquaintance know-how b Performative know-how 2 Suppose that you are a golf coach
who knows a great deal about golfing mechanics, but because of nerve damage, you are no longer able to hold a golf club. Your ability to instruct your students on putting technique can plausibly be described as which of the following?
a Acquaintance know-how b Performative know-how
3 TrUe or fAlse
According to Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, the root of the problem with Gilbert Ryle’s argument against the equivalence of knowledge-how and knowledge-that is that Ryle mischaracterizes the nature of intentional action.
4 According to a more charitable reading of Ryle’s argument, which of the following is not true of that argument?
a It suggests that we must
distinguish knowledge-how from knowledge-that to avoid a vicious infinite regress.
b It suggests that intelligent action involves knowledge.
c It suggests that all actions are intentional actions.
]
Answer key can be found on page 207.
yTheories of Knowledge LECTURE 16 QUIZ