^Actions like using pen and paper for a mathematical calculation or using Scrabble tiles to aid in brainstorming possible words to spell are called epistemic actions by Clark and Chalmers. Epistemic actions are, as they put it, actions that “alter the world so as to aid and augment cognitive processes such as recognition and search.”
^Some of the epistemic actions are such that they essentially involve environmental aids to successfully complete the cognitive task. Using a pen and paper for long division seems like one such action.
^Those cases involve what Clark and Chalmers call coupled systems, composed of a human reasoner and some portion of his or her environment. They define a coupled system as a case where
b
the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. All the components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. Ifthe system’s behavioral competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain.
^By appeal to the dual notions of epistemic actions and coupled systems, Clark and Chalmers define their position as active externalism.
By this term, they mean that when we are engaged in epistemic actions, we (at least sometimes) count as coupled systems with external entities that are genuinely cognitive.
C lark and Chalmers sum up the central claim of the extended mind hypothesis like so:
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.”
Theories of Knowledge LECTURE 11 The extended Mind
^The main strategy Clark and Chalmers pursue in the extended mind hypothesis is argument by analogy. They try to present a case in which a process that extends outside of the brain has all the marks of a cognitive process and then argue that we should therefore recognize that case as a genuinely cognitive process.
^An analogy that Clark and Chalmers develop in some detail has two cases (although they also discuss a third case that we won’t consider).
] The first case involves Inga and a normal brain-based belief. Inga hears about an exhibition that she wants to see at the Museum of Modern Art. She recalls that MoMA is located on 53rd Street, so she heads there and waits in line to enter the museum. In other words, Inga represents a typical case of declarative memory.
] The second case involves Otto, who has Alzheimer’s disease. Like many people with Alzheimer’s, Otto relies on environmental supports to provide him with aids in structuring his daily life. In particular, Otto carries a notebook with him that he uses as a support.
Whenever he learns something new and significant, he records it in the notebook. If he needs some
information, he looks it up. Otto hears about the exhibition at the MoMA and also wants to see it.
He looks up the address of MoMA in his notebook and reads in the notebook that it is located on 53rd Street. So, Otto heads to 53rd Street and waits in line to enter the museum.
^What Clark and Chalmers want to underscore is that Inga’s brain-based belief and Otto’s notebook-based belief function the same way in explaining their actions. Just like Inga, Otto headed toward 53rd Street because he wanted to go to the MoMA and that’s where he believed the MoMA to be. In Inga’s case, philosophers would naturally say that she possesses the dispositional belief that the museum is on 53rd Street even when she’s not considering it. So, Clark and Chalmers argue, we should also say that Otto believes that the museum is on 53rd Street even when he isn’t consulting what he’s recorded in his notebook. The key point, according to Clark and Chalmers, is that the information that Inga and Otto have stored functions in exactly the same way for both of them. For that reason, it shouldn’t matter if that information is stored in the brain or in a notebook.
Theories of Knowledge LECTURE 11 The extended Mind
C lark and Chalmers suggest that there are no relevant differences between Inga’s brain-based memory belief and Otto’s notebook-based belief.
Otto’s external “memory” is just as integral to his daily functioning as Inga’s internal, brain-based memory is to hers.
^But are there really no relevant differences between the Inga case and the Otto case?
^Clark and Chalmers suggest that we might raise four worries about whether the cases really are that similar. There might be differences in reliability, stability, accessibility, or phenomenology.
^The first two potential differences between Inga and Otto are reliability and stability. You might worry that Otto’s method for remembering using his notebook is less reliable or stable than Inga’s. This, however, seems to be obviously wrongheaded. If anything, the method of using a notebook as an external “memory” is more reliable and stable than using your internal, brain-based memory—not less.
^Of course, using the notebook as an external memory does open you to the possibility that it might get lost.
But this possibility exists for your
do we often lose individual memories, but there is also the more dramatic possibility that, through disease or injury, we could experience more significant memory loss.
^The other two differences—
phenomenology and accessibility—
are more serious.
^In the case of phenomenology, it doesn’t seem that there is a relevant difference between the phenomenology of brain-based declarative memory and Otto’s notebook-based memory.
The reason for this is that there is no phenomenology of brain-based declarative memory.
^Suppose someone asks you who the 13th president of the United States was. When you remember a fact or piece of information, it just comes to you—or it doesn’t. Perhaps you have the feeling of making an effort to remember, but there’s no special feeling associated with remembering
Theories of Knowledge LECTURE 11 The extended Mind
^There does seem to be a difference in phenomenology for episodic memory. Brain-based memories in which you imaginatively “relive”
a past experience seem to be more difficult to “offload” onto the environment. But perhaps with the rapid improvements of interactive technologies, even that difference will become less significant.
^The difference in accessibility is a more serious objection. Inga can access her memory in the dark or when her hands are full, whereas Otto cannot access his notebook in those types of situations.
^Clark and Chalmers recognize the seriousness of the accessibility
objection. They grant that the brain and body can be thought of as a self-contained set of fundamental cognitive resources. Furthermore, we obviously take our brains and bodies with us wherever we go, so there’s no question that those resources are optimally accessible to us. Given this fact, it seems natural to distinguish cognitive tasks that we can perform with our brains alone—or even with the aid of our fingers, say, in the case of arithmetic—from cognitive tasks that we perform with a portable electronic device.
^Nevertheless, Clark and Chalmers don’t think that the accessibility issue ultimately is a problem for the extended mind hypothesis.