Introduction
Part 1. Northeast Asia and China’s External Relations
3. Particularities in North Korea-China relations
Given the developments in recent North Korea-China relations, one cannot but be puzzled about many aspects of the relations.
Firstly, what is the importance of North Korea for China? Why Beijing continues to provide aid to Pyongyang? Indeed, the
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answer can be quite simple. China wants to prevent North Korea’s collapse. However, there is no clear answer to why China is continuing to trade, invest, and grant aid to North Korea, despite its agreement to economic sanctions. In addition, why China is tolerant, regarding North Korea’s nuclear program when its objective of foreign policy is to create and maintain a stable and peaceful international environment for its economic growth? Does China not consider North Korea’s nukes to be a threat to its national security? One principle that China has adhered to is the principle of non-alignment. Nevertheless, why does China consider North Korea-China relations to be an exception?
In the field of trade, China, as a member of the WTO, has been granting North Korea with favorable treatments. Is this not a violation of WTO norms and regulations? From 2003, Beijing has emphasized that North Korea-China relations are not
‘special’ but one of ‘normal state relations.’ However, why is China unable to overcome such specificity of North Korea-China relations? Another point of interest is that aspects of North Korea-China alliance cannot be explained in standard terms.
Chinese troops are not stationed in North Korea and there are no joint military exercises between the two states. In addition, based on available sources, there are no records of weapons sales to North Korea since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, North Korea-China alliance is still valid and capable of exercising
an effective deterrence. How can such circumstances be understood? The answers to these questions can be boiled down to the issue of what North Korea means to China.
To begin with, North Korea is China’s only ally. Regardless of the form of North Korea-China alliance, as long as “the North Korea-China Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of 1961” is maintained, the ‘specificity’ of North Korea-China relations will be maintained. China has already clarified its position, regarding automatic intervention in an emergency when this was a heated topic of debate in 1990s. If North Korea attacks first, China will not intervene and will not be obligated to do so. However, if North Korea faces an external intrusion, China explained that it will come to a decision after careful circumspection. One point of caution is the perception of
‘intrusion’ that China and North Korea have. In other words, it is necessary to contemplate the definition of ‘intrusion.’
After the conclusion of the North Korea-China treaty in 1961, the two states’ leaders have used the terms ‘intrusion’ and
‘invasion’ indiscriminately in their discussions and in the process have come to expand the concepts. By definition, ‘intrusion’ means
‘entering another country with no good reason,’ and ‘invasion’
means the ‘encroachment of another territory, rights, property, or status.’ In other words, from the perspective of security strategy, the term ‘invasion’ includes the encroachment of territorial land, waters, airspace. In this case, the conceptual scope of South
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Korean or U.S. military’s stationing in North Korea can be limited.
Thus, in an emergency situation in North Korea, the issue of South Korean, the U.S., or other allied forces’ interference is not so simple. The historical context behind North Korea and China’s expansive interpretation of ‘invasion’ includes U.S. interference in the Vietnam War in early 1960s, concerns of the ROK-U.S.- Japan alliance after normalizations of the ROK-Japan relations in 1964, and the USS Pueblo incident in 1969, among others.
Second is the strategic value of North Korea as a buffer state.
Although this argument may be somewhat of a cliché, it cannot be ignored. However, this argument does not simply claim that just because U.S. military are station in South Korea, North Korea-China alliance needs to be maintained. After China’s opening and reform, it has sought to maintain peace and stability though a balance of power. This is why China is satisfied with the status quo and promoting policies and strategies to maintain it.
Placing such logic in the context of the Korean Peninsula, as long as the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliances are maintained, North Korea-China alliance will also be maintained. It can be understood that the balance of power and status quo will be maintained when the U.S. and China hold on to their respective alliances. Therefore, if there is no counterstrategy based on such China’s principles, prospect for Korean unification is dim. In other words, in terms of Korean unification, China’s concern
regarding the presence of U.S. troops on the north of the Peninsula is not merely a material concern, but concerns of it is regional status and security uncertainties due to changes in the balance of power. For China, an important proposition is that regional power structure and the ‘status quo’ is maintained even after Korean unification.
Third, North Korea is a special ally that China cannot yet afford to lose. China is publically carrying out efforts to transform North Korea-China relations into one of normal state relations.
Nevertheless, in speeches made by the two states’ leaders during their meetings or state visits, they still state that ‘traditional friendly relations must be inherited generation after generation.’
In fact, it appears that efforts to do so are being strengthened by China. It is common knowledge that before North Korea’s successor inherits power, the successor visits Beijing and receives confirmation. However, in North Korea’s case, this has only occurred once. On the other hand, it is interesting to note what North Korea’s former leaders have done in the past. Recent Chinese leaders have made North Korea their first formal state-visit when their status as successor is confirmed. In other words, upon their entry into the political stage in the Communist Party and their leadership status becomes official; their first foreign visits are to North Korea.
When it became publically known that Xi Jinping would be China’s next leader, he visited North Korea after his entrance onto
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the political stage in 2008.50 Likewise, when it was confirmed that Hu Jintao would assume leadership in 1993, he visited Pyongyang. In the case of Jiang Zemin, his abrupt leadership succession following the Tiananmen Incident meant that he lacked a period of leadership training. Nevertheless, after his appointment as state leader, Jiang’s first official foreign state visit was to North Korea. The reason why Chinese leaders visit North Korea during their period of leadership training is probably to allow the leaders to realize the importance and value of North Korea-China alliance. The meaning and value of North Korea- China alliance may not be particularly deep rooted for Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping who were not from the revolution era nor the Korean War era. It may therefore not be as realistic to them.
This may be a point of concern for the elder generation of China’s leadership or the Communist Party. Therefore, such visits can be interpreted as a form of ‘field study’ for North Korea-China relations. In this context, the Chinese Communist Party may place a bigger strategic meaning and security value to North Korea-China alliance than is commonly thought. This is because until now the common belief was that the shared consensus regarding the meaning and value of China-North Korea relations between the next generation of Chinese leaders and North Korea’s leadership is on the decline.
In these ways, China’s government and military have maintained a tradition of emphasizing the importance of North Korea. Given the current dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula, China’s alliance with North Korea complies with its national interests and diplomatic objectives. In addition, in order for North Korea to survive and function as a state, China’s support is a necessity.
In this sense, North Korea-China relations gain more meaning as a means of fulfilling mutual strategic interests.
It is notable that military exchanges between China and North Korea are greatly influenced by changes occurring from both domestic and international. After normalization of relations in 1999, the two states experienced a lull year of military exchanges. After Kim Jong-il’s visit to China in 2000, exchanges began to expand.
Between 2000 and 2001, numerous Chinese personnel visited Pyongyang in many occasions. After 2002, mutual visits have been relatively balanced. After North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, military exchanges came to a decline. However, it is notable that exchanges became normalized after 2008. After 2008, visits by North Korean personnel to China increased dramatically and their backgrounds also appeared to be more diverse than before.
During 2006 to 2008, exchanges slowed again due to North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches. However, after official exchanges continued again in 2008, it is notable that North Korea dispatched its air force commander to China who expressed her hopes to carry out exchanges with Chinese air force.
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Since 2004, North Korea has expressed that it wants China to always be on “North Korea’s side” as indication of security verification. Since 2008, mutual military exchanges have expanded in scope; it appears that North Korea has taken an active role in seeking China’s cooperation in the navy and air force. Regarding the dominant figures in military exchanges, it is notable that personnel from the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces hold significant authority and are in charge of exchanging, discussing, and negotiating with China.