North Korea appears interested in the six-party talks, even if the country is not entirely satisfied with them. The South Korean government, which believes that North Korea's nuclear program is not exactly pessimistic about North Korea's announcement in the tripartite party. The future prospects for the US-North Korea relationship will be influenced by North Korea's intent and the US approach.
North Korea's nuclear program is the most important lever to attract foreign attention, food and aid. The US-North Korea relationship is now in a state of decay due to the two's conflicting arguments and mutual mistrust. Furthermore, it is still unclear whether the resolution of the nuclear crisis without any substantial change in the North Korean regime would lead to the normalization of US-North Korea relations.
A non-aggression pact will impact the US-ROK alliance, which sees North Korea as a potential enemy. It is time to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula by ending North Korea's nuclear program.
OVERCOMING THE KOREAN CRISIS
SHORT- AND LONG-TERM OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS BY A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE
How long should North Korea survive and be considered a threat, provided the nuclear issue is resolved? In the current nuclear standoff, Pyongyang's objectives were clear from the start: regime self-preservation. Provided none of the nuclear weapons are found, the issue of chemical and biological weapons would be put on the agenda.
In other words, the regime change paradigm can happen without the change of the political elite. First, the changes that have already begun in the economic sphere will evolve to transform the very nature of the state. To put it in a nutshell, the root of the nuclear crisis lies in the conflict between two concepts - that of regime transformation and that of regime change.
US President Clinton also opted for "engagement" of the DPRK with a view to its evolution (which certainly at the tactical level did not exclude and more likely, on the contrary, suggested corrosion and elimination of the current regime). But what if North Korea declares itself a nuclear country in the course of the talks and insists on keeping its existing (albeit imaginary) one.
THE TRIPARTITE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN NORTHEAST ASIA
A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS
There has been no change in North Korea's position that it is willing to give up the nuclear weapons option if the United States provides sufficient inducements. In the discussion of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone, two issues- Rationales for the TNWFZ. First, in the case of China, which has significantly fewer nuclear warheads than the United States.
The ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone—eliminating all nuclear weapons and achieving stable peace in the region—is worth earnest pursuit. First, North and South Korea are unlikely to resume bilateral inspection talks in the foreseeable future. In the case of Japan, Tokyo will be able to make use of the TNWFZ as a tool to reinforce its non-nuclear commitments to both domestic and international audiences.
Information sharing, transparency and verification measures incorporated into the TNWFZ would allow South Korea and Japan to double-check the North's nuclear activities and intentions. If Japan joins North and South Korea in making a nuclear-weapon-free region, the TNWFZ could transform the bilateral confrontation into a milder and less adversarial mode, at least in the nuclear field. This will bring about changes in the international community's perspective towards being more comfortable and trusting of South Korea's nuclear policies and activities.
In the technological dimension, the TNWFZ can foster favorable conditions where bilateral cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is promoted. First, the three countries and other nuclear weapon states participating in the TNWFZ could demonstrate their commitments to international nonproliferation efforts. This will strengthen the position of the nuclear weapon states against the reasons for Japan to promote the NWFZ in the region.25.
The TNWFZ can be a concrete basis for facilitating cooperation between Japan and South Korea in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in two ways. The TNWFZ could be an important political confidence-building measure (CBM) in the process of searching for a new peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. Issuance of visits and rights of passage of nuclear ships and aircraft in the TNWFZ area.
This agenda package can be studied at level II. routes, initially between South Korea and Japan, but later will invite North Korea. Various issues from the fields of politics, diplomacy, the military and the economy are intertwined, as well as the different positions of the countries involved.
TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE IN NORTHEAST ASIA
The ongoing deadlock between Washington and Pyongyang over North Korea's nuclear ambitions does not bode well for the future. In other words, the prospects for an eventual confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear ambitions will continue to loom over Northeast Asia, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. Our purpose here, in short, is to place the current, rather grim situation regarding the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's nuclear ambitions in the larger perspective of the past.
The agreed framework between the US and North Korea offered renewed hope for a peaceful transformation of the region and the reunification of Korea. Kim Jong Il's equally hostile response to President Bush has convinced him that North Korea plans to use its weapons of mass destruction to "blackmail" the United States and other countries into submitting to Pyongyang's demands. As long as North Korea is convinced that it is dealing with a hostile and nuclear-armed enemy, i.e.
The result of engagement included convincing North Korea that it would be better to engage South Korea. Pointing out these shortcomings does nothing to improve the situation for the people of North Korea. Only Japan and the United States remain reluctant to extricate themselves from past grievances with North Korea.
This would require North Korea to unilaterally disarm itself of all weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Bush administration is insisting that North Korea submit to a yet-to-be-defined process of verification. The best way to end North Korea's quest for a nuclear arsenal is to eliminate the conditions that have convinced both North Korea and the United States that they must maintain such arsenals in Northeast Asia.
The six-party plan would seek to rebuild North Korea after the Cold War with two goals. It is obvious that North Korea is the last of the Northeast Asian countries to be dragged down by modernity and the wider international community. Certainly, the combined resources of other countries in the region are sufficient to shift North Korea's economy away from arms concentration and turn it into a productive trading partner.
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION
AND STRUCTURES OF THE NORTH KOREAN POLITICAL ELITE
- Introduction
- Research Design and Methods
- Data Analysis of the Central Committee
- Conclusion
The Central Committee includes members of the Politburo and the Secretariat, the top decision-makers and executors in the Communist Party. Therefore, changes in the representation of groups at the Central Committee level can have a significant influence on the governance of the country.6. The profile analysis of the North Korean political elite consists of two main parts.
Kinship relationships with the top leader are a variable unique to the study of the North Korean political elite. Most members of the CC have overlapping membership in the legislative body, the Supreme People's Assembly. These variables are important in demonstrating the composition of the political elite in terms of the years of experience of its members in the Party and the Central Committee.
See also Directory of Officials of the DPRK (CIA, Washington); Profile Papers on North Korean Core Ruling Elites 1999 [in Korean] (Seoul: The Ministry of Unification, Seoul); H. The political elite has instead become condensed and clustered, as suggested by the declining size and low turnover of the Central Committee in the post-1995 period. The rising level of education of the North Korean political elite is evident in table 10.
The finding also means that those who were capable and familiar with the work of the Party and the Central Committee were added to the leadership of the Party. Such a trend is particularly noticeable in the analysis of newcomers to the Central Committee in the 1990s. Despite the change of leaders in the 1990s, there has been no significant change in the composition of the political elite.
The aging of the members and the increasing years of career experience of the members in the party and the central committee confirm this. The structure of the Central Committee gradually changed, aimed at the economic development and modernization of the country. The structure of the North Korean ruling elite changed in the 1990s and went in an unusual direction.
A major change in the structure and composition of the political elite is generally noticeable and easily identifiable following a Party Congress. This explains some important changes detected in the structure of the KWP Central Committee between 1980 and 2000.
