It has been 10 years since Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged in the Western Pacific region in 2003 – the first emerging infectious disease of global significance in the 21st century. Other important changes included: (1) legal requirements of member states development of national IHR core capacities;. 2) establishment of national contact points for IHR (NFP) to facilitate official communication; (3) notification by the NFP to the World Health Organization (WHO) IHR contact points of any event that may constitute a PHEIC; and (4) agreed upon procedures for identifying and responding to PHEIC.3 As one observer did. The Western Pacific region has been a hotspot for emerging infectious diseases and remains vulnerable to future threats to health security due to a number of factors such as increased international travel and trade, migration and urbanization, intensive livestock farming and illegal wildlife trade.5 Asia-Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED) is a regional tool to assist countries in implementing the IHR (2005), and progress has been made in building capacity within APSED's target areas. ) remains a challenge,7 there are certainly success stories in this region.
However, the disease spread rapidly along major airways, prompting the WHO to issue an emergency travel advisory on March 15, label the new disease "severe acute respiratory syndrome" and provide the first case definition.1 The disease continued to spread. spread, reaching 26 countries on five continents and causing at least 8,096 cases and 774 deaths globally before finally being contained.2 The SARS epidemic had a dramatic effect on the global economy, leading to severe economic losses, the collapse of regional tourism and travel industries and substantial declines in the gross national product of affected countries.3 While actual figures on the cost of the outbreak vary and depend on different interpretations, the estimated cost was believed to be approaching US$40 billion.
ISSUE
CONTEXT
Greater capacity to respond to medical emergencies would be enabled by increasing the number of staff in relevant medical emergency areas. Current staffing levels at all levels of government are grossly inadequate to operate the systems that generate information to assess risk for health emergencies in Papua New Guinea.4. When cholera6 emerged in July 2009, it caused widespread morbidity and mortality, partly due to a lack of access and preparedness of the health system.
The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of lessons learned to improve the management of human resources in future health emergencies.
ACTION
In provinces where there was a good working relationship between the Provincial Health Office and provincial hospitals before the outbreak, coordination generally worked much better than in provinces where the relationship was poor. In provinces where the Provincial Health Office and provincial hospitals did not work cohesively before the outbreak, cooperation deteriorated during the crisis, especially in the absence of good leadership. For example, without additional staff who can support provincial disease control officers with data management, ongoing surveillance, outbreak detection and verification processes between or during health emergency risk assessments will remain challenged and prioritization of interventions can be based on little information.
In the more challenging environments, the recruitment of coordinators from outside the provincial government system has been successful.
OUTCOME
Human resources during cholera outbreaks, Papua New Guinea Rosewell et al. diagnostic capacity during outbreaks worked well at the provincial level; however, additional support will be needed to ensure the sustainability of the education. During the cholera outbreak, the command and control centers facilitated the information management component of the health emergency. Data managers recruited to work temporarily under the disease control during the cholera outbreak were crucial at the time of the emergency.
When the senior executive leadership of the National Ministry of Health decided to formalize the National Rapid Response Team, action was taken quickly.
DISCUSSION
Cholera outbreaks, such as the one in Papua New Guinea, can be costly if they persist for months in environments with limited infrastructure. Human Resources for Health in Maternal, Neonatal and Reproductive Health at the Community Level: A Profile of Papua New Guinea. The Papua New Guinea response to cholera demonstrates system inadequacies, including the systems that identify, develop and project human resource requirements for health.
The target of at least one field-trained epidemiologist per 200,000 population is an example of a standard that should be set for Papua New Guinea.10 However, there are several other cadres of public health professionals required for emergency response, all of which are currently in limited supply and would also benefit from such targets.
CONCLUSION
Context: The Pacific Ocean is home to 10 million people spread across 21 Pacific Island countries and territories. Seven of them have populations of less than 25,000 people; 14 of the 21 Pacific Island countries and territories are state parties to the IHL (2005). Fourteen Pacific Island countries and territories are States Parties to IHL (2005), and seven are territories or administrative territories for which IHL (2005) responsibilities have been delegated to their metropolitan country.
Most Pacific island countries and territories are considered to be low- and middle-income.5.
STRUCTURE OF THE EBS SYSTEM
The Papua New Guinea National Ministry of Health established an EBS system during the influenza pandemic in August 2009. We review its performance from August 2009 to November 2012 and share lessons that may be useful to other under-resourced public health practitioners working on surveillance. Most (84%) of the incidents were documented as true public health events and 56% were investigated by the provincial health office alone.
EBS is a simple strategy that forms the foundation of public health surveillance and response, particularly in resource-poor settings such as Papua New Guinea. Event-based surveillance (EBS) is defined as “the organized and rapid capture of information about events that are a potential risk to public health.”1 Rumors or other ad hoc reports are transmitted through formal and informal channels such as the media, health professionals. , community leaders and non-governmental organizations, and assessments of the risk these events pose to public health enable a timely, effective and measured response. One supervisory and one administrative officer received reports of potential public health events from community members, health workers, embassies, and the daily media.
Fourteen of the 23 reports that did not come from health care workers or public health authorities listed both dates;. A minority involved either on-site or remote assistance from NDOH, with or without support from WHO in Papua New Guinea and/or the regional office in Manila, Philippines or other development partners. A few events involved investigations conducted solely by a third party (eg the reporting hospital or a mining company).
EBS is an easy-to-use strategy that is a cornerstone of public health surveillance and response, particularly in resource-poor settings such as Papua New Guinea. It is adaptable to a wide variety of public health events and settings, particularly rare events and those occurring in populations without access to the formal health care system (eg, large segments of the 87% rural population in Papua New Guinea).4 For EBS to be successful, must be closely related to the response; formalizing the EBS using assessment tools and responding to the number of cases and deaths from the syndrome is.
RESULTS
Undetermined year (n = 7)
The Ethics Committee of the Suzhou Center for Disease Control and Prevention approved this investigation. This is probably due to the similar characteristics On April 21, Case A, Case C and the same. Here we describe the epidemiology of the 2012 influenza season from the Victorian Influenza Surveillance System.
Staff of the WHO Collaborating Center for Influenza Reference and Research provided data on influenza type identification in the weekly VIDRL surveillance report. The objective of our study was to synthesize information on 2011 seasonal influenza vaccination policies, recommendations and practices for all countries and areas in the World Health Organization (WHO) Western Pacific Region. Of the 25 countries and areas with policies or recommendations, health care workers and the elderly were most often recommended for vaccination; 24 (96%) countries and areas recommended vaccination of these groups, followed by pregnant women, people with chronic diseases and children (15 [60%).
In the Western Pacific Region of the World Health Organization (WHO), awareness of the public health importance of influenza and the need for pandemic preparedness has increased in recent years motivated by the re-emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in 2003–2004 and then by the occurrence of the influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009. Data were available from 36 (97%) of the 37 countries and territories of the Western Pacific region; 35 countries and territories responded to the questionnaire and one responded to the WHO 2010 Global Mapping of Seasonal Influenza Vaccine survey. Of the 25 countries and territories with policies or recommendations, healthcare workers and the elderly were most recommended for vaccination; 24 (96%) countries and territories recommended that these groups be vaccinated, followed by pregnant women people with chronic diseases and children (15 [60%]).
Of the 36 participating countries and territories in the region, 26 (72%) reported that the seasonal flu vaccine was available through public funding, private market purchase, or both (Table 2). Of the 26 countries and territories where an influenza vaccine is available, seven (27%) reported using only an inactivated, non-adjuvanted vaccine in the Southern Hemisphere for the 2011 season. This study shows that more than two-thirds of WHO countries and territories in the Western Pacific have seasonal influenza vaccination policies or make recommendations for vaccinating high-risk groups.
Report of the second WHO consultation on the Global Action Plan for Influenza Vaccines (GAP). Epidemiological and virological features of Western Pacific influenza from the World Health Organization, 2006–2010. We analyzed the data on antimicrobial drug resistance since the start of the cholera outbreak in the country.
