from social network analysis were less widely adopted by geographers, but several recent papers have indicated the use of the block model and equivalence (Drevelle, 2013), density and nodes centrality measures (Comin, 2009; Maisonobe, 2013), and k-cores to reveal a world center–periphery structure (Van Hamme & Pion, 2012).
Once again, the emerging hybridization of disciplinary traditions appears quite interesting for geopolitical studies. It does not mean that network analysis is the only way to study conflicts or patterns of relations between actors, whatever the level of analysis. However, it is worth considering that, for some specific questions, network analysis can reveal unexpected facts and trends.
In summary, network analysis appears to be of major interest for geopolitical studies, especially when one is investigating power and hierarchy among actors. In the following sections I describe the investigation of patterns of relations among actors in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), using network analysis to test whether political regionalization is taking place on a world scale.
A Relational Approach to the United Nations General
League positions on Palestine, whereas the Arab League has supported the African Union’s position on economic development. Examples of pressure are less well- documented but are occasionally mentioned in the minutes of the meetings, albeit without precise targets. Before examination of the voting behavior and speech pat- terns in the UNGA, a short review of the UN system seems appropriate to justify some methodological choices.
Studying the UN System from a Geographical Point of View
The UN organization can be considered a relational system and a bureaucratic orga- nization at the same time. First, positions of actors in the UN system depend on the relative positions of other actors. Moreover, an actor’s behavior in one specific organ can in certain cases be explained by the position of this actor in another organ of the UN system. One familiar example is the voting behavior of the United Kingdom and France in the UNGA—they often vote differently from other member states of the European Union (EU)—behavior that can be explained only by their permanent member status in the Security Council. Another relational aspect relates to the possibility of action in the UN system in general and in the UNGA specifi- cally: Any decision involves a dense network of relations with other actors, with all decisions being adopted by consensus or majority.
But the UN system is also a bureaucratic organization where the behaviors of actors are highly predictable (needed to strengthen cooperation), where stability outweighs evolution, and where reform is always a long and costly process. One of the most famous examples of this bureaucratic aspect is the reform of the Security Council, which generated hundreds of speeches, reports, and recommendations but not one single concrete decision.
Since its creation, the UN system has been extensively studied by academics, especially by North American academics in the fields of political science and inter- national relations—the U.S. government has always paid a great deal of attention to UN activities and has financed numerous research projects. Geographers have paid scant attention to the UN’s decision-making processes. However, at least two aspects are of particular interest: the geography of cooperation and conflict, and scale issues related to daily operations. Because nearly all states are represented in the UNGA, this institution allows one to observe patterns of cooperation on a worldwide scale, from both dynamic and thematic points of view, and studying voting behavior provides some valuable geopolitical input.
A brief explanation of the purpose and function of the UNGA seems warranted at this point. The aim of the UNGA, according to the UN Charter signed in 1945, is to “consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of interna- tional peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” (Charter of the United Nations, Article 11) and to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of (a) promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of
international law and its codification; (b) promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields; and (c) assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Charter of the United Nations, Article 13).
When a member state, a regional group, or an ad hoc group of states submits a resolution proposal to the General Assembly, there can be one of two outcomes. The first and most frequent one is the resolution’s adoption by consensus without any vote. Depending on the session, between two thirds and three quarters of all resolu- tions are adopted by consensus. A vote indicates a controversial issue, and member states have four options (only member states are able to vote): vote yes, abstain, vote no, or abstain. The last option often indicates a small and/or failed state that cannot obtain a permanent delegation in the UNGA. It should also be noted that nearly all states are UNGA members: The Holy See and the State of Palestine have observer status (they can sponsor a resolution but cannot vote), and Taiwan is the only independent state not recognized by the UN system, a situation due to the strong and persistent opposition of China.
Geographical Voting Patterns in the UNGA
Studying votes in the UNGA has had a long academic tradition since the seminal paper by Ball (1951). The main hypothesis is that states that vote the same way on a vast range of topics are supposedly politically close and like-minded. Kissack (2007) noted that studying votes has advantages as well as drawbacks, and among the latter is the inability to infer any cooperative behavior from results obtained. In other words, in an arena where many resolutions are ritually adopted year after year over several decades, two states can exhibit the same voting behavior without hav- ing any actual relation. However, in an arena where two thirds of the resolutions are adopted by consensus, putting an issue up for vote already indicates a lack of con- sensus. Whereas a similar vote does not necessarily imply a close relation, a dis- similar vote conversely indicates opposition between two actors. When dozens of votes are considered, similar voting patterns can infer a relation between a pair of actors. Moreover, the autonomy of actors is not equally distributed: Some delega- tions have dozens of members (e.g., diplomats, lawyers, and counselors), whereas delegations from the poorest countries have only two to five members. It is obvi- ously difficult for the small delegations to study all proposed resolutions, to con- sider their legal implications, and so on, and voting behavior will depend on group directives rather than on national orientation.
For the two sessions considered here (the 42nd and 63rd), voting results were selected according to (a) resolutions and (b) member states. First, tables recording all voting results per session were made from the UNBISnet website, which provides all details of states’ behavior per resolution.2 Then, near-unanimous resolutions
2http://unbisnet.un.org/
were deleted (less than 5 % of no votes or abstentions). The resolution-based selec- tion was motivated by the presence of very specific resolutions on Israel for which only Israel and the United States voted against or abstained. These two states are clearly peripheral in the UNGA, and including these votes would not provide any supplementary information. The second selection, based on member states, com- prised those states that were often absent and not able to vote. Keeping the threshold used in previous studies, I chose to delete states that did not participate in at least 30 % of the votes. Failing to omit these states would produce a group lacking politi- cal consistency. The final tables included 158 states and 145 resolutions for the 42nd session (1987–1988) and 178 states and 68 resolutions for the 63rd session (2009–
2010). These basic measurements are congruent with the general trend in the UNGA in this period: a rising number of member states (with the addition of former Eastern-bloc countries in the 1990s and many small states in the 2000s) and a diminishing number of resolutions put to a vote.
Several network approaches can be used to study voting behavior in the UNGA. The most common method is to create a multibipartite state-resolution graph and to transform it into a state-state similarity matrix with range values from 0 (two states always vote in a different way) to 100 (two states always vote the same way). One issue concerns the threshold process because finding a value suitable for different sessions seems challenging. The solution proposed by Beauguitte (2011) was to choose the same statistical threshold for all similarity tables in order to allow comparison. However, transformation from continuous to discrete values remains quite unsatisfactory. Although some authors proposed this approach in the 1960s (Lijphart, 1963), multivariate analysis (mainly principal component analysis) soon became the canonical method of handling this data.
An alternative option that allows keeping link weights is to adopt a variation of the CONCOR method adapted for valuable matrices; the classification procedure groups together states that have the same relational profile. Figure 5.1 shows the regional structure based on voting behavior before the end of the Cold War (42nd session, 1987–1988), and Fig. 5.2 reflects the situation in 2010 (63rd session, 2009–
2010). The considerable cluster inertia is quite surprising but confirms results obtained in previous research (Voeten, 2000). Even today, there is one Northern bloc in opposition to one Southern and Eastern bloc. In 2009 the East appeared smaller because eastern European countries began to behave like western ones—
adhesion or application to the EU—but the main fracture between developed and less developed countries continued to be the dominant pattern. The voting pattern of Turkey, one of the few countries showing a marked change, was becoming more and more like that of western countries. The cluster inertia is also related to the structure of resolutions voted upon in the UNGA. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is the sub- ject of more than one third of all resolutions voted upon in each session. Regarding this issue, the West strives for a balanced stance, whereas other members share a pro- Palestinian approach, which partly explains their cohesiveness. In 2009 there appeared a tiny group of small developing island states that tended to vote like Southern-bloc states, except when resolutions concern global warming.
Fig. 5.1 Political regions in the UNGA in 1987 (42nd session). From UNBISnet (Performed by Philcarto. Design by author)
Fig. 5.2 Political regions in the UNGA in 2009 (63rd session). From UNBISnet (Performed by Philcarto. Design by author)
This clustering approach is of particular interest because it is able to sum up thousands of statements, speeches, and resolutions in order to produce an artificial map of political regions. The map does not necessarily signify that two member states in the same group always behave in the same way or share common views on the vast range of topics examined in the UNGA. However, it does provide an initial delineation that should be kept in mind for in-depth study.
Other approaches appear valuable and can provide relevant results, such as investigating resolutions’ sponsors by topic or similarities among resolutions to see whether or not the same type of resolution (on human rights or economic develop- ment) tends to produce highly interconnected graphs. However, studying voting behavior provides only a partial picture of relational patterns in the UNGA because only one third of resolutions are included.
Whereas studying voting behavior is a traditional way to view relations in the UNGA, the study of speeches remains less developed even though the General Assembly can be considered an arena of words rather than decision-making. Each year, representatives from nearly all countries (Taiwan excepted) issue statements on a broad range of issues, and these speeches can be considered the official posi- tion of those states’ governments. But states are not the only speakers, and the study of speeches supports multiscalar analysis.