I. S.OTHER THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CONFLICT IN MANDINI Three other basic theoretical positions account for the conflict and violence which
3. POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU AND NATAL REGION 1. INTRODUCTION
4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The dynamics, which underline political conflict in South Africa, changed substantially in the 1980s and the 1990s. The period up to 1990 was for the most part characterized by
the conflict between the state and the disenfranchised majority. Since the beginning of 1990, we saw the introduction of a "horizontal dimension" in the political conflict as more political groupings began to operate overtly in the political arena. This saw new political actors entering political arena and old actors redefining their positions, which led to significant changes in power relations. Furthermore, a significant feature of conflict in South Africa had been a marked increase in the levels of political violence.
The state and its agents, in particular the SAP and SADF, and other members of the security establishment should be blamed for the violence, which triggered the whole KwaZulu-Natal. The state contributed to violence through its acts of omission and commission. The credibility of the police (SAP and KZP) as an impartial law enforcement agency was greatly questionable. This was underlined by the traditional role of the SAP had to playas a political agent of the apartheid state, on the one hand, and the role played by the KZP as a political agent of Inkatha and Kwazulu government (though they were inseparable), on the other.
Throughout the conflict, the security forces had an important influence on the relationship between the extra-parliamentary opposition and Inkatha. Reasons for the partiality of the police lie both in official government policy and in the government's definition of national interest. The relationship between the security apparatus and organizations engaged in war in Natal is crucial to an understanding of conflict. Despite some claims that politics is not always at the center of conflict, attacks and counter- attacks were not random, but were rather directed at individuals with a high political
profile, by both the contending parties. The magnitude and scope of violence in Natal could had been reduced, had the security forces, particularly the police and to a lesser extent the defense force, been impartial in the conflict. It is imperative to refer to the active role of the security forces in the perpetration of violent acts, particularly against the extra-parliamentary opposition, which alienated a large section of the population.
Further, the role of the security forces encouraged Inkatha to act with impunity as it can resist being called upon to account for its actions.
The KZP were a highly politicized force, openly assisting the IFP by omission and by active participation in the commission of gross human rights violations as well as being grossly incompetent. The KZP, from the period 1986 - 1994, acted in a biased and partial manner and acted overwhelmingly in furtherance of the interests of Inkatha, and later of the IFP. They displayed blatant bias and partiality towards IFP members and supporters, both through acts of commission (where they worked openly with the IFP) and omission (where they failed to protect or serve non-IFP supporters). Officers of the KZP were involved in covering up crimes committed by IFP supporters and KZP members. Cover- up practices by KZP officers ranged from neglecting basic investigative procedures, deliberately tampering with evidence, taking parts in killings and purporting to investigate the very matters in which they had been involved, and issuing false police certificates and identity documents to members of the IFP who were involved in the
political violence, in order to prevent their arrests and convictions as well as to facilitate their continued criminal activities 130.
The oppressive conditions created by the apartheid state were responsible for the carnage of violence. Violence was an expression of resentment by the oppressed against their lack of democratic rights and the "inhumanities and deprivation" imposed on them by apartheid. The state's violent reaction to this unleashed counter-violence. The outbreak of violence between the ANC and the IFP was a function of the structural location of the IFP in the South African political economy. The IFP was seen as no more than a representative of the regime. The struggle for hegemony between the IFP and the ANC in Natal was therefore no more than an extension of the main clash between the regime and the forces of liberation. In addition, the violence was also a product of revolutionary forces motivated by the ANC's revolutionary theory and its strategy of ungovernability through people's war. The other players to the conflict, particularly the IFP and the security forces, were merely reacting to these tactics, and as such played the role of counter-revolutionaries. Vigilante violence then became a major factor in the repression of anti-apartheid activities. Vigilantes were capable of generating levels of terror, which the security forces were incapable of creating.
Moreover, another key feature of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal since the mid 1980s was the dynamism of rivalry between the ANC and the IFP. Among its striking features had been the changes in the formal status of the parties and in the balance of power between them. Between 1985 and 1990, Inkatha and KwaZulu government were part of a status quo,
13Dpor further discussion, see vol
which was under attack by armed struggle and insurrection, yet at the same time they portrayed themselves as opposition movements to apartheid. The changing status and the balance of power between the parties had an important influence on deciding how the problem of violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal was perceived and addressed by the state through government policy and the security force actions.
Despite the drop in a number of incidents and casualties since April 1994, KwaZulu- Natal was the only province in which political violence remained at significant levels.
Although it is essential to carefully pay attention to structural material conditions in understanding and explaining the violence, the essential characteristic, which separated KwaZulu-Natal from other provinces, was the political competition between the ANC and the IFP. In the post 1994 period, the focal point of conflict shifted from a contest for control of the territory and denial of political space to opponents, to a "propaganda war and bureaucratic maneuver for control of security in the province".
The portrayal of the Natal conflict as "black-on-black" violence was a carefully devised apartheid strategy aimed at hiding the extent of the government's involvement in the region. So to say, this was essentially the conflict between the apartheid state and its surrogate (IFP) on the one hand, and the people by liberation movement on the other.
Black-on-black violence created a vicious cycle of death and despair. The growing violence in KwaZulu-Natal was not therefore a case of black-on-black violence but a battle for political supremacy in the province. It was an attempt to crush the democratic alternatives, which had been offered with the growth of trade unions and civic
organizations. Fighting was therefore part of a disparate all-out struggle for power. What further intensified political violence in the province was the ethnic-oriented mind set of the IFP leadership whereby they perceived the region as comprising precisely of the Zulu ethnic group. The Xhosas and the likes were therefore given no accommodation in the region. The IFP wanted to command total hegemony in the region and, by all means at their disposal, wanted to eradicate or outnumber the ANC from gaining any substantial support base.
CHAPTER FIVE