I. S.OTHER THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CONFLICT IN MANDINI Three other basic theoretical positions account for the conflict and violence which
3. POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU AND NATAL REGION 1. INTRODUCTION
3.5. THE LATTER PART OF THE 1980S: INKA THA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES
3.5.1. THE POLICE AND THE SPECIAL CONSTABLES
The introduction of an auxiliary force of special constables during this period was seen as means of bolstering the work of the SAP in combating the rising militancy of the UDF in the province. It was also part of the state to remove "white faces" from the front line of public order policing of the conflict brewing between Inkatha and UDF. These special constables were described as the "third-force" and their principal purpose was offensive deployment against UDF supporters and for the support and assistance of Inkatha.
In 1988, some 300 Inkatha recruits were trained and deployed as special constables in the Pietermaritzburg area. The Inkatha officials and izinduna (headmen) assisted in recruiting
80 TRC 1998. Vo12. pp 464.
the young men and also endorsed their applications. This, therefore, confirmed the open collaboration of the state security forces with the activities of Inkatha. In Natal, the special constables constituted a convenient and effective striking force for the state and for Inkatha against the UDF alliance. The Trust Feed Massacre of 1988 is one of the typical examples into the operation of the special constables and the SAP in the Natal Midlands during the late 1980s. In this massacre, eleven people were shot dead and two wounded when gunmen opened fire on a house in the Trust Feed community. Moreover, it was a strategy of the police to firstly conduct "operation-clean up" where UDF members were raided and disarmed, the police would then withdraw, leaving Inkatha members and the special constables to launch an attack on UDF members.
Equally revealing, opposition to government's authority structures, including traditional chiefs and urban town councilors, was perceived as rebellion. Consequently, some chiefs became known as "warlords". There was therefore collusion between. the security forces and Inkatha warlords. However, this element of warlordism was identifiable from both structures of the ANC and Inkatha. This is also more evident in Natal Midlands where prominent ANC member, Mr Harry Gwala, and prominent Inkatha member, Mr David Ntombela, behaved like warlords. They usually gathered strongmen for offensive attacks, intimidated people and more particularly directed acts of violence.
Developing this argument further, since the formation of the KZP in February 1981, the jurisdiction used to belong to the SAP in KwaZulu was now enjoyed by the KZP. From its inception, the role of the KZP was highly controversial and allegations of political bias
in favor of Inkatha were randomly labeled against the KZP. That is to say, from its inception, the policy of the KZP was that it may not belong to any political party, however, practically, some of the members of the KZP were active members of Inkatha, therefore, the KZP became highly and actively politicized, biased and could be described as a "partial police force" because it openly supported Inkatha. It is therefore clear that the Inkatha and the KZP became one identity.
Jenny Irish and Howard Varney put it clear that in effective and biased policing allowed, indeed encouraged, the escalation of the conflict to gross and increasingly violent proportions81• The involvement of the KZP in unlawful acts remained highly questionable and that was the most controversial part of the KZP. Evidence showed that in areas under the jurisdiction of the KZP there were acts where the KZP were in collusion with Inkatha and had directly participated with Inkatha vigilante elements in intimidating and attacking ANC supporters or persons perceived to be non-Inkatha. Failure to investigate was the second feature of the KZP misconduct. It is also evident that the majority of the township populations did not even refer the smallest complaint to the KZP because they did not believe that it would be properly investigated, in a sense, they did not have faith in KZP at all. Often the victims of attacks who were non-Inkatha feared that if they report the matter to the KZP they would be further victimized. It is a disgrace to know that some of the members of this police force, believed to be an impartial law enforcement agency,
81 See Antony Minnaar 1992 : 49
even demanded to know political affiliation of the complainant, and even covered up evidence of their own activities.
Moreover, the third element of the KZP was its failure to protect. It is argued that in areas under the control of the KZP there were reports that the KZP either failed to respond to calls for assistance or took a long time to respond, particularly in areas identified as ANC strong holds. Fourthly, there was an acquisition of the political biasness of the KZP towards Inkatha. The relationship between KZP and Inkatha was described as an
"unbreakable thread" that ran throughout the entire force being reflected in the day-to-day activities of these police. Lastly, there was the widespread acquisition of the KZP involvement in covert activities. This is evident in May 1984 when Chief Buthelezi called for the establishment of the paramilitary wing of the KZP at Mkhuze. This was the military base used by hit squads for planning violent attacks against the ANC. The dissident members of this unit confessed that they were used by Inkatha officials to conduct hit squad missions against the ANC supporters in Natal. They were posted to secret bases run by KZP officials. Some of the members of this unit were allocated to various KZP stations. In a nutshell, political bias, incompetence and general misconduct were the defining features of the KZP.
3.6. THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION FROM THE 1980S : THE