I. S.OTHER THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CONFLICT IN MANDINI Three other basic theoretical positions account for the conflict and violence which
6. THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MANDINI IN THE 1990S THE VIEWPOINT OF THE ANC ALliANCE
6.3. THE IMPLICATION OF THE KZP IN THE VIOLENCE
The strength of these warlords was much more powerful with the involvement of Mr Thomas Mandla Shabalala, another powerful Inkatha warlord in Lindelani. Shabalala had a presence of armed men in many different parts of the region and had been implicated in conflict in the North Coast areas including Eshowe, Mandini and EsikhawinilEmpangeni.
These warlords in established a "reign of terror" in Mandini and nearly turned Mandini into a "civil war".
instrumental in giving defense training to many SDU members in Mandini. The rest of the SDU members were then arrested and the house burnt. Those who managed to flee never returned, this signaled a victory of the police and Inkatha and the end of"4S".
The Sundumbili Police Station became sort of IFP base, with perpetrators of violence moving in and out with the police quite aware of them but failing to apprehend them. A typical example of this was the case of Scefe. It did happen that this man was apprehended to a certain extent. However, the purpose of his arrest was not clear to the community because while everyone knew that he had been arrested, he could be seen in the front seats of police vehicles in broad daylight. The community therefore, completely lost faith in the KZP so that most cases of violence were not reported to the police. The victims feared to report cases to the police because either they would be further victimized or the police would not respond totally. Sometimes dockets went missing, and that was the end of the case. Sometimes the police did not respond properly if it was brought to their attention that the victim was ANC-aligned. Many people ended up leaving Mandini because of threats and intimidation by the police and Inkatha. On the contrary, whenever an IFP member was killed, five minutes was enough time for the police to respond. The situation could be so tense in that area just immediately after that particular member had been killed. If the police come across a group of people shots would be fired, a group would disperse with people running in different directions.
The KZP also failed to investigate properly cases in which their colleagues and IFP members were implicated, or they engineered an elaborate cover-up for perpetrators of violence from the IFP. This cover-up included dockets going missing, intimidation and the killing of witnesses. In addition, the police often stood by when Inkatha prepared for
a battle or waged its war against the ANC. The KZP allowed the situation where weapons were confiscated or seized from time to time from the ANC while Inkatha was able to carry illegal weapons publicly.
Allegations also pointed to the presence of hit squad operatives in Mandini working in collusion with high-ranking KZP officials in Sundumbili police station and the local leadership of Inkatha. The KZP hit squad operated very covertly and in a sinister manner.
Few were aware of its existence in Mandini, thanks to the Truth Commission which exposed the activities of three hit squad operatives situated at Esikhawini, namely, Mr Romeo Mbambo, Mr Gcina Mkhize and Mr Israel Hlongwane. Testifying before the Truth Commission, Mr Israel Hlongwane admitted his involvement in several killings and attempted killings in the Sundumbili area in the period 1992 - 1993. He alleged that the local Inkatha leadership had provided him with a hit list with the names of people to be murdered. This indicated that the KZP and Inkatha were using hit squads as a "third- force" in this violence and it clearly shows the very sinister way in which the KZP and Inkatha were involved. Mr Israel Hlongwane admitted to having killed Mr. Sduduzo Cedric Khumalo (an ANC scholar whom he shot dead on 31 October 1992), Mr Sipho Thulani Xaba (famously known as "Gidinga" - he is believed to have been 'sold-out' by her grandmother, an IFP supporter) an ANC leader at Udumo High School, Mr Themba Nkukhu and Mr Mncedisi Kalude (two scholars from Thukela High School whom were shot dead on 7 August 1993 returning from a school tour), Mr Daludumo Majenge (shot dead on 21 March 1993) and Mr Canaan Shandu who was a Cosatu official.
Local Inkatha leaders approached this hit squad because they were concerned that they were in a process of losing the struggle. The hit squad usually carried out its operations
wearing civilian clothes. Sometimes if they wanted to revisit the scene, they could run to the police station immediately after the operation and come back in full police uniform pretending to be investigating the matter. Their purpose was to find out whether the operation had been conducted successfully or not, or just to clear up whatever might be suspected as the evidence. This was their good disguise because no one suspected the police in these syndicate attacks.
In addition to this, a covert intelligence unit existed in Mandini, which supplied a hit squad with necessary and reliable information regarding the ANC targets. However, this intelligence unit was not a formal or an official unit of Inkatha but these were some members of the KZP and Inkatha who were well acquainted with ANC activists. These people made it possible for a hit squad, including Caprivians, to carry out their operations successfully. The Caprivians were deployed in almost all KZP stations in KwaZulu- Natal. One of the most notorious Caprivians deployed in Sundumbili Police Station was Detective Seargent Khumbulani Khuzwayo, who was also famously known as "KB". He is believed to have killed many ANC activists in Mandini. Most of his networks were IFP activists such as Mr Bheki Nzuza and Mr Mbuso Chiliza.
6.4. POLITICAL LIFE OF MANDINI IN THE 1990S