South Africa is a society in transition and since 1994 it has undergone a major transformation from authoritarianism to democracy, from exclusive to inclusive socio-political system bad on democratic ideals and principles of freedom, equality and freedom of speech and expression as enshrined in the Constitution (1996) and the Bill of Rights. Liberal and representative democracy including the elections and electoral systems have been the anchor of this paper more particularly in deliberating on issues pertinent to the potential and challenges of proportional representation. It has become crystal clear that proportional representation (PR) is electoral political system which is debated within its context of its potential to widen political party representation while on the other hand it can be instrumental in alienating citizens from governing. South Africa’s democracy is premised on liberal and representative democracy. It holds democratic elections which is an ideal of democracy every five years. Thus representative democracy was inaugurated through proportional representation system (PRS) whereby the people elect their representatives to govern on their behalf. This paper interrogated the essence of proportional representation (PR), as an electoral system and mechanism institutionalized in South Africa for citizens to elect their representative. The PR is institutionalized and entrenched in the Municipal Electoral Act of 2000 where it regulates a proportional representation vote. This system dictates that all party candidate list and list of ward candidates are to be submitted for parties contesting the elections. For people to transcend being consumers of politics and responsibly assuming their status as partners in developmental politics, the author has explored the mixing of both proportional and constituency electoral systems. The adoption of the mixed system is based on the rationale that even though the party may have its chosen candidate lists, ordinary people would be able to have an upper hand in holding the elected representatives accountable and ensure that politicians prioritize serving the interests of the people.
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GOVERNANCE AS A CONCEPTUAL PARADIGM FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION
J. Coetzee Polytechnic University of Namibia, Namibia Abstract
This paper argues that organised crime can potentially penetrate political power and capture the state, establishing the so-called “penetrated state” that would ultimately threaten
“national security”. South Africa’s democratisation came with numerous major corruption scandals, which the ruling party has sought to explain as a function of exposure rather than sheer increase in the phenomenon. Over the past few years, South Africa has come to terms with the excessiveness of the costs of corruption. The so-called Travelgate scandal is atypical example wherein the South African Police seized R1 billion illegal imports and exports, 83 members of parliament (MPs) pleaded guilty, 1 891 arrests made and 1 305 investigations finalised. Beyond this scandal resulting in direct costs of R26 million to the taxpayer, it demonstrated vividly that there exists a web of dependency where organised criminal groups formed mutually beneficial relationships with parliamentarians. Besides contraband, evidence suggests that international criminal organisations such as the Italian, Indian, Israeli, Russian and Triad (Chinese) mafias are infiltrating the South African market, which is considered as protective of the culture of corruption.
The dominant view has been that South Africa provides a “safe haven” for these mafias to operate with political and police protection. The paper demonstrates that the impact of organised crime extends to high levels of contraband, theft, violence and murder, making a penetrated state extremely difficult to rule because of the absence of the rule of law. It argues that perceptions of corruption matter more than the reality of its occurrence in society because the former can inculcate a culture that is devoid of trust, integrity and morality, thereby formalising cliques and/or pacts that create their own subcultures of self-justification. That is, the paper asserts that the culture of corruption is self-regulating and self-endorsing; and, the “fight against corruption”
should be focused on governance that establishes appropriate culture through reform and transformation.
Keywords: Corruption; Culture; Governance; Travelgate Scandal; South Africa
1. Introduction
Since the democratisation of South Africa numerous major corruption scandals have made headlines in the South African and international media. One example of corruption and organised crime is the so-called Travelgate scandalin which the South African Police seized R1 billion illegal imports and exports, 83 members of parliament (MPs) pleaded guilty, 1 891 arrests were made and 1 305 investigations were finalised, making this one of the biggest, if not the biggest, corruption scandals in South African history. The scandal resulted in direct costs of R26 million to the taxpayer. The ruling party decided to halt the parliamentary investigation (the Natal
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Post cited in Sipho, 2009: 213-214). This scandal caused unhappiness in the leadership ranks of the ANC, because many MPs benefited from their connection with illegal imports and exports. A web of dependency is illustrated in Travelgate, where organised criminal groups formed mutually beneficial relationships with parliamentarians. Parliament was penetrated by organized criminal groups, an indicator that South Africa could be a penetrated state (Sipho, 2009: 123-175). The scandals of corruption and organised crime in South Africa are not limited to contraband.
International criminal organisations such as the Italian, Indian, Israeli, Russian and Triad (Chinese) mafias are attracted to the protective climate or culture of corruption. South Africa provides a “safe haven” for these mafias to operate with political and police protection. The depth of such penetration is illustrated by the case of the former head of the South African Police Service and Chief of Interpol, Jackie Selebi, who allegedly received millions of South African rands (in kickbacks) from a drug boss, Glen Agliotti, to ignore the drug deals of his group in exchange for police protection, making organised criminal actions immune from detection and punishment.
When such a “corrupt relationship” exists between organized crime leaders and formal and legitimate institutional leaders, organized crime penetrates the political power of the state (state capture) and creates what is called “a penetrated state”, threatening “national security” (Klitgaard, 2008: 1). Penetrated and criminal states with a high level of organised crime suffer symptoms of severe or systemic corruption. The symptoms of organised crime and its impact extend to high levels of contraband, theft, violence and murder, making a penetrated state extremely difficult to rule in the absence of the rule of law.
What is of importance is not whether the reported perceptions are indeed factually true, but the mere perception that corruption exists in society. Where there is no repudiation of perceptions, the problem is that, if such perceptions are not cleared fully and without any doubt, for example by the media and the courts, a culture emerges in which people doubt the integrity and morality of their leaders. Such a culture is in itself a contributor to corruption as a general (systemic) community practice. Gossip is an indication of a breakdown of the moral fibre and trust of a society. Limited trust in society encourages the formation of cliques and/or pacts that create their own subcultures of self-justification. The more people who participate in corruption, the more their experiences are shared and endorsed, and the more the perceptions of the public change negatively.