Discussion - 3rd SAAPAM LIMPOPO CHAPTER Annual Conference

industry, spreading under close western observation across Africa. Accompanying donor dollars to Africa is a very narrow and very western definition of “corruption”, which in turn pivots the equally narrow methods employed to measure it. Influential definitions of corruption are the definitions of the powerful nations and in the history worn unequal encounters between Africa and the West the latter’s international business-centric view of “corruption” prevails. Despite a daring counter-insurgency from African scholars (Wiredu, 1996; Abdi, 1999; Osabu-Kle, 2000;

Adekson, 2004; Mushanga, 2004; Prempeh, 2004) the indigenous prerogative to make the final call on what constitutes “corruption”, and by extension how to measure and control it, has been suppressed under a semantic and methodological tsunami that is flooding in from the West.

Zaman & Rahim (2009) argue that the CPI is widely misunderstood to measure

“corruption” per se, it does not do this. Rather, it measures perception-based epiphenomenal choices of it. This raises two issues. First, are the measures of “corruption” proxies as good as measures of the material of “corruption”? Second, who is doing the perceiving? There is no evidence that CPI results influence “corrupt” countries to alter their governance styles. And why should it when all the CPI calculates is a representation version of the real thing. None of the nine survey sources used by TI to construct the annual CPI measure the phenomenon of “corruption”

directly. Rather these sources measure what they distinctly consider to be epiphenomenal occurrences that in their opinion point to the existence of “corruption”. In this kind of indirect reasoning, a conclusion that “corruption” exists is compelled by, or reached from, these previously known epiphenomenal facts. De Maria (2008) further point out that there was no one point at which colonialism formally ceased, the colonial condition and its formal structures of domination did not suddenly disappear after the end of formal direct-rule. The effects of colonialism continue to reverberate in reflective cultural and material ways, mainly when colonialism is understood as the modern global system of hegemonic economic power under late capitalism. De Maria (2007) argues that corruption is not uniform, nor is it constant. Rather it is ephemeral and socially-shaped. The reality of cultural differences requires the essence of corruption to remain permanently the subject of debate about moral standards that should apply to the holders of public trust and duty. At the very least this position authorises non-westernised African voices in the discourses about corruption and targets the West’s self-elected directive to regulate the limitations of this discourse and infiltrate African public policy.

office with the purpose of making private gain, which has hoped to incorporate the idea of wrongly acquiring an advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, in violation of official duty and rights of others is slippery and opens abuse across societies, particularly the former colonies (Tsheola et al., 2013). The current universally accepted definition of corruption does not meet the requirements of pluriversalism because it is deeply informed by the Western ideas of economy, public sector, law and politics. From the above findings, many Africans have jumped on the bandwagon to say African countries are generally corrupt without taking into account on who measures corruption and what constitutes corruption and the fact that it is measured using perceptions.

The social location of a place cannot be a determinant of corruption and it is inadequate to suggest that African countries are highly corrupt because of the stark social inequalities. There is a distinct probability that perception of corruption may be heightened under the stark societal disparities in a weak state because rich people may find the governing regime to be too powerful to the degree that corruption could be perceived as recognised practice for preserving societal privilege where corrupt actions are unpunished and society glorifies lifestyles associated with benefits thereof (Tsheola et al, 2013). To say TI produces measures of corruption is simply wrong.

TI does not measure corruption, and to label the measures produced by TI as measures of corruption is highly misleading. We could more accurately label TI measures as averages of perceptions of businessmen regarding corruption in various countries (Zaman & Rahim, 2009).

Corruption is a multidimensional concept and no one form of measurement can measure it adequately. It could be argued that it is true that the relationship between individuals, institutions and the state have worsened significantly, and the perceptions of economic corruption may appear to be bearing the most devastating consequences as evidenced by the wide spread culture of distrust and the many violent protests. This paper acknowledged a strong interface between African “ethics” and African “corruption”. Both must be understood within the continuing context of African culture (De Maria, 2008) and this makes one argue that Africa must come up with their own definition and measurement of what constitutes corruption in order for Africans to understand the concept of corruption. The article has further found out that according to the Western definition of corruption most African countries seems to be corrupt but further articulates for a better understanding of how this epistemology could be interpreted. The African countries today are apprehended within a discourse of power whereby foreign institutions and agencies map out its future. In this new configuration, it is the World Bank, the IMF and a multitude of non- government organizations which regulate and dictate fundamental policies. They are in numerous respects, the new colonial administrators. The inability of the African state to deliver

“development” has been aligned to the belief that Africa is corrupt. This has made Western countries to manipulate African countries and that Africa is no longer allowed to engage in activities which a normal state would perform as it would be viewed as corruption in Africa.

7. Conclusion

Most African governments tackle corruption as if it were the cause of democratic and development difficulties rather than a symptom or consequence of them. This leads to the failure to address the deeper political and class forces which drive the politics of clientelism and corruption. Cibane (2013) acknowledges that it is difficult to conclude a topic of corruption. The institutional structures and ideologies Africans use to mobilize against corruption are unlikely to take root because the concept corruption is not an African one and hence understanding its meaning, and causes is problematic in Africa and it does not take into consideration the values and history of the continent. Corruption, formerly the concern of moralists, is now confronted by a politics inspired by expansionist economic and political interests. The CPI’s results that always show African states as being corrupt must be questioned by Africans as it is completely based on perceptions. Current measures of corruption need to be examined carefully to evaluate exactly what it is that they are determining.

However, there are numerous dimensions to corruption, and by shifting the focus and definitions suitably, it would be easy to establish that richer countries are actually more corrupt.

It is the powerful who decide which dimensions should be considered in constructing a measure of corruption and governance. If, instead of the number of corrupt dealings, the measurement focuses on volume and impact it is likely that the correlation between income and corruption would be reversed. The reality of cultural variance requires “corruption” to remain permanently the subject of disputation about moral standards that should apply to the bearers of public and private office. Within that post-colonial framework a central purpose arose to expose the business bias in the CPI and identify serious epistemological weakness in its procedure De Maria (2007).

The primacy of the western value of measurement wearing the apparel of science in African corruption discourse was targeted. The researcher further calls for other African scholars to scrutinise the concept of corruption based on Africa’s believes, values and history in the search to come up with Africa’s measurements of corruption.

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POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND STATE PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA

M.J. Mamogale Limpopo Legislature, South Africa Abstract

Political patronage through state jobs is a global phenomenon dispensed by governing political parties. But in Africa, it is a leading reasons for poor institutional performance of states.

This paper uses empirical data from roundtable meetings organized by the Public Service Commission in South Africa in order to explore the existing theories of political patronage. In South Africa, political patronage has sometimes led to irregular appointments and high turnover of staff in state institutions, as revealed often by the audit process. It has further led to difficulties in ensuring effective retention strategies and high suspension rates by state institutions. Also, the paper finds that the state has, at the local government level, enacted a law that promotes meritocratic recruitment patterns in order to professionalize local state institutions. The paper concludes that although meritocracy is desirable to professionalize the state, it will not obliterate patronage politics by itself.

Keywords: State; Patronage; Public Service Commission; South Africa

1. Introduction

In the 1980s and 1990s many African states adopted a multiparty democracy based on two distinct systems of governance. Countries such as Mozambique, Gabon, Ghana, among others, adopted a presidential system of governance based on the US philosophy while countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, etc., adopted a parliamentary system based on the Westminster governance tradition. Other states such as Senegal, Cape Verde and Namibia adopted a combination of the two systems of governance (Nijzink et al., 2006; Kopecky, 2011).

Political parties seen as liberation movements brought about this political change. However, soon after this democratization process, many African states were bedevilled by many problems such as poor institutional quality or performance, unconstitutional change of government, political violence and so forth. Poor quality or performance of the state, which is the main focus of this paper, is blamed on political patronage, among others. The ensuing debate in the public administration or political science scholarship is whether political patronage promotes or hinders institutional performance or quality.

Therefore, the main research questions become: does political patronage via state jobs improve or hinder the quality or performance of the state institutions? Is it possible for political parties to do away with political patronage in the state institutions? Rival theoretical explanations are advanced by different scholars on the relationship between political patronage and state performance. Exploring these theories and also using empirical primary dataset from the Public Service Commission’s roundtable discussions in South Africa, this paper attempts to answer these research questions to understand why the governing political party or parties dispense political patronage via state jobs during its or their political term in government. The empirical

data from the roundtable meetings by the Public Service Commission was drawn largely from all the nine provinces including from the centre. Approximately, a total of three hundred and thirteen senior officials from national and provincial state institutions attended the roundtable meetings.

Most of these senior state officials were drawn largely from human resources management and labour relations directorates. These roundtable discussions took place between October and November 2013 at different venues and dates (PSC Report, 2013). It is worth noting that political party structures undoubtedly can either limit or enhance the powers and operations of the state institutions including the legislature.

Dalam dokumen 3rd SAAPAM LIMPOPO CHAPTER Annual Conference (Halaman 69-75)