Although democratic elections require civic education that promotes critical thinking that will question the nature of elections, voting systems and campaigns, civic education in Lesotho and other parts of the globe has been criticized on a number of fronts (Kabemba, 2003; Khembo, 2004; Smiddy, 2009).
The political history of Lesotho has shown that there has been a reformation of government several times, but there was no public education provided about the reformation. The issue that political reforms are not well understood by the public still stands. For instance, as far back as 1987, Gutmann felt that the people who are in charge of civic education provision may wish to indoctrinate learners rather than educate them, thereby abandoning their initial mission (Gutmann, 1987). There are indications that this is still the case on a global scale, for example, Faulks’s (2006, p. 3) discussion about reformation in England indicated that “citizens have worryingly low levels of political knowledge and lack of trust in the democratic process.”
Hughes (2006, p. 5) indicates that “weak parliaments cannot act as watchdog on the executive branch”, and therefore cannot fulfil their constitutional mandate. Parliaments that fail to exercise oversight of the executive branch invite the abuse of executive power, and by extension the erosion of democratic values and practices (Hughes, 2006). Moreover, Hughes (2006) shows that public ignorance of, or lack of information about parliament can lead to widespread disinterest, scepticism and apathy; again, when the public loses faith or interest in parliament, representative democracy is reduced to something not working because it is seen as an imported form of democracy.
54 It has been argued that geographical distance is a barrier to public engagement and
participation in parliament. Therefore, strategies, programmes and modalities have to be developed to bridge the geographic challenges, like the holding of regular parliamentary public forums in outlying regions (Hughes, 2006). This means that the travelling distance entailed in attending parliamentary sittings, constituency offices or outreach programmes is exacerbated when there is poor infrastructure and limited transport to parliaments that are located far away from the majority of the population, as is the case in Lesotho. At least in South Africa, parliamentary debate is broadcast regularly on SABC television, but this is not the case in Lesotho. Furthermore, Hughes points to another aspect, stating that the
parliamentary buildings within SADC were constructed during the colonial period and many of the rules and procedures, practices and behaviour remain colonial, or neo-colonial in tone. Many SADC countries have failed to modernise their systems (national assemblies) to mould them into nationally relevant institutions.
Parliaments operate at a social, class and political distance from civil society. In practice, the parliaments and parliamentarians of many SADC countries are relatively inaccessible in political, operational, informational and physical terms (Hughes, 2006). The latter’s elevation above civil society, rather than rendering it responsive and accountable, holds particular dangers for democracy and development in SADC countries. Khembo (2004) supports Hughes (2006) in the idea that, unlike parliamentary democracies in the developed countries, civil society in SADC is typically weak and lacks capacity and political power to represent and promote effectively the diverse interests of poor and under resourced communities.
A key challenge is to ensure that democratic behaviour exists within parliaments. Beyond induction and orientation programmes, ethics committees and a code of conduct, a major concern is the absence of a democratic culture within some political parties themselves.
Many political parties in the SADC region lack transparency and internal democracy; they are acutely hierarchical, centralized, authoritarian and intolerant of debate (Hughes, 2006).
Khembo’s opinion is that most civic and voter education programmes are inadequate in terms of content, quality and frequency and tend to be over reliant on donor funding. He shows further that rural voters, mostly women and youth in the remote areas, do not have
55 access to voter education programmes; and illiteracy3 is also an obstacle to voter education in most rural areas (Khembo, 2004). These problems contribute to voter apathy, mostly prevalent among the youth of the region, and it is not easy for citizens to make informed choices and democratic decisions in the absence of appropriate information.
Similarly, there is also limited responsiveness by the electorate/citizens generally. In
practice, most of the electorate do not attend social gatherings, unless they know that they can benefit from attending (IEC, 2012b). Therefore, many do not comply with whatever information concerns them especially that which is disseminated at the gatherings, like voter registration, screening of correct names or checking names on the voters roll. The main reasons people do not accept election results are their low levels of understanding of the electoral process and an inadequate timeframe for the provision of voter education among others. Voter education does not provide all the necessary information for future reference, which people need for a deeper understanding of the concepts of democracy and citizenship.
Programmes, which are exclusively for voter education, are often rushed without much thought to aligning them with broader societal needs, especially regarding democracy and citizenship concepts. This is supported by Kabemba (2003) and Lindberg (2006) in their argument that civic and voter education programmes:
Indirectly neglect or lack the ability to encourage voters to break away from their previous or past pre-structured, pre-designed political affiliations and to choose their leadership along policy and issue determinants (Kabemba, 2003, p. 48; Lindberg, 2006).
These challenges hamper the progress of these programmes and include the delivery style of activities that mostly follow donor expectations. For instance, the workshop approach can be rigid in manner and not sensitive to the community’s or individual’s needs, especially at home and at the village level (Smiddy, 2009). Inadequate funding to support civic and voter education is another challenge (Kadima et al., 2006). This is because the latter is implemented by NGOs, and most NGOs are implementers of the decisions taken by their aid donors (external donors). Many NGO programmes are influenced by the dominant donors’
3 Total adult literacy rate is 75.8% according to http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/lesotho_statistics.html
56 priorities and issues most popular to the donor community (donors place some constraints and conditions on their assistance) (Kabemba, 2003). Weak civil societies that are under resourced, both technically and in terms of human capacity, as Kabemba (2003), Kadima et al. (2006) and Khembo (2004) opine, may therefore fail to act as an efficient watch dog or as a powerful force in the transformation process of Lesotho’s democracy. This is because most governments seem to have left the responsibility for civic and voter education funding to donors.
The main challenges of civic education in Africa, and particularly in Lesotho, therefore, include the limited availability of civic education programmes provided by the Independent Electoral Commission and other civil society organisations such as the Transformation Resource Centre and the Lesotho Council for Non-Governmental Organizations. These NGOs (TRC, LCN) only have offices in one district of Maseru, meaning that their services do not reach the majority of the Basotho population.
Another challenge noted is that African cultural values are in transition from traditional to modern systems of operating, and are not well explained in civic education with how they are discussed academically. There seem to be opposing claims of knowledge and power in relation to new forms of democracy that have disturbed the prevailing African authorities that practiced traditional democracy and were replaced by elected leaders.
2.8.1 Conceptual Framework for Forms of Civic Education
The following conceptual framework (Table 3) has been developed from the literature regarding international civic education and traditional civic education in African contexts.
The framework is used as a tool for the analysis of the participants’ responses and the civic education programmes that are provided in Lesotho (see Chapter Seven for detailed findings).
Table 3: Conceptual Framework for Forms of Civic Education CHARACTERISTICS TRADITIONAL CIVIC
EDUCATION (Lekoko
& Modise, 2011;
Octti, 1994; Okafor, 2004; Pacho, 2013;
Preece, 2009;
AFRICAN CIVIC EDUCATION (Gyimah-Boadi, 2013; Kabemba, 2003, 2004; Kadima et al., 2006;
INTERNATIONAL CIVIC EDUCATION (Andrews
& Cowell, 2005;
Dahal, 2002; Faulks, 2006; Kanter, 2012;
Mahafza, 2014;
57 Waghid, 2010, 2014) Matlosa, 2008;
Sears, 2008)
Meyers, 2003; Schaub, 2012)
Purpose Give practical life skills
and integrate into society
Motivate and prepare citizens for democratic process, voting in elections
Promote personal and political development, promote active citizenship
Content Culture, norms, values
and traditions
Electoral and voting process, ballot counting
How democratic system works, skills, values etc
Delivery mode Informal: proverbs,
storytelling, peer-to- peer, pitso, khotla
Informal: campaigns, social movements, mass media, civil society
Formal: schools Non formal: civic organisations
Frequency Unlimited time, ongoing Once off event Ongoing at schools
Funding Free of charge Donors Government
Ideology Conservative Western influence Radical
Type of citizen Good citizens Loyal/patriotic citizens Critical/active citizens
Pedagogy Banking practice Reflective education Radical education