appear for the PR and the FPTP systems. The effective number of elective parties, the effective number of parliamentary parties and disproportionality make for interesting comparisons. The ward-based elections which use the FPTP system have a low effective number of parliamentary parties with a mean of 1.5 while the PR system has a higher value with a mean of 2.26.32 This means that a vast majority of seats in the ward-based elections were won by a single party, the ANC, thus reinforcing the dominant party system. On the other hand, the PR system fosters a more widespread distribution of seats in the council to different parties though still it was dominated by a few parties. This is consistent with Duverger’s Law which states that PR systems foster a multi-party system and majoritarian elections usually result in a two-party system (Benoit, 2006: 70).
32 The Laakso-Taagepera index of the effective number of parties.
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The comparison on the effective number of elective parties presents a somewhat surprising picture. Under the FPTP system, NE has a mean of 2.42 which is slightly above that under the PR system with a mean of 2.28. This means that under the ward-based system votes are spread to slightly more parties than is the case under the PR system. This may also reflect the influence of independent candidates who can only compete in ward-based elections. The FPTP system is highly disproportional in its vote-seat translation. Disproportionality33 has a mean of 0.24 under the FPTP system which means that on average 24% of the votes cast in the ward-based elections were not reflected in the outcome. Under the PR system disproportionality levels are quite low, recording a mean of 0.08 meaning that, on average, only 8% of the votes cast were wasted.
Table 9a: Summary statistics for FPTP system
VTO-VAP NP NE D
Mean 0.43 1.53 2.42 0.24
Standard Error 0.007 0.07 0.07 0.02
Median 0.44 1.38 2.37 0.24
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.51 0.51 0.1
Sample Variance 0.002 0.27 0.26 0.012
Range 0.21 1.64 2.5 0.51
Minimum 0.30 1 1.28 0.08
Maximum 0.51 2.64 3.78 0.59
Count 51 51 51 51
VTO-VAP – voter turnout as a percentage of VAP NP – effective number of parliamentary parties D – Disproportionality
NE – effective number of elective parties
Table 9b: Summary statistics for PR system
VTO-VAP NP NE D DS Threshold
Mean 0.43 2.27 2.29 0.09 32 0.1
Standard Error 0.007 0.07 0.086 0.05 4.14 0.01
Median 0.44 2.26 2.25 0.028 25 0.08
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.5 0.61 0.38 29.53 0.08
Sample Variance 0.002 0.24 0.38 0.14 872.16 0.006
Range 0.21 2.04 3.5 2.75 198 0.37
Minimum 0.30 1.16 0.006 0 7 0.009
Maximum 0.51 3.2 3.5 2.75 205 0.4
Count 51 51 51 51 51 51
33 Loosemore-Hanby index of disproportionality
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DS – district size or magnitude
The actual number of parties contesting the elections in both PR and ward-based elections averaged nearly 7 per constituency with a low of 4 and high of 19. Voter turnout averaged 42 percent with a high of 51% and a low of 30%. However the variation in voter turnout is very low with a standard deviation of 0.04 and a sample variance of 0.002. District magnitude across the electoral districts had an average of 32 with the lowest having only 7 seats and the highest, which was the eThekwini metropolitan municipality, with 205 seats. The threshold which only applies in the PR system recorded an average of 10%. This means that on average parties had to secure at least 10% of the votes in order to gain representation in parliament.
This perhaps explains why the effective number of parliamentary parties is low, since many small parties do not have the political muscle to garner 10% of the votes. About a third of the electoral districts had no decisive outcome with any party obtaining an absolute majority of seats. If anything can be read from these statistics, it is that electoral systems have direct if not decisive implications on the structure and nature of competition between parties.
Moreover, electoral rules also influence the composition of elected bodies in terms of the number of parties that get representation in parliament.
Table 10 (a) and (b): correlation coefficients of the variables Correlation matrices – FPTP system
VTO-VAP Parties NP D NE CI
VTO-VAP 1
Parties -0.39 1
NP -0.06 -0.13 1
D -0.12 0.15 -0.61 1
NE -0.40 0.063 0.57 0.15 1
CI 0.12 0.24 -0.75 0.12 -0.8 1
Correlation matrices – PR system
VTO-VAP DS NP NE D Threshold% CI
VTO-VAP 1
DS -0.15 1
NP -0.32 0.04 1
NE -0.35 -0.08 0.74 1
D 0.05 0.07 0.14 -0.51 1
Threshold% -0.12 -0.55 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 1
CI 0.12 0.08 -0.8 -0.6 -0.14 0.023 1
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Tables 10(a) and (b) show the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable (voter turnout), under the ward-based and PR systems in the local elections respectively. The tables also show the correlation coefficients between the various independent variables themselves. Under the FPTP system which captures the dynamics of the ward-based elections the effective number of elective parties seems to have a fairly strong negative correlation with voter turnout with a value of 0.4. The other two variables measurable under the FPTP system; effective number of parliamentary parties and disproportionality have weak and negative correlation with voter turnout and have coefficients of 0.06 and 0.12 respectively. Amongst the independent variables the most notable relationship are disproportionality and the effective number of parliamentary parties with a negative correlation coefficient of 0.61. This shows that high levels of disproportionality result in a few parties gaining representation in the council.
Disproportionality also has a weak but positive correlation with NE with a coefficient of 0.15.
NE and NP are strongly related with a positive correlation coefficient of 0.51.
Table 10(b) captures the dynamics of the relationship between voter turnout and the PR component of the mixed system and its associated variables. The most interesting aspect in the trends shown on the table is that all the independent variables with the exception of disproportionality have negative correlation coefficients with voter turnout. This is a departure from general consensus in the literature which posits that PR systems generally have a positive relationship with turnout (Jackman, 1987; Blais and Dobryznska, 1998). NE shows a comparatively strong relationship with the dependent variable having a correlation of -0.35 while disproportionality is the weakest with a correlation of 0.05. Amongst the independent variables NE and NP exhibit a very strong positive correlation with a value of 0.74. This is likely because under PR system vote shares and seat shares are more proportional than under the FPTP system. It would be prudent to eliminate one of these variables from the model as they seem to measure the same thing. The threshold and DS have a fairly strong correlation coefficient of -0.51. This means that as the number of seats in a local municipality increase the number of votes required for a party to gain at least one seat becomes low since the threshold is a dividend of DS and voter turnout. The opposite is equally true. Disproportionality and NE have a coefficient of -0.52 meaning that disproportionality decreases if more parties gain votes in the elections.
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