A reading of the results shows that the electoral system has limited albeit non-negligible influence (even if indirectly) on voter turnout dynamics in KZN’s 2011 local elections. The mixed electoral system, largely because it directly influences election outcome, shapes the constraints and incentives of the political parties and the voters in participating in the elections on a number of fronts (Norris, 2003: 1-3; Barwig, 2009: 296-299). The simultaneous use of the single-member district system and the multi-member district in the local elections presents the parties with unique challenges and opportunities as they formulate their electoral strategies. Political parties and voters are the principal users of the electoral system. It is therefore inevitable that as the parties devise strategies on how the get the most out of the elections; or weighing if they can get anything at all, the mechanical effects of the electoral system will be a key factor (Blais and Aarts, 2006: 185-186).
A similar case might be made for the voters as well. The electorate votes in the hope that their favoured candidate will be victorious or their party of choice will form the government.
Therefore it is most likely that the electoral system is at least one of the important factors as voters weigh the likely impact their vote may have on the outcome of the election. This section explores the potential psychological impact of the electoral system on both the parties
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and the voters pertaining to their decisions to participate in the elections. Further, it discusses how these electoral systems determine electoral choices, costs and vote decisiveness and ultimately the level of voter turnout.
6.5.1 The FPTP system effect and rational choice assumptions
An examination of the results reveals, to an important extent, evidence and support of Duverger’s law34. The FPTP component of the mixed system used in the ward-based elections appears to be biased in favour of the big parties and against the smaller parties.
Ladner and Milner (1999: 246) also found majoritarian systems to be negatively correlated with the number of parties that win seats in the Canadian local elections. The ward-based elections had an average of 0.24 for disproportionality and 1.5 for the effective number of parliamentary parties. This means that most of the council seats calculated by the FPTP formula went to a single party with the remaining few seats being shared by other parties. A disproportionality of 0.24 indicates that almost a quarter of the votes (24% or 687 805) of the votes, mostly that of the smaller parties turned out to be wasted votes in the allocation of 50%
of the available seats. That is, no seats were awarded for those votes, resulting in these parties being underrepresented in the council. Furthermore, as shown on Table 11 below, in 17 out of the 51 (a third) local municipalities in the KZN province one or the other of the big parties had a clean sweep in the ward-based elections.
Table 11: distribution of votes in 17 local municipalities in ward-based elections
Local council VTO% D NP NE
uMzumbe 44 0.27 1.1 1.83
Emnambithini 39 0.29 1.1 2.29
uMzimkhulu 45 0.08 1.1 1.28
Mpandeni 40 0.28 1.1 2.12
Impendle 47 0.16 1 1.4
Mkhambathini 45 0.39 1 2.37
Mpofana 36 0.3 1 1.94
uMshwathi 47 0.29 1 1.95
Ezinqoleni 46 0.34 1 2.06
Greater Kokstad 45 0.22 1 1.58
Ingwe 47 0.28 1 1.85
Kwa Sani 43 0.36 1 2.14
Ubuhlebezwe 43 0.25 1 1.74
uMhlabuyalingana 44 0.36 1 2.12
Ndwendwe 47 0.34 1 2.1
Dannhauser 40 0.51 1 3.03
eMadlangeni 32 0.59 1 3.78
34 A hypothesis proposed by Duverger in his work “Political Parties” (1951) stating that electoral systems can significantly shape party systems. Duverger proposed that single-member district majoritarian systems generally result in a two-party system. On the other hand, PR systems tend to promote a multi-party system.
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Source: Calculated by the author based on the results of the 2011 local elections recorded on the IEC website, www.elections.org.za.
The effective number of parliamentary parties in these local municipalities for the ward-based elections was 1. Their average disproportionality was 0.31 meaning that 31% of the votes cast by the supporters of other parties, mostly the small parties, were wasted votes. In other words, 31% of the voters were as good as those who had stayed away. In some of the municipalities like Dannhauser and eMadlangeni, over half of the votes (51% and 59%
respectively) cast in favour of other parties were not reflected in the allocation of seats. The effective number of elective parties in these municipalities was 3 and 3.78 respectively but all the seats went to a single party.
There are various possible lines of explanation for these trends and various possible implications on the voters’ and smaller parties’ calculus of participation and mobilization respectively. This significantly reduces the decisiveness of a substantial number of votes which have no influence on the composition of the council. Such prospects may turn away potential voters resulting in lower turnout levels (Chen, 2011: 300). Smaller parties do not invest much effort in canvassing for votes in constituencies they know they don’t have any chances of gaining representation. The supporters of the smaller parties themselves would not be motivated to go and cast their votes in the elections since their votes stand a little chance of making a difference (Rainey, 2014:4; Norris, 2003: 4).
Among other things, the electoral system also determines electoral costs associated with the election process incurred both by the voters and the political parties. The demarcation of electoral districts influences the information dissemination and campaign costs to be incurred by parties (Milner, 1997: 91). The electoral costs associated with the FPTP system are prohibitive for chronically under-resourced small parties which can barely afford to carry out effective campaigns in every ward or mount candidates in every ward. For example, campaigning in the ward-based elections may be more expensive for smaller parties as they may not be able to fund the campaigns of their individual candidates (Ladner and Milner, 1999). Such small parties like Federal Congress, South African Democratic Convention (SADC), and African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) among others could only afford to contest in a few districts. This significantly limits the choices available to voters in the elections and may very likely be responsible for depressed turnout rates in the local elections.
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Further, it is clear at least from the observation of the results in the ward-based elections that the electoral system in place does affect competition dynamics between parties. For example, as demonstrated by the outcome of the ward-based elections, the use of the FPTP system encourages and reinforces the dominant party system. In such a system one or two parties dominate the political space to the detriment or even outright demise of the other parties.
Such a system has the effect of diminishing the amount of realistic choices available to the voters which may explain the high abstention rates observed in the local elections. Turning out to vote and choosing who to vote for are inextricably inter-linked.
In such cases, it is not only the alienated supporters of smaller parties that are not motivated to participate in the elections but even those of the bigger parties themselves. The rational choice theory has it that voters or potential voters are more likely to participate if there is close competition between the party they support and the opposition parties (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). However, as observed in the results the FPTP system creates a dominant party system in the South African political landscape and as a result weakens competition between the contestants. The supporters of the bigger parties are likely to feel their party or candidate is not in danger of defeat so they will not be pressed to cast their vote thus reducing turnout.