The preceding section on hypotheses stated predictions on how the technicalities of the electoral process as defined by the electoral system and are likely to shape the political playing field and thus affect turnout rates. However, the functioning of the electoral system has implications well beyond the technicalities of seat allocation or ballot structure. Electoral systems also have the potential to shape the non-concrete subtle dimensions of the elections which may have a bearing on the participation of the political parties and the voters in the elections (See Norris, 2003: 1-3; Barone and de Blasio, 2011: 16-19). The three dimensions frequently pointed out in the literature include the associated election process costs, the choices offered by the election and the decisiveness of the election (Norris, 2003: 2; Shugart, 2001: 174; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968: 26). Elections exhibit varying degrees of these attributes under different electoral systems. These dimensions will be discussed in turn below with a particular focus on how they weigh in the voters’ decision to turnout and the parties’
decision to rally voters to the polls thus affecting turnout.
4.3.1 Electoral choice and diversity of options
One of the major ways in which the electoral system affects turnout is in its ability to affect the quality and quantity of choices, both in terms of the number of parties and the policy choices, at the voters’ disposal. The availability of choice directly affects the cost-benefit appraisal of participation. A broader choice-base means that potential voters have a chance to pick the best option they consider more likely to accrue the most benefits. Wessels and Schmitt (2008: 21) argue that the institutional system must supply the electorate with meaningful choices as this is likely to lead to higher turnout. Hortala-Vallve and Esteve- Volart (2010: 43-44) found that voter turnout in American elections improved in a multi- dimensional policy space when voters had many choices than in a one-dimensional space with small policy differences between contesting parties. PR systems are generally associated with multiple parties while majoritarian systems generally result in two-party systems (Duveger, 1964: 210-255; Gronlund 2004: 512-516). Thus, according to Duverger (1964: 220) the PR system generally performs better on the effective number of parties than
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the majoritarian system (the number of parties with a realistic chance of achieving representation).
This is because in the PR systems even small parties with scattered support have a chance of getting seats in parliament because of the high degree of proportionality between the amount of votes and the number of seats. Blais and Aarts (2006: 185) concur as they argue that in multi-party systems voters have wider choices and are likely to find a party that matches their policy preferences and with more parties come more mobilisations leading to higher overall turnout in the elections. Chen (2011: 300) also points out that PR systems are mostly centrifugal while the majoritarian systems are characteristically centripetal and this is likely to affect the choice voters have going to the elections.21 If voters have fewer alternatives, so that they have a difficulty finding a party that matches their views, they are less likely to participate.
However, there is a flipside to the electoral choice issue. Barone and de Blasio (2011: 17), argue in terms of the quality and not necessarily the quantity of the choices. They point out that the majoritarian system is likely to generate high quality choices for the elections as the parties present their best candidates with the best chance of winning elections. Since in an SMD system voters vote for an individual not a party, parties will feel the need to forward their best candidates. It is plausible to argue that even though the PR systems do offer the voters a wider range of choice they do not necessarily offer the best candidates, something which may discourage participation as the voters may feel their preferences will not be realised (Ibid, 2011: 16). Moreover, PR systems tend to lead to coalition governments due to the failure to produce a clear winner from the competing parties. For example in the 2011 local elections in KZN there were nearly 10 local councils that produced a coalition management as no party managed to gain the absolute majority of seats (IEC, 2014). This was mostly due to the outcome of the PR allocation of seats which distributed seats amongst parties more or less equally. As such, the PR system does provide choice but the choice is less clear and less decisive than in the majority systems.
21 Chen (2011) argues that majoritarian systems are likely to result in centripetal party systems in which political parties tend to agree or have the same viewpoint on several issues and thus leaving voters with limited choice. PR systems on the other hand tend to foster centrifugal party systems in which parties’
viewpoints on major issues are diverse and therefore offering voters more choice and indirectly encouraging participation.
66 4.3.2 Electoral decisiveness
The decisiveness of the vote is a central component of the rational choice theory and is an important determinant of the voter’s likelihood of turning out (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968:
30). The hypothesis is that the more a voter perceives that their vote will be decisive the more they are likely to participate in the elections. The type of electoral systems in place affects the decisiveness of the vote to varying degrees (Norris, 2003; Chen, 2011; Blais and Aarts, 2006). A voter may perceive a political benefit from casting a vote that is likely to determine the composition of government and its policy agenda or the outcome of referenda issues.
Decisiveness is enhanced when elections are anticipated to be close. Voters are likely to feel far greater incentive to get to the polls in close elections than in those where the outcome appears to be a foregone conclusion (Blais and Aarts, 2006: 184; Abramson et al, 2007: 510- 511). In close elections a few votes have the potential to swing the outcome in a particular direction, hence every vote is crucial.
Moreover, people do not only vote to elect an individual but vote to elect a government. If voting for a party makes no difference to the composition of the government, voters will not be motivated to turnout since their choices will not be reflected on the outcome (Norris, 2003:2). For example, South Africa’s dominant party system means that supporters of the opposition parties are less inclined to participate in the elections as their vote is less likely to affect the composition of government and its policies (See Barwig, 2009: 299). This also raises the issue of ‘wasted votes’ especially in areas perceived as incumbent party
‘strongholds’ where the challengers are unlikely to win (Norris, 2003: 5). Jackman (1987:
408) suggests that the tendency of the PR system to produce coalition governments is likely to reduce the decisiveness of the vote and therefore discourage turnout. In a similar line of argument Shugart (2001: 175) came up with the concept of “electoral efficiency” in which identifiability and proportionality are key elements which have an important bearing on the decisiveness of the vote. Shugart (2001)’s argument of how the electoral system design is likely to affect the decisiveness of the vote is worth quoting at length at this point:
The task of a democratic government is to produce a basket of public goods that is preferred over some other basket by as broad a segment of society as is feasible. It follows then that to provide such a link between governmental output and societal demand requires an electoral process that conveys as much information about voter preferences as possible (Shugart, 2001:
174).
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The SMD system on the other hand is associated with a high degree of decisiveness in terms of government composition as compared to the PR system and is thus more likely to encourage voter turnout while simultaneously motivating parties to mobilise supporters (Jackman, 1987; Shugart, 2001). The various features of the electoral system such as (dis)proportionality, district magnitude and ballot structure amongst others can affect the decisiveness of the vote and by implication overall voter turnout.
4.3.3 Electoral costs and benefits
Elections are a demanding exercise and involve costs (financially, administratively, logistically and time-wise) for both parties and voters who participate. Electoral systems at the centre of the election process are likely to determine the costs that voters may have to incur as they vote or do not vote. Different electoral systems entail different voter registration methods, ways of demarcating electoral boundaries and the design and production of ballot papers and hence varying electoral costs (IDEA, 2005: 155). For political parties, electoral systems require different campaign strategies in order to reach out to voters. In an FPTP system with numerous small constituencies campaigning is likely to be expensive as parties have to fund campaigns in each and every constituency. A proportional system with large constituencies campaigns can be relatively cheap for the parties as they do not need to campaign everywhere and can centralise their campaign in one area. Norris (2003: 6) and Feddersen (2004: 100) points out that voters incur costs mainly in terms of the amount of time they invest in getting registered thinking about their voting decision and joining the queue to cast their vote on the election day.
As per the rational-choice theory argument, higher electoral costs are likely to dis-incentivise or discourage participation on the part of the voters and mobilisation by the political parties (Hansen, Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1987: 17). Milner (1997: 93) suggests that the impact of the electoral system is most felt in the information dissemination and acquisition costs incurred by political agents and voters respectively. The PR system with a higher district magnitude requires a relatively cheaper information dissemination strategy than what would be necessary under the majoritarian systems. This is different from a majoritarian system where a party has to channel the message through a multitude of ward-based candidates which can be cumbersome and expensive (Ibid, 1997: 96). Thus increasing the cost of information acquisition and processing needed to make up one’s mind on the preferred party or candidate (Matsusaka, 1995: 93-94). For local elections, which are the subject of this study,
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information costs are likely to be lower for both the parties and the candidates than they would be in a national election. This is due to the fact that most candidates standing for a seat in the local council are from the neighbourhood as voters and therefore are able to reach out to voters relatively cheaply. The voters on the other hand can also contact the candidates without incurring significant costs since they are from the same area and easy to reach.
It has also been argued that the simplicity of majoritarian systems stimulates participation unlike the more complicated PR which stifles participation (Geys, 2006: 651). PR systems encourage the emergence of smaller parties able to contest the elections and also promote more centrifugal policy positions which makes it difficult for the voters to understand policy differences between the parties (Chen, 2011: 302). Since proportional systems are generally associated with a low number of wasted votes, the higher costs of non-voting may prompt voters to turnout. Non-voting will risk one’s favoured candidate or party losing a seat and the least favoured candidate getting one – this encourages voters to cast their votes (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968: 25-40).