CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIANISM
2.6 Humanitarian Military Intervention (HMI)
HMI is a combination of two terms, namely ‘military intervention’ and ‘humanitarian’. The conjoining of the two terms denotes that a combat military adventure being undertaken by an uninvited external force (presumably powerful country) into the internal affairs of another country (mostly weak one) is not based on self-defense or invasion but undertaken to alleviate the suffering of the ordinary citizens from an inhumane and brutal leader. HMI is a controversial adventure. These controversies include but are not limited to definitional issues, the question of authorizing power, the issue of killing innocent civilians, sometimes referred to as collateral damage and the question of it being a façade for the pursuit of the national self-interests of the intervening country.
The definition of HMI has been transforming from its traditional understanding to suit the current nature of international relations. The old definition, noted that HMI:
…is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied (Holzgrefe, 2003: 18).
Teson (2003: 94) defined HMI as “the proportionate international use or threat of military force, undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, welcomed by the victims, and consistent with the doctrine of double effect.” The two scholars noted above have the same conceptualization on HMI. However, they differ on the fact that while Holzgrefe does not stipulate the nature of the government that should undertake intervention, Teson specifies that the intervening power(s) should be liberal, and in extension should not be found committing the same atrocities in their countries.
The old definition was identified by the lack of regulating authority to sanction the intervention. It was the discretion of an outside force to determine whether or not to intervene. If the outside force deemed it necessary, it took a cue from no other authority to embark on the HMI mission. This open ended nature
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of the doctrine left it prone to abuse by expansionist leaders in Europe where the doctrine was used in many cases to justify imperial adventures and self-interests.
The contemporary conceptualization of humanitarianism in war times is credited to Jean-Henri Dunant (Douzinas, 2007: 5). After witnessing the scourge of war after the battle of Solferino in 1859, Dunant spearheaded the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1864 which sought to bring relief to suffering combatants, protect civilians in warfare and also to protect prisoners of war. At its inception, this new humanitarianism was not concerned with the justness of any war but to alleviate the impact of such wars on the non-combatants and combatants who would have been taken captive. The principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence were the basis of humanitarianism (Douzinas, 2007: 5).
Humanitarian workers who assisted those suffering in times of warfare had to do so without supporting any side and without having been an arm of any military involved in the war. This concept has however transformed to the current embrace of HMI.
The concept of HMI is derived from the general understanding of the term ‘humanitarian’. The transformation comes from the use of military action in alleviating those who are in need of assistance specifically suffering from massive abuse of sovereignty and brutality from their leaders. The concept differs from the general understanding of humanitarian action because it is mostly applied in political situations where the citizens of a sovereign country are being brutalized by their leaders (Krylov, 1995:
368). HMI therefore is a combination of military intervention and humanitarian aid in the affairs of another state but such military intervention not being undertaken for conquest by the intervening country or countries (Douzinas, 2007: 8-9) hence the intervention is humanitarian in nature. Kreig (2013: 37) notes that, “The term ‘humanitarian’ describing an intervention aimed at providing relief for individuals in danger grants the concept of humanitarian intervention a rather charitable, philanthropic or even altruistic connotation”.
In some instances, military intervention is conducted not only to stop the excesses of a tyrannical leader but to assist in opening safe passages for humanitarian aid in war zones as was the case in ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in Somalia in 1991 (Ramuhala, 2011: 36) or for the military to assist humanitarian aid workers, without the conduct of war as was the case with Haiti in 2010 (The White House (Office of the Press Secretary), 2010).
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The birth of the UN created the first relatively effective supra-authority in international relations. While the UN has failed to reign-in all countries, specifically the powerful ones, in their international conduct, it has managed to be the forum on which sanity could be brought in international relations, hence the creation of an International Society as advanced by the English school led by Hedley Bull. Its creation, and its subsequent illegalization of the application of force except in self defence after being attacked or after having been sanctioned by the UNSC under Chapter 7, to stop a conflict that has the capacity to disturb international peace and security, meant that the conduct of HMI was no longer a matter to be determined by individual countries and acted upon. The contemporary definition of HMI therefore has to accept the existence of a supreme authority that regulates the behaviour of states outside their borders.
A focus was made on African countries since it is in Africa where most interventions have been witnessed.
HMI cannot be seen as a total imposition from outside Africa without Africa’s input or acceptance after humanitarian considerations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), adopted the classical concepts of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries. Article III (1-3) of the OAU Charter states that African countries in their mutual interactions were guided by the principles of
“the sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence”.
The non-intervention principles were further emphasized by Article VI which stated that, “The member states pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter.”
This strict adherence to sovereignty and non-interference saw the African continent experiencing a number of civil wars and state-sponsored mass human rights abuses. The civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), civil wars and mass killings in Rwanda and Burundi and the Sudanese civil war are some of the crises that left a dent on African humanitarian history. The strict adherence to non- interference is exemplified in the case of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda. The OAU condemned Tanzania’s entrance into Uganda even though it had been invaded by Idi Amin first (Acheson-Brown, 2001). The Continental body did not take into consideration the mass atrocities that Idi Amin had committed against Ugandans.
Africa’s strict adherence to the concept of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs was shaped by its long history of colonialism. It was interference in the affairs of other societies (which later became
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countries) that led to colonialism, one can argue. Hence, in order to guard against future colonialism and the dominance of the affairs of the new countries by the powerful countries in the post-colonial era, African leaders might have seen it wiser to adhere to the strict rules of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. However, this policy created new problems for the continent.
Some of the new leaders used brutal means to hold on to power with their peers not having the power or will to take such brutal leaders to task. The OAU earned a notorious picture of being seen as a league of despots.
The notion of an attempt to come up with a modern institution, in line with the concepts of the International Society paradigm in the name of the OAU and adhering to old classical state centric politics meant that there were contradictory actions by African founding fathers. The creation of a rules based institution automatically created an interactive relationship between African states under which transformations in one state would have impacts and shockwaves in another. The attempt to ignore the birth of an African society was therefore going to fail as was later seen in the Ugandan case under Idi Amin. The contradictions between the African Society and attempts to remain in primordial state-centric politics were witnessed when Tanzania intervened in Uganda, a case which was unpalatable to most leaders in the OAU and later on from the destabilizing effects of the Somali Crisis in East Africa.
The rebirth of the continental body changed the non-interference policy. The African Union (AU) which succeeded the OAU in 2002 established new rules on sovereignty and non-interference. Article 4(h) of the Union’s Constitutive Act states, “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” A complete reading of the Constitutive Act shows that while the Union undertook to respect territorial integrity of member states and to refrain from the threat or use of force among member states (Article 4 (g) and (f) respectively), this respect was now subject to the member country not acting in a manner that made it lose its claims to sovereignty.
This thinking came about due to the continental experiences as noted earlier and the push from leaders whose countries suffered state led mass atrocities with no response from the continent such as Uganda and Eritrea (Kioko, 2003: 813). In an address to the 22nd Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 1986, the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni stated that,
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Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandans perished at the hands of governments that should have protected their lives … I must state that Ugandans … felt a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent … the reason for not condemning such massive crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of a Member State, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations.
We do not accept this reasoning because in the same organs there are explicit laws that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life.
The push by African leaders and changes in the global world can be seen as the major reasons for the intervention policy change. Africa had been embarrassed by the humanitarian catastrophes in Uganda, Rwanda and Somalia among a number of humanitarian cases. The pro-intervention clauses in the Constitutive Act signalled a theoretical transformation which would take time to be implemented practically. The genocide in Darfur of 2003 and the slow responses to Ivory Coast (2010-11) and Libya (2011) showed that the continental body still had a big task ahead of it to operationalise the pro- intervention clauses of its Constitutive Act and its African solutions for African problems principle.
However, under the new Constitutive Act, the continental fathers managed to deal with the theoretical and practical contradictions between the created African Society as a component of the International Society and the rules governing sovereignty and non-intervention.