CHAPTER 5: THE CREATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE (R2P)
5.4 Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Moral Humanitarian Military Intervention
5.4.1 Responsibility to Protect Cases, Ivory Coast, Libya and Syria
5.4.1.2 Libya
84
85
Western and the Arab League countries had different plans on Libya. The UNSC passed Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 which called on the Libyan government to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, protect all civilians in Libya and imposed an arms embargo on Libya. It also referred the Libyan case to the ICC. In less than a month, on 17 March 2011, the UNSC went on to pass resolution 1973 which authorized:
Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
NATO member states quickly moved in to implement the no fly zone as dictated by Resolution 1973.
Britain, France and USA bombed targets in Libya in order to paralyze the military machinery of Gadhafi (Adams, 2012: 8). NATO moved further in its enforcing of resolution 1973 from simply stopping the military mighty of Gadhafi to be used on civilians into assisting the NTC to defeat Gadhafi, hence becoming a de-facto air force for the NTC (Zifcak, 2012: 8).
While the intervening forces faced little challenge on the legality of the intervention in Libya, the morality of the intervention was challenged. In a move that resembled Ivory Coast, NATO states supported a single part in the conflict against the incumbent, namely the NTC. The intervention was a regime change mission which was against the ethical principles of R2P as stated in the R2P report that:
Overthrow of regimes is not, as such, a legitimate objective, although disabling that regime’s capacity to harm its own people may be essential to discharging the mandate of protection – and what is necessary to achieve that disabling will vary from case to case” (ICISS, 2001: 35).
Politicians and scholars criticized NATO actions arguing that they were either driven by geo-strategic, political or economic interests. Gadhafi was the first to criticize the intervention arguing that those who targeted his government “were trying to plunge Libya into a civil war and to turn it into an Islamic state, or an Afghanistan or a Somalia” (Spencer, 2011) (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8341567/libya-Col-Gaddafi-damns- the-rats-as-he-clings-to-power.html). It was difficult for anyone to take Gadhafi seriously given that he was the primary target of the R2P intervention. However, Gadhafi’s claims were supported by the Chadian President, Idriss Deby, who warned in March 2011 that NATO R2P military bombardments in
86
Libya “could have grave consequences for the stability of the region and the spread of terrorism in Europe, the Mediterranean and the rest of Africa” (De Waal, 2012).
After the fall of Gadhafi, Libya plunged into a political and military crisis with different militia groups claiming territories and establishing distinct governments (Lulie, 2015: 8). NATO failed to undertake its responsibility to rebuild (ICISS, 2001: 39) and lead Libya into establishing an effective government. The failure by NATO member states that intervened in Libya to direct the political processes to stability under the responsibility to build led to the realization of the warning given by Gadhafi and Deby.
In support of Deby’s criticism of the Libyan intervention, De Waal (2012) pointed out that the Malian crisis that erupted in 2012 was directly related to the fall of Gadhafi and the failure of governance in Libya. De Waal states that “about 3000 Malian Tuareg served in Gaddafi’s army and during the war they helped themselves to enormous supplies of weapons and as soon as the dictator fell, returned home in force”.
Another direct result of the failure in managing Libya after the fall of Gadhafi, according to De Waal (2012) was the growth of the Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb which has been active in Algeria.
Countries that had supported or abstained in voting for resolution 1973 criticized the manner in which the resolution was implemented. The Russian President, then Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin said that
“Security Council resolution (1973) is deficient and flawed; it allows everything and is reminiscent of a medieval call for a crusade” (Russian Information Agency Novosti, 2011).
Putin’s rebuke was based on the fact that the resolution was too open ended that, inspite of the good intentions that those who supported it had, it was open to abuse. For instance, the statement, “to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” in the resolution is too open ended that it can even be interpreted to mean a regime change or assassination if that is the necessary measure to ensure the safety of civilians. South African president, Jacob Zuma criticized the manner in which NATO interpreted the resolution. He said “We have spoken out against the misuse of the good intentions in Resolution 1973. We strongly believe that the resolution is being abused for regime change, political assassination and foreign military occupation” (Meo, 2011)http,//www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8575984/Libya-
Jacob_Zum-accuses-Nato-of-not-sticking-to-UN-resolutiuon.html.
The intervention failed to meet the benchmarks of R2P intervention. While legally the intervention was authorized by the UNSC, the resolution was hastened without having exhausted all peaceful channels
87
that the AU was pursuing. The intervention targeted a regime change and assassination of Gadhafi, which is not provided for in the R2P doctrine and lastly countries that undertook the intervention became more concerned with financial gains specifically oil and gas while neglecting the security of the ordinary Libyan (see Borger and Macalister, 2011). The issue of oil and exploration deals remained shrouded in secrecy. However, due to competition between the powers that intervened in Libya, some of the issues have been exposed to the public. For instance, Borger and Macalister (2011) point out that while the dust of the war was still up, France declared that it was “fair and logical” for its companies to benefit from oil resources which triggered a concession rush. As early as April 2011, the USA government had approved trade in oil that came from the rebels (Quinn, 2011) (http,//www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-libya- usa-opposition-idUSTRE73Q6SI20110427). The Libyan R2P intervention could have therefore been influenced by the desire to get rid of Gadhafi given that he was a longtime foe who was still trying to re- engage the West (Roberts, 2011) and also to acquire oil and reconstruction deals. Gadhafi fell out with the West after he nationalized western oil investments after his 1969 coup, and his alleged sponsoring of terrorism mainly the Lockerbie (Scotland) bombing of American passenger jet in 1988.