48 First, as scapegoats, they help preserve the post-apartheid project‘s legitimacy by providing a convenient explanation for widespread crime, disease and unemployment103‘. Negative attitude of South Africans in Johannesburg towards foreigners is replicated in almost all parts of the world where refugees and migrants are no longer celebrated.
49 According to the Somali leaders at the time, since colonial divisions of Africa are an archaic legacy which has little relevance for modern African nationalism, the Somalis cannot be considered fully independent ‗until that legacy is eradicated and all Somalis are united under a single political jurisdiction‘105. At the 1963 Pan African summit the Somalis maintained that all Somali people were,
…members of a single Somali nation. Somali is our language, spoken from the Gulf of Aden to the Northern Frontier District [of Kenya]. Islam is our culture, pastoralism our way of life. We want to reunite with our brothers with whom we can evolve an administration suited to our way of life106
Somalis in Kenya had earlier indicated in a 1962 British-supervised referendum107, that they wanted to join Somalia when Kenya gained independence in 1963.When Somalia obtained independence in 1960, ahead of Kenya, it supported a political party, the Northern Province Peoples‘ Progressive Party, which campaigned for a greater Somalia that would unify the ethnic-Somali population in all the countries that neighbor Somalia.108 Using this argument, Somalia maintains that the Somalis in Kenya and
105J. Boyd, ‗African boundary conflict: An empirical study‘, African Studies Review, vol.22.no.3. 1979.p2
106 A. Ajala, Pan Africanism, New York, St. Martins, 1974,p.150
107 The referendum was to ascertain and report public opinion in the Northern Frontier District (NFD), later called the Northeastern Province (NEP) regarding the wish to break away from Kenya. According to the report by the then Secretary of State for colonies Duncan Sandys,87% voted to secede while the rest said
‗no‘. This was not implemented and NFD/NEP, occupied by ethnic Somalis, remained a Kenyan territory.
See ‗We wanted to have our way as minority, says pre-secessionist‘, The Standard, 6 November 2010.
Available www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/article/2000021832/we-wanted-to-have-our-way-as- minority-says-pre-seccesionist[Accesssed 30 November 2017)
108‗War with Somalia ‗started way before independence‘ reveals Karangi‘, Daily Nation, Sunday 16th,2015 p.17
The Sunday Nation was reporting on a presentation by the retired Chief of Kenya Defense Forces, Major retired .Julius Karangi.
50 Ethiopia have not exercised their right to self-determination as advocated for by the United Nations109.
As expected, Kenya refused Somalia‘s claim over the Northern Frontier District (NFD110) and declared that it was ready to defend her territory militarily. When Kenya turned down Somali demands, Somalia encouraged and helped the Somalis in Kenya to fight for the right to secede between 1963 and 1967111. That war came to an end when the leaders of Kenya and Somalia met in Arusha, Tanzania, in October 1967 under the chairmanship of Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and signed a Memorandum of Understanding112. That memorandum, inter alia, called for the normalization of relations between the two countries, the ending of hostile propaganda and emergency regulations, and the appointment of a Working Committee of Kenya, Somalia and Zambia to implement the agreement113That did not, however, mean an end to the Somali problem in Kenya. For example, early in 1981, a Somali irredentist movement
109S. Makinda, ‗Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa‘, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1982,p.97
110 Northern Frontier District (NFD) was the name used to refer to the NorthEastern part of Kenya especially in the colonial period. It is occupied by ethnic Somalis. Under the constitution of Kenya 2010, it comprises Garissa, Wajir, Isiolo, Marsabit and Mandera counties. Prior to and during the early years of independence (for Somalia and Kenya), the NFD expressed interest to unite with the Somali nation to form a greater Somalia. This was denied by independent Kenya and marked a series of guerilla wars between Kenya‘s security forces and secessionist groupings supported by Mogadishu.
See S. Cheboi, ‗welcome to Garissa, eastern and central Africa‘s safest town‘, Special report, Daily Nation, Tuesday June 15, 2010.p19.
111 This war is also called the Shifta War. Shifta is a Somali word meaning ‗insurgents‘.
112‗Arusha Agreement on Ending of Kenya-Somali Border Hostilities, Somali-Ethiopian Agreement‘, Keesing‘s Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives) vol.13, November 1967.p.
22386.
113S. Makinda, ‗Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa‘, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1982,p.97
The Working Committee of Kenya was to implement the Memorandum of understanding
51 calling itself the NFD Liberation Front114 toured several Arab states soliciting for arms and money and later announced that it was determined to ―liberate‖ about 200,000 Somalis in Kenya.115
The current Somali refugee crisis in Kenya can be traced to the overthrow116 of Somalia‘s president Siad Barre117 by forces led by Mohamed Farah Aidid118 in January 1991.
Following the coup, Somalia was left without a central government and fighting among clan factions that followed soon after made Somalia a failed state as it slowly descended into a civil war. Attempts by the USA to intervene in the civil war failed in 1993 leading to the infamous Black Hawk Down119 in Mogadishu where dozens of USA special forces were killed after failing to capture Mohamed Farah Aidid120.
114NFD Liberation Front, as the name suggests, was formed in 1980-1981 to purportedly ‗liberate about200, 000 Somalis in Kenya‘. The group sought to advance secessionist ideology in NFD hoping to‗re-unite‘ it with the greater Somalia. This was reported in Kenyan papers in May 1981. See, for instance, The Weekly Review (Nairobi) 8May, 1981.See also Rono Jona, ‗Kenya Foreign Policy‘, Africa Foreign Policies Stephen Wright (ed.) (Colorado: Westview Press,1999), 10
115 This was reported in Kenyan papers in May 1981. See, for instance, The Weekly Review (Nairobi) 8May, 1981.See also Rono Jona, ‗Kenya Foreign Policy‘ Africa Foreign Policies Stephen Wright (ed.) (Colorado:
Westview Press,1999), 10
116S. Beswick, ‗If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!‘ Rape, Suicide, and Violence: The Voices of Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps‘, Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue: Women in the Horn of Africa: Oral Histories, Migrations, and Military and Civil Conflict, 2001, p.77. Since the January 1991 overthrow of the dictatorial regime of Mohammed Siad Barre by forces led by Farah Aidid, the country has been without any effective central government or formal economy.
117Siad Barre was overthrown in January 1991 and died while in exile in Lagos, Nigeria on January 2, 1995, reportedly of a heart attack.
118 Mohamed Farah Aidid was a Somali Military commander and political leader. He was the chairman of United Somali Congress (USC) and later led the Somali National Alliance (SNA).He declared himself president of Somalia in June 1995 although his declaration did not receive international recognition. Aidid died on 2 August 1996 after succumbing to injuries inflicted on the battlefield a week earlier.
119 Black Hawk Down refers to the Battle of Mogadishu between USA Special forces and militia allied to Mohamed Farah Aidid, on October 3 1993, after a failed attempt to capture him in Mogadishu. It is reported
52 During the colonial era, when Italy and Great Britain occupied the region and most clans shunned Western education, one Somali clan group, the Mejerteen121, became the most highly educated. Thus, in modern times many Mejerteen served as bureaucrats in the Siad Barre regime and, hence, became among the wealthiest of Somalis, but also highly unpopular122. The unpopularity of the Mejerteen clan led by Siad Barre created a conducive environment for the coup that overthrew him in January 1991. Consequently, thousands of Somalis crossed to Kenya to seek asylum leading to the establishment of Dadaab refugee camp in 1991.
Two decades later, little has changed. A refugee complex designed for 90,000 inhabitants in 1992 is now bursting at the seams. By May 2013, the official number of registered
that 19 USA Special forces and about 1000 Somali militia and civilians were killed. Since then, the USA withdrew from direct combat in Somalia and has largely resorted to ‗technical assistance‘ in support of the struggling Somalia government after decades of being a failed state. Mark Bowden later wrote a book titled Black Hawk Down based on investigative research on the battle.
120 Mohamed Farah Aidid and his senior commanders were being sought after for attacking humanitarian and UN staff working in Somalia. He was also accused of attacking Unified Task Force(UNITAF), a USA- led United Nations sanctioned multinational force, which operated in Somalia between 5December 1992- 4May 1993.UNITAF was to create a protected environment to facilitate humanitarian operations in Southern Somalia.Seewww.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm(accessed 1 December 2017).
121 One of the clans in Somalia that had embraced education and became wealthy but unpopular. Siad Barre belonged to this clan. See S. Beswick, ‗If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!‘ Rape, Suicide, and Violence: The Voices of Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps‘, Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue: Women in the Horn of Africa: Oral Histories, Migrations, and Military and Civil Conflict, 2001, p.77
122S. Beswick, ‗If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!‘ Rape, Suicide, and Violence: The Voices of Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps‘, Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue: Women in the Horn of Africa: Oral Histories, Migrations, and Military and Civil Conflict, 2001, p.77
53 refugees in Dadaab was 425,238123 with 51% of them being women, living on land with an official capacity of 190,000 people. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its March 2013 report places the number of refugees in Kenya at 474,483124 .The 2011/2012 famine caused the latest exodus –a crisis which estimates suggest killed up to 260,000 Somalis, and forced 150,000 across the Kenyan border.125