3.2. The position of the Federal Government of Somalia on Repatriation
3.3.2 Perceptions of the UNSC as a UNHCR partner agency
In this section, I discuss the condition of physical security in Somalia as reported by various security actors including the UNSC and NGO‘s. These reports are important because repatriation works on the assumption that security conditions at home must have improved. While the researcher was unable to empirically collect data in Somalia because of logistical, security and financial constraints, it is reported that civilians in south and central Somalia persistently face insecurity and risk being targeted for grave human rights abuses. These include, for instance, indiscriminate and targeted violence, including rape and murder, as well as extortion.378 Although it is unclear who is responsible for attacks on civilians in all circumstances, it is widely believed that all parties to the conflict, including the SNAF379 and allied militia, as well as Al Shabaab, carry out such attacks. AMISOM, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces have also been responsible for attacks that have killed and injured civilians, including and as a result of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).380
377J. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 2005, p. 464.
378 Amnesty International (2014a:16). No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 52/001/2014. London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like- home-2014.pdf
379 Somali National Armed Forces(SNAF).Somali national army was one of the strongest military in Africa
before the 1991 coup of President Siad
Barre.Seehttps://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/somalia/personnel.htm [Accessed 2 February, 2018]
380For more information see: Amnesty International, Returns to south and central Somalia: a violation of international law, 15 May 2013.
134 Although it is difficult to monitor the impact of the conflict on civilians, given limited access to many parts of south and central Somalia, and the ongoing absence of a system to track civilian casualties381,it is generally agreed that violence of every kind is still rampant. The conflict is characterized by violations of international humanitarian lawand human rights abuses by all sides in conflict, and civilians often fall victim. For example, the port town of Kismayu saw intense clan-based fighting in June 2013 over a longstanding dispute382as well as disagreements over the creation of a semi-autonomous state, Jubaland.383One incident alone resulted in the reported deaths of at least 70 civilians with hundreds more wounded.384 At least 18 of those said to be killed were children.385 On 17 November 2013, at least 25 people were killed when heavy fighting broke out between government forces and local armed militia in Lower Shabelle region in an area
381Security Council resolution 2036 (2012) commended the commitment of AMISOM to establish a Civilian Casualty, Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) to track and investigate incidents of civilian harm, and provide compensation when required. The cell has yet to be established.
382The rift between the Marehan and Ogaden clans over control of Juba land and Kismayu . It demonstrates how these sub-clans struggle for power, yet both support the Darod for the
larger control of the Somalia government. It is important to note that the Harti sub-clans including the Majerten control Puntland.[Interview of Somali refugees at Dadaab camps, 12th November 2016]See also International Training Programme for Conflict Management, ‗Clan and State Politics‘, International Commentary Vol. IX no. 34, 2013,pp.15-16.
383Jubaland is semi-autonomous region where Kismayu is located. The control of Juba land is therefore necessary for one to control the strategic port city of Kismayu , the biggest port city in Somalia.
Human Rights Watch, Somalia: Civilians Killed in Kismayo Clashes, 26 June 2013,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/somalia-civilians-killed-kismayo-clashes[Accessed18.12.15]. See also International Training Programme for Conflict Management, ‗Clan and State Politics‘, International Commentary Vol. IX no. 34, 2013,p.16
384UN, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, S/2013/521, para 17.
385UN, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, S/2013/521, para 41.
135 known as Km 50.386 On 13 December 2013, further clan based fighting broke out across Lower Shabelle region killing at least 10 people and injuring dozens others.387
Reports indicate that schools and hospitals continue to be targeted, and while challenges in access make it difficult to determine the extent, the UN has identified 72 attacks on schools and 12 on hospitals in 2012, and verified seven attacks on schools between January and March 2013.388 On 15 January 2013, six children were killed when AMISOM accidentally fired at a madrasa (Islamic school) in Lego, Lower Shabelle.389The worst single bomb in Somalia‘s history hit a Somali hotel on 14th October 2017,killing at least hundreds390 people, raising questions on future stability prospects for a country that was seemingly stabilizing.
Unlawful killings continue to take place with frequency. Reportedly, killings by the SNAF are often as a result of weak command control and discipline, while Al Shabaab continue to cause civilian harm through an indiscriminate use of weapons, as well as
386See http://allafrica.com/stories/201311170308.html for further details [accessed 18 December 2015].
387Reports to Amnesty International, 16 Dec 2015, on file.
388UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, Annex 8.1, para 14 and 17.
389UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, para 139. See also UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 September 2013.AMISOM may have mistaken the children for Al Shabaab.
390 ‗Somalia: Atleast 230 dead in Mogadishu blast‘, BBC, 16thOctober, 2017. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41621660 [Accessed 3rd February 2018].See also Nor, O., and Gray, J., ‗Mogadishu bombings kill ‗unprecedented number of civilians‘, CNN News, 16th October, 2017.Available at https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/15/africa/somalia-mogadishu- blast/index.html[Accessed 3rd February 2018]
136 targeted killings.391Unlawful attacks on civilians are particularly common on main transport routes. Men, sometimes wearing government uniforms, have reportedly fired on transport vehicles, often killing or injuring civilian passengers.392
Despite the presence of AMISOM in Somalia, Al Shabaab, although weakened, continue to reign terror on civilians and even make daring raids393on foreign militaries under AMISOM, such as the Kenya Defence Forces. Security in Mogadishu and surrounding cities has been improving considerably since Al Shabaab fighters were dislodged from these regions by coalition of AMISOM and SNAF forces. Somalia‘s capital city has not seen running battles for months. Business vibrancy is slowly but steadily returning.394The prevailing sense of optimism has prompted thousands of refugees in Kenya and diaspora Somalis elsewhere to return home. Still, normalcy is an elusive prospect. Suicide bombings, targeted assassinations and sporadic clashes between Al Shabaab fighters and Somali government security forces remain common, with the worst single suicide
391UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, para 139. See also UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, para 133.
392Amnesty International., No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced,p.17,AFR 52/001/2014,London, Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-home- 2014.pdf [Accessed 3rd February 2017]
393 For instance, the Al Shabaab ambushed a Kenyan military base in El-Adde in Somalia reportedly killing several KDF soldiers on the morning of 15 January2016.This bloody attack was carried as headlines in Kenya‘s popular newspapers on the 16th January 2016.The Standard, for instance, carried the headline
‗Bloody battle for KDF troops‘. This attack on the KDF camp in Somalia could be a justification that Somalia is still too dangerous for any meaningful repatriation.
394Ali, L., ‗‘Mogadishu is like Manhattan‘: Somalis return home to accelerate progress‘, Guardian – January2013 http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/jan/11/mogadishu-manhattan- somalis-returnprogress
137 bombing in Somalia claiming hundreds on 14thOctober, 2017395. Despite significant losses, Al Shabaab fighters still control a large swath of land in southern Somalia.396 That makes most refugees nervous and uncertain about returning to Somalia. According to a study report by Heritage Institute for Policy Studies titled Hasty Return, only 6% of those interviewed in Kenya said they are prepared to return home immediately. 63% said they considered Somalia their home and are willing to return if conditions continue to improve, and more regions are recovered from Al Shabaab fighters. 20% said they were not willing to return to Somalia because the conditions under which they fled remain.397This implies that by the time the Tripartite Agreement for return was signed in November 10th2013, majority refugees were considering returning to Somalia in the future if physical safety conditions improved and Al Shabaab was defeated.
In sum, the UN and international organizations operating in Somalia have recognized that conditions are not yet conducive for the return of Somali refugees.398 Indeed several reports399by UN and NGO‘s have warned of the security situation in Somalia at the
395O. Nor, and J. Gray, ‗Mogadishu bombings kill ‗unprecedented number of civilians‘, CNN News, 16th October, 2017.Available at https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/15/africa/somalia-mogadishu- blast/index.html[Accessed 3rd February 2018]
396As early February, Al Shabaab controls much of Middle Shabelle, parts of Lower Shabelle, almost all of Galgaduud, Bakool, Gedo and Middle Juba regions.
397Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Hasty repatriation: Kenya’s attempt to send Somali refugees home.
Mogadishu, HIPS, 2013, p.19 Retrieved from //www.heritageinstitute.org/wp- content/uploads/2013/03/HIPS_Hasty_Repatriation_ENGLISH.pdf
398UNOCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin, September 2013.
399UN Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 8 January 2016, S/2016/27,
138 present time, expressing concern about the current conditions in Somalia and noting, among others, the following:
(i)There remains a large presence of local and national militias contributing to local insecurity;
(ii)There is not sufficient protection for returnees;
(iii)There has been a surge of human rights violations including gender-based sexual violence;
(iv)A large influx of refugees being returned will likely destabilize the situation in Somalia and undermine the fragile authority of the government;
(v)The new government does not have the capacity to provide assistance to returning refugees;
(vi)The situation in Somalia remains fluid – there are many unknowns such as whether AMISOM‘s mandate will be renewed and if so, for how long;
(vii)While the situation has stabilized in Mogadishu, it is remains extremely difficult for NGOs and international agencies to operate in southern Somalia;
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5698a0b64.html, para. 12. According to the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, in February 2016 ‗Somalia was once again among the deadliest countries for civilians, with 107 killed‘, Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Global Extremism in February 2016,
http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Extremism%20Monitor%2002.16.pdf, p. 3. In January 2016 Somalia ‗saw more incidents related to violent extremism than any other country‘. Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Global Extremism in January 2016,
http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/reports-analysis/report/global-extremism- january-2016, pp. 7-8. ‗The volatile security situation has deteriorated since the beginning of the year [2015], making the delivery of assistance and protection services to people in need
even more dangerous‘, OCHA, 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview, 25 November 2016,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/somalia/document/2016-somalia-humanitarian- needs-overview p. 11. In January 2016.[Accessed 4thFebruary 2018]
139 (viii)Corruption remains rampant400.