66 individual states that host refugees and the prevailing circumstances and contexts in these states.
67 reluctant to repatriate, claiming that the conditions back home may not be conducive for return.
For example, despite UNHCR‘s efforts to promote the repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan165, many refused to repatriate citing, inter alia, the inability of Taliban government of Afghanistan to offer them the required protection for them to be safe. As a result, by 2006, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was about 2.5 million who were not ready to leave because of insecure life conditions, less working chances and many social problems in Afghanistan. Thus, a large population was not willing to leave Pakistan because the conditions166 in Afghanistan were not fully secure for peaceful life.
This, therefore, implies that while the UNHCR felt that Afghanistan was safe for return, the refugees themselves, on the contrary, felt unsafe and insecure hence could not embrace the repatriation process as anticipated by the UNHCR.
These contrary opinions held by the UNHCR and Afghan refugees raise the question as to whether the refugees were involved fully in the whole process of repatriation. As it appears, it is possible that refugees may refuse to repatriate not necessarily because it is
165 A. Alam, ‗Barriers to Repatriation of Afghan Refugees‘, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Science, vol.2.no.3.p. 60. The first wave of Afghan refugees to Pakistan began during the Soviet War in the 1970‘s.Although many have returned to Afghanistan since 2002, UNHCR in 2017 reported that there are up to 1.3 million Afghans in Pakistan.
166A. Bialczyk, ‗Voluntary Repatriation‘ and the Case of Afghanistan: A Critical Examination‘, Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, Oxford University, Working Paper Series, 2008.The conditions in Afghanistan were harsh with rampant insecurity, poverty, unemployment etc. The Taliban government is also accused of being too weak to govern decisively.
68 unsafe to return, but because they felt they were excluded from the decision to return and hence have no control over, or do not own the process. The decision by many Afghan refugees not to return suggests that their aspirations may not have been captured during the decision making process. This implies that sustainable repatriation is only possible with the involvement of refugees. This involvement should go beyond that of ‗spectators‘
to being actually involved in the ‗game‘.
After several Tripartite Agreements between the Afghanistan government(s), Islamic Republic of Pakistan and UNHCR regarding the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, at the latest Tripartite Commission meeting signed on 11 March, 2015 in Islamabad, Pakistan provided for a more active role for the refugees in the repatriation process. For instance, all the three parties of the Tripartite Agreement, inter alia:
Underlined the importance of ensuring the inclusion of returnees into the new reform agenda of Afghanistan, its social policy and development processes at local, provincial and national sector levels: inter alia by facilitating their access to National Priority Programs, the National Solidarity Program, growth and job creation plans as well as by prioritizing community-based (bottom-up) investments benefiting both returnees and local communities in areas of return.167
167 Conclusions of the 25th Tripartite Commission Meeting held in Islamabad, Pakistan on 11th March 2015.p.1
69 The protracted refugee crisis in Pakistan, where Afghan refugees have sought refuge in Pakistan for at least 30 years, has seen the tripartite parties go beyond just calling for voluntary repatriation, but ensuring that returnees are included in the reform agenda of Afghanistan in all levels and sectors.
In the case of Burundi, many of the refugees from the previous 1972 caseload, especially those who had lost relatives, bitterly complained that they were duped by the international community into believing that it had been safe for them to return to Burundi.168 Unlike the Afghan refugees, the Burundian refugees seem to have been unaware of the state of unsafety and insecurity in Burundi before choosing to repatriate.
This may have been occasioned by lack of information regarding their country of origin which led to the regrettable decision to repatriate. Such instances may lead to ‗recycled‘
refugees where refugees decide to go back to the refugee camps because of difficult circumstances at home. In another instance, following the first tripartite agreement of July 24, 2003169, repatriation of some Rwandan refugees from Uganda took place. However, by August 2004, nearly 700 out of 2,000 repatriated refugees returned to Uganda citing persecution170 in Rwanda. These recycled refugees argued that they had been repatriated
168 International Crisis Group Report of 25 November 1999, ‗Burundi Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor to the Burundi Peace Process‘ p.3
169 Tripartite Agreement signed between UNHCR, Government of Uganda and Rwanda on voluntary repatriation of up to 26000 Rwandan refugees in Uganda.
170D. Williams, and Jesuit Refugee Service, ‗Is Rwanda Safe? An inquiry into the reluctance of Rwandan refugee community to repatriate‘, 16 August 2004, p.6
70 against their will due to push factors and threats171 from the Government of Uganda.
These examples are indications of a glaring difference of opinion between the refugees and the tripartite signatories regarding the perception of safety and physical security at home.
It is worth noting that no repatriation is facilitated by UNHCR without Tripartite Agreements of the concerned countries i.e. either the home country of the refugee, the first country of asylum or any other country of asylum. Repatriation is the most common form of permanent solution to refugee problems besides local integration and resettlement. Local integration largely depends on the compatibility of refugees with the host population and the willingness of the host state to integrate them. Many host states in Africa and beyond have not embraced local integration as it is perceived as too delicate and a factor that could complicate domestic political, economic and social systems.
Resettlement on the other hand may be a better option to many refugees but only few refugees(less than 1%) of all refugees globally may benefit from being resettled in a third country. For instance, between 1999-2009some 810,000 refugees were resettled, compared to 9.6 million refugees who were able to repatriate.172 Considering that 59.5 million people were forced to flee their homes by end of 2014, up from 51.2 million a
171 C. Karooma, ‗Reluctant to Return? The Primacy of Social Networks in the repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Uganda, Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, Working Paper series no. 103, 2014.
172 UNHCR, Global Trends, 2009.
71 year earlier173, repatriation remains the only most viable solution when dealing with such large populations.
While repatriation to home countries is often regarded as the best and most practiced form of permanent solution to refugee settlement, the timing of this is mostly contested.
The question of whether home is now safe and conducive for return is always debatable.
This is made even more complex since many refugee states in Africa will always consider repatriation as a permanent settlement even when conditions that led to the flight have not yet changed. As far as Rutinwa is concerned:
African States have become less committed to asylum. Instead of opening their doors to persons fearing harm in their own States, African countries now prefer refugees to receive protection in ‗safe zones‘ or similar areas within their countries of origin. African States now routinely reject refugees at the frontier or return them to their countries of origin even if the conditions from which they have fled still persist. Refugees who manage to enter and remain in host countries receive ‗pseudo-asylum‘. Their physical security, dignity and material safety are not guaranteed. As for solutions, African States are less inclined to grant local settlement or resettlement opportunities to refugees. What they seem to prefer is repatriation at the earliest opportunity, regardless of the situation in the countries of origin.174
The questions, in terms of this dissertation, include: Is the timing right for the repatriation of Somali refugees to their home country Somalia? What are the indicators that this is indeed the right time? Are refugees willing and ready to repatriate back home? How will
173 UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014.
174 B. Rutinwa, The End of Asylum? The Changing Nature of Refugee Policies in Africa, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 5, Geneva, UNHCR, May 1999, 2, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c34.html (last visited 11 Aug. 2010).
72 Somalia, Kenya and the UNHCR ensure a successful repatriation? How were refugee perceptions (if at all they were gathered) incorporated into the Tripartite agreement?
How can refugee centered approaches on repatriation be applied more broadly in Africa?
Kenya has expressed fear regarding the long-term hosting of Somali refugees, with increasing calls for the exploration of available options towards permanent settlement of Somali refugees.
Despite the rhetoric assuring refugees that Mogadishu is secure and the Government of Kenya being keen to rid Garissa of its inconvenient guests, Dadaab‘s refugees are still reluctant to leave. The reasons for this vary, but most still feel it is too unsafe to return175. Others feel there are more opportunities in Kenya, or simply hold no ties to their
―homeland‖, having been born or raised in the camp176.It is interesting though, that both the refugees and the host state cite their security fears; for Kenya, the presence of refugees poses a security threat (especially because of the porous Kenya-Somalia border) while for many refugees one of the greatest impediments to repatriation is the fear and insecurity
175Abdallah, Interviewed by Peter Kirui, 27th September 2016,Dagahaley camp(Dadaab),A1. He rejected the thought that Somalia was safe for return, arguing that ‗More violence is experienced in Somalia, no clear information about the situation‘. Abdallah shares this views with thousands of refugees in Dadaab refugee camp
176 Hussein, Interviewed by Peter Kirui, 27th September 2016, Dagahaley camp, C1.He asserted that he was not going to Somalia because, ‗I am among those who came in 1991 at a tender age. I do not have home to go back to‘.
C. Kamau, &J. Fox , ‗The Dadaab Dilemma: a Study on Livelihood Activities and Opportunities for Dadaab Refugees‘ Itermedia Development Consultants Report of August 2013 commissioned by Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
73 inside Somalia177. Apart from security, many host states complain that refugees compete with locals for scarce resources such as land, jobs and environmental resources (e.g.
water, rangeland or firewood), and overwhelm existing infrastructure such as schools, housing and health facilities. These concerns underpin the state's rationale for keeping refugees in camps, where they can be assisted and managed by international refugee agencies178.
The quest for permanent settlement of refugees is indeed more pressing in Kenya than in any other country in Africa. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), as of mid 2013, UNHCR recorded Kenya as hosting the majority of refugees in the East and Horn of Africa region with 550,506 refugees. In the Southern African region, South Africa hosted the majority of refugees at 65,233. In Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, the Democratic Republic of Congo hosted the highest number at 183,244 while in the West African region; Liberia hosted the majority of refugees standing at 58,852179.
The fact that Kenya hosts the highest number of refugees in Africa does not only justify the need for the proposed study but the urgency too of finding a lasting settlement
177Omar, Interviewed by Peter Kirui, 27th September 2016, Dagahaley camp, J1. Omar maintained that,
‗Somalia is full of gang militia, no place for non combatants like me‘.
178K. Jacobsen, ‗Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African State-building‘, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 , 2002, p.580.
179United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Global trends report 2012. Geneva, Switzerland: Division of Programme Support and Management, 2013.
74 solution for refugees in cases of protracted conflicts. Given that repatriation remains the optimum solution to refugee problems, especially when dealing with large numbers of refugees, there is evidently a need to better understand past repatriation experiences and the problems that have been generated by repatriation processes180. Although repatriation has been termed as the optimum solution when dealing with large numbers, other researchers note that ‗what is being promoted as the most desirable solution to refugee crises is poorly understood social and spatial phenomena‘.181