6.2 Questionnaire results
6.2.4 Multiple challenges faced by the MCZ in fostering reconciliation and healing
There was some disagreement as to whether the church had become a product of colonial legacy. The theme on ‘maintaining colonial legacy’ was identified in Chapter Five. It appeared to some that colonial legacy was maintained through the church’s liturgy in hymnbooks which promoted the perpetrators and as a result the church failed to challenge offenders. But the Herald (2013), maintained that the church did not remain quiet during 2013: it harmonised election processes in the face of violence, rebuked and condemned acts of violence through a programme called Ecumenical Peace Observation Initiative (EPOI).
There was unanimous agreement that funding was inadequate. It was also confirmed in Chapter Five that due to unsustainable funding some of the programmes were postponed, suspended or cancelled. Findings by Muchena (2004) pointed out that the entire religious community was affected by lack of enough resources. Dube and Makwerera (2012) confirmed that lack of moral
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and financial support from the government to run the programmes was a major drawback.
According to Haider (2010), compensation of the victims failed due to financial crises which were influenced by lack of political will. Funding was needed to rebuild and restock the homes that had been destroyed, for scholarships for vulnerable children, for equity in redistribution of land and for compensating for loss of property.
Most agreed that internal divisions over partisan politics were a challenge. Matikiti (2014) claimed that the church could not effectively carry out the role of peace-building due to partisan politics. This was worsened by the divide and rule policy of the government. There were divisions between mainline churches and Pentecostal churches; as a result the church’s focus was redirected to attacking each other rather than putting in efforts for advocacy for peace and justice. In Munemo and Nciizah (2014), partisanship was exposed as Independent African Initiated Churches threw their weight behind Robert Mugabe while the ERB identified itself with the opposition and the oppressed. The other wing of the church which was against lack of social justice was viewed as an enemy of the state, hence was not given space to carry out reconciliation and healing programmes. As indicated in Chapter Five, regarding the theme of
‘division over partisan politics’, the church had members in opposition political parties, hence any peace-building related programme was condemned as having a regime change agenda.
Also the Zimbabwean church denominations were split along political lines; some wanted to support the government while others supported the opposition.
There was general agreement regarding a lack of political will. This was confirmed by the results of the questionnaire analysis in Chapter Five. Participant R53 felt that the government had never been interested in carrying out proper reconciliation and healing programmes, R119 noted that the proposal to effect TRC was rejected by the government, R74 pointed out that any church denomination or religious organisation or CSOs criticising the political violence became victimised, hence political will was clearly lacking in Zimbabwe to support peace- building initiatives.
Still on the issue of lack of political will, Haider’s (2010) findings established that CSOs called for transitional justice mechanisms to be effected, but government did not cooperate;
perpetrators of violence often could not stand for trials due to old age, some had died and the passage of time overshadowed the culprits. Murambadoro (2015) and Hororo (2015) identified that intense surveillance led to ineffective operations of the church which was grappling with
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fear. Reports from the fact-finding Chihambakwe and Dumbutshena Commissions of 1980s atrocities were not published by the government because truth disclosure was seen as a betrayal of the government and ZANU-PF (ruling party); this was a violation of human rights leading to condemnation by the international community. Furthermore, Hororo (2015) pointed out that after the successive defeating elections in 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2008, ZANU-PF declined to concede power to MDC-T and in 2008 prepared for war by importing arms from China. When GPA developed ONHRI, it mandated NPRC to run the national healing and reconciliation exclusive of the church despite it being a neutral entity that was willing to facilitate peace- building programmes, which indicated there was no political will at all.
In terms of the lack of public counselling centres, there was general agreement. The Standard of Zimbabwe (28 September - 4 October 2008) reported that the church and civil society had established the structures to run healing processes similar to those of the South African TRC, immediately after GNU of 2009. Dube and Makwerera (2012) also noted that the role of engaging victims and perpetrators by peace-building actors was shot down as infrastructure’s operations lacked the national mandate as well as moral and financial support from political authorities. This undermined the function of a public counselling centre which was an essential tool for counselling traumatised people as proposed by R173. R140 identified that lack of skilled counsellors meant that some survivors with post-traumatic stress disorder were not attended to. In addition, the lack of public counselling centres was worsened by poor government legislative reforms as in Machakanja (2010). The agenda of the MCZ conference in 2005 proposed that counselling centers should be set up throughout all districts to enable the church to deal with various issues that affected people. However, MCZ (2013) conference agenda noted the same issue of setting up public counselling and healing centres; evidently nothing had been done and this issue resurfaced after eight years. The MCZ (2013) minutes of the conference confirmed that the church had failed in this regard due to lack of financial resources and lack of political will. Survivors, especially in rural areas, could not find where they could come for counselling or to meet and share experiences.
The challenge of the lack of skilled counsellors within the MCZ personnel was also raised. In the view of R140, the lack of skilled counsellors within the MCZ had led many survivors with post-traumatic stress disorder remaining unattended to. This was also highlighted in the findings of NANGO (2012): ministers of this era were not professionally equipped for handling effects of political violence such as psychological therapy of both survivors and perpetrators,
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hence the need for developing these skills. Munemo and Nciizah (2014) noted that the church should be responsible for conflict transformation in society by training pastors and lay people to acquire skills for peace-building processes which includes counselling expertise. As established by Machinga (2012), many unskilled pastors were involved in counselling traumatised survivors. The crisis of skilled personnel is reflected in the report by the Daily News (22 June 2003) that the church participated in training programmes for counselling skills, resolution and management of conflict in order to support processes of healing and reconciliation. This was a positive move but the church was reacting rather than being proactive.
Respondents agreed that there was insufficient education for reconciliation and healing and truth telling. As pointed out by R91 since truth-telling was lacking in the Zimbabwean situation, healing and reconciliation need a new dimension to bring together the wounded and the perpetrators so that relationships can be rebuilt among blood relatives, church members and the entire community. With regard to this matter of truth-telling, Haider (2010) and Murambadoro (2015) established that truth-telling was meant to promote reconciliation and healing after acknowledgment, apology, reburial of mass graves and establishment of memorial sites and museums; hence history can be celebrated and pain eased after facilitation of dialogue between perpetrators and victims. Murambadoro (2015) confirmed that intense surveillance of actors of peace-building led to ineffective operations to disclose the truth. Findings from MCZ (1996) minutes of conference established that awareness workshop training in peace-building was held at various levels of the church. What was then missing was implementation of the system of a TRC due to lack of political will and enforcement of draconian laws of AIPPA and POSA. The TRC system is connected to truth-telling, without a TRC, truth-telling was restricted. As described in the theoretical framework in Chapter Three, truth-telling entails exchange of truths openly which assures justice, promotes social and psychological healing, fosters reconciliation and deters recurring violence.
There were mixed reactions regarding the supportiveness or lack thereof from CSOs. Those who felt CSOs did not support the church in peace-building initiatives suggested this was because the support was limited due to lack of government legislative reforms. As established in Sisulu et al. (2009), civil society was further threatened by the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill passed through Parliament in August 2005. This led to withdrawal of any kind of assistance as identified in the MCZ (2013) agenda of conference which noted that many
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international donors had withdrawn their support due to the unfriendly political atmosphere.
Furthermore, Machakanja (2010) discovered that draconian laws like AIPPA and POSA hampered peace-building initiatives by the church and CSO in Zimbabwe by prohibiting freedom of speech and assembly. The enforcement was intensified by surveillance over the actors as recorded by Murambadoro (2015). Despite the issue of unfriendly political terrain, Haider (2010), Hororo (2015) and Muchena (2004) established that CSOs played a positive role together with the church in reconciliation and healing processes.
There was ambivalence regarding whether government legislative reforms were poor. ZCC, ZCBC and EFZ (2006) established that the existence of contentious laws: the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) which effectively barred freedom of assembly, expression and access to media and hampered peace-building initiatives for church and CSOs, as in the findings of Machakanja (2010). Findings of Sisulu et al. (2009) confirmed that restrictive legislation created an environment difficult for proper functioning of civil society, preventing the holding of meetings without police clearance and generally denying Zimbabweans basic freedoms of assembly, speech and association. There was Apartheid-like legislation such as POSA, AIPPA and BSA which closed down media space. In addition to closing down newspapers (including the bombing of printing presses), there were attacks on journalists and independent media stakeholders. Participants such as R15 noted that the government had imposed restrictive measures against freedom of assembly, expression and media which made it difficult for programmes to run smoothly. It was not easy for the churches to be granted dispensation for public assembly or media publications by police. R53 said that repressive laws were instituted by the government and ministers of religion who were famous for being critics of the government’s injustices were arrested in Bulawayo in 2007 over the issue of public gathering. Gifford (2002) established that lack of democratisation leads to security structures becoming partisan, corrupt tendencies from the government, elimination of opponents, no freedom of expression, torturing, property destruction, electoral irregularities and the collapse of social institutions.
It was established that fear of victimisation affected the church badly in terms of trying to be effective in its ministry of reconciliation and healing; because of fear of being associated with the opposition political parties, the church failed to intervene for peace, especially during the Gukurahundi period, hence it took a backstage position (R99 and R122). With regard to fear,
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findings from Banana (1996) and Dube (2006) showed that MCZ and other churches in general, grappled with fear due the 1980s violence while Matikiti (2014) confirmed that Zimbabwean churches, except ZCBC, failed in their roles due to fear and identity crisis of association with former colonial regime.
Dube (2006), Chitando (2013) and Matikiti (2014) established that only ZCBC stood up against all injustices fearlessly with pastoral letters; the MCZ would hide and write pastoral letters collectively through ZCC and HOCD. The MCZ (2006) minutes of conference confirmed there was fear within the church, seen through exclusion of ministers to serve in private sectors such like Christian Alliance Organisation for peace-building.
With regard to the theology of silence from a religious perspective, participants R77, R209, R4 and R30 claimed that the church had been silent, hiding and negating its role; they felt it could have been more vocal, visible and pragmatic in challenging all forms of human rights abuses during or after political violence. These findings were also confirmed by NANGO (2012) that the church was gripped with docility and a non-interference attitude in the face of political violence. Banana (1991) accused the church of being comfortable with the theology of silence, of lacking the theology of condemning, confrontation, redemption and protest, hence rendering itself ineffective. According to Matikiti (2014), all denominational churches except ZCBZ lacked advocacy statements against the government’s abusive actions of human rights. Dube (2006), Chitando (2013) and Matikiti (2014) criticised MCZ for failing to be like ZCBC which sent pastoral letters to give hope in a hopeless situation and to give strength to act towards peace-building.
Participants R82 and R211 commented on the lack of a social justice desk within the church.
This could effectively strengthen the organisation’s role in reconciliation and it would have been ideal if the church was able to appoint an officer in charge of healing and reconciliation.
Sources from MCZ (1996) confirmed that the organisation lacked the mechanisms to establish facts over atrocities during 1980s. Findings of Matikiti (2014) encouraged Zimbabwean churches to develop relevant systems to buttress unjust government systems. Banana (1996) also confirmed that the Methodist church in Zimbabwe lacked practicality, became silent and lacked the machinery to establish facts on atrocities.
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