4.3 The Social-Security Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict
4.3.3 Oiling the Guns and Gunning for Oil
Nigeria is among the developing countries where the proliferation of SALW is manifested in crisis proportions and ―its society has become fully militarized and enmeshed in the culture of the gun‖ (Badmus, 2010: 325). This has been the tragic story of the Niger Deltans. Unhappy with the exploitative and heavy-handed nature of the Nigerian state, different oil-producing ethnic minority groups have united under various social banners to contest exploitation and as a result, ―oiling their guns as well as gunning for oil in the region‖ (Badmus, 2010: 325, emphasis added), and fighting for a fair share in the natural resources found on ‗their‘ land. The foregoing has led some scholars to describe the Niger Delta as a region that is both ―ungoverned and ungovernable,‖ (Badmus, 2010: 325; Agbiboa, 2011b) owing to the fact that the Nigerian government lacks the required gravitas and savoir faire to stem the rising tide
124 of conflict that has plagued the region in recent decades (Chatham House, 2006;
Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz, 2007: 1; Watts, 2007). According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the growing unrest in the Niger Delta is one that
―could tip towards outright warfare‖ (UNDP, 2006: 18).
Beyond this, ―the increasing sophistication of organized piracy, oil-bunkering and hostage-taking in the oil producing Niger Delta region, [as well as] the region‘s peculiar swampy geography and extensive access to international waterways combine to make the region an important distributional point for SALW proliferation in Nigeria‖ (Ogundiya, 2011: 64). The use of small arms by elements in the security services to seize power has spawned a ―militarized national psyche and culture of violence‖ (Small Arms Survey, 2001: 3). Adding a further complication to the issue of SALW proliferation in the Niger Delta is the fact that it becomes intractable to draw a distinction between lawful and unlawful trade in arms because ―weapons once officially sold to state statutory security forces are often stolen by military personnel only to re-appear on the black market as illegal weapons, thereby prolonging the intensity of conflict in the region‖
(Badmus, 2010: 326). In particular, the crisis in the Niger Delta has been aggravated by the militant approach of the Nigerian government to armed group activity while failing to seriously address any of the legitimate concerns of the irked population.
The grievances of those living in the Niger Delta are well founded. The population bears the brunt of environmental despoliation resulting from the irresponsible operations of oil companies. As we have previously stated, oil spills and gas flaring have dealt a fatal blow to fishing, farming, and the air quality in the region. In return, the population has received only a modicum of support from the Nigerian government, which benefits from the high revenues earned from the sale of crude oil. Grievously, the Niger Delta population have no control over the oil in their land,68 and no claim to the associated perks that flows from its sale. Indeed, rather than serve as a tool for ―social engineering,‖ law has been used as an ―instrument of expropriation and denial‖ in the region (Agbiboa, 2011b: 12). According to Amnesty International (2009: 9), ―The [Nigerian] Federal Government allocates permits, licenses and leases to survey, prospect for and extract oil to the oil companies, who are then automatically granted access to the land covered by their permit, lease or license.‖ In particular, the provisions of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions and other legislations such as the Territorial Waters Act (1967), the Petroleum Act (1969), the Exclusive Economic Zone Act (1978) and the
68Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Clause 44 states: ―…the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.‖
The Petroleum Act of 1969, Clause 1 states: ―the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands to which this section applies shall be vested in the State.‖
125 Land Use Act (1978) served to firmly entrench the nationalisation policy which vested ownership and control of all land and the resources therein in the Federal Government.
This contravenes the common law doctrine of quic quid plantatur solo cedit (―what is attached to the land accrues to the land and belongs to the owner‖).
Though the percentage of oil-related revenue has gone up (in the Niger Delta) from less than 2 per cent (under military rule) to 13 per cent, the bulk of this funding ends up lining the pockets of many state officials, with little visible signs of growth and development in the area (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 18). Albeit ―the incidence of poverty has declined since 1996 in the delta‖ (UNDP, 2006: 58), the lack of roads, health care and educational facilities, as well as the high level of unemployment in the region underline the insouciance and insensitivity of the Nigerian state and oil multinationals. Irked by the redundancy in the region and bent on drawing the world‘s attention to their odious condition, the Niger Delta (since the 1990s) has witnessed the emergence of a plethora of armed groups.69 According to one June 2004 anti-cult law in Rivers state, armed groups in the state number close to 100 (Best and Von Kemedi, 2005: 21-22).70
The Niger Delta has since become a hot spot for the proliferation of SALW, which the militias have used to unleash terror in the country on various occasions (Omotola, 2006:
13). For example, armed groups have hatched various nefarious plans, including the use of violent tactics in the form of ―kidnappings, battles with security forces, clashes with one another, and car bombs, which is a more recent tactic‖ (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 19). Increasingly, such groups are demonstrating sophisticated tactics and weaponry, raising concerns apropos of future violence (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 19;
Fisher-Thompson, 2007). As previously stated, the Nigerian state has often had a flair for repressive measures as a means of interrogating the activities of ethnic militias in the oil-rich region. This includes the emplacement of draconian decrees such as the one promulgated by the Abacha regime prohibiting the Ogoni‘s demand for the right to self-determination as articulated in the Ogoni Bill of Rights. The decree criminalized any disruptions of crude oil production activities as acts of treason attracting capital punishment (Ovwasa, 1999: 94-95; Omotola, 2006: 19). Noticeably, the militarization of the delta area has not helped matters. Instead, it has ―solidified the resolve of the
69Some of these agitate for change in the political situation and in the distribution of resources. In other words, it is a claim for resource control and financial revenue to be ceded to the oil-bearing states where decisions about distribution can be made, thereby taking this decision-making power out of the hands of the federal government.
70 The most prominent groups currently active in the Niger Delta is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)—some of the nefarious activities of MEND will be considered in chapter five of this study. Other groups include the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), the Niger Delta People‘s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and a number of cult groups, such as the Outlaws and Icelander (see Hazer and Horner, 2007: 19).
126 armed groups, encouraged recruitment, and heightened public support for some of these groups‖ (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 19).