37 Source: Adapted from, Agbiboa, 2010, p.483.
Achebe‘s quote is incarnated in the Niger Delta region. The plethora of natural resources in the delta should make it a region with huge potentials in terms of industrial development. Poignantly, however, these huge potentials have remained only on paper. The above paradox has led many Niger Delta inhabitants to view the oil resource as a curse rather than a blessing. Further, Nigeria has been described as a prime example of the rentier state (Kuru, 2002: 52). A rentier state is generally regarded as ―a state reliant not on the surplus production of the domestic economy or population but on externally generated revenues or rents, usually derived from an extractive industry such as oil‖ (Kuru, 2002: 52; Karl, 2007). Frequently, a rentier state is ―without a productive outlook in the sense that revenues from natural resource rents contributes a significant proportion of the GDP and dominate national income distribution, usually at the expense of the real productive sectors of the economy‖ (Kuru, 2002: 52). In other to appreciate the context in which Nigeria is being classified as a rentier state, it is useful to put the Nigerian state in perspective.
38 well functioning state in which economic progress and democratic institutions
flourish (quoted in Omotola, 2006: 7).
Though Nigeria gained political independence in1960, the same perception of the state has endured, even after the local elites took over from the colonialists. Such a perception holds serious security implications.
2.6 (In)security
Following the end of the Cold War, the concept of ‗security‘ is back on the radar screen, this time with renewed academic interest. This allows writers in the field to think about security as something that transcends the customary notion of military defence of state interests and territory (Parris, 2001). Traditionally, security has been understood in the light of military threats to the de-emphasis of other security threats (Buzan, 1983; Cable, 1995; Mastanduno, 1998). As Baldwin (1997: 9) contends, ―during the Cold War, security studies was composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft. If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics.‖ For several decades, the predominance of the realist paradigm meant that security was subsumed under the rubric of power and the state (du Pisani, 2007: 15). As Tickner (1995: 176) notes, ―conceptually, it was synonymous with the security of the state against external dangers, which was to be achieved by increasing military capabilities.‖
The scholar Barry Buzan (1991: 16-17) is in the vanguard of viewing issues of security in a new light. According to Buzan (1984), individual security, state security and the international system are inseparably linked. He argues that ―security cannot be isolated for treatment at any single level‖ (quoted in Baldwin, 1997: 8, emphasis added).
Further, Buzan (1991: 16-17) notes that the concept of security should be broadened to include military, political, economic, societal and environmental aspects. These are:
1. That human security is a universal concern. The notion of human security is not limited to the poor or rich countries. It recognizes that there are common threats to all peoples including unemployment, crime, pollution, drugs and human right violations.
2. That the components of human security are interdependent. There are no territorial limitations to the components of human security. Famine, floods, pollution, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social integration can no longer be conceived as circumscribed to national borders.
3. That early prevention is an easier way to guarantee human security than later through intervention. When weighted in the balance, the costs of preventive measure are less than the costs of dealing with the aftermath of a security breach. For instance, rather than trying to stem the tide of death and diseases
39 after a disaster, prior emphasis placed on primary health care may lessen the potential damage to the population.
4. That people are at the [epicenter] of human security. Human security deals with how people live and breathe, how they exercise choice, how much access they have to opportunities and whether they live in conflict or peace (Buzan, 1991: 16- 17).
Human security is the most recent formulation in a general broadening of the concept of security that has gained momentum over the past three decades. Ojakorotu (2008: 39) argues that the human security paradigm is an inclusive conception of security that recognizes and accommodates a wider range of issues that borders on human concern such as security from poverty, disease, famine, illiteracy, environmental despoliation, and unemployment, which [individually or collectively] have contributed to the destruction of human existence. These are the stuff of crisis in the Niger Delta.34 From a human security perspective, the security of the state is not an end in itself: ―it is a means of providing security for people‖ (du Pisani, 2007: 18). As such, human security complements state security in four important respects:
1. Its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state.
2. Menaces to people‘s security include threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security.
3. The range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone.
4. Achieving human security includes not just protecting people, but also empowering people to fend for themselves (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003: 4).
Most human security supporters share the idea that
the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly; as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy... It has been related more to nation-states than to people... Nations have forgotten the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives (Echeverri, 2010: 58).
Continuing with the theme of human security, the comprehensive report of the U.N.
Commission on Human Security (2003: 2) reminds the reader:
Today‘s flows of goods, services, finance, people and images spotlight the many interlinkages in the security of all people... The security of one person, one community, one nation rests on the decisions of many others—sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously.
34 The shift from the authoritarian, state-centric view to the notion of human security is premised on the fact that people are the means and end of the development process.
40 According to the U.N. Commission on Human Security (2003: 2-4), human security
―complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf.‖ Further, the commission (2003: 4) adduces the following definition of human security: ―to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.‖ In practice, this means: ―protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people‘s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity‖ (U.N. Commission on Human Security, 2003: 4).
The human security paradigm presents us with two important questions. The first question is: Security for whom? du Pisani (2007: 17) argues that the answer to this basic question is that human security is people-centered. He notes that ―human security takes individuals and their communities, rather than territory, states, or governments, as its point of reference‖ (du Pisani, 2007: 17). The second question in respect of human security is: Security from what? Again, du Pisani (2007: 17) notes that
―human security addresses threats to the survival and safety of people from both military and non-military sources.‖ The first category—military—includes, inter alia,
―intra-state war, small arms proliferation, communal-based violence, insurgency, rebel activity, and civil war‖ (du Pisani, 2007: 17). The second—non-military—can include
―serious human rights violations, famine, environmental degradation, violent crime, illicit drugs, economic collapse, infectious diseases, and natural disasters‖ (du Pisani, 2007:
17).
Onuoha (2009: 248) has noted that ―Nigeria‘s national interests include preserving its sovereignty, independence and economic security, and strengthening the institutions and frameworks for the realisation of these objectives.‖ As such, national security in Nigeria revolves largely around protecting these interests through the ―optimum combination of sound military defence policies and a favourable foreign relations position, and an administrative capability to support these‖ (Onuoha, 2008: 248). At independence, Nigeria reproduced the marks of the colonial state—a state which was essentially authoritarian in nature with a security orientation that was best described as highly statist (Omotola, 2006: 8). As Ake (2000: 36) avows, ―more often than not, the post-colonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an apparatus of violence, and while its base in social forces remained extremely narrow it relied unduly on coercion for compliance, rather than authority.‖ This aside, rent-seeking activities associated with Nigeria‘s mono-cultural economy also underscore the perceptions of national security in
41 the country. As Onuoha (2009: 248) argues, ―Nigeria‘s excessive dependence on income from oil exports exposes the linkage between the rentier context of its economy and its national security.‖ To be sure, since the 1970s, Nigeria‘s economic survival have been exclusively tied, like an umbilical cord, to oil rents as the oil multinationals became quintessential to the survival of the Nigerian economy (Onuoha, 2009: 248).
Against this backdrop, any internal or external disturbance of oil production poses serious threats to Nigeria‘s security interests.
The above context, says Onuoha (2009: 249), ―reinforces the coercive approach to government which, in responding to internal legitimacy challenges, precludes more non- coercive and social-oriented approaches‖ (see, also, Imobighe, 1987; Nweke, 1988;
Olukoshi, 1992), which in turn mirrors the manner in which the state relates with its local constituencies. According to Onuoha (2009: 249), the understanding of security was
―largely characterized by the forceful repression of public discontent, the co-optation of local government officials in power and a system of top-down financial allocation.‖
Quite aside, the state security apparatuses, working in complicity with the private security forces of the companies, also play a crucial role (Isike et al. 2007). Through irresponsible practices, oil multinationals have unleashed severe havoc on the Niger Delta environment. Regrettably, the Nigerian military have shielded them from been held responsible for their environmental damage and human rights violations. The systematic neglect underlying the Niger Delta conflict has been described as a ―matrix of concentric circles of payoffs and rewards built on blackmail and violence‖ (Ibeanu, 2002: 165), involving key players from the local and international scene. According to Ibeanu (2002: 165):
The closer a person is to the centre, the greater his/her capacity to blackmail oil companies and therefore the greater his/her payoff. In time, members of the raucous inner circle fade away in a wimper and silence as a new core of vocal community leaders emerge: more blackmail, more payoffs.
Another dimension to security challenges in Africa is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). This alarming development calls for serious attention on the part of respective states in Africa as the proliferation of SALW tends to sustain tension as well as intra-state conflicts (Agbiboa, 2011b). More often than not, the currency of SALW in Nigeria has asphyxiated any efforts at ending the conflict in the Niger Delta region. The violent confrontations between the Ijaws and their immediate neighbours, the Itsekiri and Urhobos, all serve as salutary reminders (this subject will be taken up again later on in chapter three).
Crucially, two mutually exclusive conceptions inform the security situation in the Niger Delta. These two conceptions are supported by the two contending stakeholders in the
42 crisis—the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta communities. On the one hand, the Nigerian government, as well as the oil companies, endorse a traditional state- centric view of security. On the other hand, local people in the Niger Delta, as well as other stakeholders in the region, favour the human security conception (Uzodike and Isike, 2009). The conflict between these two conceptions of security in the Niger Delta is partly responsible for the pervasive tensions in the region since the 1990s. The traditional state-centric conception of security frequently favours the use of military force as a means of quelling dissent. The case of Umuechem (1990 and 1993) and that of Uwheru (2004) and Odioma (2005) are especially instructive in this regard (Uzodike and Isike, 2009).