Chapter 6 Research f"mdings
7.14 Policy Analysis
inputs, infrastructure, training, mentorship but without government departmental support that is effective, small scale farming enterprises will continue to fail.
on former commercial farmland, white owned or otherwise, and therefore cannot be counted as contributing to the redistribution of 30% of commercial agricultural land.
However, contrary to the policy specifications, the DLA continues to regard this project as an official LRAD project.
7.14.2 Beneficiary selection
LRAD policy does not specify how the beneficiary selection process is conducted. Loteni was an unique case where the shift in policy from SLAG to LRAD has disadvantaged the greater Loteni community. The decrease in the number of beneficiaries under LRAD has made the issue of selecting LRAD beneficiaries important for this case. However, the selection process is a secret held by the community at Loteni. The truth about the selection process for the LRAD beneficiaries of the Sibonginhlanhla Project may never become public knowledge as the DLA distanced itself from this process. It is unclear why 15 beneficiaries were chosen but this seems to be a decision taken by the DLA and the LDC.
Is it possible that the decrease in the number of beneficiaries for LRAD compared to land for settlement purposes (the SLAG programme at Loteni consisted of 352 beneficiaries) indicates that there is a perception that more land is required for agricultural production.
However, there is no specific mechanism in the LRAD policy for determining the number .of beneficiaries and this would vary depending on the type of category of project pursued.
7.14.3 Category of project
The LRAD policy document distinguishes between four different categories of project.
These are detailed in Chapter 4. The categorisation of projects enables stakeholders to pursue the objective of that category of project.
However, there were at least two problems identified here. Firstly, the requirements for implementation of each category of project should be stipulated in policy. There are marked differences between each category of project. The inputs and resources required vary depending on the category of project. For example,food safety net projects will not devote all their time and resources to agriculture. According to Schmitz (2001), the cut-off points in terms of hectarage for cropland, horticulture, pasture grazing and extensive grazing are 40, 15, 50 and 600 ha respectively,above which projects are considered to be
commercial. Therefore, the Sibonginhlanhla Project, which only has 40 hectares of potential cropland, whilst the remainder of the 303 hectare farm is dedicated to grazing, would not be considered a commercial enterprise and thus the category of project is easily determined if such a definition was put into practice. However, the Sibonginhlanhla Project was initiated and managed by government departments in the same way as all the other LRAD projects irrespective of the category of project. Thereby, the categorisation of project is made irrelevant.
Secondly,classification of the Sibonginhlanhla Project into one the four categories was not done in consultation with all stakeholders. As a result, the DLA categorised the Sibonginhlanhla Project as a food safety net project while the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers wanted to produce for markets. The DoA had already started to implement the business plan with its focus also on production for external markets. This created a discrepancy between the DLA's perception, the DoA perception and Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers perception of the type of farming to be undertaken.
7.14.4 Policy: Post-transfer
The post-transfer stage of the LRAD Programme was problematic for all stakeholders involved and limited action was taken to enhance this. This highlights that LRAD policy does not adequately address post-transfer agricultural development. LRAD policy only provides land on which agricultural development may take place as the LRAD grant enables for acquisition of land and some inputs. When the LRAD Programme was initiated there was no programme in place to develop emerging farmers once the land was transferred to the beneficiaries. This fact made the institutional arrangements for carrying out extension support to LRAD farmers difficult. Since the inception of CASP there is more finance available for post-transfer agricultural support. However,.CASP was designed to provide extension support to a range of agricultural programmes and not just the LRAD Programme. As a result of being designed separately, the two programmes are not aligned comprehensively.
It remains unclear if, at inception, the LRAD programme was to be complimented by CASP. This confusion arises as,firstly,the CASP was implemented four years later than the LRAD programme and, secondly, the LRAD grant, in most cases, provides finance for
some initial on-farm purchases. This points to a lack of thought between the DLA and the DoA about post-transfer support in LRAD policy. LRAD policy-makers should have been involved with the formation of CASP policy. Whether CASP was to compliment LRAD or not is now irrelevant as emerging black farmers have been waiting since 1994 for an agricultural support programme that will assist them.However, the effectiveness of CASP is still to be examined but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
7.14.5 Organisational learning
Attempts have been made to promote organisational learning. For example, a number of staff involved in land reform in South Africa were selected to visit Brazil to engage with their land reform counterparts and process there in order to bring back knowledge to South Africa (Madonsela, 2005, pers. comm.
*).
However, although this experience was useful for gaining insights into land reform in Brazil it seems that this learning opportunity has not enhanced land reform in South Africa.M&E has not been utilised fully by government as described in Chapter 3. A culture of fear predominates in institutions where M&E is seen as exposure to public scrutiny. However, this does not contribute to organisational leaming. The implementation problems of SLAG were not reviewed and as a result the same mistakes were duplicated in the LRAD programme. M&E is still focused on outputs rather than outcomes. Therefore, the M&E of LRAD remains focused on land delivery rather than the impacts of land delivery on the target population.
The learnings associated with Sibonginhlanhla Project can contribute to the implementation of future LRAD projects. A repeat of the Sibonginhlanhla Project should be avoided. M&E systems can assist in the process of organisational learning so that LRAD performance is enhanced. Additionally, projects should be monitored so that problems can be identified and LRAD project beneficiaries assisted to avoid disillusionment.
• Madonsela, M.2005. DLA field officer,Pietermaritzburg.