2.1 Sexual Agency in Foundational Discourses
2.1.1 Quranic Verses
Three sets of Quranic verses are often identified by scholars as assuming female passivity and dependency and assigning male control over female bodies and sexuality which Ali (2006:116) describes as not wholly misogynistic but certainly androcentric. These are Q 2:18725, Q 2:222-22326 and Q 4: 3427.
Ali argues these verses point to a decided “asymmetry in Gods speech” as men are spoken to about women, commanded to “behave in a particular way towards them”, and appear to have a “degree of control over women’s bodies”. In spite of this, Ali (2006: 112-113) stresses that a higher ethical standard is implied in the text, as
25 Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to your wives. They are your garments and ye are their garments. Allah knoweth what ye used to do secretly among yourselves; but He turned to you and forgave you; so now associate with them, and seek what Allah Hath ordained for you, and eat and drink, until the white thread of dawn appear to you distinct from its black thread; then complete your fast Till the night appears; but do not associate with your wives while ye are in retreat in the mosques. Those are Limits (set by) Allah: Approach not nigh thereto. Thus doth Allah make clear His Signs to men: that they may learn self-restraint (Quran 2:187, Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali 1989).
26 They ask thee concerning women's courses. Say: They are a hurt and a pollution: So keep away from women in their courses, and do not approach them until they are clean. But when they have purified themselves, ye may approach them in any manner, time, or place ordained for you by Allah. For Allah loves those who turn to Him constantly and He loves those who keep themselves pure and
Your wives are as a tilth unto you; so approach your tilth when or how ye will; but do some good act for your souls beforehand; and fear Allah. And know that ye are to meet Him (in the Hereafter), and give (these) good tidings to those who believe (Qur’an 2: 222-3 Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).
27 Menare the protectors and maintainers (qawwamūna) of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct (nushūz), admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them Means (of annoyance): For Allah is Most High, great (above you all) (Qur’an 4:34 Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).
illustrated in Q 2: 187, because even as men yield superior control and agency in sexual relationships, they are simultaneously subject to divine oversight and scrutiny.
With respect to verse, Q 4: 34, scholars have rendered a wide range of meanings.
Some sustain androcentric viewpoints, favouring male authority and female obedience. Others produce more egalitarian notions of the marital bond, stressing complementarity and limiting male power over wives (Abou El Fadl 2001; Ali 2006;
Barlas 2009; Chaudhry 2013; Doi 1989; Esposito 2001; Hidayatullah 2014; Shaikh 2007; Silvers 2006; Wadud 2006).
In particular, the notion of qiwāma 28 arising out of the word ‘qawwamūn’ meaning
“protectors, maintainers, guardians”, has been used to assert a husband’s right to command and discipline wives. Added to this, a wife’s sexual availability and sexual obedience is linked to the normative interpretation of the word nushūz (recalcitrance).29 Scholars have re-appraised both concepts from within the Islamic tradition, according with Helie and Hoodfar’s (2012: 1-2) thesis that transformative strategies and reforms in the area of sexuality arise out of the Islamic tradition itself (Ali 2006; Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015).
Regardless of the varying interpretations of Q2: 222-223, each interpretation concludes with male dominance and control of sexual relations, and presumes female passivity. Nonetheless, they simultaneously assert that the Quran protects women, by dictating male restraint during sex (Ali 2006: 130).
One dominant interpretation of the verse is to locate it in the context of the (im)permissibility of contraception. Some fundamentalist scholars like Maududi30 emphasise the sanction against contraception, an opinion that curbs a woman’s right to choose to have children.
28 See Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015, Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition, for a critical engagement with the notion of qiwāmah, from within the Muslim tradition, towards an egalitarian reconstruction and reform.
29 See Mernissi (1996: 13) for the normative androcentric definition of nushūz (generally referred to as recalcitrance and for Mernissi as rebellion) and Ali’s (2006: 120-121) and Wadud’s (2006) more nuanced analysis which allows space for a more egalitarian construct.
30 Maududi explains the metaphor of harth as “man being the tiller and the woman the tilth” with the only objective being procreation and careful cultivation (Sachedina 1990: 109).
This is increasingly contradicted by alternative perspectives which allow for “rational participation”31 in deciding to contracept or not (Saleem 1969: 258). Numerous contemporary discourses also indicate that sex in Islam is also viewed in terms of non-procreative purposes, mutual pleasure and fulfilment and that contraception should be mutually negotiated (Shaikh 2011: 355). Another interpretation of these verses allows for differential sexual positions and the proscribing of anal sex and sex during menstruation, a protective measure which promotes male and female sexual health through the curbing of forms of sex which are deemed risk factors in the spread of HIV and AIDS (Balogun 2010: 461).
Fatima Mernissi, in her seminal feminist reading of historical Islamic texts (1991:
146-147), mentions the ambiguous nature of these verses, and their susceptibility to numerous interpretations, which requires exegete Imams to be extra-vigilant. She critiques contestations in the work of classical Sunni exegete Tabari, sketching the conflicting variances in Tabari’s reasons for revelation (aṣbāb al-nuzūl) of these verses, which prioritise questions of sexual positioning. Like Saleem (1969), she notes the interpretation of women as objects, whose bodies are controlled by men precluding their right to protest. Citing Tabari’s extensive accommodation of questions about the (im)permissibility of sodomy of wives, she criticises classical scholars like him for their lack of courage in codifying sexual ethical principles which recall the equality, free will and agency of both partners.
It was this timidity on the part of the Imam toward the necessity to evolve principles that makes the verses so malleable, and makes opportunism in their interpretation a structural, almost institutional feature in Islam (Mernissi 1991: 147).
By far the most controversial interpretation of Q 2: 222-223 is the perceived sanctioning of a male licence for sexual access to wives whenever and however a husband wants. Subsequent to which, the verses can be interpreted in terms of women being the sexual property of men, so that forceful and violent sexual coercion
31 Mohammad Saleem (1969: 258), in a critical analysis of orthodox perspectives of this verse, doesn’t indicate if this “rational participation” is only open to husbands or to women too, but acknowledges that if a deduction as to the “status of women in Islam” is to be made from this one verse alone, then women as objects for procreation might be surmised. He argues like others (Barlas 2009) that the verse has to be understood in relation to others.
is regarded as legally sanctioned by Qur’an (Ali 2006; Barlas 2005; 2009; Bennet 2004; Hidayatullah 2014; Izugbara 2001).
As a case in point, in the Dutch film Submission, Q 2:223 is written onto a woman’s back and translated as, “a man may take his woman in any manner, time or place ordained by God”. Noting the inflammatory potential of this interpretation Barlas responded: “I don’t think there’s a more powerful or troubling way to suggest that Muslim women’s oppression is codified in the scripture itself” (Barlas 2005: 16).
It has also been suggested that these perspectives of women’s sexual passivity and lack of consent in relation to these verses can be used to justify marital rape and sexual coercion, making women vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases (Bennet 2004; Balogun 2010; Izugbara 2001).
In an attempt to unearth the ethical ethos underpinning these verses, Barlas (2009:
160) widens the semantic scope of the word harth and argues these verses cannot be read on their own, but within a wider context with other verses32 prescribing mutuality, intimacy and reciprocity in marital relations. She suggests that the Quran requires uncorrupted and non-violent sexual behaviour between spouses and precludes marital rape and forcing women into sex.33 In a divergent, less palatable analysis, Ali insists that the choice of metaphor of a field denotes the passivity of an object, not that of an active consenting participant even if it is read alongside others on marriage (2006: 130). Her argument is that while women are given a certain level of agency in the verses on marriage and divorce, the verses on sexual intimacy like Q 2:222-223, place men in control over sexual intimacy and contraception (2006: 125- 130).
Regardless of how these verses are interpreted, whether in relation to contraception, sexual positions or sexual availability, Ali (2006) like Mernissi (1991) before her, and Aysha Hidayatullah (2014) later, insists that they preclude a woman’s sexual
32 Barlas (2009: 160) refers to Quranic verses Q 9:71 and Q 30: 21 in this respect.
33 Barlas (2009: 160-165) argues that according to Q 5:6, lawful sex is neither “lewd nor lustful”, and that while it doesn’t refer to the wife’s will or to “the idea of consensual sex”, by virtue of imputing
“will” as moral agents in other verses like Q 4:19, it imputes will on women as sexual beings, because
“this moral agency is not sexualized by the Quran” (160).
freedoms, and simultaneously place all sexual relations, including men’s access to women’s bodies, within the “scope of divine regulation” (Ali 2006: 129).
Scholars draw on the work of modern philosophers like Fazlur Rahman, Nasr Abu Zayd and Mohammed Arkoun to propose new gender-just possibilities to androcentric verses like the ones featured above (Ali 2006; Hidayatullah 2014; Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015; Rhouni 2008; 2010). Some also propose the incorporation of Sufi thought, focusing on core concepts related to the human soul’s innate spirituality and the God-human relationship (Shaikh 2012; Silvers 2006).
But honesty about the inherent androcentrism in the verses on sexual intimacy, and an acknowledgment of the strength of interpretations that favour male dominance and control, is regarded as the first step towards reform efforts to create egalitarian ethical Quranic interpretations for gender justice (Ali 2006; Hidayatullah 2014; Mir- Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015; Rhouni 2008; 2010). Referring to an essay focusing on Q: 4:34 by Esack (2001), Ali (2006: 126) states:
Esack demonstrates that while classical commentaries oversimplify the matter of women’s devotion to God and obedience to husbands, modern apologetics and feminist analyses frequently overlook the very clear authority delegated to men over women’s bodies.
In a similar vein, Hidayatullah in a radical critique of exegetical approaches employed by female exegetes, argues that they fail to “rescue” the text from an inherently male bias, have not managed to account for verses that disallow women sexual freedoms, and have been “reluctant” to hold the Quran, which is regarded as the unadulterated word of God, responsible for its “misreading”. Thorny androcentric meanings are instead attributed to “interpretive errors” or “linguistic difficulties” of human beings, or to “problematic hadith” (2014: 132-133). She adopts Ali’s (2006: 133) stance and warns against imposing on the text what it does not intend.
When exegetes of feminist tafsir claim that their interpretive results are what the Quran actually “says” or really “intends”, they risk making pronouncements that are just as authoritarian as those that they seek to combat (Hidayatullah 2014: 143).
Summarily, while 20 years ago Mernissi criticized classical scholars for their timidity, which led to the malleability of androcentric verses, others today (Ali 2006;
Hidayatullah 2014; Rhouni 2008) are asking feminist interpreters of Quran to be honest about the inherent male bias in the verses on sexual intimacy; they call for clearer, more serious definitions of principles of justice, kindness, and love; and for
“theorising afresh concepts of equality and sexual difference using a discursive rather than a definitive approach to ideas of equality, and to the Quran as text” (Seedat forthcoming 2016: 7). Some propose new gender-just possibilities gleaned from the work of modern philosophers, while others propose the incorporation of Sufi thought.