5.3 Discussion
5.3.3 Supplicating Wives, Angry Husbands and Cursing Angels
religious texts are employed in formulating normative discourses around sexual health, agency and expression (El Fadl 2001; Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015; Shaikh 2004; Shaikh, Hoel Kagee 2011).
Abdul Kodir (2007) and Bennet (2007) have reviewed the various interpretations and versions of the ‘cursing angels’ hadith cited by Docrat in the fatwa. They argue that classical and modern scholars all do not subscribe to a wife’s absolute submission in terms of her sexual services. Some interpretations state that she will only be sinful and therefore cursed by angels dependent on her husband’s emotions, like when he is angry at her refusal, while others suggest that she is “entitled to reject her husband’s call for sexual activity if it is certain to hurt her, or if she is engaged in fulfilling a religious obligation” (Kodir 2007: 73). These alternative interpretations, argues Kodir, provide a glimpse into legal scholarly attempts to create “opportunities for the woman to enjoy sexual relations or refuse them” (73).
Attesting to the fact that the hadith play a greater role in women’s experience and understandings of sexual agency, Hoel and Shaikh (2013) and also Marcotte (2015) have shown that women were familiar with, and had internalized the general message in many popular hadith like the ones used in this fatwa. In Marcotte’s study, Australian women in online forums rejected the discourse of male sexual need, particularly the notion of a dangerous female sexuality and passivity, while in Hoel's and Shaikh’s study, women displayed ambivalent responses to particularly the
“cursing angels” hadith, depending on their life experiences. Some women in their study carefully negotiated the hadith without outrightly rejecting it, but “in ways that reflect a deep resistance to patriarchy”. Others who experienced abusive marital encounters, also in the face of HIV and AIDS, challenged its authority by invoking other ethical theological concepts of a just, merciful God as a means of resistance.
Still others dealing with promiscuous husbands chose to reject the hadith and instead emphasized ethical-moral discourses of mutuality and consent (2013: 83-85). In light of Ahmed’s (1992) idea that Muslim women have internalized a legal pragmatic and an ethical spiritual voice, Hoel and Shaikh’s study shows how and when the ethical voice trumps the legal one in relation to the ‘cursing angels’ hadith cited by Docrat.
Accordingly, I argue that much like the women in Shaikh's study, the wives in fatwa C and A have either negotiated, resisted or rejected the discourse of female responsibility to fulfil male sexual need and enacted their capacity to refuse. In contrast, the wife in fatwa F has internalized her responsibility as duty. However she’s
able to use this same concept of duty to also argue for her release from the marriage, given her admitted failure to meet this duty.
I argue that even though only the mufti in fatwa C has used the hadith and the muftis in the other fatwas A and F have not, the mufti in F can nevertheless rely on this hadith and others like it, which female and male petitioners seem familiar with, to reinforce his ruling. Docrat’s reasoning reflects, in the contemporary Deoband madressa curriculum, the emphasis of hadith over philosophical reasonings (Moosa 2015: 120).
To summarise, the discourse that prioritises male sexual need underpins the legal logic of a Muslim marriage and is complemented by views of a potent male sexuality, male financial obligation, continued female sexual availability, female responsibility, sin, and a potentially dangerous, sinful female sexuality that needs to be kept in check.
5.3.4 “She Should Discuss this with Him”.
In Fatwa C, Docrat proscribes the wife’s agentival capacity by insisting that her refusal must be preceded by a discussion to ascertain whether her refusal is legitimate.
In making space for sexual communication to be initiated by the wife, another temporary power slippage occurs. The wife is given agency by the jurist to verbally explain her reasons for refusal. This slippage is mirrored in Kodir's contention that a nuanced interpretation of the cursing angels hadith provides opportunities for refusal.
Docrat states, “If a woman has a valid reason for not responding positively to her husband, she should discuss this with him”. The implication is that in the absence of valid reasons for refusal, the power slippage reverts and the dominant dynamic is re- established. The valid reasons alluded to by Docrat may be gauged from other fatwas in my sample79 which also deal with women refusing sex; however in each instance the valid reason is decidedly health-related, namely instances of post-natal pain, and pregnancy.
79 Refer to fatwa’s # 18778 hereon referred to as J and # 24644 hereon referred to as K and # 27692, hereon referred to as L in Appendix B.
In the same fatwas that indicate some reasons Docrat might find valid, we also find the petitioner’s, who are all men, are enquiring about the consequent possibilities of achieving sexual satisfaction through masturbation or through their wives touching them.
The petitioner in fatwa J for example asks:
If wife does not want to have sex (because she feels pain in her private parts and also she is tired looking-after her small baby), then is it permissable for the husband to masturbate?
The answer in fatwa J, by a student of Mufti Desai, states:
In principle, it is not permissible for a man or woman to masturbate/self stimulate themselves. This is substantiated by clear juristic texts cited in various books.
However, if a husband desires his wife to masturbate him, it will be permissible despite it still being regarded as an undesirable act.
The fatwa concludes by citing texts used in the Deoband curriculum.
Notably, even in the face of an undesirable act, i.e. masturbation, the mufti prioritizes male satisfaction and female responsibility to fulfil it. In fact he uses a distinctive rhetorical persuasive method of citing Deoband sources in this regard. No mention is made in the answer about the wife’s agency in regard to masturbation, so that only her physical biological health constraints are regarded as valid reasons for refusal to engage in intercourse. Her feelings about whether she wants to “masturbate” her husband are not considered, neither does Docrat consider her post-partum status.
Once again the mufti prioritizes male sexual satisfaction.