Introduction
The siege of Mafikeng was part and parcel of the South African war of 1899 to 1902. However, the siege took place from 1899 to 1900. This war was named the Anglo-Boer War because it was destined to be a “white man‟s war” which was agreed upon by the Boers and the British. Some conservative Afrikaner nationalists call it the “Transvaal war of independence” because this was the objective they aspired to achieve when going into the war. They also agreed that Africans could only be used for auxiliary duties in assisting the Boers to achieve the above-mentioned goal. The British, on the other hand, wanted to protect Mafikeng against the Boer encroachment and this became their imperialist goal of securing the road to the north and preventing the Boers from having contact with the Germans in South West Africa(Namibia). The siege of Mafikeng is one war theatre within which Africans were used extensively by English and Boers respectively and they were placed at the crossroad of this war as it will be shown in this chapter. Most of the literature on the siege is published and written by white liberal and Afrikaner nationalist historians who have initially twisted the evidence to vindicate the perspective that the war was essentially a “white man‟s war”. Paradoxically, the same brand of historians revised their works and accepted an all-encompassing perspective, namely, “The South African War”.
However, even though this view point seemed to be accommodating to Africans of South Africa, its contexualisation is questionable because it was concluded by the liberal and Afrikaner nationalist historians. From African nationalist point of view, in the 1912 the Union of South Africa was an extension of the South African
republic (Transvaal). Therefore, the term South Africa in 1899 and 1900 did not include the Africans and it is still skewed in favour of the Boers. African perspective was not canvassed in the decision to name this country South Africa therefore it was a compromise to accept the name and subsequently the South African War. Pan-Africanist trajectory in South Africa could have coined this event as „Azanian War of liberation‟. This chapter attempts to bring the African perspective into the siege‟s historiographical equation. It draws extensively upon primary sources, especially the various diaries and scrutinises them and reinterprets them with the higher degree of scepticism to judge their usefulness and authenticity. It deciphers how Europeans dehumanised Africans and how Africans re-humanised Europeans. It analyses the written sources and evaluate their authenticity in their reconstruction of the role played by Africans in the siege and in particular how they examined racism during the siege. Finally, the chapter examines the consequences of the siege for the Ratshidi-Rapulana relations.
Historians including Warwick, Willian, Packenham, Selby, Jeal and others have written about the siege and their works have been beneficial to this study in that they dealt with pivotal issues that affected the Barolong. The Afrikaner nationalists and liberals were initially responsible for this myth and twisted the facts and propagated that it was a white mans war but later revised their works because of the existence of sufficient evidence in particular the oral testimonies of the African people who were involved. Warwick‟s work centers entirely on Baden-Powel‟s preparations for the defense of Mafikeng and on the food situation. He has covered the British motive for occupying Mafikeng, which was to secure the road from Cape to the interior, an important issue, which has not been acknowledged by other historians already mentioned (Warwick, 1983:29). Warwick has written little about the impact of the Boer shells which affected men, women and children. Willan in his recent work on the siege outlines in detail the people who were designated to defend the Stad and shows how it was protected.
His work also deals with the role of the Barolong in providing the non-combatant duties and military role in defending the Stad and also outlined the suffering of
the Barolong (Willan, 2001). His work contributes to the understanding of some of the important aspects of the siege. However, there were other issues which affected both the ordinary people and chiefs which historian like Willan said very little about and which this chapter deals with extensively. Another historian, Packenham who has written incisively on the siege has tended to over-rely on Vyvyan‟s diary, particularly about the attempts to evacuate white women and children from Mafikeng. Willan and Packenham do acknowledge the existence of racial discrimination but omit other important information about race-relations.
Moreover, these historians have nothing on the consequences of the siege for the Ratshidi-Rapulana relations. The literature surveyed does not answer the following questions: Why did the British government choose the Stad as their line of defense? Was the Barolong the priority in the protection of Mafikeng or a ploy to use them and their encampment to safeguard the British imperialist interest in Mafikeng? Is there evidence that cast some skepticism to the so-called British
“protection”? Is there sufficient evidence of discrimination against the Barolong?
This chapter intends to answer these questions and interpret the siege from another dimension to fill the void left by historians.
In 1899 the Stad was swelled by refugees from the Transvaal which included the Fingo and Shangaans who came to the Stad to escape the South African War.
The Fingo were driven into the Stad when their villages were burned down by the Boers and the Shangaan “mine boys” were expelled from the Rand gold mines and fled from the Transvaal to the Stad to seek British protection (Warwick, 1983:31). When the siege began in 1899 the Stad was placed within the defense of Mafikeng and the Ratshidi were willing to cooperate to protect the Stad and look upon his Majesty‟s government as their shield against the “cruel” Boers.This was a good opportunity for Montshiwa to defend the Stad under the British flag against people he had always considered his enemies. The Barolong thought that the British would arm them with guns to revenge against the Boers.
However, they were told that the war was a “white man‟s war” and that they would be defended by the British government. From the very beginning of the
siege the British did not hide their hidden motives to use the Barolong as human shields against the Boers to protect themselves and the white communities. The Barolong‟s choice to assist the British was not a collaborationist stance to advance the British cause but they were fighting against the „worse form of hegemony‟. To that extent, African participation in the war was, paradoxically, part and parcel of Africa‟s struggle against foreign exploitation and in search of human dignity, human rights and social justice. However, their objectives to fight both the Boers and the Rapulana were compatible with the British cause and the Barolong were not hard to come by. But the Ratshidi had guns which they had secured much earlier from Bethel and other Englishmen to defend themselves with against the Boers and what they needed was ammunition. The Ratshidi did both combatant and non-combatant tasks at the beginning of the siege. As already noted, before the siege took place, the Rapulana-Barolong had been convinced by the Boers that they were fighting to restore Moshete‟s paramountcy. Montshiwa had always been backed by the English men against the Boers‟ attempt to take Mafikeng by force. The Ratshidi lost their women and children in these conflicts and wanted an opportunity in the absence of the Boers to teach the Rapulana a lesson.
Another reason that encouraged the Barolong to assist the British during the siege was that they wanted to repossess their cattle from the Boers. The Ratshidi realised that the Rapulana and the Boers continued stealing cattle even at the beginning of the siege in an attempt to placate the Ratshidi and the British resistance. The Boers stole cattle of the Barolong in order to put a total onslaught on the Stad in a common knowledge that it would be very difficult for the Ratshidi and the British to sustain the siege without food. For example, on 12 December 1899 a group of Boers tried to steal cattle from the Ratshidi, but retired without getting any (Molema, 1966:52).
After the outbreak of the siege and the South African war, Montshiwa called a meeting of the Barolong chiefs, at Mabeela in Mafikeng district. The chiefs who
met were Moshete of the Ratlou, Matlaba of the Rapulana and Makgobi of the Ratlou in Phitshane (Molema, 1966:106). He requested them to join the war on the side of the British government to protect their land from being taken by the Boers. This was a last dish attempt by Montshiwa to pacify other section of the Barolong by compelling them to subsume themselves under the British government. Moshete and Matlaba refused to join Montshiwa and asserted that they were the “children of the Transvaal” because they were promised land by the Boers after they had helped them to defeat Montshiwa (Molema, 1966:106).
Moreover, the other sections of the Barolong did not want to be dictated terms by Montshiwa whom they regarded as an opportunist and a minor chief with no respect for Moshete. Montshiwa was shaken by the negative comments made by Chief Matlaba‟s nephew called Mogotsi who accused Montshiwa of ambition and greed for power and leadership and excessive love for anything British (Molema, 1966:107). There was a crisis and Montshiwa appealed to the chiefs to reprimand Mogotsi but he was applauded by Matlaba‟s brothers and other men of the Rapulana for undermining Montshiwa. Montshiwa felt humiliated in before other Barolong chiefs and decided to “punish” the Rapulana. The impending attacks by Montshiwa triggered the Rapulana to fight the war on the side of the Boers, it was a good opportunity for Montshiwa to settle old scores during and after the war (Molema,1966:107). The Barolong were prepared to kill one another because of the iron curtain that had been established by the Boers and the British. It has to be noted that the Barolong entered the war in order to safeguard their land , cattle, women and children but also to rule themselves. However, the two colonial powers had their own agenda which included the discovery of diamond among the Barolong and the British quest to protect the road to the north which could be thwarted by the Boers occupation of the Northern Cape.