2.4 Crime-Terror Argument: A continuum of Terror and Organized crime
2.4.1 The Nature of the Crime- Terror Continuum
According to Roth (2010:480), the crime-terror continuum is a concept that obtains its origins in the 1970s and 1980s when scholars first started to uncover the connection between terrorism and organized crime. During that time, the relationship between the two entities was designated as narco-terrorism. The term was coined by Lewis Tambs, the then US Ambassador to Colombia, in an attempt to describe terrorist acts perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (Williams, 2008:126). White (2009: 68) posits that the term narco-
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terrorism refers to ‘terrorists who use either terrorist tactics to support drug operations or drug-trade profits to finance terrorism’. This is typified in the operation and tactics of the Medellin Cartel whose pursuit of power and profits led its members to resort to violence against governments and civilians that included public bombings and assassinations (Roth, 2010: 492). From this period onwards, the crime-terror relationship would not only surge but also grow in complexity.
Tamara Makarenko (2004) is credited as the first scholar to assess this complex relationship which is described as the crime-terror nexus (Carrapico, Irrera & Tupman, 2014: 214). In addition to the rise of globalisation, the subsequent transnational dimension of organized crime entities coupled with the evolving nature of terrorism contributed towards the steady decline in the demarcation line between organized crime and terrorism. This process of the gradual amalgamation of the two phenomena is referred to as a security continuum which consists of organized crime on the one end of the spectrum and terrorism on the other end.
This spectrum comprises of four gradual phases: 1) organized crime and terrorist groups form alliances to promote their respective interests; 2) each entity appropriate each other’s tactics and method; 3) terrorist and criminal groups converge creating a functional alliance and 4) transformation of one group into the other (Makarenko, 2004: 130-131; Carrapico, Irrera &
Tupman, 2014:214). These four phases can be classified under the broad headings of:
alliances, appropriation, convergence and transformation (as noted in Fig. 1).
Figure 1: The Crime-Terror Continuum
Source: Makarenko (2010:185)
Juxtaposing the latter phases on the crime-terror nexus are the following three levels, that is, the operational, evolutionary and conceptual (Makarenko, 2010: 184). On the operational level, the nexus can adopt either one of two forms. Firstly, one group adopts the tactics of the other, for instance, a terror group employing criminal tactics and the other way round. The second form is the functional merging of the terror and criminal group which can be either an ad hoc alliance or the integration of one group into the other. The evolutionary plane refers to the ‘transformation of the tactics and motivations of one entity into the other’, that is, a
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criminal network can evolve into a terrorist group or vice versa (2010: 184). Finally, the conceptual level occurs when both entities occupy the same space and time and as such, crime and terrorism are treated as clearly defined actions.
This conceptual level mirrors the ‘convergence’ (third phase) context that engenders hybrid entities that pursue their ‘ideological and economic motivations by perpetrating acts of politically motivated terrorism and engaging in organized criminal activity for profit maximization’ (Makarenko, 2010: 184). Likewise on the crime-terror continuum (Fig. 1), this convergence context is situated in the middle of the spectrum and it consists of a ‘grey area’
symbolising the fulcrum where organized crime and terrorism are inseparable from each other (Makarenko, 2004: 28). While chapter three will examine the convergence and transformation in greater depth, the other two phases (alliances and appropriation) on the continuum is briefly examined in the subsequent paragraphs.
2.4.1.1 Alliances
In addition to being the most common type of linkage, alliances formed by organized criminal groups and terrorists are both tactical and strategic. Tactical alliances can be described as a once-off deal or a short-term negotiation (Dishman, 2001:52) whereas strategic relationships are based on mutual interests and last for a longer period (Wang, 2010: 15).
Dishman (2001:53) spotlights that the reasons behind both strategic and tactical alliance include: ‘the desire of a TCO [Transnational Criminal Organization] to enter a new market, the need for a specialized service, or more generally, as a means to reduce the risk of a TCO’s illegal operations’. To these, Makarenko (2004:131) adds: sharing ‘expert knowledge’ in terms of bomb-manufacturing, money laundering or counterfeiting; providing operational support, that is, providing access to smuggling routes; and also procuring financial support, for instance, colluding in bringing illicit products like narcotics onto the market.
The meeting of three IRA members with FARC members - in 2001 - in order to share expert knowledge of bomb-making typifies a tactical alliance (Sanderson, 2004). In other words, the encounter was temporary as it had a specific purpose with no endeavour of forging of a long term partnership. On the other hand, a strategic alliance can be exemplified in the relationship that was developed between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Albanian mafia during the Kosovo conflict involving heroin trafficking (Makarenko, 2004: 132). The profits
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the Albanian mafia concurred in regard to the heroin transactions were funnelled towards the KLA’s political wing in order to purchase weapons (2004:132). This type of alliance, according to Hutchinson & O’Malley (2007:1104), can be described as ‘parasitic’ since it comprised of terrorist benefiting from organised crime profits in a relationship that ‘will only last as long as the terrorist group appears useful, and as long as the ideological differences between the two groups do not conflict’. Similarly, Wang (2010:16) assiduously observes that the strategic alliance between organized crime groups and terrorists can be perceived as a means of risk reduction that is mutually beneficial. As a way to guarantee their profits, organized criminals seek the protection of terrorist entities while the latter benefit by hiding themselves through their involvement in organized crime (Wang, 2010:16).
2.4.1.2 Appropriation of Tactics
The second phase on the continuum is an evolving step from the alliance phase. It refers to the operational tactics employed by both organized crime and terrorist groups and consists of a twofold feature: appropriation and integration. Appropriation occurs when terrorist groups learn to engage criminal activities to support or finance their activities or when organized crime groups that engage in terrorism tactics to further their own interests. In this regard, criminal organizations conduct ‘selective and calibrated violence to destroy competitors or threaten counternarcotic authorities’ (Dishman, 2001: 45) and the aim is often to coerce competitors or government into negotiation and compromise. This was exemplified by the Sicilian Mafia’s bombing spree in 1993 as way to force government to abrogate the anti- mafia legislation (Jamieson, citied in Makarenko, 2004:134).
Meanwhile, terrorist groups employ criminal tactics in order to secure funds for their operations and this includes ‘Basque Homeland and Freedom movement (ETA), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)’, and more recently the Taliban, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, more importantly AQIM, have all been linked to the drugs trade (Phillips & Kamen, 2014;
Makarenko 2004: 132). Integration of tactics, on the other hand, is when an organised crime organization integrates within a terrorist group or vice versa, in order to acquire that group’s tactics. In sum, most relationship in the crime-terror nexus evolve into appropriation or integration as this phase eliminates the inherent difficulties associated with alliances. These include: ‘differences over priorities and strategies, distrust, danger of defections and betrayal, and the threat that alliances could create competitors’ (European Union, 2012:30).
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