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situation of the people. After three decades of rule, the FLN had only managed to embody an authoritarian-bureaucratic system that saw the suppression of other political opponents and the absence of free elections. Converting Algeria into a one-party state through the justification of being the only legitimate party due to its struggle accolades, the FLN struggled to achieve its objectives it promised after independence. Furthermore, the FLN began alienating itself from the middle class (who had been the hardest hit from the economic crisis) comprising mostly of the youth. The drift between the ruling party and the masses widened as the Algerians became more frustrated with the political and social grievances exerted upon them by the ruling party. Suddenly, the FLN, which few decades earlier had struggled so hard to defeat the French colonisers had eventually followed in their footsteps.
This phenomenon is reminiscent of Paulo Freire’s prescient warning:
Many of the oppressed who directly or indirectly participate in revolution intend—conditioned by the myths of the old order—to make it their private revolution. The shadow of their former oppressor is still cast over them…In their struggle the oppressed find in the oppressor their model of "manhood"
(Freire, 2000:46).
The accumulated grievances of the people meant that it was only a matter of time before they themselves would openly express their discontents towards the ruling party. The stage was set for a confrontation between the government and the people and it arrived in the form of a public demonstration in October 1988. The protests began as a demonstration by people who felt marginalized by the current regime and within four days, it turned into a riot. Despite the massive suppression of the protesters by security forces, the government had little choice but to listen to the voice of the people. Within days, Chadli initiated a process of liberalisation when he introduced political pluralism which allowed the organisation of other political parties, thus officially ending the FLN monopoly of power (Naylor, 2000:164). After a new constitution was adopted in 1989 allowing for the public participation of opposition political parties, Chadli authorised multi-party elections throughout the country and scheduled the first democratic election in Algeria.
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solely on the FLN. The Islamists capitalised on the failures of the ruling party and seized the opportunity to enter into the political domain by attending to the grievances of the people.
They established ‘food markets and religious schools, invested in mosques and provide cheap services and food’ to the Algerian population (Borka, 2012: 103). The youth who were the hardest hit by unemployment became the primary target of those Islamists. The party also attracted to its ranks the unemployed, Arabic teachers, merchants who were opposed to state socialism, engineers, jewellers, former discontented members of the FLN and a few intellectual (Zoubir, 1993: 94). Gradually the Islamists set out to build a rapport with the people by attending to their grievances in view to obtaining the support and legitimation of the people.
Although the FLN had claimed to be an Islamist party since its inception, Islam never influenced any decision made by the leaders as it remained confined either to the cultural domain or on the political periphery (Kepel, 2002: 163). Thus, when the Western economic method adopted by the FLN failed dismally, the Islamists had little problem in convincing the people that a radical change was required; a change where Algeria would return to its Islamic roots. The Islamists, interpreting the text of the Quran to fit their messages, proposed that the solution to the problem of the people was to establish an Islamic state of Algeria ruled by a religious government guided by Sharia. It is against this background that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS – Front Islamique du Salut) emerged on the Algerian scene as a political party under the guidance of Abassi Mandani and Ali Belhadj. The FIS soon became a legal political party and won a resounding victory at the 1990 municipal elections. Frederic Volpi (2009: 132) posits that the success of FIS as a political party can be attributed to
profitant pleinement de l'effet de nouveauté, du manque de competition politique organisée dans la sphère religieuse, de la lenteur de la mobilisation des autres partis politiques, du réseau des mosques indépendantes, et jouant sur l'impression très répandue que les acteurs islamiques ont directement contraint le régime à faire des concessions démocratiques. [Fully benefiting from the novelty effect, the lack of political competition from other religious parties, the tardiness of other political parties to mobilise, the network of independent mosques and capitalising on the widespread impression that the Islamists were directly responsible for pressuring the regime into making democratic concessions]
The momentum the FIS obtained from their small victory continued into the general elections a year later. With their newly found stimulus, the FIS continued to rally the support of the people through its efficient social services and political rhetoric. The FLN realising the threat
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posed by their main opposition party, started to repress the FIS supporters that were organising protests and demonstrations through the country in a bid to challenge the government. A few months prior to the general elections, the military leadership declared a state of emergency because of the fierce resistance by the FIS supporters and members. This resulted in the arrest of numerous FIS members, amongst whom were its leaders Mandani and Belhadj (Volpi, 2003:50). Opposition parties including the FIS and other secular parties began doubting the validity of the so-called democratic transition instituted by the FLN and began searching for alternative political options. Despite the fact that some executive members of the FIS encouraged for an end to the political participation with preference for other means of political struggle, Abdelkader Hachani who was the interim leader, arbitrated that the party continues in its campaign through the proper political and legal channels. He believed that ‘the political legitimacy gained through the ballot box was the best insurance the FIS could get at the time’ (Hachani cited in Volpi, 2003:51).
Regaining its confidence, the FIS re-launched its electoral campaign. Hachani’s decision proved accurate, as the FIS emerged victorious in the first round of the general elections triggering surprise among many analysts and observers. President Chadli and his leadership anticipated a close contest between the FLN and the FIS but regretted their decision for political democratisation when the ballots were finally counted. Late in the evening of 26 December 1991, the results were made official: out of the 231 contested seats in the national assembly (430 in total), the FIS won 188, the FFS (Socialist Forces Front) which was the main democratic opposition party captured 25 and the FLN came third with 15 seats (Le Sueur, 2010: 51; Volpi, 2003:52). Not only did the FIS win by a huge margin but they won by majority which meant that they would have the power to change the constitution when they came into power.
Hence, the conversion of Algeria into an Islamic state was within reach of the FIS party. If the defeat in the municipal elections proved a waking call for the FLN, then the result of general elections was a humiliating calamity for the ruling party. To exacerbate matters, the fact that the new elections law stated that only the two parties with the most votes from the first round were eligible to contest in the next round, the FLN did not qualify to stand as a candidate in the next round of elections. After almost three decades in power, it appeared that the FLN’s leading role in Algeria’s politics ended with the people looking forward to change.
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