JOURNEYING THROUGH THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
2.4 Post-colonial Rwanda (1962-1994): Learning from the past?
2.4.4 The post-Genocide transformation (1994 up to the present)
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prevent the Genocide in Rwanda and states what it should have been done to prevent the tragedy. For instance, the international community did not react on pogroms of Tutsi which occurred early in the 1990s. During the Genocide, the Security Council led by the United States and the United Kingdom instead of changing the mandate of the peacekeepers’ mission so that it can intervene rather reduced the number of troops.
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After the Genocide there was a climate of mistrust towards the Hutu by survivors who suspected them rightly or wrongly, to belong to the side of Genocide perpetrators. Some released prisoners also increased tensions between communities (Buckley-Zistel, 2006). In fact, there was an unfair global affirmation that all Hutus were involved in the Genocide (Fierens & Frère, 2009). Conversely some Hutu were unhappy due to their innocent relatives being jailed without clear evidence as perpetrators. The situation was further complicated by the fact that victims and ‘perpetrators’ had to live together. In many parts of the country, insecurity was nourished by persecution, threats and even murders of Genocide survivors who were considered as witnesses to the committed atrocities. Serious threats have led some people to relocate.
The destruction of family ties by the Genocide concerns both Hutu and Tutsi families.
In families some Hutu women married to Tutsis have witnessed how their children and husbands were killed. Alongside their sorrow and sad experiences, in some cases these Hutu women have not been integrated within the Tutsi survivors (Buhigiro, Bagaye, & Munyakayanza, 2012).
From an economic point of view the destruction of houses, schools, hospitals, industries, businesses and important trading centres led to the disruption of the country’s development and many Rwandans consequently experienced poverty.
Before the October 1990 war between the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the then Government, Rwanda was in a very fragile economic situation due to inefficient land use patterns and inadequate pasture and a deteriorating trade balance due to the falling prices and quantities of exported products, including tin, coffee and tea (Newbury, 1995). The Genocide of 1994 deeply affected a weakened economy (Prunier, 1997). The exploitation of scarce land was completely paralyzed by the extermination of a portion of the population as, for example, tea and coffee plantations were looted or destroyed. Simply put, the Rwandan economy was destroyed due to the devastation of the agricultural sector which was the basis of the economy. Industry and basic infrastructure were also destroyed. In addition, banks, state coffers and private property were looted. The tourism sector, which was one of the pillars of the national economy, was not operational during the Genocide. The
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safety of animals in the national parks was not guaranteed. Forests were also destroyed causing environmental and ecological damage (IRDP, 2006).
Another big post-Genocide challenge was the number of alleged persons involved in the tragedy (Straus, 2004; Gourevitch, 2009). After the Genocide, and immediately after the Rwandese Patriotic Front victory, the Rwandan government began to arrest thousands of individuals on Genocide charges, and by 1999, Rwandan prisons held more than 120 000 people suspected of Genocide killings. As the judicial system was disorganised, the first Genocide trials only started in December 1996.
Consequently, it was estimated that to complete the prosecutions it would have taken the courts working at full capacity over 100 years to complete the trials (Longman, 2010).
Regarding the high number of jailed persons, after the July 1994 military victory of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, both the international community and the newly installed Rwandan government embraced trials as a primary tool for promoting post- conflict social reconstruction. The United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in late 1994, which focused on prosecuting the top organisers of the Genocide, and the first trials took place in Arusha, Tanzania in 1997. Seeking to speed up the rate of prosecution and implicate the population more directly in the judicial process, the Rwandan Government launched a new system of non-professional grassroots justice in 2002, called Gacaca courts. This drew on a traditional Rwandan dispute resolution mechanism.
Gacaca courts were organized in every locality in the country, using popularly- elected lay judges to treat most Genocide crimes. By early 2010, over 1.5 million cases had been heard in Gacaca courts (Clark, 2010; Ingelaere, 2008; Longman, 2010).
Despite their achievements as the Gacaca courts managed to hold many Genocide perpetrators accountable and to promote dialogue among Rwandans in different communities (Byanafashe, 2013; de Brower & Ruvebana, 2011), they were also criticized. There was a view that “trying crimes of Genocide and massacres in Gacaca would minimize the seriousness of these crimes” (Ingelaere, 2008, p.37).
Another viewpoint considers Gacaca courts as “a retributive and punitive process
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used to promote a repressive political agenda and to settle many personal vendettas” (Longman, 2010, p.49). Regardless of these critics, testimonies from the public helped some survivors to talk openly and to identify the location of the corpses of the Genocide survivors’ family members killed during the Genocide. In addition, some killers pleaded guilty and demanded pardon from the survivors (Byanafashe, 2013). Some innocent prisoners were released due to Gacaca trials and in some communities, survivors and perpetrators were grouped in associations.
Another effort undertaken by the Government of Rwanda in view of promoting the rule of law, and mainly due to mass violation of human rights during the Genocide was epitomised by the creation of the National Commission for Human Rights in 1999. The Commission aims at sensitising the population on human rights issues. It has the power to initiate investigations in line with the violation of the law in Rwanda or as requested by aggrieved persons. The Commission’s reports revealed a series of injustices regarding, for instance, the killing of Genocide survivors, its visits to prisons and the piteous living conditions of the Twa social group (Sherti, 2014).
Some of the Twa are still marginalised by society and they consequently prefer to live in isolation. They are considered as the poorest citizens and their children drop out of primary school due to lack of support. Even if the Twa were represented in the Senate, they used to be victims of injustice during grass roots level elections where some of them were excluded from becoming elected members (Sena, 2007).
Another strategy for fighting against injustice related to the post-Genocide period was the creation of the Ombudsman Office which prevents and fights against corruption and other forms of injustice. Since its inception in 2003, the Office received many complaints in line with injustice in job recruitment, land issues including those related to people who returned from exile and unfair contracts termination (Transparence Rwanda, 2008). The institution is weakened by a lack of power to prosecute individuals or institutions.
Rwandan relationships with other countries were another challenge. The conditions and circumstances that led to the 1994 change of regime in Rwanda, as well as the behaviour of the international community during those events, have destabilized relations between Rwanda and some neighbouring or distant countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). For instance, the alleged role of France in the Genocide and
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the accusations of Bruguière, that Rwandan officials participated in the assassination of the former President Habyarimana have led to the discontinuation of diplomatic ties between Rwanda and France from 2006 to 2012 (Delany, 2010; Verschave, 1994).
The exile of Rwandans in neighbouring countries, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, resulted in the presence of the former Rwandese Forces and Interahamwe militia in the east of the country. The Rwandan combatants in the Congo became a security threat which destabilised the hosting country and the enormous and powerful interests of several companies or governmental or nongovernmental international organisations. Consequently a massive smear campaign against Rwanda was organised by the affected companies and organisations. A campaign of hatred among Congolese citizens against Rwanda was also organised by some Congolese politicians due to the feeling of humiliation caused by the war Rwanda had launched in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, officially to fight against Rwandan militia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).
In reality, the Congolese territory was used for assault and retreat against Rwanda.
During 1996-97, the post-Genocide government decided to remove this threat by joining other countries such as Uganda, Burundi and Angola supporting the Alliances Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila to overthrow President Mobutu and hereby end the source of insecurity. Another objective considered by Reyntjens (1999) as a pretext was to save Congolese Tutsi who were victims of injustice and insecurity in the Eastern Congo. Kabila’s decision to request foreign troops, including Rwandan ones to return home, brought about a second war (1998-2001) which attracted a number of African countries due to various reasons such as economic interests or national security. Thus countries such as Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia supported militarily Kabila as the Democratic Republic of the Congo had become a member of the Southern African Development Community. Chad, Libya and Sudan were also involved in this war on the side of Kabila while Uganda and Burundi were on the side of Rwanda. This war, which created serious tension between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was considered by the American diplomat Susan Rice as the ‘first African world war’. The United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity invited
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belligerents in peace negotiations which resulted in Lusaka agreements in July 1999.
Thereafter, Rwandan troops were removed from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (IRDP, 2005; Olsson, 2004; Reyntjens, 1999; Sherti, 2014). Due to insecurity and human rights violation the Congolese youth clearly expressed the centrality of Rwanda “in the origins of the Congo’s ‘worst ever nightmare” (Bentrovato, 2014, p.17).
The Government of Rwanda tried its best to solve problems outlined above but the reality is that it is a heavy burden to be carried by a developing country. The first step was to put into place a government. In this regard, the Rwandese Patriotic Front which took power did not choose to rule the country alone. It incorporated other political parties in the process, except those which were actively involved in the Genocide such as the former single party Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développment et la Démocratie and its satellites mainly the Coalition pour la Défense de la République considered as anti-Tutsi at the outset (Kinzer, 2008). As Hutu, Tutsi and Twa had to continue living in the same territory, one of the solutions was the promotion of a unity and reconciliation policy. This decision was in line with Arusha peace agreements signed in 1993.
Unity and reconciliation are defined by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission as “a consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterised by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence, truth, and healing of one another’s wounds inflicted by our history, with the objectives of laying a foundation for sustainable development” (Republic of Rwanda, 2010, p. 18). In this regard, the Commission established a series of governing principles including the promotion of Rwandan identity and to put forward national interests instead of those guided by ethnicity, blood relations, gender, religion or region of origin. Another guiding principle of the Commission is the fight against the Genocide and its ideology. This guiding principle is among the key mission of the National Commission for the Fight against the Genocide discussed later. Furthermore, the Commission urges Rwandans to strive to heal one another’s physical and psychological wounds while building future interpersonal trust based on truth telling, repentance and forgiveness. Thus, the Commission educates and mobilises
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Rwandans on matters related to national unity and reconciliation and undertakes research in the matter of peace and unity and reconciliation to make proposals on measures for eradicating divisions and for reinforcing unity. In addition, a series of strategies such as solidarity camps where different categories of people meet to discuss issues related to unity and reconciliation and programmes on radios are used by the Commission (Republic of Rwanda, 2010). Despite the Commission’s achievements its approach has been criticised for not allowing an open and honest engagement with the past. In addition, the search of Rwandan identity does not allow a discussion around ethnic differences (Clark, 2010). However, most Rwandans (87%) in a recent study done by the Commission affirm that major issues related to the causes and consequences of the Genocide have been frankly discussed and that the trust between inter-group relations have increased (Republic of Rwanda, 2010).
The Rwanda Commission for the Fight against Genocide was also put into place in 2007 with the aim of stopping forever the resurgence of such atrocities. In addition, for the fight against an ideology of Genocide, a law was put into place to fight against Genocide denial (Republic of Rwanda, 2013). One scholar attempted to conceptualise the Genocide ideology:
Genocide ideology is defined as an ideology which led to 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and still bears a high potential, if not checked upon, to lead to genocide. It is a set of organized thoughts and beliefs which use ethnic identity as a base, primarily for competition for power, but also for stirring up hate, conflict and violence as the main strategy to attain set objectives. It is rooted in the Hutu supremacy ideology as the core component, and the denial of the genocide against the Tutsi as the main branch (Kantengwa, 2013, p. 111).
In order to fight against the Genocide ideology, the Commission has set some strategies including the commemoration of the Genocide and keeping Genocide memory. The Commission is convinced that commemoration of the Genocide against the Tutsi aims at remembering its causes, such as exclusion and divisionism, and to fight against them. Another aim of commemoration is to react against any other genocide wherever it can occur. Thus, every year in April, the Genocide is remembered countrywide through speeches, public lectures, testimonies and prayers, and the solemn reburial of victims’ remains. The conservation of remains in different museums is not only a tangible proof against the denial of what happened in
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Rwanda but also a didactic aid for future generations. Genocide memorials are therefore considered as an educational centre which helps to teach the history of what happened at the sites and to remember the victims (Kantengwa, 2013;
http://www.cnlg.gov.rw/uploads/media/10._ikiganiro_akamaro_ko_kwibuka.pdf).
Despite these endeavours, the Commission is still facing the problem of Genocide denial. Deniers are not only Rwandans but also expatriates. A list of foreign scholars, journalists and politicians considered as Genocide deniers by the Commission was published in the media (Manzi, 2014). Another challenge is related to the well-being of Genocide survivors who still have various problems such as loneliness felt by old persons, houses, medical issues and school fees.
Efforts were also made in the education sector to stop the discriminatory practices of the former regimes. For example:
The Rwanda National Examinations Council was put in place with the main mission of promoting national reconciliation and reconstruction through transparent, accountable and responsive assessment and evaluation (…). The Council has been conducting the examinations in transparency and placing successful candidates in secondary schools and higher institutions of learning on merit (Nzabalirwa, 2009, p.158).
Moreover, since 2009, in order to give to Rwandans more access to education as a sign of social justice and a way of improving knowledge, a Nine Years Basic Education programme was put into place (Republic of Rwanda. Ministry of Education Science and Technology and Scientific Research, 2008).
In view of assisting the demobilised combatants of the former Rwandese Army Forces and other rebellions or of the Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (troops of the Rwandese Patriotic Front), the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was created in 1997. After the Genocide against the Tutsi, the country had to reduce the number of its soldiers in the military. Some minors had to return to school and unneeded soldiers during peacetime were demobilised. Sherti (2014) notes that the number of Rwandan troops was increased to pursue the external rebellions made up of the defeated army and Interahamwe militia on Congolese territory. In 2001 the Commission started the second phase of demobilisation because a peace agreement was reached during the ‘first African world war’ followed
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by the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The main aspects of this phase are described as follows:
The particularity of the second phase is that the demobilisation on one hand concerned members of the former Rwandese Patriotic Front Army and on the other hand the former Rwandese Army Forces and their new recruited forces who separated themselves from the rebellion based in Congolese forest. The fact that the Demobilisation Commission equitably deals with the Rwandese Defence Forces (FDR) and former enemies prove that it aims at “facilitating peace process in the Great Lakes region, contributing to unity and reconciliation between Rwandans and work for their welfare (Sherti, 2014, pp.310-311).
The above quote illustrates how the Commission contributes to unity and reconciliation by integrating members of the defeated army and the demobilised soldiers from the current Rwandese Defense Forces in normal life. What happened in Rwanda needs to be compared to other contexts which experienced a genocide.