There are also a number of social factors that have contributed to the shifts posited above. In the past, individuals were united through their shared religious beliefs and the consequent shared conception of the good. In later conceptions such as those of Kant and Hegel, what tied individuals together was a shared conception of the good that was reached through universal reason. In Rawls‟ account, the state aims to remain neutral – there is no single substantive conception of the universal good that is ascribed to the society (Seligman 1992:143), nor is there a social good that has been determined by the
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collective action of civil society. The belief that there is no single universal good has undermined moral group action as there is no collective moral aim. As mentioned above, not only does Rawls have a conception of a universal good – liberty – it is this very good that has undermined the idea of a collective. Without the ties of shared belief or rationality, individuals have nothing to bind them together as a collective beyond market values which are purely instrumental (Seligman 1992:99).
The complexity of the distinction between the public and the private sphere has also played a role in shaping contemporary citizenship and civil society. As argued previously, Marquand contends that the market realm overlaps with the public domain (1992:35). The market related behaviour of assigning monetary worth to one‟s time, possession and talents is evident in the public realm taking the place of the „priceless‟
value of duty. Central here is Marquand‟s argument that the line between the private and public spheres is also blurred. This is supported by Seligman‟s argument that as the public realm has diminished, so the private realm has been projected onto the space left behind, and thus the private has become public (Seligman 1992:134). He argues that it is the universalisation of citizenship that has created a society where the sphere of the citizen has disappeared (Seligman 1992:133). Each individual is guaranteed their citizenship, but in the process, the sphere in which they should act together has been neglected. He suggests that what truly belonged in the public sphere, shared political interest, is no longer evident in society, and instead the gap has been filled by issues that has previously belonged only in citizens‟ private lives. He contends that private passions and interests have been projected into the public arena in the form of rights (Seligman 1992:133). Issues such as gender and sexuality are to Seligman, the private realm projected into the public realm. So while these issues are discussed in the public realm and so are issues of shared interest, Seligman contends that they are in fact private concerns. The fact that there are important issues such as abortion, and more recently, stem cell research in discussion does not, to Seligman, prove that the public arena is still
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a sphere of debate on public issues, but rather that the private sphere that replaces it is not always trivial (Seligman 1992:136). While there are important issues at stake, these are issues that used to belong in the private realm and thus their presence in civil society indicates that the private has become public. Citizens‟ views on what belongs in the public realm have become blurred with their own private issues. The autonomous public realm has therefore been lost in contemporary society and what is left is a public domain that finds its worth only in the value of the participating individuals who are increasingly focusing on private issues and not those of shared political goals (Seligman 1992:135).
Having discussed my conception of the way citizenship and civil society have shifted, from moral to rational and duty to instrumental and group to individual, and explained (some of) the factors that have contributed to the changes in behaviour, the next chapter focuses on what I conceive civil society should be.
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Chapter Three: Developing a Conception of Civil Society
In light of the lack of clarity in the study of civil society discussed in the introduction, we need to examine the differing notions of the good that underpin different conceptions of civil society. Debates about the common good appear to be between two polarised views. It is as if there are only two available positions– either there is a single universal common good or there are no universal goods and thus each individual should be able to pursue their own individual goods. I suggest however that there are problems with both of these positions and a balance needs to be found between the two extremes. The first position is that there is a single universal good, an idea supported by many philosophers including Kant and Rousseau, both of whom claim that the common good can be found through reason. Others have used religious bases for their common good – the communitarian principles of Buddhism or Christianity should, for example, be adhered to by all in society. The problem with this view is that it is often oppressive because it does not allow citizens the freedom to choose their own way of life. The idea of a regime built on a common good is often associated with Fascism where the state is completely involved in, and has control of, citizens‟ lives.
In contrast, and because of the value placed on freedom in liberal democratic societies, an alternative conception of the good has developed, one which emphasises the value of freedom. Rawls for example argues that the common good is purely procedural: it lies in the fact that citizens are free to choose their own good (Rawls 1971:246). The value lies in the freedom rather than in the particular goods of each citizen. This conception is however problematic in reality in that with this heightened freedom and independence, citizens seem to seek only their own goods. With each citizen pursuing their own interests, society loses its sense of community. Citizens seem to get involved only when it is in their own rational self-interest and so there are few signs of shared interest and
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group action in civil society. It appears to be simply a space in which individual citizens can act as opposed to a space where they unite to act together.
I argue that this debate is not a true reflection of all the available conceptions of the good.
My conception of civil society includes a common good that is a balance between substance and procedure. The common good should be a recognition in citizens of the value of democracy, and the moral value of their participation in democratic procedures.
Citizens need to view their citizenship as, on some levels, a moral duty. In addition, there needs to be a recognition of fellow citizens and respect for their role in democracy.
In this way, it is not a substantive common good that proposes a set of values by which citizens should live their livesnor is it simply procedural. Instead, it calls on citizens to see a good above each individual issue. The importance lies in how we address these issues rather than what the final answer is. It is important that these decisions be made both democratically and with engagement between citizens. There is value in the procedures, but this is because there are substantive goods within those procedures. It is not just freedom that is valuable but how we treat fellow citizens and how we contribute to the strength of democracy through active and meaningful participation and engagement with fellow citizens and the government.
My view is similar to that of Anderson‟s who argues that the non-instrumental value of participation is conditional on its instrumental value (2009:213). Certainly participation must legitimise democracy through enhanced representation and popular political decision-making but this does not mean that it only has this instrumental value. In order to reach its non-instrumental value (the moral development of citizens and the recognition of the value of democracy) it has first to have instrumental value (Anderson 2009:213). Anderson contends that „intrinsic values cannot always be identified prior to and independently of instrumental desires‟ (2009:214). She believes that judgements of
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intrinsic and instrumental value „interact bi-directionally‟ (Anderson 2009:214): that is, these values are dependent on each other.
This chapter discusses the contrasting views on civil society and its value by examining both past and contemporary literature on civil society. The second section of the chapter sets out the conception of civil society I propose, one which I suggest will best serve the creation of deep democracy in South Africa. I argue that it is important to have a civil society that allows for, and encourages, other-regarding behaviour, a sense of duty and shared goods.