There are two interpretations of the causes of occupational accidents, both of which will be discussed. As a result, conventional accident research concentrates on a series of "forensic" analyzes of the problem. In manufacturing, the worker controlled the pace of work, whereas in machine production this is often dictated by the speed of the machine or assembly line.
The worker becomes an appendage of the machine and responds mechanically to the production pace set by management. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, industrial accidents can be seen as embedded in a conflict of interest between the -owners of the means of production and those who are employed. Examination of South African Workers' Compensation Act accident reports reveals that the iron and steel industry has the highest recorded number of industrial accidents and the second highest rate of frequency* and severity of accidents** in production, as shown in Table 1.
Firstly, it states: "It is claimed that as many as 25% of workers exposed to dust suffer from pneumonia. The first questionnaire was administered to management representatives and the second to shop workers working in ten of the above cases worked.
MANAGEMENT'S PERCEPTION OF ACCIDENTS
The privilege of control over the production process is therefore also seen as part of the management function; and should conflict arise in the factory, it can be explained away by referring to factors such as incompatibility of personality, lack of communication or agitators. The fact that most management representatives interviewed believed that accidents were the fault of the individual serves as confirmation of this. This may be true for recorded injuries (over a four-day period), but there are a large number of unreported injuries. 0 - 4 days), especially in the large foundries, as shown in Table 5.
It can thus be concluded that injuries can hinder productivity, especially in larger foundries. Given the hazardous nature of foundry work along with the lower wages offered in the foundry industry, urban labor tends to avoid foundry work. Adler has emphasized that this dependence on immigrant labor has been beneficial to management, because management has not been forced to spend money on protective measures at the foundry.
34;It would appear that it is cheaper for management to replace injured workers than to improve conditions for them.• In situations such as the foundries, where protection is desperately needed, workers are generally unskilled migrants who pay the lowest rates is allowed in the Metal industry, viz. 70. However, some managements do feel this economic pressure and show some awareness of the problem as illustrated by a.
PROTECTIVE EQUIPHENT
Attempts to address this concern have been made by management primarily by implementing health and safety committees or more sophisticated loss control structures. Reducing the severity of the injury is not at all harmful to the worker, but the problem of the unsafe machine is not solved. However, as will be shown in the next section, management applies cost minimization to the provision of protective equipment itself.
Regardless of the problems associated with protective equi];meI)t, let's now look at what happens on the factory floor. It was found that half of the foundry managements (52%) spent less than R30 per worker per year. There were numerous complaints from confidants about the uncomfortable nature of the equipment which was best reflected by this anecdote from a foundry manager.
Six months later we had a strike and one of the problems was that they wouldn't carry the stuff. Some may argue that smaller foundries do not need much protective equipment due to the smaller scale of their production. For example, at the deburring shop, which employs most foundry workers, shop workers from a large foundry revealed that 6 to 8 pairs of overalls are needed per year.
Despite the fact that the people wearing the safety equipment did not select it, in 42% of the foundries there was a penalty for non-compliance. Although this question was not asked in the interviews, some comments can be made about the structure of these health and safety departments. The structure varied considerably~ in one foundry there was no committee and a health and safety officer was employed simply to record accident statistics.
The effect of this is that the health and safety office becomes another aspect of management's pursuit of increased productivity and control. Most foundry managements were either in favor of management-appointed health and safety representatives (36%) or undecided (37%), while 27% were in favor of elected representatives. Managements that have elected worker-elected representatives appear to show more concern for the health and safety of.
MEPICAL FACILITIES
Before the store managers (were elected), we had nominated blacks and never talked about issues. Although the new Machinery and Occupational Safety Act requires management to have 'designated' health and safety representatives, it will be interesting to see how workers and management respond to this. In addition, store clerks said employees distrusted clinic staff because not only did they receive inadequate treatment when they were injured, but they were also never told what was wrong with them when they became ill.
Workers should be x-rayed at least annually for signs of lung disease due to the high dust levels in. It should be noted that SANTA uses small x-ray plates that are approx. 1.9 of the size of standard plates. There were numerous accounts from union representatives who claimed that workers were fired on the basis of X-ray tests.
Workers were either fired after the results of their X-rays became available or, in the case of migrant workers, their contracts were not renewed. This was also expressed (in quite sinister terms) by a manager of a medium-sized foundry, as in the question. Because workers are not told what is wrong with them, they are unaware of what treatment to seek.
Under the Factories Act (1941), workers exposed to noise greater than 0.85 dB(A) must have their hearing checked once. hearing loss detection year. As can be seen in Table 15, only 4 foundries, comprising 46% of the workforce, claimed that such tests are carried out regularly. In one instance, when a health and safety officer claimed they carried out regular hearing tests on all workers, store managers were unaware of this.
To the question "Have dust levels in the foundry ever been determined ~ only nine out of thirty. The rest, 70%, making up 76% of the workforce, had never determined dust levels in their plant, as shown in Table 16. There are 3 departments where it due to the high levels of dust emitted, it is imperative that, in the absence of dust control, respirators are provided for worker protection.
SMALL w a
SMALL ,,1
CONCLUSION
If Health and Safety is seen within the context of a conflict of interest between management and workers, it can be understood why the former tries to minimize costs during the production process. As shown by the example of dust monitoring, management has paid little attention to its improvement. Instead, employers compel workers directly or through their health and safety structures to wear protective equipment.
The belief in the role the individual worker plays in causing accidents is reinforced by NOSA and the state. This serves to reinforce management's privilege over the production process regardless of the effects on workers. But management's positions have been challenged by the rise of the independent trade union movement over the past decade.
A sample of 36 foundries was thus selected, representing 32% of the Witwatersrand foundries and 15% of the South African total. As a result, interviews were conducted with a range of people in this category, ranging from the Managing Director to the Health and Safety Officer, as shown in Table A. A questionnaire consisting of 36 questions was administered to the shop stewards. from each of the above ten foundries.
The author also interviewed the director of a large protective equipment supply company to determine what equipment should be supplied in each foundry department. Management representatives were interviewed at their factories and each foundry was inspected. The fear of retaliatory measures by the management ruled out the possibility of interviewing the representatives of the workers in the foundries.
Both questionnaires were pre-tested once and subsequently modified for the purposes of the study. In addition to the structured questions, there were many open-ended questions where discussions between management representatives and the author took place. A factory inspector and union representatives from one of the foundries were interviewed to determine the reasons for their refusal.
APPENDIX 2
APPENDIX 3
What are your feelings about the health and safety of the workers at your foundry? Do you know someone who has had an accident and their name was never recorded in the Accident Register (Accident Book). Do you know any employees who have been fired after being "medically examined".
The Work's Working Environment Program. OSHA, U.S. Dept.. 11) Cunningham, J., Floyd, E., et al. Foundries, Health and Safety at Work I. Center for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 1980. Report of the Erasmus Commission of Inquiry on Occupational Health Republic of S.A. Prevention of Occupational Diseases and Industrial Accidents in South African Industry". These papers constitute the preliminary findings of the second Carnegie Study on Poverty and Development in Southern Africa and were prepared for presentation at a conference at the University of Cape Town from 13-19 April 1984.
SALDRU
