THERESHOLD ON ELECTION LAW OF NO.7/2017
3. DISCUSSION
In this discussion the author only uses conflict theory to focus on seeing and analyzing deeply related to this case.
3.1. Political Conflict in Formulating the President's Threshold
Conflicts in the formulation of laws are commonplace. However, it becomes a problem if the conflict is not based on the interests of the people. It would be a big problem if the conflict was based on personal interests and interests for certain groups. Maswadi Rauf (2000: 2) argues, that conflict can be interpreted as any conflict or difference of opinion between at least two people or groups. In this context, there are several factions that have different interests and views from one another. So that this is what makes the formulation
of the presidential threshold full of interest interests, so that it ends in political conflict.
The source of political conflict as stated by Maswadi Rauf (2000: 23) is the political ruler.
Maswadi Rauf explained that the political ruler had the aim to manage conflict (management of conflict) with all the authority he had. However, this authority is often misused. So that such authority or power often opens opportunities for political authorities to realize their personal or group interests. The result is that the political ruler no longer emphasizes his role as the manager of conflict, but becomes the source of a conflict in this case political conflict.
In the context of this case, the submission of presidential thresholds in the electoral law was carried out by the government which in this case was submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Indonesian House of Representatives, to be later discussed in the DPR. In its proposal, the government proposed a presidential threshold of 20% of seats in the DPR or 25% of national legitimate votes. As a result of the proposal, various factions expressed their views regarding the president's threshold value. Among them there are 3 factions that agree and agree with the government's proposal at 20-25%. The factions are PDIP, Golkar and Nasdem. The three factions view and argue that the figure of 20-25% aims to strengthen the presidential system.
And then, 7 factions agreed that the presidential threshold at 0% or the presidential threshold was abolished. The factions included Gerindra, Democrats, PAN, PKB, PKS, PPP, and Hanura (in the Minutes of the Election Bill Special Committee Meeting). The initial view of the seven factions is to see that the presidential threshold at 20-25% is contrary to the constitution (incititu-sional) and the logic used to strengthen presidential systems is not appropriate.
In the next of the discussion, there was a change in views from several factions. Among them are the PKB, PPP and Hanura factions. The PKB, which initially rejected the presidential threshold, then changed their views by proposing
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25% of seats in the DPR and 25% of the national votes. While the PPP, which initially refused the presidential threshold, then changed its view by proposing a 7.0% seat option in the DPR and 3.5%
of the national votes. While Hanura, which initially refused the presidential threshold, then changed its view by supporting the presidential threshold with a figure of 20% of seats in the DPR and 25% of nationally legitimate votes..
So that of the 10 factions in the DPR, 4 factions that agree with the presidential threshold are 20-25%. The four factions are PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem and Hanura. Then 4 other factions namely Gerindra, Democrats, PAN and PKS remained on the initial view which proposed the presidential threshold (Presidential Threshold) abolished.
While the other two factions namely PPP proposed 7.0% of seats in the DPR and 3.5% of the votes
were nationally legitimate, and PKB proposed 25%
of seats in the DPR and 25% of national votes.
The debate continued until finally the discussion of the presidential threshold was raised at the second level meeting at the plenary meeting on July 20, 2017 for decision making. In the discussion there was a lobbying process and a compromise between factions. Where before the voting was done, the PKB and PPP factions changed their views, which initially did not agree with the presidential threshold at 20-25%, then changed to support and agree with the presidential threshold at 20-25%. Thus, after the voting was carried out there were 6 factions which agreed with the presidential threshold at 20-25% and 4 factions did not agree with the presidential threshold at 20-25%. Here the author states in the table the changes in views of the faction from the beginning to the end of the presidential threshold discussion.
TABLE I
Faction Views on the President's Threshold
No. Fraction Early View Middle View End view Description of Views
1. PDIP 20-25% 20-25% 20-25% Still agree
2. Golkar 20-25% 20-25% 20-25% Still agree
3. Gerindra 0% 0% 0% Fixed Disagree
4. Demokrat 0% 0% 0% Fixed Disagree
5. PAN 0% 0% 0% Fixed Disagree
6. PKB 0% 25-25% 20-25% Change Agree
7. PKS 0% 0% 0% Fixed Disagree
8. PPP 0% 7%-3,5% 20-25% Change Agree
9. Nasdem 20-25% 20-25% 20-25% Still agree
10. Hanura 20-25% 20-25% 20-25% Change Agree
If you look at the table above, the factions that support the President's threshold are 20-25%, most of which are factions within the government coalition or referred to as the Great Indonesian Coalition (KIH). As is known, the factions joined in the government coalition namely PDIP, Golkar, PAN, PKB, PPP, Nasdem and Hanura. However, there is only one fraction incorporated in the KIH that does not support the President's threshold of 20-25%, namely the PAN fraction. While the other
three factions, Gerindra, PKS and Democrats who rejected the presidential threshold by 20-25%, were factions that were opposed to the go-vernment, most of which were members of the Red and White Coalition (KMP). For information, the faction that is still incorporated in the KMP is Gerindra and PKS. The polarization of the two poles between the factions that support the President's threshold of 20-25% and the faction that rejects the President's threshold of 20-25% is
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KMP in the 2014 Presidential Election.
In an interview with the media, Lumkman Edy, a member of the PKB faction who was also chairman of the Special Committee for the Election Bill, argued that "PKB continues to seduce the government from the start with various arguments. But then the government stays at 20-25%. So, because the PKB is in the line of the government coalition, then the PKB inevitably has to believe in the government ". So finally PKB agreed with the presidential threshold of 20-25%
(https://news.detik.com, July 22, 2017).
Then, the PPP's view changed to agree with the presidential threshold because with a presidential threshold of 20% the government could save the election budget. Quoting Romi Romahurmuzy's explanation "We are trying so that there is no voting. But if there is a voting we are in a basic manner. That is our effort to offer a meeting point. (http://kabar24.bisnis.com, July 11 2017).
Maurice Duverger (1982: 47) suggests there are three types of conflict. First, conflict which has no principle at all. Second, conflict arises because there are differences regarding parts of a principle but not about the principle itself. Third, conflict which departs entirely from a basic principle.
Syamsuddin Haris (1988: 271) analyzes that the first type of conflict deals with practical problems that are not related to the issue of ideology.
Disagreements born of the political interests of someone or a group of conflicting people seem to be included in this category. The second type of conflict concerns differences of opinion regarding a problem related to the interests of the party, or the interests of the organization, or the community that is considered to be represented by the party.
While the third type of conflict arises if the disputed issue is an ideology, such as regarding the basis of the state.
If you look at the analysis of Syamsuddin Haris above, it can be confirmed that the second type of conflict is relevant to the reality of the conflict that occurred in the DPR RI when
discussing the formulation of the presidential threshold. Because basically the conflict between factions is related to differences of opinion regarding a problem related to political interests, namely the interest to gain power from each political party that is to be achieved through elections. So that ideological values that become the guidelines and guidelines in the institutions of political parties are no longer an important foundation in the formulation of a policy. Because it was displaced by the pragmatic interests of those who held control in the political party.
The conflict situation according to Paul Conn in (Ramlan Surbakti, 2010: 196) is that conflict situations are basically differentiated into zero-sum conflict and non-zero-sum conflict.
Surbakti (2010: 197) explains that zero-sum conflict is a situation of conflict that is antagonistic in nature so that it does not allow for the achievement of a compromise between the parties involved in the conflict. The characteristic of the structure of this conflict is that it does not allow for cooperation, the results of the competition will be enjoyed by the winner only, which is at stake usually involves matters of principal and important positions of government.
While the win-win conflict (non-zero-sum conflict) is a conflict situation where the parties involved in the conflict are still possible to make a compromise or cooperation so that all parties get a part of the conflict. The characteristics of this conflict are compromise and cooperation, the results of the competition will be enjoyed by both parties. In this context, the conflict that occurred especially related to the issue of presidential threshold can be categorized as a zero-sum conflict. Due to the failure to reach a compromise / deliberation until voting is carried out.
4. CONCLUSSION
Seeing the dynamics of political conflicts that occur in the formulation of the presidential threshold above, there are fundamental findings that can answer research problems. First, it relates to the dynamics of political conflict which color
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the formulation of the presidential threshold.
Where each faction has their own views and argu-ments that support their attitude in determining the president's threshold. But there are also factions that change their views or are inconsistent in determining attitudes that are influenced by compromises and political lobbies between factions.
The second, pragmatic reasons for gaining power that dominate and color conflict in the formulation of the presidential threshold. There are no ideological values that serve as guidelines and guidelines for the president's threshold formulation debate. Moreover, the interests that are based on the interests of the people are not visible at all. The conflict is purely on the basis of pragmatic political interests to gain momentary power.
If such pragmatic interests dominate and color the process of formulating laws in the future, then this will be a bad precedent in our legislative process. Moreover, the interests of the people are negated. So that people are no longer used as interests in formulating laws.
5. REFERENCES
Constitutional Court Decision Number 14 / PUU-XI / 2013.
Draft Election Law (Election Bill) Number 42 of 2008.
Lexy J. Moleong. Metode Penelitian Kualitatif.
Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya 2000.
Maswadi Rauf. Konsensus Politik ―Sebuah penjajangan Teoritis‖. Jakarta: Direktorat jendral Pendidikan Tinggi. 2000.
Maurice Duverger. ―Political Parties‖. N.Y. John Willwy & Sons. Inc 1963 dalam Arbi Sanit, Sistem Politik Indonesia: Kestabilan, Peta Kekuatan Politik dan Pembangunan, Jakarta: Rajawali Press. 1982.
Ramlan Surbakti. Memahami Ilmu Politik. jakarta:
PT Grasindo. 2010.
Robert A. Dahl. Demokrasi dan Para Pengkritiknya. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia. 1992.
Short Report on Election Bill Special Committee.
Syamsuddin Haris dkk. Draf Ringkasan Eksekutif Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019. Jakarta: Electoral Research Institute-LIPI. 2015.
Syamsuddin Haris. Pola dan Kecenderungan Konflik Partai Masa Orde Baru. Jurnal Analisa, CSIS, Tahun XVII, No. 5, Mei 1988.
Treatise of the Special Committee Meeting on the Draft Law on the Implementation of Elections.
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