1
DEWAN REDAKSI
SEMINAR INTERNASIONAL
DINAMIKA BUDAYA TIMUR TENGAH PASCA ARAB SPRING
PROGRAM STUDI ARAB
FAKULTAS ILMU PENGETAHUAN BUDAYA
UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Pelindung: Dekan Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya Universitas Indonesia
Penasihat: Dr. Muhammad Luthfi
Drs. Juhdi Syarif, M.Hum Dr. Apipudin, M.Hum Dr. Fauzan Muslim Dr. Maman Lesmana
Penanggung Jawab: Letmiros, M.Hum., M.A Siti Rohmah Soekarba, M.Hum
Ketua Panitia: Abdul Mutaali, Ph.D
Sekretaris: Yon Machmudi, Ph.D
Editor: Siti Rohmah Soekarba, M.Hum
PROSIDING UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR OF THE MIDDLE EAST (UI ISME) 2015
Diterbitkan oleh Program Studi Arab
Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya Universitas Indonesia November 2015
2
KATA PENGANTAR
Musim semi Arab atau lebih dikenal dengan istilah Arab Spring, adalah sebuah peristiwa sporadis yang melahirkan banyak perubahan dan masa depan bagi masing-masing negara di kawasan Timur Tengah. Pergolakan Arab Spring dan kejadian yang menyertainya adalah rentetan gerakan yang memiliki tujuan utama untuk tercapainya kebebasan, demokrasi dan reformasi ekonomi-politik.
Respon yang mengalir ke negara-negara Arab bak air bah, people power menjadi tren yang berhasrat ingin menggulingkan rezim yang dianggap diktator. Gerakan ini merembet ke Syiria, hingga negara-negara berpengaruh di Timur Tengah seperti Arab Saudi, Iran dan Turki ikut terseret dalam kancah ini dan saling berebut pengaruh dengan bermacam kebijakan dan manuver politiknya. Dan tentu saja ada efek dari berbagai sudut pandang yang menetas dari kejadian-kejadian tersebut.
Dinamika budaya yang lahir pasca Arab Spring adalah salah satu produk turunan yang dihasilkan. Hal ini yang membuat kami dari Program Studi Arab mengundang para akademisi internasional untuk menuangkan pemikiran, ide dan pandangannya dalam bentuk makalah.
Makalah–makalah pilihan yang dimuat dalam prosiding ini adalah makalah dari akademisi berbagai universitas dalam maupun luar negeri yang konsen dengan masalah dan dinamika budaya di Timur-Tengah.
Prosiding ini tidak akan hadir tanpa adanya kontribusi dari pihak-pihak baik secara langsung ataupun tidak. Oleh karenanya saya harus mengucapkan banyak terima kasih kepada semua pihak tersebut. Ucapan terima kasih kepada Bapak Rektor UI, Dekan FIB dan juga para pembantunya dan tentu tak lupa terima kasih kami kepada KAPRODI Arab dan seluruh staf pengajar atas bantuan, dukungan dan bimbingan langsung kepada kami sebagai panitia.
Ucapan terima kasih juga saya sampaikan kepada seluruh panitia yang telah bekerja keras hingga hadirnya prosiding ini dan juga seminar internasional.
Terakhir, izinkan saya memohon maaf atas berbagai kekurangan prosiding ini. Harapan kami semoga prosiding ini bermanfaat bagi pembaca dan juga ikut selalu berperan dalam perkembangan studi Arab bagi Indonesia.
Depok, 11 November 2015
3
DAFTAR ISI
Dewan Redaksi 1
Pengantar 2
Daftar Isi 3
MAKALAH PEMBICARA UTAMA
The New Paradigm of Geostrategy in The Aftermath of Arab Awakening 5 (Indria Ernaningsih)
Arab Spring, Indonesian Democracy, and Diplomatic Blind Spot 19 (Ryantori, M.Si)
TATANAN BARU TIMUR TENGAH PASCA ARAB SPRING: Analisis 31 Deskriptif Budaya Arab
(Zul Karnen, S.S., M.Si)
ISIS, Indonesian Sympathizers and International Relation 44 (Muhamad Syauqillah)
Peran Indonesia Dalam Membangun Demokrasi di Timur Tengah 58 (Inggar Saputra)
Pengaruh Media Sosial dalam Pembentukan Budaya Timur Tengah Pasca 68 Arab Spring
(Fany Dayang Sary)
The Influence of Middle East Scholars towards Political Islamic Movement 79 in Jogjakarta and Surakarta
(Dr. Istadiyantha, M.S.)
MAKALAH PARALEL
The Relation of Radical Islamic Movement in the Middle East and 96 Terrorism in Indonesia: the Study of National Integration Effort
(Dr. Istadiyantha, M.S. and Dr. Eva Farhah, M.A., Ph.D.)
Bahasa Arab di Wilayah Hijaz Arab Saudi: Kajian Geografi Dialek 110 (Muhammad Yunus Anis, S.S., M.A.)
Peran Barat terhadap Gejolak Politik Timur Tengah 129 (Muhammad Azizul Ghofar)
Strategi Tindak Tutur Meminta Bahasa Arab Amiyah 141 (Muhammad Ridwan, S.S., M.A.)
Sastra dan Politik pada Masyarakat Arab Zaman Umayyah (abad ke 7-8 m.) 153 (Dr. Fauzan Muslim, M. Hum)
4
MAKALAH
5
The New Paradigm of Geostrategy in the Aftermath of Arab Awakening
Indria Ernaningsih
indriaerna5@gmail.com MSc in Islamic Finance
Hamad Bin Khalifa University
Abstract :
The wave of democratic revolt and consequent turnmoil in the Middle East have
changed the landscape of socio-political and economics in the region, even in its relation
in international affairs. Having said that, the paper attempts to discuss two main
considerations. Firstly, it examines how the political unrest process which is commonly called "Arab Spring or Arab Awakening” has undergone in several different scale upheavals across the region due to its root causes as well as a set of factors such as; the
state structures and responses of the regime, the role of security forces and the conflict of
the ethnic and sectarian issues make up in the society. In addition the paper argues that
the revolutionary waves tend to expand and impend nearby, further changing
dramatically into a state alliance relationship, hence the second consideration is how to
asses the uprising impact on the regional and international geostrategy alongside the
roadmap of balance power of various players in this region after three years of “Arab Spring”.
1. Introduction
Currently, the Arab world is experiencing one of the most substantial transformations
in socio- political and socio-economic movements. The movement is commonly labelled as “Arab Spring” or Arab Awakening”. More specifically, it describes the wave of demonstration, civil unrest and civil war uprising demanding greater
democratic governance in the Arab world.1 The revolts grew either to overthrow their existing regime or turn it into a civil war. The six countries namely Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen have faced a full scale of upheaval. Beyond those
6
at a lower scale such as in Morocco, Jordan and the rest of the GCC states. Meanwhile
some countries such as Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and Palestine have been relatively
immune by this uprising. 2
The Arab Spring was triggered by the first protests that took place in Tunisia on
December 18, 2010. A series of mass demonstrations resulted in the overthrow of the
regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali who has ruled for 23 years. What happened in
Tunisia spread far and wide like the domino effect across social media. The image of
bravery embodying the spirit of change of the demonstrators went viral through
Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and satellite TV inspiring thousands of others across the
Arab world. Ultimately the power of media has proved effectively to build awareness
and mobilize mass.3
The spirit of democratic movement has spilled over, as similar mass
demonstrations then occurred in Egypt by the end of January 2011, calling for President Husni Mubarak’s resignation. Although President Mubarak has responded by not standing in the president election in September 2011, the pledge was rejected. After the massive wave of protestors occupying Tahrir Square in Cairo expressing “A Day of Departure” rally, eventually on 13 February 2011.
President Husni Mubarak was forced to step down.4 In Yemen, since President Saleh rejected the proposal of his resignation, divisions in its military forces have sparked,
hence opening doors to a violent crackdown between the government and the
opposition, tribesmen backed by defected military forces. In Bahrain, when the Shia
majority population protested against its Sunni ruling Khalifa royal family, security forces quickly suppressed those supported by the “Peninsula Shield” forces from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate. In Libya, the protests started in the eastern city of
Benghazi, before escalating to various cities including Tripoli and evolving into a open war between Gadaffi’s militaries and groups of anti government protesters which ultimately dragged NATO into the conflict.
Among those six countries, Syria experienced the most deteriorated of insurgencies
since the Assad regime responded with extreme violence towards the peaceful protests.
The heavy military repressing provoked strong resistance in the form of radicalism and
7
In fact, the Arab Spring outcome varied depending on socio-economic, political and
environmental factors, the nature of each ruling regime, the degree of civility in
surrounding environments, and the momentum in achieving the revolution's goals.5 By supporting that argument the paper also asserts that the Arab revolt has created a
new socio-political and economy in the region. Having said that the paper assesses to
what extent the root causes induce the several different levels of turbulence across the
region. In parallel, the paper examines the impact of the uprising on regional and
international geostrategy alongside the roadmap of balance power of various players in this region after three years of “Arab Spring”.
2. The Root Causes of The Arab Spring
Indeed, in the beginning there were three fundamental demands of the Arab Spring
movement that wanted to be achieved; (a) domestic freedoms, (b) good governance and
(c) social justice.6
These three demands were voiced by the famous slogan of the Arab protestors ash–
shabyuridisa at an–nixam (the will of the people is to bring down the regime).7 These claims emerged as a form of protest against all socio-economic and political problems
that deteriorated the quality of life. These factors include high employment, government
corruption, violation of human rights, the change of demographic profiles, and
further deterioration of economies due to global financial and high inflation
precipitated by rising food and energy prices.8 Nonetheless financial pressures seems to be a pivotal trigger especially when corruption of the ruling elite was so blatantly
revealed to the public.
Despite the warning that has been expressed from many parties including academic
researches about the increasing popular dissatisfaction due to the impairment of
economics, the Arab regimes and international financial institution have failed to
predict the political turmoil. They still believed in the number of economics indicators
that suggested the economies were undergoing a high growth rates, approximately five
percent per annum. The IMF report released seven month prior the collapse of Mubarak
even praised the sustainable and wide ranging reforms both in monetary and fiscal
policy, without mentioning the demographic problem as a potential factor that enable to
8
Table 1. GDP Growth Rates, 1980-2012
Period Country
1980-1990
1990-2001
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Developed Economies
US 3.4 3.5 2.7 1.9 0.0 -3.5 3.0 1.6 2.2
Canada 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.2 0.7 -2.8 3.2 2.4 1.8
UK 3.1 2.6 2.8 2.7 -0.1 -4.9 1.4 0.8 0.2
France 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.3 -0.1 -2.7 1.5 1.7 0.0
Sweden 2.2 2.0 4.3 3.3 -0.6 -5.2 5.6 4.0 1.2
Germany (West) 2.1 1.5 3.7 3.3 1.1 -5.1 3.7 3.1 0.9
Japan 4.1 1.3 2.0 2.4 -1.2 -6.3 4.0 -0.7 2.0
Australia 3.4 4.0 3.1 3.8 3.7 1.3 2.7 2.1 3.6
Non-Oil Arab Countries
Egypt 5.0 4.6 6.8 7.1 7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 2.2
Jordan - 4.8 7.9 8.5 7.6 2.3 3.1 2.6 2.8
Syria 2.1 5.5 5.0 5.7 4.7 6.0 3.2 - -
Tunisia 3.6 4.7 5.7 6.3 4.7 3.1 3.7 -1.8 3.6
Morroco 4.0 2.5 7.8 2.7 5.6 4.8 3.7 4.9 3.0
Sources : World Bank10
A combination of the increasing birth rate , the declining infant mortality rate and also
the rising life expectancy over the last few decades have caused the Arab regions to face
an unprecedented boom in its youth population which is almost three quarters of the
population under the age of thirty. In addition, the rise of female participation in
workforce has put a tremendous pressure on labor markets, social services and social
stability. The youth workforce are also more educated and politically demanding.
However, the region has showed the lowest share of employed workforce in the
9
Figure 2. Share of Employed People in Working Age Population (+15)
70 64
52 55 57 57
52.5 47 50
35
17.5
0
MENA ECA LAC SA EAP SSA EU25
Sources : World Bank, 2009 cited in Ozekin & Akkas 2014
MENA =Middle East & North Africa; ECA = Europe & Central Asia; LAC = Latin America & the Caribbean; SA = South Asia; EAP = East Asia & the Pacific; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; EU = European union.
Due to pressures from the IMF and World Bank, the majority of Arab countries were
forced to reform their economies based on the economic liberation program called “Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)” in the mid 1980s. In order to follow the program, government started to revoke the subsidies of basic essential commodities,
decreasing the number of government jobs, increasing taxation and consumption for
citizens; on the other side, local and foreign investors were granted custom and taxation
exemption. The economic impoverishment of the majority of people occurred as result
of the rising food prices and unemployment particularly among the youth. Meanwhile,
the ruling elite through corruption seem to be ongoing enrichment themselves by
managing numerous amount of wealth which triggered a potential social conflict.12 In addition, there were massive violation of human rights as a form of the repressive and
violent nature of the Arab regimes that reflected on the report issued by World Bank in 2011. This report has title “the Worldwide Governance Indicators” showed that MENA region has the second lowest score after former Soviet Union. Finally, the
culmination of socio-economic and socio political problems coupled with increasingly
deteriorating economy aftermath of financial crisis sparked the Arab Uprising led by
10
Figure 3. Voice and Accountability by Region, 1998 - 2010
Sources ; World Bank, 2011 “ The Worldwide Governance Indicators cited in Ozekin &
Akkas
2014
MENA =Middle East and North Africa; SSA = Subsaharan Africa; SA = South Asia;
EA = East
Sources ; World Bank, 2011 “ The Worldwide Governance Indicators cited in Ozekin & Akkas 2014
MENA =Middle East and North Africa; SSA = Subsaharan Africa; SA = South Asia;
EA = East Asia; LA = Latin America; EUB = Eastern Europe & Baltics; FSU = Former
Soviet Union3. The Difference in Escalation of the Arab Uprising
In fact the military institutions have played a pivotal role responding the escalation of
Arab movement through three different stances; (a) disassociation with the regime and
welcoming the transition, (b) loyalty to the status quo; (c) defection and becoming part
of the opposition. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the military kept distance from
repression committed by the police and security forces to demonstrators, hence the
regime was overthrown in a relatively smooth manner. Furthermore, the collapse of
Hosni Mubarak led to a military take over and allowed the democratic election to be
won by Freedom and Justice-the party of the Muslim Brotherhood both in People’s
Assembly-the Parliament’s lower house (47.2%) and the Consultative Council (58%);
ultimately their candidate Mohammad Morsi won the presidency in May 2012.13 In Tunisia, the transition was even better than Egypt because the military was already
frustrated with the policy of marginalization and neutralization implemented by
11
The military in Syria and Bahrain on the contrary were different to their counterparts in
Tunisia and Egypt; they put themselves loyal to the ruler. In Syria, the Assad regime
adopted policies for recruiting military and security forces particularly for the top officer
- they were mostly taken from the Alawite minority population-the loyal Shia supporter
of Assad. Moreover the brutal tactic of the army in the face of the demonstrators
spawned fierce resistance from the opposition and brought international intervention.
Quickly the uprising transformed into a bloody civil war and caused fragmentation of
the country in terms of the sects (Shia vs Sunni), ethnicities (Kurdish vs Arab) and
ideologies (the Islamists and secularist). This regime has survived until now, because of,
not only the loyalty of the army, but also the ingenuity of Bashar in utilizing his allies.
In Bahrain, the military also remain unified to King Hamad but not due to sectarian
relation. The opposition, who were mostly composed of the Shia, demanded more
participation in social and political discourses. The revolt was immediately put out by
the Sunni rulers who assisted GCC forces that was mainly composed of Saudis. The
danger of the Sunni-Shia friction threatened Saudi security hence there was no option
for Saudi but to support the Bahrain ruler at any cost.
In Libya and Yemen, the military forces were not solid, as a split of stand point on
how to respond to the revolt occurred. The division comes as a result of the weak
institutional state structure.15 As regards Libya, the protestors faced stiff opposition from the ruling regime. The military and militias were loyal to Qaddhafi, killing
numerous demonstrators that induced international condemnation. The Arab League
called for the imposition of a no fly zone over Libya to protect civilians from Qaddhafi
forces. The United States took action quickly to the internationalised Libya crisis
through the help of Qatar by sending military forces supported by NATO allies under
legitimization of Resolution 1970 adopted by UN Security Council.16
Shortly, after the outbreak of the uprising, under General Abdul Fatah Younis and Musa
Kusa - Qaddafi's right-hand, some army units and intelligences defected and joined the
rebellion. The revolt then moved uncontrolled, although Qaddafi has been assassinated,
Libya was the fragmented into numerous fractions. The post-Qaddafi ruler was weak
and failed to rebuild their institutions, especially in the security sector. Moreover
military bases and mercenaries during the civil war later transferred to the National
12
Touareg Movement (in north of Mali), causing open instability and tension as well as
geopolitical chaos.17
With regards to Yemen, initially the demonstration ran peacefully, without any
crackdown. However the situation did not last long, with the authorities becoming
impatient and using violence to disperse demonstration that caused disintegration within
the military and defection of some its leaders; later they joined the rebels. After
following a series of government massacres against the revolutionary forces, the Saudi
backed US, forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down and ceded his office to vice president Abdu Mansour Hadi. Since then Hadi’s government also became an ally of the Saudis since Hadi’s foreign policy was similar to the former president Saleh.18
4. The Arab Uprising Implication : Geostrategy Configuration
The Arab Spring has changed the Middle east region on the levels of ideology, sect and
power politic. After three years euphoria declined, the new political order in the Middle
East is marked by rebalancing power within each state at national level, changing allies
at regional level as well as geostrategic configuration. As the upheavals continue grow
in number, especially in strategic countries such as Syria and Bahrain, they will continue
to have a large effect on regional politics as well as a great power interest.
4.1 The Case of Syria
What actually happens in Syria is the proxy war of world powers (US and Rusia) and
regional powers (Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia); duplicating the Iraq and Afghan
scenario. When the reputation of United Stated tarnished after the failures in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Syrian conflict is lucrative gate for Russian regain the
dominance. In fact, Syria was the locus of the Soviet Union in the Middle East also the
home of Rusian naval base which placed in the Syrian harbor of Tartous. Meanwhile for
the US, the region is still important to maintenance the security of Israel, although might
be shifted of its strategy related energy source.19
In context of regional politic, Iran initially welcomed the Arab Awakening in the hope
that they would be more anti-western and pro-Islamist that encourage an emergence
new ally for Iran. However, by the passage time, the revolt was even more away than
13
Mishaal abandon longtime base in Damascus by January 2012”.20
Therefore, there is no
option for Iran except to fully support Assad’s regime. Furthermore Assad’s regime is 33
years ally of Iran due to some reasons; channel for military and financial support to
Hezbollah also resistance fronts against Israel. Syrian crisis and domestic political
development are challenge for Iran to be the natural Shia leader on the region through
strengthening the Alawite (Nusairi) who hold strong power in Syria right now.
On the other hand, in order to stem Iran-Shia political leverage; accordingly, Saudi
together with Qatar and Turkey as Sunni allies, support to the Syrian opposition in the
form of financial, weapon and military training.21 Moreover, Turkey also has expressed interest in Syria due to Kurds which live in many parts of Syria, heavily concentrated in
the northeast province of Hasakah. These tribes are better organized than many ethnic or
sectarian groups in Syria. They have 12 Kurdish political parties, one of the most
important is Democratic Union Party (PYD) which has close links with the Kurdistan
Worker Party (PKK)- the terrorist organization in Turkey.22
4.2 The Case of Bahrain
Bahrain like Syria has a pivotal role in both regional and international affairs. In the region, Bahrain is the battlefield of the “Cold War” between the two Gulf powers, Saudi and Iran, which has been increasingly chilly since the fall of the Ba’ath in Iraq 2003 and consequently weakened the geopolitical role of Baghdad. In Saudi’s perspective, neutralization of the influence of Shia is a must and cannot to fail in a way by
strengthening the power of the Khalifa ruling familly-sunni ally. On the contrary Iran plays on the Issue “ The Bahrain nation is an oppressed nation”, to seek sympathy of the outside. As we know, Bahrainis following Shia are approximately seventy percent of the
total population.23
Internationally, Bahrain is the home of a US military base-the US Fifth Fleet
which is responsible for the American naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea,
Arabian Sea ad the East African coast as far south as Kenya. This facility is to
safeguard places of American interest, Israel and his allies. Moreover, the presence of a
military facility, pushes the US government to be proactive on all issues, both domestic
14
enhanced particularly when Washington intended to launch strikes against Iranian
nuclear facilities. 24
4.3 The Pivotal Players
Despite major uncertainties accompanying the current uprisings, one thing is clear: the
uprising has reshaped the rivalry of Shia-Sunni, which has converted the region into one “Geopolitical Great Game”. There are three regional main players; Saudi, Iran and Turkey, which have triggered power struggles throughout the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is one of the predominant powers in the Arab region, who has enormous
oil wealth, respectable demographic base, and geostrategic competition with Iran since it proclaims itself as “the protector of Sunni interest’’. In order to curb the growth of the Iranian influence in the region, including to break down the Al Qaeda linked terrorist
organizations, Saudi has used to its power to draw Bahrain, Oman and possibly also
Kuwait closer to its circle of influence and domination.25 While the United Arab Emirates are trying to stay out of the imbroglio, Qatar has been one step ahead, ready to
use its high international profile and ability to chart its own independent course, as a
newly emerging active player in the region. The influential al Jazeera news channel
which is based in Doha is one of the important means to support its role.26
Saudi in its rivalry with Iran often sustains its capabilities, primarily by the transfer of
high-tech weapons from the United States and has to rely, simply, on funds to influence
events. Conversely, it has a lack of genuine political institution and intervention in the region. Thus, Saudi’s inherent weakness on its foreign policy means it becomes less effective in regional diplomacy.27
Iran
The top priority of Iran’s foreign policy, in aftermath of Arab Spring is Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. According to the political analyst Simon Tisdall, the close
bilateral relationship between Iran and Syria is based on similarity on ideological and
physical confrontation with Israel and US and its buffer against the pro Western Sunni
monarchies of the gulf. Syria, to Iran, is the springboard into the Arab Middle East,
15
could become a potential threat in the future. Its relation with Turkey, Turkey has showed consistently its support of Iran rights for enrichment using it’s uranium for peaceful purposes. However, Iran also has tensions regarding the Syrian uprising,
supporting the Nuri-al-Maliki Regime -A Shia dominated government in Iraq and also
the issue of Kurdistan.
Turkey
Initially, both Turkey and Iran welcomed the Arab Awakening against the authoritarian
Arab rules, but for different reasons. For Turkey, the Arab Spring is a reflection
of their own experiences on their success in a democracy and reducing the military's
role in the political sphere. In fact, this country has been seen as the role model for
emerging Arab democracies.29
While Iran expected the uprising would topple pro-western dictators and emerged as the new ruler, which inlined with Iran’s interest. However, in the subsequent development there was a different result to be expected by both parties, this even raised tension in
their relations.
Moreover, the issue on the foreign policy of Turkey in Middle East is, so far, in Syria,
Egypt, Iraq and Israel. When the Assad regime brutally suppressed the protestor, Turkey
firmly asked Assad to secede his power and recalled its ambassador as a form of protest
against the atrocities on the people of Syria. The similar stance of Turkey when calling a
military coup to the president Mursi. Although this is a right thing, but was again
isolated, hence for the reason of national interest, preferred to stay neutral or paid lip
service to the opponents of the coup. As a result Turkey would lose its important ally in
the middle east and Arab world due to the significant role of Egypt in the region. In Iraq,
Turkey does not observe formalities with the PM Maliki due to the Shia-Sunni conflict.
In contrast, Turkey started to improve its relations with Israel on the basis of national
interest.
5. Conclusion
To sum up in the wake of the Arab Spring, there are three fundamental geostrategic
implication transforming the balance of power in Middle East. First, the people
movement in the Arab world seem have similarity of the root causes which heavily
16
the regimes were dissimilar, causing the different level scale of upheaval. There six
countries were experiencing a full scale of upheaval, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Among of them, four countries were successful to
topple the old regimes. Due to the limitation, the paper only examine the combination
factors driven the revolt and the degree escalation in six countries mentioned above.
The second geostrategic consequences is the fragmentationin of power whether on the
basis of ideology, sectarian or tribal, that led the proliferation of weak states. The new
authority or the existing regimes were failed to reach a national consensus to calm the
sociopolitical unrest. The last is the geostrategic future of the Middle East is likely to be
determined in the short and medium terms by interaction of three key regional players;
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey while the United States and Rusia as international player
also playing significant roles.
Note
1 Pike, J. “Arab Spring, Arab Awakening”. 06 August 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/arab-sping.htm
2 Dalacoura, K. “ The Arab Uprising Two Year On: Ideology, Sectarianism and The Changing Balance of Power in The Middle East”. Insight Turkey. Vol 15/ No.1/2013. pp. 75-89.
3 De Vriese. “Paradox of Globalization: New Arab Publics? New Social Contract?”. KoninkklijkeBrill NV, Leiden.PGDT 12. pp 114-134. 2013
4. Pike. supra note 1.
5 Ogbonnaya. “Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt &Libya: A comparative Analysis of Causes & Determinants”. Alternative Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.12 no.3 Fall 2013
6 Elakawi. “The Geostrategic Consequences of The Arab Spring”. 22 November 2014.
http://www.opendemocrazy.net/arab-awakenin/zaki-samy-elakawi/geostrategic-consequences-of-arab- spring
7 Abo, Bakr Elenndy. Arab Spring: Causes and Role of NSOs, Central Agency for Public Mobilization & Statistics, CAPMAS, Egypt, February, 2012, p.
8 Ozekin & Akkas. “An Emperical Look To The Arab Spring: Causes and
17
9 IMF. “ Arab Republic of Egypt: 2010 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report”. IMF Report No.10/94. April 2010
10 The World Bank (WB), World Development Report, various issues; WB, World Bank Data, http://data.world- bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=5; IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013.
11 Ozekin & Akkas. supra note 7
12 Salih. “ The Roots and Causes of The 2011 Arab Uprising”. Arab Studies Quarterly. Pluto Journal. Vol. 35. No. 2. Spring 2013
13 Dalacoura. “The 2011 Uprising in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications.” International Affairs. Vol. 88, No.1, 2012
14 Kwakbi & Khadmani. “ Armies, People and Dictators”. http://www.alsafhat.net/blog/?p=31496
15 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “ The Arab Awakening”. Strategic Survey Vol. 2011. pp 43-96
16 Gamal M. “The United States and the Arab Spring: The Dynamics of Political Engineering”. Pluto Journal Vol.35, No. 3, 2013
17. Elakawi. supra note 6
18 Katz. “The International Relations of The Arab Spring”. Middle East Policy Vol. XXI. no. 2, Summer 2014
19 Yakis. “Turkey after The Arab Spring: Policy Dilemmas”. Middle East Policy Vol. XXI no. 1, Spring 2014.
20 Akram. “Hamas Leader Abandons Longtime Base in Damascus.” New York Times, January
27, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/middleeast/khaled-meshal-the-leader-of- hamas-vacates-damascus.html
21 Ayoob. “ The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance”. Middle East Policy. Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2012
22 Al Monitor. Anberin Zaman. July 21, 201323 Rafati. “Iran and the arab Spring”. http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/ SR011/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS IranAndArabSpring_Rafati
24 Ayoob, supra note 21
18
26 Coates & Ulrichsen. “Small States with a big Role” HH Sheikh Nasser al Mohammad al SabahPublication Series, no. 3 (october 2012).
http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/alsabah/ Small/ StateswithaBigRole.pdf
27 Al Rasheed. “ Yes, It Could Happen Here: Why Saudi Arabia Is Ripe for Revolution”. Foreign Policy-Middle East Channel. February 28,2011.
http://wwwmideast.foreignpolicy.com/post/2011/02/28/yes_it_could_happen_here
28 Tisdal. “ Bashar al-Assad’s Syria offers Iran A Springboad into the Arab Middle East.” The Guardian , February 8, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/feb/08/assad-syria- iran-middle-east.
29 Shadid. “In Riddle of Mideast Upheaval, Turkey Offers Itself as An Answer.” New York Times, September 26, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/world/europe/in-mideast-
riddle-turkey-offers-itself-as-an-answer.html?scp=3&sq=erdogan%20in%20cairo&st=cse.
19
ARAB SPRING, INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY,
AND DIPLOMATIC BLIND SPOT
Ryantori
INTRODUCTION
The Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions,
spreads across the Middle East throughout 2011. A rhythmic chant echoed across the
Arab lands which showed that the people want to topple the regime. It has been widely
seen as a watershed event which has irrevocably changed the region and the global
political landscape. A main force behind it was the call for a formative political change,
with freedom, democracy and justice, and the attack on corruption and nepotism.
In the history of the Middle East, the opportunity to support democracy has never been
as great as today. The momentum for democracy in the Middle East is at its peak (Wandi,
2013). The people’s voice for freedom is at its loudest, while the regimes’ popularity is
at an all-time low. Regardless of external support, the oppressed will continue to revolt — it is a fight to the end. Most of those regimes clinging to power are teetering at the edge of the precipice. Arab dictatorial regimes might spill more blood, but the darkest
hour is just before the dawn.
Initially, the Arab Spring was an optimistic transformation of the Middle East into
democratic region. Yet, until now, the progress is not as quite good as expected, not to
mention failed. In many public debates, there is a tendency to focus solely on Islamism
as the major obstacle toward democratization in the region. Is it true that Islam and
Democracy are not compatible or even opposite each other?
WEST VS ISLAM
≈
DEMOCRACY VS ISLAM ?When we talk about democracy in this modern era, western democracy comes into
20
‘liberal democracy’) include a commitment to fundamental freedoms, within a framework of laws designed to prevent their abuse, such as freedom to practice one’s own religion; freedom of speech; freedom of association; freedom to publish; and
equality before the law.
It is important to distinguish from the beginning between democracy as means and
democracy as goals. The most fundamental of the goals of democracy are probably four
in number. Firstly, to make the rulers accountable and answerable for their actions and
policies. Secondly to make the citizens effective participants in choosing those rulers
and in regulating their actions. Thirdly, to make the society as open and the economy as
transparent as possible; and fourthly to make the social order fundamentally just and
equitable to the greatest number possible. Accountable rulers, actively participating
citizens, open society and social justice – those are the four fundamental ends of
democracy.(Birch, 2001)
However, the way to achieve these goals has elicited different means. For examples, in
making the rulers more accountable some democracies (like the United States) have
chosen separation of powers and checks and balances, while other democracies (like the
United Kingdom) have chosen the more concentrated notion of sovereignty of
parliament. These are different means towards making the executive branch more
accountable and answerable in its use of power. The same situation occurs related to
freedom of the press and speech. The United States has a highly permissive legal system
on freedom of speech, but more restrictive public opinion. The United Kingdom has a
more restrictive legal system on freedom of the press, but a more tolerant public opinion.
(Hensley, 2001; Feldman, 1993)
Talking about the relationship between Islam and democracy,the debate over the
relationship between them rests not only on Islamic doctrine but also on history. Even,
we can trace back to the debate over the relations between Islam and the West. Samuel P.
Huntington (1993: 222-239) in "The Clash of Civilizations?" offers his hypothesis that
the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or
primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of
conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world
21
groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.
The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict
between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern
world.
Now, let us turn into the debate over democracy and Islam. Essentially, democracy is a
system of governance where sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. But many will
say this contradicts with the doctrine of Islam, since in the Islamic view, sovereignty lies
in the hand of God. Advocates of this line of thinking put forward three arguments
(Kumoro, 2013).
First, there is the fundamentally different view of the nation, or ummah. The view of the
nation in modern democracy is tied to a physical space marked by territorial and
geographical borders. On the other hand, Islam has its own understanding of a nation
that is not bounded by borders, but by aqidah (the basic tenets of Islam). Therefore, for
many Muslims, nation is defined by faith, not by geography. Second, some Muslim
scholars see democracy as a worldly value, when spiritual goals are of primary
importance. Democracy thus becomes a secondary goal. Third, a contradiction arises because the people’s sovereignty that lies at the heart of democracy is absolute, meaning the people are the ultimate holders of power. Laws and regulations are decided by the
people through their representatives and not by God. But for some scholars, the people’s
sovereignty is not absolute at all, since it is bound by the laws of Islam. In Islam, only God’s sovereignty is absolute.
These three interpretations are used by some Muslims to argue that there is no space for
democracy in their lives. However, there are many Muslims who take the opposite view,
arguing that democracy is inherent in people and in line with Islamic teachings. They
base their argumentation on Islamic doctrines—justice, freedom, deliberation and
equality—that espouse the basic principles of democracy.
At this level, Islam does not speak about a procedural system but more about the basic
soul and spirit of democracy. If the interpretation of democracy is the existence of
certain social and political ideals, like the freedom of thought, faith, opinion and equality
22
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: INDONESIA’S EXPERIENCE
It is important to note that the absence of democracy in some Muslim World, such as
countries of the Middle East1, is not a feature of the wider Muslim world. There are some Islamic societies which have made explicit commitments to some of the values
identified as those relating to Western societies. Many of these derive from a number of
attempts to develop the concepts of traditional Islam to take account of the changes in
Western societies which have led to modernisation. In this context, democracy stands on
first line.
One good example of those Islamic societies is Indonesia. It is the world’s third largest
democracy after India and the United States of America and the world’s largest
muslim population (The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010). Home to
approximately 230 million people of which more than 85% follow Islam, there are
almost as many Muslims living in Indonesia as in the entire Arab-speaking world
combined. Sunni Islam is the predominant branch of Islam, with only around one
million Indonesians being Shia. There is a wide array of other forms of Islam, including
significant numbers of Sufi communities. The major fault line, however, lies
between santri who adhere to orthodox forms of Islam while the abangan practice
more syncretic versions of Islam.
Indonesia has seen much success in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a
democratic system of governance. While Indonesia still has a long way to go before
1
23
democracy fully takes root, at the very least it has been quite successful in tearing down
the walls of tyrannical power. Since the authoritarian regime of President Suharto
collapsed in 1998, the most immediately visible change in Indonesian politics has been
the implementation of an extensive regulatory framework that directs both executive and
legislative elections. In April 2009 Indonesia conducted the third legislative election of
the post-Suharto era. As in 1999 and 2004, the recent election featured a
nationwide legislative election for the national parliament, the senate-like Regional
Representatives Assembly, and for the parliaments at the provincial, district and
municipal level. Furthermore, direct elections for regents and mayors were held in 486
out of 510 regencies and municipalities and governor elections in 15 out of 33
provinces throughout the last few years. By the end of 2008, all the leaders of
sub-national executive governments had been directly elected by the Indonesian people.
Finally, presidential election took place in 1999, 2004, and 2009 (Buehler, 2009).
It is said that Islam and democracy are in a relationship fraught with problems as the
former, allegedly, does not allow secular law to be put above divine law or accept the
legitimacy of worldly authorities (see Table 1). This relationship is less problematic in
Indonesia, a democratic Muslim-majority country, the argument goes, due to the
syncretic forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago state that are less dogmatic, and
hence more conducive to democratic principles. While this is a valuable point, various factors extraneous to ‘moderate Indonesian Islam,’ such as a fragmented Islamic authority in civil society, a weakly institutionalized party system as well as dynamics
triggered by recent institutional reforms all play a role in the continuing insignificance
of political Islam in the country (Buehler, 2009).
Table 1:
TYPOLOGY IN MODERNIZATION CLAIMS
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY SUPPORT FOR ISLAMISM
High Education Low Education
More Equitable Gender Attitudes Less Equitable Gender Attitudes
Higher Income Lower Income
Less Religious More Religious
24
To summarize, the reason why Islam and democracy seem to go well together in
Indonesia has as much to do with broader dynamics within civil society, political parties and state institutions as it has to do with the syncretist, hence moderate forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago.
PANCASILA DEMOCRACY: INDONESIAN MODALITY
As the most Muslim-populous democratic country in the world, Indonesia can play a
significant role in efforts to promote democratization in the Islamic World, especially in
The Middle East. The nation is a real-world example of the compatibility of Islam and
democracy, one that could serve as a model for countries in the wider Islamic world.
Yet, there is important question related to the phenomena above. If the goals of
democracy are the same while the means for achieving them differ, are there Indonesian
means of achieving those same four goals of accountability of rulers, participation of the
citizens, openness of the society and greater social justice? That is the challenge facing
constitution makers in Indonesia – how to keep the democratic goals constant while
looking for democratic means more appropriate to people. In this context, let us focus on Indonesia’s genuine democracy: Pancasila Democracy.2
Pancasila Democracy (democracy based on five basic pillars) was formally labeled
under President Suharto in 1966. It is inspired by the noble values of the Indonesian
nation. Pancasila itself, which means the five principles, is the name given to the
foundation of the Indonesian Republic. The five principles of Pancasila are Belief in the
One and Only God; A Just and civilized humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy
2
25
guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and Social Justice for all
the Indonesian people.
Pancasila Democracy is a system of government based on popular sovereignty. It is the
people who determine the shape and content of the desired rule. Based on these
meanings, it is clear that people are not objects, but subjects who could play an active
role. For example, most Indonesians believe that the individual exists in the context of
his family. And the family is the building block of society. There are cultural differences
between Western and Indonesian societies and these differences influence their
understanding of democracy. Meanwhile, Indonesians believe human beings should
pursue balance between individual and communal interests. In the past, all aspects of the individual’s life in Indonesia were regulated through structures and by coercive pressures, both formal and informal. In such a setting, organized opposition was not only
out of place, but antisocial.
Pancasila itself, as a genuine ideologi, can be define as following: (Pilliang, 2010)
First Pillar: Deity.
Second Pillar: Humanity.
Third Pillar: Nationality.
Fourth Pillar : Democracy.
Fifth Pillar : Socialism.
Thus, Pancasila Democracy means democracy based on people's sovereignty, which is
inspired by and integrated with the other principles of Pancasila. This means that the use
of democratic rights should always be in line with the sense of responsibility towards
God Almighty according to the respective faith; uphold human values in line with
human dignity; guarantee and strengthen national unity; and be aimed at realizing social
justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.
It is almost certain that Indonesian democracy differs from liberal democracy. In terms
of cultural origins, liberal democracy is rooted in Western culture while Indonesian
democracy has its own roots that emphasized the harmony between individual and
communal interests. Gotong Royong (mutual cooperation) is one of the underpinnings of
26
The other difference relates to the role of religion vis-a-vis the state. All liberal democratic states are secular in nature. Indonesia is neither a theocratic nor a secular
state. It believes that God Almighty is a spiritual guide who drives everyday life. As for
social democracy, this system is relatively close to Pancasila democracy in terms of
values. These two political ideologies are in the same camp in perceiving social justice
and the role of the state in regulating economic and social life. When it comes to the
issue of religion and the state, they have opposite views (Sriyono, 2013).
Syeikh Ali Zainuddin, a religious cleric from Lebanon, addressed his respect to Pancasila. “Pancasila is a living philosophy that serve as a guidance to live quite harmoniusly for Indonesian people from various backgrounds, such as tribes, religions, cultures and languages” (Tribunnews, 2013). As we know, Lebanon is one of fragile countries in the world because of prolonged sectarian conflicts. In addition, Australian
ambassador Greg Moriarty says Indonesia has shown the "Arab Spring" countries that Islam and democracy guided by Pancasila values are compatible, and demonstrated the wisdom of not marginalising groups on religious grounds. "Each country is unique, but Indonesia has shown the world democratic transitions can be
made, that Islam and democracy are compatible, and that the yearning of people to have
a say in how they are governed is universal (www.theaustralian.com.au).
As a comparison, let us see what Japanese people did in pursuing their national
philosophical ideology. The Japanese after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 asked themselves: “Can we economically modernize without culturally Westernizing?” The Japanese said “YES – we shall seek Western techniques and maintain the Japanese spirit.” They retained Japanese tastes; and expanded their Western skills. Following the Second World War, they economically interlocked specifically with the American
economy, even displacing American dominance in areas like the automobile industry –
without giving up their Japanese spirit (Waswo, 1996).
DIPLOMATIC BLIND SPOT= DIFFICULT HOME WORK
Indonesia with its bebas aktif foreign policy – a “free and active” approach to
27
and anticipated the Arab Spring since its beginning. Now, Indonesian foreign policy
over the next five years under President Joko Widodo will be focused on three priorities: maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy. The last is the most promising priority if
Indonesia can set up a good economic scheme in the region. In order to support its claim
to a greater role in Middle East politics as peacemaker and mediator, Indonesia
generated a set of arguments that highlighted its distinctive attributes and credentials.
With such modality mentioned above, Indonesia is predicted to be able to gain political
and economic benefit from its relations with other countries, and also from Arab Spring
countries, for the shake of its nation. Unfortunately, this country often fail in many cases
to do. This is what foreign policy experts call “diplomatic blind spot”, which entails the
idea of neglected strategic issues in diplomacy. The term could also refer to diplomatic
achievements on which we have failed to capitalize in the national interest (Yahya,
2015).
Indonesia had often missed multiple chances to take advantage of its “political dividends”, although this country certainly have our political assets. Valuable experience of democratic transition and managing bureaucratic transformation could be shared with
other countries — this is no less significant than economic investment. The above examples show the success of our many diplomats in projecting Indonesia’s role to assist our partners in finding solutions to some of their internal, regional and global challenges.
However, lack of coordination between the ministries and other institutions, especially
in the economic sector, seems to have resulted in poor follow-up. Hence the economic
benefits of our diplomatic achievements have not been fully exploited.
In the 1990s, a prescription to treat and cure this disadvantage was offered by the New Order government, with the idea of creating “Indonesia Incorporated”. The core of Indonesia Incorporated as suggested by President Soeharto was a synergy among
governmental institutions, the private sector and civil society in managing and realizing
integrated economic development (Yahya, 2015)
28
culture, design, entertainment, media and innovation, all of these are very open for
Indonesia to go through. It is the first kind of economy where imagination and ingenuity
decide what people want to do and make. And what they want to buy. A creative
economy is measured just like any other: demand, price, profit and margins. This
economy also look at jobs, output and productivity in great measurement.. At the heart of today’s changes is the private determination of individuals to think of new and often surprising ideas that might stimulate others. Brought together, people all around the
world are fuelling the creative economy and shaping the future. At this point, Indonesia
must be able to get out of the box and become a big player in it.
CONCLUSION
Will Arab Spring succeed or fail? I propose in this paper that Arab countries should have
their own democracy standard just like what Indonesia has experienced so far. On
broader context, many say that there are many roads to democracy and the Arab
countries cannot follow a Western standard or recipe. In short, Islamic values and
western democratic philosophy can be blent to have a middle eastern democratic taste.
As the biggest muslim country in the world, Indonesia would thus seem to prove that Islamic doctrine itself is not in contradiction with democracy. Instead, Muslims’ interpretation of Islamic doctrine and cultural heritage forms their views on the value of
democracy and its relationship to Islam. Moreover, the existence of various models of
democracy in Indonesia has given rise to an intellectual question on what kind of
democracy is the best fit, whether to be combined with another ideology or to be “pure”
a la western countries.
Nonetheless, Indonesia should gain from, not just pose as role model for, Arab Spring
politically as well as economicly. There must be a synergy among governmental
institutions, the private sector and civil society in managing and realizing integrated
economic development in the Middle East in order not to get trapped into diplomatic
blind spot.
29 1. Books
Birch, Anthony H. 2001. Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy , 2nd ed. London; New York: Routledge.
Choueiri, Yousef. 1990. Islamic Fundamentalism, Boston, MA.
Feldman, David. 1993. Civil Liberties And Human Rights In England And Wales. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
Halliday, F. 1995. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (Chapter 4—Islam and the West: "Threat of Islam" or "Threat to Islam"?). London: I.B. Tauris.
Hensley, Thomas R. ed. 2001. The Boundaries of Freedom Of Expression & Order in American Democracy. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.
Howkins, John. 2013. The Creative Economy: How People Make Money From Ideas. Penguin Business.
Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1994. Vanguard to the Islamic Revolution : the Jama`at-i Islami of Pakistan . Berkeley : University of California Press.
Nasr, Vali. 2009. Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World, Free Press.
Ruthven, Malise. 2002. A Fury For God : the Islamist Attack on America. London; New York: Granta.
Waswo, Anne. 1996. Modern Japanese Society. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
2. Article in Book
Piliang, Indra Jaya. 2010. “Demokrasi Pancasila dalam Budaya Politik dan Etika Politik” in Bahan Diklat Lemhanas. The Indonesian Institute.
3. Articles in Journals
Esposito, John L. 2000. “Political Islam and the West”, JFQ, Spring.
Buehler, Michael. 2009. “Islam and Democracy in Indonesia”. Insight Turkey. Vol. 11 No. 4.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations”. Foreign Affair. Summer. Vol. 72 No. 3.
Jamal, Amaney A. 2006. “Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy”. World Affairs. Fall. Vol. 169 No. 2.
4. Website
Kumoro, Bawono. “Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Analysis”. May 13, 2013.
www.gnfi.com. Accessed on May 17, 2013.
Sriyono, A. Agus. “Pancasila Democracy the Right Fit For Every One of Indonesia’s 240m”. July 31, 2012. www.jakartaglobe.com. Accessed on May 25, 2013. The Weekend Australian. “Indonesia a Model for Arab Uprising”.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesia-a-model-for-arab-uprisings/story-e6frg6so-1226123161330. Accessed on Nov 3, 2015 Tribunnews. “Pancasila Disukai Ulama Lebanon”. 10 Mei 2011.
30
Wandi, Agus, “On the Right Side of History Indonesia and the Arab Spring”
http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/on-the-right-side-of-history-indonesia-and-the-arab-spring/ Accessed on No 2, 2015
Yahya, Tantowi, “Foreign Policy vs Indonesia inc.”.
31
TATANAN BARU TIMUR TENGAH PASCA ARAB SPRING
(Analisis Deskriptif Budaya Arab)
Zul Karnen
Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia
zulkarnen@uai.ac.id
Abstract
Arab Spring is a phenomenon that occurs in the countries of the Middle East arising from a social dynamic who want a new order that can change the state of a country in the form of protest or rebellion committed by the pro-democracy in the Middle East and North Africa against authoritarian regimes in the region that started around the year 2010 up to 2011. In the Arab Cultural studies is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East, because Hitti (2006) says that Arab culture egalitarian and typical barren desert geography is a factor which form the main character and personality are hard and unyielding. Descriptive analysis of the qualitative approach to the Arab culture of the Arab Spring phenomenon is so rare that, the author hopes this paper can describe the Arab culture studies in the phenomenon of the Arab Spring. New order which is the main hope of social dynamics is still far from the hope, so in this paper the authors provide an alternative to the establishment of a regional and community based theory of post-Islamic Arab society institutions.
Keywords: Arab Spring, Dynamics, Culture, Arab
Pendahuluan
The Arab Spring (Musim Semi Arab) yang menjadi istilah baru terkait dinamika yang terjadi di kawasan Timur Tengah, terutama negara-negara Arab, dimulai sejak
tahun 2010 sampai dengan 2011 ditandai dengan kebangkitan harapan akan lahirnya
sistem politik yang lebih baik dan lebih demokratis dan berjatuhannya para pemimpin
32
Arab Spring merupakan fenomena yang timbul dari sebuah dinamika sosial yang
menginginkan adanya sebuah tatanan baru yang dapat merubah keadaan sebuah negara
yang berupa gelombang protes atau bahkan pemberontakan yang dilakukan oleh
masyarakat pro-demokrasi di Timur Tengah dan Afrika Utara terhadap rezim-rezim
otoriter di wilayah tersebut yang dimulai dari Tunisia, Zein Al-Abidin Ben Ali (Ben Ali),
kemudian merambat ke Mesir yang melengserkan Hosni Mubarak, terus menyeberang
ke Libya, yang mengakhiri pemerintahan Moammar Khadafy yang sudah berlangsung
kurang lebih 40 tahun lamanya.
Dalam kajian budaya Arab. fenomena ini bukanlah hal baru di Timur tengah,
karena Hitti (2006) mengatakan bahwa budaya Arab yang egaliter dan geografi tandus
khas padang pasir merupakan faktor utama yang membentuk karakter dan kepribadian
yang keras dan pantang menyerah.
Pendekatan analisis Deskriptif kualitatif budaya Arab dari Fenomena Arab
Spring masih sangat langka, sehingga penulis mengharapkan makalah ini dapat
mendeskripsikan kajian budaya Arab dalam fenomena Arab Spring.
Tatanan baru yang merupakan harapan utama dari dinamika sosial ini masih jauh
panggang dari api, sehingga dalam makalah ini penulis memberikan alternatif
pembentukan sebuah kawasan dan masyarakat berdasarkan teori pranata masyarakat
Arab pasca Islam.
Kerangka Teori
Fenomena
Fenomena adalah kenyataan yang menampakkan diri (Hardiman, 2007: 28)
seperti yang penulis kutip dari KBBI online yang mendefinisikan Fenomena adalah hal-hal yg dapat disaksikan dengan pancaindra dan dapat diterangkan serta dinilai secara
ilmiah.
Kant kemudian membedakan antara fenomena dan nomena. Wilayah fenomena
menurutnya masih dapat diketahui oleh akal, sedangkan wilayah nomena yang tidak
dapat diketahui. Tuhan adalah wilayah nomena ini. Sehingga Fenomena adalah gejala
33
akal (meminjam pemikiran Ibn Khaldun) sama dengan menimbang emas gunung dengan
timbangan emas (Sukardi, 2003: 67) .
Perlu dicermati di sini adalah fenomena tidak sama dengan masalah. Fenomena
adalah fakta yang kita temukan di lapangan. Untuk mengetahui apa masalah yang
sebenarnya terjadi, kita perlu mengidentifikasi penyebab masalah untuk berbagai
masalah (Rangkuti, 2011: 53). Karena Fenomena adalah entitas yang diam, di mana
maknanya ditentukan oleh sudut pandang, termasuk kepentingan orang yang melihatnya
(Bagir, 2005)
Penulis dalam makalah ini menggunakan definisi Fenomena yang berarti berpikir
fenomenologis yaitu mencoba memahami dan bukannya mempertanyakan mengapa
suatu kelompok manusia berpikir dan bertindak sesuatu. (Jatmika, 2009: 64).
Dinamika
Kelompok sosial selalu mengalami perubahan. Hal ini terjadi karena setiap
kelompok tidaklah bersifat statis atau stagnan. Tahapan demi tahapan perkembangan
kelompok sosial dan perubahannya disebut dinamika kelompok sosial (Huntington,
1996: 29).
Dinamika dalam KBBI berarti gerak (dari dalam); tenaga yang menggerakkan;
semangat. Sementara dinamika kelompok merupakan gerak atau kekuatan yang dimiliki
sekumpulan orang dalam masyarakat yang dapat menimbulkan perubahan dalam tata
hidup masyarakat yang bersangkutan dan dinamika sosial diartikan sebagai gerak masyarakat secara terus-menerus yang menimbulkan perubahan dalam tata hidup
masyarakat yang bersangkutan.
Pengertian dinamika kelompok sosial dapat diartikan sebagai sebuah proses
perubahan dan perkembangan akibat adanya hubungan beberapa orang atau kelompok
dalam masyarakat yang bersifat terus menerus yang kemudian memiliki kekuatan untuk
menimbulkan perubahan dari dalam.
Ruth Benedict (2005) mengungkapkan terdapat pokok persoalan (aspek) yang dipelajari dalam dinamika kelompok sosial, diantaranya:
34
Dalam persoalan kohesi akan terlihat tingkah laku para anggota dalam suatu
kelompok, seperti proses pengelompokan, intensitas anggota, arah pilihan dan
nilai-nilai dalam kelompok.
2. motif atau dorongan
Persoalan motif berkisar pada perhatian anggota terhadap kehidupan kelompok,
seperti kesatuan kelompok, tujuan bersama dan orientasi diri terhadap kelompok.
3. Struktur
Persoalan ini terlihat pada bentuk pengelompokan, bentuk hubungan, perbedaan
kedudukan antar anggota, dan pembagian tugas.
4. Pimpinan
Persoalan pimpinan sangat penting pada kehidupan kelompok sosial, hal ini
terlihat pada bentuk-bentuk kepemimpinan, tugas pimpinan dan sistem
kepemimpinan.
5. perkembangan kelompok
Persoalan perkembangan kelompok dapat dilihat dari perubahan dalam
kelompok, perpecahan kelompok, keinginan anggota untuk tetap berada dalam
kelompok dan sebagainya.
Saat ini banyak pihak menyadari pentingnya mempelajari dinamika kelompok
sosial karena alasan berikut:
1. Kelompok sosial merupakan kesatuan-kesatuan sosial yang selalu ada dalam
setiap masyarakat.
2. Dinamika kelompok sosial berkaitan dengan perubahan sosial dan kebudayaan
masyarakat.
Faktor-faktor pendorong dinamika kelompok sosial
Adanya kelompok sosial yang mengalami perkembangan maupun perubahan
selalu berkaitan dengan faktor pendorong. Adapun faktor-faktor yang menyebabkannya
sebagai berikut:
1. Faktor Pendorong Dinamika Kelompok Sosial dari Luar (ekstern):
Faktor pendorong dari luar kelompok merupakan pengaruh luar yang
menyebabkan berkembangnya suatu kelompok sosial, di antaranya sebagai
35
a. Perubahan situasi sosial
b. Perubahan situasi ekonomi
c. Perubahan situasi politik
2. Faktor Pendorong Dinamika Kelompok Sosial yang berasal dari Dalam (Intern):
Faktor ini merupakan kondisi di dalam sebuah kelompok sosial yang
menyebabkan perkembangan suatu kelompok sosial, di antaranya sebagai
berikut:
a. Adanya konflik antar anggota kelompok
b. Adanya perbedaan kepentingan
c. Adanya Perbedaan paham
Proses perkembangan berbagai kelompok sosial:
Dinamika kelompok sosial tidak lepas dari perkembangan kelompok sosial dari
kelompok yang sederhana menjadi kelompok yang kompleks. Perkembangan kelompok
sosial dalam masyarakat dimulai dari kelompok sosial yang paling homogen dan
sederhana yaitu kelompok kekerabatan, yang kemudian berkembang menjadi kelompok
sosial yang kompleks yaitu masyarakat perkotaan sehingga dapat dilihat sebagai berikut:
a. Kelompok Kekerabatan
Keluarga merupakan kelompok sosial terkecil dalam masyarakat. Keluarga inti yang
terdiri dari ayah, ibu dan anak-anaknya yang belum menikah. Dari keluarga inti
berkembang menjadi keluarga besar (extended family) yang disebut kelompok
kekerabatan. Dalam kelompok kekerabatan terdapat hubungan darah atau hubungan
persaudaraan. Kelompok kekerabatan ini merupakan cikal bakal terbentuknya
masyarakat.
Dalam kelompok kekerabatan nilai-nilai tradisional masih dijunjung tinggi sehingga
kehidupan kelompok terpusat pada tradisi kebudayaan yang telah dipelihara secara
turun-menurun. Menurut Huntington (1996) kemungkinan mengubah tradisi
kebudayaan yang telah dipelihara secara turun temurun memang sulit, tetapi melalui
proses inovasi khususnya dalam bidang ekonomi dan politik yang dilakukan secara
bertahap, perubahan-perubahan dalam kelompok kekerabatan dapat terjadi dalam
36 b. Kelompok Okupasional
Kelompok kekerabatan merupakan masyarakat homogen yang menganut nilai-nilai,
norma-norma, ataupun pola tingkah laku yang relatif sama sehingga pembagian kerja
dilakukan secara sederhana berlandaskan pada tradisi dan perbedaan jenis kelamin.
Dalam masyarakat tradisional belum terdapat spesialisasi pekerjaan, tetapi tidak ada
satu masyarakat pun yang benar-benar tertutup dari pengaruh luar. Ketika kelompok
kekerabatan mendapat pengaruh dari luar, maka kelompok tersebut berkembang
menjadi suatu masyarakat yang heterogen. Dalam masyarakat yang heterogen timbul
spesifikasi pekerjaan atas dasar bakat dan kemampuan.
Pada perkembangan selanjutnya, spesifikasi semakin berkembang lebih khusus lagi,
munculnya berbagai industri menuntut para pekerja bertanggung jawab pada satu
unsur tertentu saja sehingga para pekerja semakin ahli dalam bidang tertentu dan
kurang mampu mengerjakan pekerjaan lainnya.
Ketika masyarakat semakin maju, spesifikasi dikembangkan secara ilmiah melalui
lembaga-lembaga pendidikan tert
