A
SSOCIATION TO
N
ATIONAL
U
NION
:
T
HE
‘I
NDUSTRIALISATION
’
OF
U
NIVERSITY
S
TAFF
1983–1993
JOHNO’BRIEN
T
his paper traces the history of the major unions that covered Australian academic staff––from the registration of the Federation of Australian University Staff and the Union of Australian College Academics in the federal industrial jurisdiction in the mid-1980s to the formation of the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) as an ‘industry’ union incorporating general staff in 1983. It builds on work done on the collective organisation of academic staff from 1949 to 1983. The paper discusses the notion of ‘unionateness’ and argues that the emergence of the NTEU is a product of changes in state policy, both in terms of industrial relations and in the structural adjustment of higher education. It contests the view that its emergence is a product of simplistic notion of the ‘industrialisation’ of the higher education sector.INTRODUCTION
This paper is an account of the collective organisation of academic staff in the Australian higher education sector––the earlier instalment of which ended in 1983 when the High Court overturned the State School Teachers’ decision of 1929 and opened the way for teachers and university staff to gain access to the federal industrial relations jurisdiction. It was argued that the formal industrial regulation of academic staff begun at least in the 1950s, but many university staff, particularly in the pre-1987 universities, did not see themselves as employees.1
The present paper then maps the narrowing of the gap between that conscious-ness and the reality of ‘industrialised’ life. This process is discussed in relation to the registration of organisations representing college and university staff; the response of those organisations to the ‘unified national system’; their experience as part of the federal industrial relations system and the processes leading to the formation of the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU). The paper is based on an examination of the archives of the two principal academic unions, key policy documents and interviews with leading participants in these processes.
FEDERAL REGISTRATION
By early 1987, three organisations representing academic staff had been regis-tered in the federal industrial relations jurisdiction: the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations (FAUSA); the Union of Australian College Academics (UACA) and the Australian Teachers’ Union (ATU). The first two represented staff in universities and colleges respectively. The ATU had signifi-cant coverage of the college sector in New South Wales and some residual cover-age of university academics. Registration enabled the three organisations to use the federal Industrial Relations Commission for the purposes of seeking wage adjustments and regulating other aspects of the working conditions of academics. Both the UACA and ATU were well versed in using state industrial jurisdictions to protect working conditions, while FAUSA had little experience in actively using these jurisdictions. In New South Wales, however, university staff formed a state-registered union. For most members of the three organisations, the reality of industrial regulation probably only had any great significance when salary increases were being sought. Indeed, FAUSA members were told that federal registration was simply a defensive action to preserve university academics being ‘poached’ by organisations covering professional engineers and salaried medical practitioners.2For the UACA, federal registration provided
an opportunity for its state branches to convert state-based arrangements into federal awards, and to use the federal jurisdiction as a defence against hostile state governments.3While federal registration opened up opportunities that had been
hitherto unavailable to the academic unions, for FAUSA, at least, there was a view that its method of work would not change fundamentally. Federal tration reinforced UACA’s ‘unionate’ consciousness; for FAUSA, formal regis-tered status was uncharted territory for most of its membership and some of its leadership. It was not the changed industrial status of the academic unions that provided the immediate challenge; rather, it was the emerging changes in the structure of the higher education system itself.
Efficiency and effectiveness in higher education
In 1985, the federal Labor government established an enquiry into the efficiency and effectiveness of the Australian higher education system. The report of the enquiry made a number of significant recommendations concerning the employ-ment conditions of academic staff. It recommended that a review of the terms and conditions of academic staff be undertaken as the basis for a ‘general agreement on academic staffing arrangements between institutions, staff associ-ations and the Commonwealth government . . .’4 At no time; however, did it
suggest that the federal industrial jurisdiction was the appropriate place for the determination of employment conditions in the sector. The report, however, did not recommend the dissolution of the binary divide between universities and colleges of advanced education that had become increasingly under challenge.5
DISSOLVING BINARY DIVIDE
Australia redesignated the Western Australian Institute of Technology as a university. This decision placed the UACA and FAUSA on a collision course over the coverage of academic staff. As a college of advanced education there was a long-standing constituent staff association affiliated to the Federal Council of Academics (FCA––the unregistered identity of UACA). FAUSA’s rules enabled it to represent academic staff in all universities. FAUSA gained federal registration in December 1986 while UACA was not registered until February 1987. During that ‘window of opportunity’ FAUSA served a log of claims on the new Curtin University of Technology, seeking to have academic salary scales at the institution regulated in a federal industrial award. The problem was that FAUSA had neither members nor a branch infrastructure at the institution. It sought to recruit members, but with limited success.6Most academics stayed with FCA/UACA.
The Curtin Academic Staff Association argued that FAUSA and FCA/UACA should amalgamate.7The Staff Association regarded FAUSA’s response on this
issue as equivocal.8The administration of Curtin University chose to deal with
FAUSA rather than the staff association.9 UACA sought to have Curtin
academic staff included in its coverage rules. This was refused initially by the industrial registrar, but subsequently granted by the Commission in July 1987.10
The vice chancellors’ industrial body, the Australian Universities Industrial Association, appealed against the decision. It was upheld by a full bench in October 1988.
11In the meantime, UACA and FAUSA agreed to share coverage at Curtin
University, with FAUSA agreeing not to recruit existing UACA members on the campus.12The general secretary of UACA, Grahame McCulloch, proclaimed this
decision as paving the way for amalgamation between UACA and FAUSA.13
‘UNIFIED NATIONAL SYSTEM’ OF HIGHER EDUCATION
The appointment of JS Dawkins as Minister for Education in 1988, however, presented a much greater challenge to the academic unions. The Green Paperon higher education issued in December 1987 and the subsequent White Paperin July 1989 set out proposals for fundamental changes in the organisation and funding of universities and significant changes in the working conditions of university staff. The two principal academic unions had to decide how best to respond to these changes. For FAUSA, the emergence of the unified national system and the amalgamation of institutions designed to facilitate that process, threatened to dilute the distinctiveness of research-based university work. Nevertheless, FAUSA had uncontested industrial coverage of academic staff in all institutions designated as ‘universities’. While UACA had been able to main-tain its coverage at Curtin University, its future in a unified system was not secure in the long term. Moreover, UACA could see benefits for its members in the unified system. They could have access to the same salary scales as their university counterparts, as well as the opportunity to share in the research funds hitherto allocated to universities. There was a strong incentive for UACA to amalgamate with FAUSA, particularly after the government set a minimum 10 000 membership for continued registration within the federal jurisdiction.
FAUSA. The FAUSA executive thought that the organisation had three options: reject amalgamation altogether; move for it immediately; or initiate a widespread discussion within its membership.14 A considerable diversity of
views about amalgamation was apparent in the meeting. The executive and staff concentrated on the industrial aspects of relations between the unions, while council members were more concerned with the implications of the dissolution of the binary division. One member expressed concern about the inferior qualifi-cations of college staff. It was acknowledged, he said, ‘that persons who obtained high level appointments in colleges would not get a tutorial appointment in universities’.15 Another member predicted a significant loss of membership at
his university if amalgamation took place.16Other members, however, argued
that the binary divide was breaking down; some institutes of technology were being upgraded to university status and ‘traditional universities’ would be left behind these institutions in the quest for funds.17An executive member argued
that the binary divide was not the main issue, rather, it was the existence of two federal unions covering academics. In the current environment, FAUSA was in a strong position: UACA was ‘shrinking’ and there was the ‘snob appeal’ of belonging to FAUSA.18At its August 1987 council meeting, FAUSA endorsed
the amalgamation concept. At its 1988 council meeting, it endorsed a structure for an amalgamated union and instructed the executive to draw up a set of rules for the new organisation that would be subject to the endorsement of two-thirds of all the branches.19While these issues remained unresolved, the unions had to
respond to the plans for a unified system of higher education––both in policy and industrial terms.
POLICY RESPONSE: ‘THINKINGAHEAD’
The unions crafted a carefully worded document designed to be critical of some of the government’s proposals, while not rejecting its basic assumptions. Thinking Ahead defended the multiplicity of functions of higher education including training, certification, research, advice and critical public comment within a framework of the ‘creation and transmission of knowledge’. The role of social critic and the vocational and utilitarian roles were said to be parts of an insepar-able whole. The unions argued that economic and social innovation, with direct utility to society, was often the product of general and abstract thought that may have seemed ‘far fetched’ at the time its formulation.20 The objection to the
Green Paperthen was not to its instrumentalism per se, but the narrowness of its instrumentalism. The unions argued that the socially critical role of universities was a superior form of instrumentalism to that espoused by the government. In doing so, the unions were attempting to turn the government’s assumptions on their head, in order to reassert a less overtly instrumental conception of higher education.21
other hand, it could not be a party to an all-out assault on vocationally-oriented instrumentalism when most of its members worked in such institutions. The claim that general and social critical education and pure research constituted a superior form of instrumentalism enabled the differing interests of the members of the two organisations to coexist, if not be entirely reconciled. Indeed, the subsequent White Paperon higher education claimed that the objections of the academic unions were more about matters of ‘priority and balance’ rather than fundamental disagreement with the government’s assumptions and objectives.22
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT OF UNIVERSITY EMPLOYMENT:
THE‘SECOND TIER’
One of the crucial aspects of the Dawkins agenda was to bring the employment conditions of university staff into the mainstream of industrial regulation. This was achieved through the application of the broader structural adjustment agenda of the government to university employment. This was to be achieved through the mechanisms of the ‘second tier’ and structural efficiency processes of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission which had themselves emerged from the Accord processes of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Labor government. These processes became the means whereby the govern-ment could promote the changes in the nature of university employgovern-ment.23
Moreover, the ACTU thought that academics could not stand aloof from the structural adjustment of the education and training sector.24
For the two principal academic unions, this process presented somewhat different challenges. For FAUSA, it was important to preserve the centrality of the research and general education said to be characteristic of university life. For UACA, the task was to ensure that college academic staff members were not submerged by that culture as many college staff members were being drawn into amalgamations with ‘traditional’ universities,25in some cases amidst
con-siderable controversy.26For FAUSA, moreover, these processes represented the
first significant regulation of employment conditions of university staff, whereas for UACA such regulation was a common reality for much of its membership. For many FAUSA members, this presented a threat to their conditions, rather than a means of protecting them.27For university employers, it was an
oppor-tunity to embed in university employment conditions a greater measure of managerial authority. These processes represented the first system-wide regu-lation of university employment, whereas for many other sectors, these processes represented a significant reduction of regulation by the state and an enhanced regulation of working conditions by market forces and managerial authority.28
politics in general.29On the other hand, UACA was strongly committed to the
combined salary scale.
Although academics received a second tier wage adjustment in June 1988, the negotiations over changes in working conditions continued into 1989 and involved two separate rounds of arbitrated proceedings. At the end of this process, redun-dancy and dismissal procedures were introduced across the system, as well as processes to assess staff performance, and some compensatory staff development programs. For some members in the traditional university sector these, develop-ments undermined the notion of academic tenure and, as such, constituted a threat to academic freedom.30The leadership of the unions, however, argued that
regu-lation of the processes leading to the declaration of unsatisfactory performance and eventual dismissal, constituted a protection of employment conditions.31The
feeling of betrayal on the part of some members had been compounded by the intervention of the Commonwealth in its capacity as ‘paymaster’ supporting the employers’ agenda. This, in their view, demonstrated the malevolence of the government amidst the difficult process of restructuring the sector.32The
four per cent wage adjustment was regarded as insufficient recompense for the significant trade-offs that had been made by the unions. FAUSA, in particular, had a problem of politically managing significant sections of its membership.33
There were differences in the industrial approach taken by the two unions. FAUSA relied on political intervention and cogent argument rather than indus-trial action. This partly reflected tradition within the organisation as well as its decentralised structure. FAUSA still largely operated as a federation of staff associations whose members placed great store on their operational autonomy. This was suitable when the activities of the associations were largely confined to representing individual members of their institutions. It was not a structure con-ducive to mobilisation on a national scale. UACA had developed in a different way that reflected its location within the college sector. State governments exercised close supervision over colleges. As a consequence, UACA developed a state-based structure, at least in the larger states, that was more accustomed to confronting external bodies that exercised considerable influence over employ-ment conditions in colleges. Nevertheless, there was no tradition of mobilisation of FCA members on a national basis. The decision of UACA to call nation-wide stop meetings of its members (together with college-based members of the ATU in NSW) in October 1988 was an indication that there was greater willingness to use the tactics of ‘real’ unions: it did not, however, constitute the adoption of militancy that characterised school teachers in the 1960s and 1970s. For the time being, however, FCA/UACA was more ‘unionate’ than FAUSA.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT OF UNIVERSITY EMPLOYMENT: AWARD RESTRUCTURING
enhancing efficiency. The effect of this general direction in workplace reform represented for many unions, especially the weaker ones, a lessening of the external regulation and the operation of flexibility in the workplace that was likely to increase managerial prerogative.34In the university sector, however, a
different model emerged. Award restructuring became a means of regulating academic work in a way that had not been possible on a national basis before the availability of the federal industrial jurisdiction. The ‘positive’ side of the award restructuring for many unions was that they were able to use the discourse of multi-skilling and training required to achieve that objective, to argue for a model of work flexibility that would benefit workers. Academic work was already multi-skilled and it required the exercise of a significant degree of autonomy for those carrying out the work. Thus, the task for the academic unions was not to enhance multi-skilling as such, but to regulate it such a way as to provide a career structure that incorporated the differing, but overlapping, skills of the university and college academics. For employers, on the other hand, there was a somewhat more contradictory task. Vice chancellors wanted to reinforce their prerogative to discipline, redeploy and dismiss staff. This could be achieved through national regulation of academic work. On the other hand, it wanted those regulations to be sufficiently flexible to allow the maximum degree of movement at the insti-tutional level. The discourse of collegiality was mobilised to resist the intensive regulation of academic work.35 More concretely, vice chancellors resisted, for
instance, tighter regulation of the proportion of employees that could be employed on a casual basis.36
Not all differences were between the employers and unions. There were different approaches by the two unions to the creation of a combined classifi-cation system. All parties agreed to a five level classificlassifi-cation structure ranging from the bottom of the structure (level A) to the top (level E). The unions wanted level A to be the beginning of a career structure. While the employers did not claim that the level A position would often be the first step to an academic career, it resisted the formalisation of that principle in the structure. Eventually, it was agreed that about 30 per cent of people occupying those positions would have continuing appointments. In contrast, there was serious disagreement between the unions about the nomenclature of the new classifications. UACA wanted the level A position to be called ‘lecturer’. This reflected the position in the former college structure where those at the bottom were referred to as lecturers, although differentiated as lecturers 1, 2 and 3.37FAUSA, however, favoured the
nomen-clature of ‘associate lecturer’.
The other party in the negotiations was the federal government both in its role as ‘paymaster’ and policy driver of the structural adjustment of the education and training sector. It tended to put pressure on both sides to accept parts of its agenda. The government was credited with persuading the employers’ accep-tance of the position classification standards agreed by the unions, while at the same time supporting the vice chancellors in their pursuit of a system of performance appraisal for academics.38 Nevertheless, there was a perception
to act as a consultant on award restructuring. This apparent advantage, however, was not sufficient to prevent the unions taking industrial action in support of outstanding claims in October 1990. National stop work meetings were held and decisions were taken to place bans on the transmission of final results in univer-sities.39The purpose of this action was twofold: to demonstrate to the
govern-ment that academics were capable of taking and sustaining industrial action, while putting pressure on the employers to take a more acceptable position on matters in dispute.
The action was historic. It was the first time that academics from both higher education sectors took industrial action in concert. For FAUSA, this was a signifi-cant development and it focussed on it in its subsequent submissions to the Industrial Relations Commission.40For UACA and ATU members, the action
was not novel, but it was stronger with the participation of members of the largest academic union. Nevertheless, behind this united front were some significant tactical differences. To the FAUSA leadership, industrial action should only take place after a long period of build up among the membership designed to generate widespread support when it did take place. In that context, the unions were more likely to gain maximum advantage in the Commission.41 On the
other hand, the UACA leadership, that saw itself as leading a more industrially disciplined organisation.42FAUSA thought UACA was more inclined to take
symbolic action and then cut a deal with the employers. UACA had less faith in the Commission to produce an acceptable outcome.43For UACA, this different
approach was a reflection of its being an ‘explicitly industrial’ organisation. Most of the debates within UACA were tactical, whereas FAUSA was still debating whether it should act like a union.44For the FAUSA leadership, however, the
FAUSA model of extensive debate about both policy and tactics was vital in the process of engendering support among its membership.45
CRAFT UNION OR INDUSTRY UNION?
The redesignation of institutes of technology in the mid-1980s and subsequent emergence of the unified national system of higher education rendered an amalga-mation between the two academic unions as almost inevitable. It took, however, nearly five years for it to occur and when it did, it was in a form that had not been envisaged in 1987. What were the issues at stake and what do they tell us about the issue of ‘unionateness’?
had also some strong state level branches. The Victorian members of the UACA constituted 45 per cent of the total UACA membership. The FAUSA strong-hold was in NSW (with about 40 per cent of the membership), but it was complicated by the fact that it took the form of a state-registered union that incorporated both FAUSA and UACA members. Nevertheless, the state-registered union that became the Academics Union of NSW, represented a model that could be duplicated at the federal level thus facilitating FAUSA domination of the new entity.
After some argument, it was agreed that FAUSA would fill the office of President of the organisation at the federal level, while the General Secretary’s position would be filled by UACA. It was also agreed that state divisions would be formed with important coordination roles. The full-time state secretaries in Victoria and South Australia would remain and be filled by the existing UACA state secretaries, at least in the first instance. This was not a problem in Victoria where UACA was numerically stronger than FAUSA, but in South Australia it emerged as a significant issue. The staff associations at the University of Adelaide and Flinders University were prepared to accept the incumbent UACA secre-tary as state secresecre-tary as long as the focus of power and organisation remained at the branch level. An overall membership fee that remained low and the use of only a small proportion of the fees for operating a state office would ensure this arrangement.46On the other hand, the UACA state secretary wished to retain
his leading role in the state organisation.47
These arguments about structure took place initially in the context of an amalgamation model involving the two academic unions. In late 1989, however, McCulloch produced a model that involved general staff membership in the union. It was in part, designed to outmanoeuvre FAUSA.48Discussions had taken
place between the UACA leadership and the leadership of a state-registered union covering general staff; the Victorian Colleges and Universities Staff Association (VCUSA). VCUSA had an established relationship with the state body of UACA; the Council of Academic Staff. VCUSA was concerned about its long-term future, as were many small unions.49It needed partners with existing federal registration.
Both UACA and FAUSA were federally registered organisations, but general staff in colleges and universities outside Victoria were covered by a variety of organis-ations, principally state-based public service and health sector unions. In the ACT, however, there was a federally registered union with about 130 members covering senior general staff at the Australian National University (ANU): the ANU Administrative and Allied Officers Association (ANUAAOA). It had no future as a registered organisation within the federal jurisdiction and did not want to be absorbed into the principal union covering general staff at ANU; the Health Services Union of Australia. Amalgamating with the two academic unions and a much larger general staff specialist union in another state was the ideal solution for the ANUAAOA.50It was also the optimal solution for UACA. The combined
membership of UACA, VCUSA and ANUAAOA of about 13 000 members would be sufficient to counter balance the membership of FAUSA with about 9000 members.51The model, moreover, had the support of the ACTU.52After
was the model that was presented to the members of the amalgamating parties in 1993.
This model was largely acceptable to the UACA membership and the members of the various general staff unions, but there was significant opposition in parts of the FAUSA membership. The FAUSA leadership in South Australia organ-ised a campaign against the industry model. Most of the general staff members would be located in Victoria. This, they claimed, would lead to ongoing disputes about coverage of general staff outside that state. Moreover, the financial arrange-ments of the new union would give too many resources to the state divisions and too little to branches.53Although the FAUSA leadership supported the
amalga-mation, key figures such as General Secretary, Di Zetlin, declined to repudiate its dissident members, arguing that they would need to be reconciled to the new union.54Opponents of the amalgamation who were interviewed by the author
denied that they were attempting to invoke snobbery among the FAUSA rank and file who might be uncomfortable being in the same organisation as general staff.55On the other hand, supporters of the amalgamation among both the UACA
and FAUSA leaderships argued that this was an important underlying motiv-ation.56Whatever the rationalisation, there seemed to be a fundamental conflict
about the nature of unionism in the sector. The UACA model (with consider-able support among FAUSA activists in NSW) looked more like a union tradition-ally understood: a strong central strategic direction and leadership, coupled with a capacity to mobilise members when required. The FAUSA model, as expressed in South Australia, placed considerable emphasis on branch autonomy and an individual grievance or service model of unionism, and much less emphasis on the industrial mobilisation of members. It was thought that the presence of general staff in the union would strengthen the former model at the expense of the latter. The reservations within FAUSA are reflected in the final vote in favour of amalgamation. While over 95 per cent of UACA and ANUAAOA members supported the proposition, only about 75 per cent of FAUSA members did so.57The tensions between local autonomy and central leadership
remain within the NTEU today.
CONCLUSION
structure of the sector changed. There was, however, no inevitability about the nature of the organisation that emerged in the form of the NTEU. Although the ACTU and the federal provided the discourse of industry unionism, it did not follow that such a model would emerge in the higher education sector. The coincidence of federal registration and the restructuring of the sector provided an opportunity for more extensive industrial regulation of work in universities, while the phase of managed decentralism of the industrial relations system was the beginning of the decline of detailed state regulation of employment conditions in many other sectors. It can be said that the NTEU is more ‘unionate’ that any one of its parts, but it remains a product of that mixture of organisational struc-tures and culstruc-tures. The contemporary NTEU incorporates the FAUSA tradi-tion of relative branch autonomy with the UACA/ACUSA style of centralised strategic direction and membership mobilisation. Indeed, to conclude that any organisation achieves precise ‘unionate’ status is to deny the ever-emergent nature of unionism. Just as the working class may continue to be made, so are unions. University staff were not so much ‘industrialised’, but the nature of the industry itself changed. Industrial relations existed long before the institution of the unified higher education sector, but the changes in the late 1980s intensified the industrial consciousness of university staff. The NTEU in its emerging form is primarily a product of those changes, but it is not in itself a manifestation of the coming of ‘industrial relations’ to the sector.
NOTES
1. O’Brien, J (1993)The collective organisation of Australian academic staff 1949 – 1983. The Journal of Industrial Relations35(2), 195–220.
2. Interviews with Ralph Hall, former President of FAUSA, February 2000; Di Zetlin, former General Secretary FAUSA, former President NTEU, October 2000; Rod Crewther, University of Adelaide branch, FAUSA and NTEU and Cathy Harrington former Field Officer FAUSA and South Australian Division Industrial Officer, July 2000.
3. Interview with Grahame McCulloch, former General Secretary, FCA/UACA, General Secretary, NTEU, December 1999.
4. ibid, 22. 5. ibid, 195–9.
6. FAUSA, Memorandum to Executive from Philip Elkins, Re: Award Coverage of Curtin University of Technology, 27 April 1987; FAUSA, Curtin University - Implications, confidential memo to Executive and Staff, of FAUSA from LB Wallis, General Secretary, 11 February, 1987; FAUSA, letter to academic staff members, Curtin University of Technology, 27 February, 1987, NTEU archives.
7. FCA and Academic Staff Association of the Western Australian Institute of Technology, Demarcation Dispute: The Official FCA and ASA View, nd but 1987; Academic Staff Association of the Western Australian Institute of Technology, nd but 1987, Why you should not join AAUS/FAUSA. Letter to members. NTEU archives
8. Interview with McCulloch.
9. Curtin University of Technology 1987, Academic Staff Position, Council – 29 July 1987. 10. ACAC [Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission], s.88F application, Union of
Australian College Academics, C No. of 2159 of 1987, Decision, Print HO289.
11. ACAC, s.35 appeal against order, Australian Universities Industrial Association [C No. 30132 of 1988], Decision, Print H4765.
12. Australian Association of University Staff and Union of Australian Academics, Agreement, [re; demarcation], 15 June 1987.
14. FAUSA, Minutes of Representative Council Meeting 1987, Wednesday and Thursday
20. FCA and FAUSA, Thinking Ahead: Planning Growth in Australian Higher Education, Melbourne, 1988.
21. Hinkson, J. Academic Union Conferring with Dawkins. Arena84, pp 112–32. 22. Dawkins JS, Higher Education: A Policy Statement, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p 5.
23. Department of Employment Education and Training, National Report on the Australia’s Higher Education Sector. Canberra: AGPS, 153-5.
24. ACTU (1988) Response to the Federal Government Higher Education Discussion Paper. Melbourne: ACTU.
25. Interview with Murphy, op cit.
26. On the debate at UNSW see Patrick O’Farrell (1999) UNSW: A Portrait: The University of New South Wales, 1949–1999. Sydney: UNSW Press.
27. Interviews with Harrington/Crewther; Zetlin. 28. Interview with McCulloch.
29. Interview with Zetlin.
30. Currie J (1992) The emergence of higher education as an industry: The second tier awards and award restructuring. Australian Universities Review35(2), 17.
31. Interview with Hall. 32. Currie, op cit, 18. 33. ibid.
34. Richard Curtain and John Mathews, Two models of award restructuring in Australia. Labour and Indu stry3 (1),58–75.
35. David Penington (1991), Witness Statement to Industrial Relations Commission, 8 February 1991, AHEIA exhibit, NTEU archives.
36. Currie J (1994) Award restructuring for academics: The negotiating process. Discourse15(2), 22–4.
37. FCA/UACA (1989) Award Restructuring for the Unified National Higher Education System: A Proposal from the Federated Council of Academics and the Union of Australian College Academics, 18 February 1989.
38. Currie, Award Restructuring for Academics, 24–5.
39. FCA, Industrial Action and Award Restructuring, Memorandum to State and Territory Councils, 30 October.
40. ACAC, National Wage Case 1989, Application to Vary Certain Awards. Re: Wage Rates, C No. 37277 of 1989, Transcript, submission by Di Zetlin, 1779.
41. Interview with Zetlin, op cit. 42. Currie, Award Restructuring. 43. Interview with Zetlin.
44. Currie, Award Restructuring; interview with Murphy. 45. Interview with Zetlin, op cit.
46. Interview with John Summers, July 2000; NTEU in South Australia :Why a Minimal State Structure Should Occur in S.A. undated document 1994.
47. Paul Acfield, The Role of the South Australian Division in 1994 – A Discussion Paper, memorandum to NTEU interim executive.
48. Interviews with Murphy, Zetlin and Lewis. 49. Interview with Lewis.
51. The University of Adelaide General Staff Association also became an amalgamation partner. 52. Confidential Background Paper on Demarcation Matters in Higher Education, produced for Bill Mansfield by the Australian Colleges and Universities Staff Association, October 1991. NTEU Archives.
53. Ballot on Union Amalgamation: A Case for FAUSA Members Voting No, leaflet circulated in South Australia, nd but 1993; interview with Summers.
54. Interview with Zetlin.
55. Interviews with Harrington/Crewther and Summers.
56. Interviews with McCulloch and Hall, op cit; and Carolyn Allport, FAUSA Executive member, FAUSA and President, NTEU, 2000.
