Amenities Drive Urban Growth Growth

AMENITIES DRIVE URBAN GROWTH

TERRY NICHOLS CLARK*

University of Chicago

with

RICHARD LLOYD

University of Chicago

KENNETH K. WONG

Vanderbilt University

PUSHPAM JAIN

University of Maine

ABSTRACT: Studies of the city traditionally posit a division between a city's economy and its culture, with culture subordinate in explanatory power to work. However, post-industrial and globalizing trends are dramatically elevating the importance of culture. Cultural activities are increasingly crucial to urban economic vitality. Models to explain the growth of cities from the era of industrial manufacturing are outmoded. Citizens in the postindustrial city increasingly make quality of life demands, treating their own urban location as if tourists, emphasizing aesthetic concerns. These practices impact considerations about the proper nature of amenities that post-industrial cities can sustain.

O

ur classic theories of urban growth and decline are out of date. Not all need be scrapped but most need significant updating. Why? Because of globalization, the most dramatic force restructuring our cities around the world. The power of the process is no less if we ignore it; we do so at great risk. Mayors, developers, political party leaders, and even social scientists need to rethink their paradigms about how cities grow, decline, and redevelop. It is painful for everyone.

This article briefly sketches the broader changes accompanying globalization then highlights the critical role of amenities and urban political choices about amenities, suggesting where and how they can dramatically shift urban growth dynamics. Data

*Direct correspondence to: Terry Clark, 1126 E. 59 Street, Suite 322, Chicago, IL, 60637. E-mail: tnclark@uchicago.edu

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 24, Number 5, pages 493±515. Copyright#2002 Urban Affairs Association

come from our Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation project, an ongoing study of 35 countries and over 7,000 cities, and includes an in-depth study of one cityÐChicago. Why Chicago? Because Chicago is an outlier for many urban processes as it is heavily Catholic and has long preserved peasant traditions like strong neighborhoods and clientelist politics. These features make it more like cities globally than most US urban areas. Its strong hierarchical party tradition distinctly separates it from Tocquevillian democracy in the New England or Northern Italian model of Putnam (1993).

Yet a recent study by Markusen, Chapple, Schrock, Yamamoto, and Yu (2001) ranks Chicago number one in the US in the absolute number of high-tech jobs, ahead of Silicon Valley. Just a decade or so earlier, many observers were forecasting that Chicago, as part of the Rustbelt, was being driven like Detroit into a downward spiral of disinvestment and racial strife with investors and jobs moving to suburbs and the Sunbelt. How could the pessimists have been so wrong? Their paradigms were outmoded. Similar trends are occurring in many older US cities that demand reconceptualization. Amenities are a key to understanding the deficiencies in established theories of urban growth.

GLOBALIZATION: WHAT IS IT AND HOW DOES IT WORK?

The last two decades of the twentieth century have seen profound transformations of the political systems of the world. These political changes dramatically changed what we thought we knew about cities. Several events and trends have influenced the way we think about cities including:

. the end of the Cold War in 1989, and general global peace thereafter

. the decline of major tariffs and trade barriers, and the rise of new regional trading

blocks, as well as global trade

. the rapid increase in connectedness via new modes of communication: fax, Internet,

fiber-optic cables, and digitalization of increasing quantities of information, etc. First seen among key elites, but soon thereafter by the broad public as the costs of own-ership dropped rapidly.

. the drastic expansion of education in much of the world, thus giving more citizens the

ability to read, a sense of self-worth and to form opinions on major public issues

. the decline of agricultural and industrial work, and the rise of more professional,

service-oriented, and technological jobs where computers and machines replace people for basic tasks

In much past work the termglobalization was invoked to imply a simple capitalist or economic determinism. Globalization means more; it includes culture and amenities that can redefine economic rules. As used in this article, globalization has three distinct meanings. The first is the City as a Global Market Participant. This is the fiscal and economic production meaning, stressing global markets for capital and labor. A key idea is that as global markets rise, national quasi-monopolies and strong-state regulations fall. This is primarily a private sector process but it is also important for local governments as they often seek to encourage local economic development and production.

Tourism is the world's third largest industry, and attracting visitors has become big business for local officials who in turn build new stadiums, parks, museums, convention centers, and similar facilities hoping to win visitors.

Third is the City as a Global Democracy. Here the democratizing impacts of global leaders and non-government organizations press cities that lag. Human rights, which grew out of expanding citizens' civil rights, continue to grow in their extent and seriousness of applicationÐto women, children, Indian untouchables, the homeless, illegal immigrants, as well as physical entities that can assume human rights: trees, beaches, and endangered species of animals. One can envision, for example, a Boston non-profit organization arranging international trips for physically disabled persons to Costa Rica. After arriving at their destination, they might ask if there are corner cuts in the sidewalks for wheel-chairs. If the answer is no, they might ask if there is an organization that advocates for the disabled in Costa Rica. If not, they might insist that one should be created. This spreads Tocquevillian and Putnam-like principles and promotes civic and voluntary associations globally. As a result, citizen rights expand as organized groups and professionals develop new themes and specialties. This in turn adds new issues to local political agendas, leading political parties to embrace them or be challenged by other parties that champion these new political interest groups.

Globalization in all three areas illustrates the following:

. More information about options

. Citizens' redefinitions of their ambitions as they see new options . More potential and actual contacts

. More citizen incorporation or empowerment, thus illustrating what Adam Smith

called an increase in the extent of the market.

. More competition in previous areas in which decisions were made by hierarchies or

traditions

More important than the technology or the legal framework of constitutions are the actual rules of game by which people live and politics are played. National states with centralized power are being replaced by federalist systems involving shared powers among multiple units of government. Political rules are changing but not simply in response to technical and legal changes. A new conception of politics is spreading worldwide. We have termed it theNew Political Culture, as it is more than democracy; it is a more specific set of rules about politics. It is readily identified by such leaders as former President Bill Clinton in the US, Prime Minister Anthony Blair in Britain, and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Germany. This New Political Culture contrasts with clientelism and class politics. Clien-telism is common in many less developed countries today and often seems more prevalent in an agricultural economy where social relations are tied to the land and endure over many years. Class politics arose with industrialization, led by labor unions and socialist parties, which opposed the hierarchy of industrial management.

Beyond the Growth Machine

Molotch's (1976) metaphor suggests that the city is a machine geared to creating growth, with growth loosely defined as the intensification of land use and thus higher rent collections associated professional fees and locally based profits. Many urban econo-mists, planners, and political scientists have made similar arguments (e.g., Bradbury, Downs, & Small, 1982; Mollenkopf, 1983; Stone, 1989). However, a quarter century later in the contemporary competition among US cities, the growth machine model has lost much of its power. More research makes it increasingly clear that the simple growth machine model has often been weakly supported. Perhaps most convincing are more recent works by Logan and Molotch. Logan, Bridges and Crowder (1997) reach this conclusion in reviewing some 20 years of studies on the growth machine, and Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen (2000) embrace a multicausal approach to explain growth. Both stress amenities. Consumption and amenities are different from use or exchange value, which are broader traditional concepts.

The new economy has not spelled the demise of older central city areas, but it has changed the basis for urban economic viability. Traditional forms of capital give way to the primacy of human capital in the form of an educated and mobile workforce (Clarke & Gaile, 1998; Florida, 2002). An ideology of growth at any cost via land use intensification is not a given. In many locations, smart or managed growth strategies have replaced the growth machine as the driving civic ideology. Many locations have thus found consider-able success in competing for knowledge workers. For example, Portland, Oregon imple-mented ``a program of financial penalties designed to discourage excessive growth by one of its largest employers, Intel, Inc.'' (Florida, 2000, p. 24). Such policies run counter to political strategies in which the provision of manufacturing jobs and corresponding patterns of capital intensification are taken as quasi-automatically desirable. These illus-trate the lessons from Economics 101Ðthat people maximize utility, not income, and that utility equals income plus amenities. Glaeser (2000a) suggests that non-market transac-tions, essentially amenities, have grown more important than market transactions in explaining urban growth and decline.

Agriculture Clientelism

Industry Class Politics

Agriculture Clientelism

Globalization

Industry Class Politics Traditional Framework

Globalization Framework

FIGURE 1

What are amenities? The concept comes from economics. Leading observers write: ``A pure amenity is a nonproduced public good such as weather quality that has no explicit price. In practice, previous empirical studies include some government services such as education and public safety'' (Gyourko & Tracy, 1991, p. 775).

Much has changed in the last half century. In prototypical industrial cities like Chicago we have seen a steady decline in manufacturing employment and growth in services, which was followed by more subtle high-tech and globalizing processes. This description is well known; but what drives these changes? Which locations attract new high-tech jobs while others fail? Displacement of manufacturing from central city space changes the class structure of large cities with political and cultural consequence. Workers whose social location renders them less adaptable to structural change suffer from chronic unemploy-ment or move into subsistence occupations in the service sector (Wilson, 1987). They occupy spaces of devastation within most large cities (Zukin, 1991). Nightmare landscapes of poverty are a feature of former industrial cities in the US, and they have been studied extensivelyÐethnographically and demographically.

Yet simultaneously, a new elite economy has emerged in these same cities featuring workers educated in finance, producer services, information technology, and media production. Castells (1989) termed theminformational. They are educated and fluent at manipulating symbols, which lead Reich (1991) to term them symbolic analysts. Simi-larly, theories of economic innovation from Schumpeter, Jacobs, and Romer stress new ideas as driving jobs and economic growth (Glaeser, 2000).

Still, this leap of post-industrial production stressed by Castells and Reich, for example, is still not clearly joined to entertainment or consumption by them or most theorists who have long invoked primarily production-based interpretations to explain general urban processes. We thus stress the critical epistemological implications of our next conceptual step: the informational city implies the city of leisure. Some have described but few have interpreted implications of this shift toward consumption. For instance, Bennett (1999) documented the importance of new consumption-oriented strategies for several US cities, but did not locate them in a conceptual framework. Although Judd and Fainstein (1999) document the huge role of tourism in the world economy, the authors are still visibly struggling to interpret it. We believe that the research of Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2000) is the closest parallel to our approach.

pursuits compared to work. As a result, the relative importance of new or more refined occupations like tour guide or restaurant critic has increased and created differentiation among providers of personal services. Fifth, there is a rise of concern over the arts and other aesthetic considerations along with more traditional concerns about the spatial dynamics of cities. Sixth, these unique tastes and concerns create a new role for govern-ment and public officials as they respond to citizen demands. These demands are often for public goods (clean air, attractive views, pedestrian responsiveness) contrasting with more private goods (jobs, contracts, tax breaks to separate persons and firms) in the past. There is an increasing concern over zoning and construction of new public spaces, a rise in support for public art, and the introduction of a host of new considerations into urban political decision-making because judging the demand for competing public goods is more complex than for private goods. These last elements are elaborated here and tested using comparative urban data elsewhere (Clark, 1999). Our focus in this article is on detailing the dynamics of urban growth and decline and elaborating the profile of the post-industrial city. These changes are more profound for heavily post-industrial cities, but the fact that they emerge there also shows their pervasiveness and power. Globalization enhances many of these processes as international criteria and consumer demands via tourists are increasingly added to the local arena.

Decline and Renewal: Postindustrial Trends in US Cities

Disinvestment and fiscal crises in large US cities during the 1970s led to a bleak prognosis concerning urban fortunes. Many saw the growth of telematics and globaliza-tion as undermining the place boundedness of economic activity, which implied that the dense, central investment of capital in urban cores was no longer desirable. New informa-tion technologies are an advance with extreme potential impact on spatial organizainforma-tion: ``they represent the opportunity to conduct many more economic transactions at a distanceÐfrom an employee at home to a central office, from a consumer to a store, from one company to another'' (Atkinson, 1998, p. 134). The changes in the technological foundation of economic activity have been consequential for spatial organization. As a result, theories about these activities need to be revised. The central place theories that explain the grown and urban morphology of population in cities, as in Loesch and Burgess, were predicated on the centralized locational tendencies of manufacturing. This is no longer adequate given the rise of new information technologies (Gottdiener, 1985). Edge cities and deconcentration are instead the newer catchwords. As unionized manu-facturing jobs declined in the old center cities, structural mismatch occurred between workers and jobs and between the built environment and new economic activities, produ-cing patterns of extreme poverty and blight.

This explosion in the number of firms locating in the downtowns of major cities during that decade goes against what should have been expected according to models empha-sizing territorial dispersal; this is especially true given the high cost of locating in a major downtown area (p. 2).

Sassen (2001) points out that central cities have enjoyed renewed vitality as postindustrial production sites. But why? Her focus is the world cities interpretation, based more on production than consumption.

A related view is that cities are important milieux of innovation in the information or knowledge economy. Postindustrial production differs from industrial production in key ways. In particular, it is design intensive and highly flexible versus the long-term durable assemblage of traditional industrial production (Lash & Urry, 1994). The proliferation of media provides the content for one such postindustrial activity because the production of media images is an activity significantly concentrated in urban cores, along with finance and elite producer services. Reich, Castells, and Lash and Urry and others highlight the symbolic and expressive content of these activities and the distinct competencies of their most valuable workers. The question as to why some such activities continue to cohere in what were industrially based city spaces is one of the most crucial puzzles of the contemporary city. The entertainment machine provides a key piece of the puzzle not explored by the above theorists. Contemporary consumption practice extends to the consumption of space. The lifestyle concerns of social participants are increasingly important in defining the overall rationale for, and in turn driving, other urban social processes. Quality of life is not a mere byproduct of production; it defines and drives much of the new processes of production. It has been advanced to explain the population shifts from the Frost Belt into the more (consumption-friendly) climates of the southern and western US. Castells (1989) questions this order of causality, positing the opposite more traditional view: ``so, the `quality of life' of high technology areas is a result of the industry (its newness, its highly educated labor force) rather than the determinant of its location pattern'' (p. 52). His interpretation seems to reflect an earlier reality. It is important that in many urban locales migration patterns of residents, especially elite participants in postindustrial growth sectors, are driven by new quality of life demands. How do we know?

InCity Money, Clark and Ferguson (1983) argued that urban job growth increasingly turned on citizen's consumption patterns and tastes, not on production, and showed that certain past migration and job growth studies could be productively reinterpreted in these terms. Simultaneous equation studies of job and population growth measured the relative impact of each on the other. They were both strong and roughly equal in some estimates. This suggested that migration to a city or to a job was about equal in importance for all American migrants. Evidence of such patterns has mounted in the subsequent decade and a half, such as in the suggestive studies of Bennett (1999), Judd and Fainstein (1999), Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2000), and Florida (2000). This article furthers the clarification of the analytical logic behind the earlier (mainly statistical) results and illustrates key points with new, mostly ethnographic evidence.

Residential patterns since the 1980s have run counter to bleak expectations for some older industrial cities. The concentration of poverty documented by Wilson (1987) as a response to de-industrialization coexists with revalorization of some former slums by black, brown, and white residents. Gentrification trends indicate that affluent workers, particularly the young, are finding the city not simply a clear destination for work but also a desirable place to live and play. These changes in the residential profiles of urban neighborhoods are treated by some as indicators of postmodern consumption trends (Harvey, 1990); but many post-modernist interpreters like Harvey still rely heavily on finance or jobs. For instance, Smith (1996) notes,

systematic gentrification. . .is simultaneously a response and a contributor to a series of

wider global transformations: global economic expansion in the 1980s: the restructuring of national and urban economies in advanced capitalist countries toward services, recreation and consumption: and the emergence of a global hierarchy of world, national, and regional cities (p. 8).

Our view is that we should focus more directly on the changing preferences of citizens and workers. They are choosing where to live and choosing to change jobs on average every 3.5 years (Florida, 2002). The gentrified neighborhood as a distinct type of urban community differs considerably from the neighborhoods studied in past classics of urban sociology, for example Gans (1962) or glorified by Putnam (2000). The important local amenities are no longer schools, churches, and neighborhood associations, as in the urban mosaic of the old Chicago school. A residential population of young professionals with more education and fewer children creates a social profile geared toward recreation and consumption concerns. They value the city over other forms of settlement space because of its responsiveness to a wide array of aesthetic concerns because it can become a cultural center offering diverse, sophisticated and cosmopolitan entertainment lacking elsewhere.

In the new economic geography of entertainment, cities like Seattle and Portland become central locations for the development of information technologies. A common explanation for the location of a large firm is: it was the personal choice of the top executive. Such might have been the case for Bill Gates' selection of Seattle for Microsoft's headquarters. The conceptual fallacy here is in implying that the top executives are merely idiosyncratic, simply wrong, or personally selfish because they did not select a lower-cost or more production-driven location. But this may just be conceptual tunnel vision by the observers. Behind it lies a key to reinterpretation: the top executives may have had in mind not merely themselves in locating in attractive places but a concern to attract top talent. Provision of lifestyle amenities has become a key feature of urban development that we must recognize conceptually. These two cities, however, are extremes because they are leaders in smart growth strategies and have experienced recent dramatic growth.

The absence of children suggests that yuppies will be less interested in local schools and perhaps churches as relevant amenities. Rather, they are excited by opportunities for recreation (e.g., Chicago's refurbished north shore lakefront, which provides bicycle paths, beaches, and softball fields) and by fashionable consumption opportunities in the hip restaurants, bars, shops, and boutiques abundant in restructured urban neighbor-hoods.

other variables. What is unclear without more direct evidence is the relative explanatory power of: 1) tolerance for diversity as associated with intellectual exploration, the type of favorable production climate that a Bill Gates or Schumpeter might imagine; 2) the amenity or consumption rich location that attracts persons whose work may not be the first consideration in selecting the location; and 3) the joint influence of tolerance for diversity and the amenity or consumption rich location. Our sense is that many decisions are joint, but how much weight to assign to each factor is not clear. Much past research has assumed that we have limited evidence to sort out these competing explanations. Some of the best are the simultaneous equation studies of job and population growth, but the results shift according to the specific controls introduced (Clark & Ferguson, 1983).

New Political Culture

Most of the above analysis is based on private sector dynamics, involving jobs, work, lifestyle, etc. But cities are also driven by public policy, which interpenetrates private decisions. How and where does leadership enter? The key is public leaders who recognize the importance of amenities and use them to attract new residents. Which do and why? This is a key question in the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project (Clark, 2000). We completed a national survey in 1984 and 1996 of mayors in all US cities with populations over 25,000. Results suggest the national importance of a leadership pattern that we termed the New Political Culture (NPC), which is distinctly responsive to con-sumption rather than just production. It is found in increasing numbers of cities and countries, even if empirically many cities retain elements of clientelism and class politics. The New Political Culture includes these points:

. The classic left-right dimension has been transformed. People still speak of left and

right, but definitions are changing. Left increasingly means social (primarily con-sumption) issues and not traditional class politics focusing on jobs and related economic issues.

. Social and fiscal/economic issues are explicitly distinguished. Positions on social issues

like abortion or women's roles or the environment cannot be derived from their positions on fiscal issuesÐfor citizens, leaders, and parties.

. Social issues have risen in salience relative to fiscal/economic issues.

. Market individualism and social individualism grow. The NPC joins market

liberal-ism (in the past narrowly identified with parties of the Right) with social progressive-ness (often identified with parties of the Left). This new combination of policy preferences leads NPCs to support new programs and follow new rules.

. Questioning the welfare state. Some NPC citizens and leaders conclude that governing

in the sense of state-central planning is unrealistic for many services. While not seeking to reduce services, NPCs question specifics of service delivery and seek to improve efficiency. National governments decline and local governments grow in importance.

. The rise of issue politics and broader citizen participation and the decline of

hier-archical political organizations. The NPC counters traditional bureaucracies, parties, and their leaders. New social movements and issue-politics are essential additions to the political process. By contrast, traditional hierarchical parties, government agen-cies, and unions are seen as antiquated.

. These NPC views are more pervasive among younger, more educated and affluent

The NPC emerges more fully and forcefully in cities with less hierarchy, and where citizens have more resources, such as more education, higher income, and more professional and high technology service occupations. These defining elements and propositions elaborated in Clark (1994, 1996) and Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot (1998).

A second process persists in other cities and neighborhoods: class politics, especially in working class unions and socialist parties. Even if socio-economic changes in cities erode this older working-class base, strong parties may continue these programs and politics even if citizens change their preferences. How much parties buffer political leaders in this way is a critical intervening variable. The US institution of primary elections, where citizens vote on candidates for the party, is one illustration of the weak and citizen-dependent US party system. Thus, where and how urban innovation occurs, and in particular how NPC patterns arise, depends heavily on parties. Traditional class cleavages focus on jobs and deflect concern away from amenities, entertainment, and other new issues to which citizens are increasingly sensitive, thus, fueling demands for more citizen responsiveness worldwide.

To illustrate the NPC patterns in urban development policies, we examined several major US cities whose policies in recent years were shaped by NPC mayors: Michael White in Cleveland, Richard Riordan in Los Angeles, Rudolph Guiliani in New York, Edward Rendell in Philadelphia, and Stephen Goldsmith in Indianapolis. Richard M. Daley of Chicago is discussed in more detail. Most of these mayors governed in the 1990s and set the tone for national urban leadership. These six mayors exemplify the efficient management of city government through contracting-out (Miranda, 1992). All focused on quality of life issues and attempted to attract the middle class and businesses to the city (Wong, 1992). These mayors had no strong party affiliation and revealed a keen interest in public education (Wong, Dreeben, Lynn, & Sunderman., 1997). These mayors met regu-larly and exchanged ideas in an informal network (Beinart, 1997). Five were re-elected by wide margins. Their management styles are similar and reflect many common elements.

Michael White, from Cleveland, is a black Democrat and son of a union activist. He contracted out garbage collection, road maintenance, and other city services, making city workers compete against private firms. Mayor White moved the city toward more efficient management, citing an instance when the city's road repair unit outbid a private contractor. He also strongly supported Republican Governor Voinovich in introducing school vouchers in Cleveland to pay for parochial and private schools. White also insisted on holding down taxes.

In Los Angeles, Republican Mayor Richard Riordan also contracted out several city services. He required the head of every city department to establish quantifiable goals for the year, strategic priorities for the next three to five years, and tied employee pay to achievement. He distributed a concise budget patterned after private sector corporate reports. He also strongly supported affirmative action, gay rights, and Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein.

All of these mayors personify the NPC patterns. They all broke with their city's political pasts of the New Deal with its left-right rhetoric, dominated by jobs and work. To add more subtlety, consider the growing dominance of the NPC in Chicago, classically known as a blue collar Democratic city, long incarnated by its mayors named Daley.

HOW CHICAGO ILLUMINATES THESE PROCESSES

Chicago's main industry in 2000 was entertainment. The mayor gave speeches about trees, floral landscaping of bare rooftops, and defended gondoliers singing arias on the Chicago River against the barge haulers who claimed the gondolas obstructed traffic. The mayor added that he wanted the Chicago River to become as lively as the Seine in Paris. Between the eras of Mayor Richard J. Daley and Mayor Richard M. Daley, Chicago underwent epochal change. The reasons behind these changes are important for Chicago and other governments worldwide. Few governments have changed as fundamentally and as rapidly as Chicago's without a visible or violent revolution. During these years, Chicago's economic base, culture, and politics were revolutionized in ways similar to the revolutions occurring in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia during the same period. Govern-ments can learn important lessons from one another about innovations of this magnitude. Chicago's changes are paradoxically camouflaged by an outdated image that the city, its citizens, and especially its leaders, are conservative. What has changed? Carl Sandburg's ``City of the Big Shoulders'' continued through the period of Richard J. Daley (1955 to 1976). Its lifeblood was heavy industry, production, and growth; its citizens were mostly blue-collar. Today, Chicago is a postindustrial city focused on consumption and ame-nities. Its political life was once dominated by clientelism, patronage, jobs, and contracts. Battles were fought in what game theorists call a zero-sum game, where one person's gain is another person's loss. It was zero sum because jobs and contracts are private goods that only one participant consumes. If Alderman X got a job, Alderman Y lost it. There is an obvious residue of these concerns in Chicago. There are always some private goods, but the news is that politics increasingly involves more public goods, like lakefront aesthetics, which any visitor can enjoy. The view is not consumed by just one person as is a job. Other new concerns are multi-culturalism and efficient service delivery, which also broadly affect all residents not just a limited number of political victors. Coalitions today can accord-ingly be broader with more participants and more beneficiaries because everyone can consume a public good, but only a select few can receive patronage jobs. Instead of zero-sum games we can have more positive-zero-sum games with many winners. Politics is no longer necessarily about conflict among subgroups.

Another major change: the average citizen is no longer conceived of as a mere cog at the bottom of a huge machine, voting as instructed by his precinct captain. Citizens are emerging instead as the ultimate concern, and citizen preferences are key criteria for winning elections, evaluating policies, and promoting or firing leaders in city hall and in Chicago businesses. This theme emerges repeatedly in presentations by the mayor and top staff and in policy changes in Chicago. These are deep shifts affecting cities generally (Clark & Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998). To probe these changes in Chicago, I interviewed leaders for 17 years as part of an oral history.

transformations occur in many cities but details vary in each location. The specific social, cultural, and political context shapes the precise changes. Every city, including Chicago, is unique in its distinct combination of general elements. We can dissect the uniqueness by identifying how and why more general processes work in Chicago.

Just as important as new jobs and new technology for postindustrial society is the diminution of authoritarian social relations in favor of more collegiality and egalitarian-ism. These follow as people are better educated and perform more professionally. Workers at all levels are increasingly expected to act like professionals. The postindustrial market-place is more abstract and cosmopolitan than that found in the old industrial era. There is more contracting-out of tasks, more provision of services over a distance, and sales to far-off world marketsÐall made possible by computers, faxes, inexpensive air travel, the Internet, etc. Evidence on the transformation of America's 100 largest corporations in this direction is explained in Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot (1998).

Industrial organization was built upon practices such as strict seniority, few pay differentials by individual achievement, and promotion from within. Post-industrialism is built upon completely different premises. Rising national and global competition and precise communication make possible the contracting out of tasks and production to small firms worldwide. More abstract and distant relations often replace local and intense personal relations. This transition is also deeper for most Catholics than for most Protes-tantsÐconfession, parochial schools, and parish life traditionally taught more social skills and respect for personal authority.

But these are production concerns. The most revolutionary change in the ``City that Works'' was that it could do more than work. For example, note the following:

. The city's number one industry is now entertainment, which city officials define as

including tourism, conventions, restaurants, hotels, and related economic activities (see Tables 1 and 2). Tourists rose from 32 million in 1993 to 42.9 million in 1997, with the average business or convention traveler estimated to spend $242 per day. This implies that the Chicago economic zone took in $16 billion in 1997 and indirectly $29 billion (Shifflet, 1997).

TABLE 1

Attendance at Popular Chicago Attractions

Attraction 1999 1998 1997 19961995

Navy Pier 7,750,000 8,248,000 6,081,200 4,500,000 3,000,000

Lincoln Park Zoo coming soon 3,000,000 3,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000 John G. Shedd Aquarium 1,851,618 1,981,000 1,802,385 1,775,765 1,844,927 Museum of Science and Industry 1,656,611 1,750,000 1,680,234 1,760,813 2,012,284 Art Institute of Chicago 1,358,412 1,537,157 1,723,549 1,669,842 2,248,576 Field Museum of Natural History 1,501,465 1,450,923 1,390,481 1,212,475 1,263,453 Sears Tower Skydeck coming soon 1,302,307 1,380,221 N/A 1,441,966 Chicago Cultural Center coming soon 623,006 566,538 565,882 486,521 Museum of Broadcast Comm. coming soon 500,000 180,000 200,000 180,000 Chicago Children's Museum coming soon 471,602 554,000 600,000 N/A

Adler Planetarium 460,815 459,626 430,000 458,357 430,502

Chicago Symphony Orchestra coming soon 272,628 N/A 453,059 422,790

DuSable Museum 147,336171,186168,392 247,502 220,000

Chicago Historical Society 148,284 143,201 153,634 176,015 150,000

. The most visited park in the entire US is the Chicago Lakefront. It has far more

visitors than the Grand Canyon (which had five million visitors in 1997), although many are from nearby. The visitor can admire a clear view of the city because the skyline stands a quarter mile from the waterfront of Lake Michigan (thanks to the Burnham Plan). Much was totally rebuilt in the 1990s, including new marinas, walk-ways, fountains, and beaches surrounding harbors filled with yachts. Cyclists, joggers, and rollerbladers heavily use the lakefront path, which runs the length of the city. Picnickers abound.

. Mayor Richard M. Daley proudly claims to have planted more trees than any mayor

in the history of the world (city hall estimates this figure to be around one million) as a commitment to environmental and aesthetic sensitivity. Flowers and shrubs, new pavement, street lights, benches, public art, wrought iron fences, and related land-scaping were added in thousands of locations around the city in the 1990s.

. The city is a leader among US cities in devising ways to convert polluted land areas

(brownfields) into usable property, which new industries and housing can develop productively.

Our analysis considers five key components of political culture as these have shifted with leadership patterns. We follow the changes in Chicago in the last half of the twentieth century by assessing six mayors according to these five components. The most significant changes illustrate movement toward the New Political Culture. Table 3 summarizes the key points. These five dimensions define change over time toward five core elements of the New Political Culture. The more general ideas draw from research that charts the rise of the New Political Culture (Clark, 1996; Clark & Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998; Clark & Rempel, 1997; Hoggart & Clark, 2000).

In many US cities business leaders have been reputedly powerful in affecting decisions directly or indirectly through a business-oriented regime (Stone, 1989). Common inter-pretations stress either the economic or materialist base of politics from Karl Marx onward or the specific importance of business leaders. Both interpretations are outdated. It is quite possible for a mayor or restaurant entrepreneur to seek to use consumption and amenities to maximize the material wealth of the city or restaurant. This may be direct and short-term or more indirect and long-term. By limiting density and population growth, TABLE 2

Top Ten US Counties for Overnight Group Meeting Travel

Ranking County State City 1998

1 Cook IL Chicago 4.53

2 DeKalb GA Atlanta 3.52

3 Orange FL Orlando 3.3

4 Clark NV Las Vegas 2.94

5 Dallas TX Dallas 2.86

7 Washington DC Washington 2.8

8 Los Angeles CA Los Angeles 2.63

9 San Diego CA San Diego 2.17

10 San Francisco CA San Francisco 2.07

13 New York NY New York 1.56

TABLE 3

Key Components of Leadership and the New Political Culture in Chicago

Components of the New Political Culture

Mayor

Ligitimated women's issues High spending First mayoral candidate to defeat machine

Little new policy Pushed through higher property taxes

Was between machine and reform forces

No empowerment pursued Little new policy

it is assumed that the land value of a less-congested area will grow more valuable. Additionally, the specific role of business surely varies by issue area and the leadership capabilities of individual firms.

In some issues, where most citizens and groups have minimal involvement, active business interests may sway policy decisions such as the allocation of public contracts. In the past, political decisions would be openly discussed by aldermen and others in Chicago. But as over 26 aldermen have gone to jail since 1971 for accepting bribes and similar offers (Simpson, Adeoye, Feliciano, & Howard, 2002), such directly targeted contributions have grown more rare. By contrast, firms may legally contribute to a leader's campaign as long as they are not given a specific benefit. Under such conditions, some firms contribute to many candidates if they are unsure who will win, hoping to have at least more access. This is referred to as pinstripe patronage, engaged in by law, accounting, banking firms, and developers. Such patronage has allegedly mushroomed in the 1990s in Chicago.

Many types of leaders may see the same problems and move toward similar or compet-ing conclusions either individually or in open discussion, directly or through media coverage and various conferences. This type of political exchange and debate frequently occurs as cities rethink their policies. The media enters the debate by bringing in perspec-tives from multiple participants. Editorial writers would not bother to publish their views if they did not think someone would pay attention to them. Changing the ``climate of debate,'' ``framing issues,'' ``adding new items to the public agenda'' are labels more consistent with this continuous, pluralistic, and more subtle form of public discourse than clout or exercising power. These terms imply a command and response set of political relationships that are increasingly out of date. This more open and pluralistic perspective is especially important when fundamentals are involved, specifically in Chicago's shift toward the New Political Culture. Business interests can become defined very differently across issues and in different cities. In locations like Lake Tahoe, business leaders join the consensus in limiting growth. The opposite is true in Lawrence, Kansas, where business leaders and citizens all support continuous growth (Clark & Goetz, 1994; Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997; Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002).

These changes are illustrated in Chicago when political, civic, and business leaders shift their commitments from laissez faire business growth and low taxes to support for trees and arts. According to a key Chicago business leader: ``The future vibrancy of our city is very dependent upon the arts,'' says Nuveen Chairman and CEO Timothy Schwerfeger.

People can live and work almost anywhere, as communications technology increases the capacity to connect. A place to live is no longer driven by the headquarters of a company. So, quality of life and creating a high-quality environment in which to live, work, and raise a family increasingly is a key competitive issue in attracting people to the city (Abarabanel, 2000, p. 45).

NPC Shapes City Agencies: The Chicago Story

other governments are attempting on a global basis. With cities growing more visibly important worldwide, Europeans have been visiting and writing about Chicago as an example of how much an autonomous mayor can accomplish. There are many policy lessons to be derived from Chicago's experience.

Mayor Richard M. Daley broke sharply with Chicago's past. Becoming mayor in 1989, Daley started slowly but grew increasingly ambitious over more than a decade in office. His reforms in the Chicago Park District (CPD) and Chicago Public Schools (CPS) were explicitly linked to amenities and quality of life issues, including clean and safe streets. For decades, separate governments handled schools and parks and mayors followed the dictum of ``Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers'' as Rakove (1975) summarized. Operationally, this meant that mayors would not speak out publicly on most major policies but would instead focus narrowly on jobs and contracts. On national US tests, Chicago schools ranked at the very lowest levels.

Daley sought to reverse the status of Chicago schools by concentrating on educational policy and management. He tried to change schools in a manner that would make them responsive to students. He was far more direct and focused on educational policy than past mayors:

We have a state of emergency in our nation's public schools and chief executives have to take on that challenge. The future of our cities is at stake. All across the nationÐfamilies from all racial groups and financial backgrounds are leaving cities because they have lost faith in urban public education. It is true in many American cities, including our nation's capital. . .But it doesn't have to be this wayÐand I want to offer the mayors,

school board officials, businesses and parents around the country a more hopeful vision for the future of our children. I can picture a day when families choose to stay in cities because of the quality public school systems. I can see urban schools that have enough classroom space, modern equipment, and safe hallways.

As Mayor of our nation's third largest city, I have to believe in the future of our public schools. Improving schools is the only way to make a lasting change in this country. It is the only way to lift people out of povertyÐto cut down on crimeÐand to create a stronger economy_{. . .}Everything I do as mayor would fail if we gave up on the schools (Daley, 1997).

Schools were part of the key in the creation of stable neighborhoods and well-managed city services. Both changes were needed to attract middle-class residents and new busi-nesses (Daley, 1996a, 1996b).

Management Structure

for them to shoulder their dramatic charges. This made them quite different from the traditional ``good manager'' who may be hired from outside by a private corporation or who circulates in smaller cities with city managers. Chicago is managed more like a Japanese corporation with its powerful local culture and deep personal commitments. This particularism is underwritten by a strong Irish Catholic localism and trust, even if weakening, that has long colored Chicago leadership (Clark, 1975).

The appointment of the two top officers was followed by 100%_{top management turnover}

in both agencies. They hired highly qualified staff who were personally loyal to them, in clear contrast to Weberian civil service ideals. The management structure in both agencies is two-tiered, separating the functional from core-agency services. The functional tier covers finance, human resources, communication, and other general operational activities. The core-services division addresses education in the Chicago Public Schools and recreation and landscaping in the Park District. This division of management is evident in the pattern of appointment of managers to the school system. The majority of the newly appointed managers under the new administration in non-core services at the Chicago Public Schools (about 91%_{) were recruited from non-CPS agencies. Of these, 55}%_{were recruited directly}

from city of Chicago agencies. In comparison, all new managers (100%_{) in core-serv ices}

were recruited from within the school system (Wong et al., 1997).

Trusted generalists implemented the major management changes, but service delivery specifics still built on agency experience. Nonetheless, problems with unions and minor-ities were just below the surface. In the schools, gender politics also surfaced. In the public schools, where many teachers are black females, visible African American women have been key leaders. Ferman (1996) discussed how Chicago's long tradition of ethnic politics infused ethnicity and race into policy considerations more than in most cities.

Despite these political problems, the initial focus of both Claypool and Vallas was on keeping their agency financially solvent and eliminating the deficit. In 1993, the Park District faced an annual deficit of $10 million and was near its legal debt ceiling. Similarly in 1995, the public schools faced a four-year budget deficit of $1.2 billion. Claypool and Vallas moved swiftly to balance the budget and bring fiscal responsibility to the two agencies.

They then cut costs through downsizing, efficient management, and contracting out. The Park District reduced its total staff from 4,938 FTE in 1993 to 3,577 for 1997 ( 27%_).

The Chicago Public Schools reduced its central office staff from 3,456 in 1995 to 2,740 in 1997 ( 21%_{) with barely any reductions in the teaching staff of about 25,000. The central}

administration at the Park District and the public schools also cut down their operating expenses significantly (44%_{and 10}%_{respectively).}

Both agencies contracted out mostly in non-core service areas. Experienced managers at the two agencies were familiar with contracting-out and the cost differentials involved and implemented similar polices swiftly. Among those services contracted out were the print shop, employee health services, workers' compensation, and student records storage (Daley, 1997). Both Vallas and Claypool successfully negotiated with their major unions and had some skirmishes with other smaller unions. Their success was due to the over-whelming support from the mayor, council, and active civic groups.

Outcomes-Based Accountability

improvement plans and to determine compliance with the state school code. Vallas's administration targeted the improvement of low-performing schools based on test scores. In January 1996, after six months in office, Vallas and his administration placed 109 schools on probation, approximately 20% _{of the district's elementary and high schools.}

The previous administration had placed only six schools on remediation, a step below probation. Using some of the most draconian measures in the country, the Chicago Public Schools reconstituted seven high schools in 1997, essentially restarting the schools with many new staff.

Effects of Political Control

Vallas and Claypool were both highly charismatic leaders, a fact that motivated agency employees and generated great enthusiasm (Heard, 1996). Their two successors are young, enthusiastic staff who follow their examples. As one Chicago Public Schools manager summarized the central office mood, ``There is a feeling of motion and energy.'' The mayoral-induced management of the schools and parks led to a clear political mission in the two agencies. The two CEOs outlined long-term visions, emphasizing infrastructure investment and major capital improvement projects. They also stressed aesthetics. Parking lots were converted to areas with flowers and trees and wrought iron fences were added around schools across the entire city.

Another result of mayoral (political) control was increased collaboration between the two agencies and across different city agencies. A new CPD-CPS initiative was an after-school program called Park-Kids, where kids went from after-schools to the parks. These highly acclaimed programs showed concrete commitment to dramatically improved service. As a result, children were engaged in program activities from breakfast to dinnertime.

Managing Dramatic Policy Innovation: Lessons from Chicago

The policy preferences of NPC mayors (especially fiscal conservatism combined with social liberalism) led them to pursue improvements in productivity as a major objective. In pursuit of this objective, consumption and amenities replaced production and jobs. They now see their political constituency as individual citizens rather than organized political groups such as unions and city employees. As governments increasingly embrace such policies, some leaders have fared poorly while others have done well. President Jimmy Carter, for example, advocated certain NPC themes but was widely considered a manage-ment failure. Chicago, in recent years, illustrates dramatic innovations in policy and in management. What lessons can be learned from these experiences?

Contrast two established types of managers with those in Chicago. First is the city managerÐthe ideal professional of the International City Management AssociationÐwho is good for modest innovations and sound, honest management. The manager is the Weberian-Taylor-inspired model of the classic American city administrator who can work well with all constituencies. There is high mobility of such managers across cities; they have low political involvement, weak ties to other staff, and superficial knowledge of local civic and neighborhood associations. These conditions discourage corruption that might come from personalistic contacts. But they also spell administrative timidity; they discourage big challenges because they offer a shallow political foundation (Gurwitt, 1997).

outlined in many Harvard case studies of the federal government and in some city govern-ments like New York under John Lindsay (Lynn, 1981). The archetype is intelligent and ambitious, an aggressive manager who is organizationally rather than politically sensitive. He favors a closed rather than an open organizational environment. This assumes weak political leaders who will tolerate innovative administrators under them. In situations meeting such assumptions, the administrative entrepreneur can accomplish much.

While these two types of managers can succeed in some locations but would probably fail in Chicago. This is because some Chicago elements are unique but many are shared elsewhere. This suggests that the Chicago case may offer important policy implications for innovative management and administration. Our cases suggest dramatic innovation is plausible when:

. The status quo has lost legitimacy: there is a sense of crisis or at least serious

mishandling of local issues. This urgency can come from a fiscal or political crisis or it can be fueled by a new elected leader seeking change.

. Major policy changes can seldom be shielded from elected officials, the press, or

citizens. Hence, internal, closed-organizational models or managers who do not conceive of external actors as key are inclined to fail.

. If political leadership is highly unstable and divided, competing leaders are likely to

challenge one another over each policy step, leak critiques to the press, and undermine creative managers. This was most visibly in Chicago under Mayor Harold Washington and the Council Wars when many good ideas were tabled or ignored for years.

. Coherent political leadership can shield managers and press them further to politically

acceptable policies. This was clear in Daley's Chicago after the mid-1990s, where the mayor had no significant opposition and strong support in the council, civic associ-ations, media, and public.

. The status quo not only was illegitimate but also permitted dramatic cuts in

lower-middle-level administration (some 20%_{of total staffs and budget in one or two years).}

Savings realized from these and other inefficiencies freed up substantial resources for innovative policies.

. Major layoffs sparked fiery union confrontations. These confrontations stymied the

initiatives of past mayors Byrne and Washington (weaker mayors who took on unions and lost). Vallas and Claypool followed the Daley tradition of not going to battle unless you can win.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS: TIGHT MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC GOODS, MANAGED GROWTH, AND CONSUMPTION OF AMENITIES

Many mayors and leaders around the world are driven by new concerns that we have summarized as a New Political Culture. The Chicago case study suggests that dramatic policy innovation is more likely when: 1) managers operate in an environment charac-terized by high risk and uncertainty, 2) the status quo's legitimacy is low, 3) policy alternatives are actively monitored and criticized by many political participants in an open-system environment, 4) managers are talented and ambitious but also trusted and personally well-connected to political leaders who support them in good times and bad, 5) political leadership is stable and coherent, 6) general policy direction is clear, and 7) managers have autonomy and encouragement to pursue dramatic change.

the New Political Culture. First is a shift from separable to public goods. This is the core of reform in Chicago and many other cities. The political enemy is clientelism or patron-age, which reformers seek to replace. These are usually replaced with public goods that are shared widely across a geographic area, ideally the entire city, such as clean air, environ-mental improvements, and governance procedures open and accessible to all (not just the politically well-connected). By contrast, separable goods (such as bread or shoes) are consumed by one or a few individuals or, due to public policies, a patronage job or contract is obtained. Public and separable goods are analytical distinctions that are not always clear by just looking at a city's budget or its downtown. All cities have standard budget categories, public buildings, and roads. What is critical to understand is how the participants assess the decisions about them. An airport can be interpreted in terms of its implications for public goods (it is used by many persons) as well as for separable goods (it creates jobs and contracts). Separable goods were once preeminent in Chicago; public goods have risen in salience. Globalization generally drives public goods. Similar proced-ural reforms are stressed by NPC leaders from Japan to Italy (Clark & Kobayshi, 2000). What can mayors do if they cannot eliminate poverty with redistributive programs? A major policy alternative is to stress equity, due process, fairness, and the incorporation of all groups. These policies entered Chicago with Harold Washington and continued thereafter. Indeed, institutionalizing open, transparent, universalistic (Protestant-inspired) government programs as the core processes for making decisions and administering them is a major policy to counter inequality as these procedures are not dependent on personal contacts and favors.

The second policy shift is from pure economic growth to a slightly more managed growth strategy. For example, numerous cities worldwide are committed to the promotion of economic growth. Chicago was the fastest-growing large city in America in the late nineteenth century. The pursuit of growth was the explicit policy of most Chicago mayors in the twentieth century. These policies included: developing the economy, creating jobs, and building large infrastructure projects (Bradbury, Downs, & Small, 1982; Mayfield, 1996; Suttles, 1984, 1990). The growth machine model was classically illustrated by Mayor Richard J. Daley's close ties with leading corporate officials seeking continuous growth.

livable and pleasant place. These public-good consumption concerns emerged powerfully in Chicago and other major US cities only in the last years of the twentieth century. They have been enjoyed by European and Asian aristocrats for centuries, but what is new and distinct is the popular diffusion of these concerns.

The more general importance of amenities for urban life, and even as a major cause of urban economic development and population growth, is starting to become recognized by a few economists and urban policy analysts. For example, Glaeser (2000a) stresses non-market transactions like crime, education, and beautification. Other research seeks to measure these processes using national urban data and analysts report substantial impacts of many different amenities from high quality restaurants to bicycle paths on develop-ment, population growth, and high-tech jobs (Florida, 2000, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2000).

Several policy conclusions follow from these findings. The most talented members of America's mobile and creative work force are offered jobs by firms in many cities. As a result, they have a wide choice of cities for jobs. The decision about where to live and enjoy life can play as large or a larger role than the job offer itself in the final location decision. Many policy makers follow the New Political Culture emphasis and have moved away from clientelism and patronage as viable strategies to retain individual firms with subsidies and benefits. Instead, many invest more in public goods for all citizens like schools and parks. Many feel these policies are paying off in the new global economy.

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