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Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
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IN MEMORIAM: PROFESSOR SUMITRO
DJOJOHADIKUSUMO, 19172001
Thee Kian Wie
To cite this article: Thee Kian Wie (2001) IN MEMORIAM: PROFESSOR SUMITRO
DJOJOHADIKUSUMO, 19172001, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37:2, 173-181, DOI: 10.1080/00074910152390865
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074910152390865
Published online: 17 Jun 2010.
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Professor SumitroDjojohadikusumois oneoftheprincipalarchitectsof Indone-sia’spost-independenceeconomicpolicy. Hehasheldkey economicportfoliosin both theimmediatepost-independence andtheNewOrdereras.Inaddition,as ProfessorofEconomicsattheUniversity ofIndonesia,andasatirelesslecturerand writeroneconomicissues,hehasbeen in-strumentalinshapingthe education of severalgenerations ofeconomistsin In-donesia,manyofwhomarenowinkey governmentpositions.
Thus ran the introduction toan inter-viewwithProfessorSumitro,oneof In-donesia’s foremost economic policy makers,publishedintheDecember1986 issue of the Bulletin ofIndonesian
Eco-nomicStudies underthe title
‘Recollec-tions of My Career’. While much is known aboutSumitro’s roleas a cabi-netministerandpolitician,relatively lit-tleisknownabouthisroleasthepioneer ofmoderneconomicstudiesin Indone-sia,asaprolificscholarandasaforceful publicadvocateofsoundeconomic poli-cies. It is therefore fitting that this obituary fo cuses primarily on his achievements inthesetwofields.
Asthesonofapublicservantinthe higher-middle echelonsof the Nether-lands Indiesadministration, Sumitro wasabletoattendDutchschools.Onhis graduation from secondary school in 1935,hisparents,atgreatsacrifice,sent himtoRotterdamtostudyatthe
Neth-erlands Schoolof Economics(later re-nam ed the Facult y of Econo mics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam). In 1937/38 Sumitro interrupted his stud-iesinRotterdamforayear,toread phi-losophyandhistoryattheSorbonnein Paris.In1943heobtainedthedegreeof doctorofeconomicsattheNetherlands School of Economics, having success-fullydefendedhisdoctoraldissertation, HetVolkscredietwezenindeDepressie [ThePeople’sCreditServiceduringthe Depression].From1946to1950,Sumitro wasactiveasdeputychiefofmissionof theIndonesiandelegationtotheUnited Nations, advocatinginternational sup-port for Indonesia’s struggle for inde-pendence. After Dutch recognition of Indonesia’sindependenceinlate 1949, Sumitro, at the young age of 33, was appointedMinisterofTradeand Indus-try in Mohammad Natsir ’s cabinet (1950–51),andsubsequently asMinister of Finance in both theWilopo cabinet (1952–53)andBurhanuddin Harahap’s cabinet(1955–56).
In1957SumitroleftforPadang,West Sumatra, to join dissidents who had become increasingly concerned about the rising leftward bent of thecentral government andthe economic neglect of the regions. When no compromise wasreachedbetweenthecentral govern-ment and the regional dissidents, the latterproclaimedarivalgovernmentin
IN
MEMORIAM:
PROFESSOR
SUMITRO
DJOJOHADIKUSUMO,
1917–2001
TheeKianWie
TheeKianWie 174
Bukittinggi, whichtheycalledthe Revo-lutionary Governmentofthe Republic ofIndonesia(Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia,PRRI),and which SumitrojoinedasMinisterof Commu-nicationsandShipping.Thedefeatofthe PRRI rebellion in the course of 1958 forced Sumitro and his wifeand four smallchildrentogointoaself-imposed exile abroad, which lasted until 1967. Duringthisperiodheearnedhisliving asaprivateeconomicconsultantin Ma-laysia, Hong Kong, Thailand, France andSwitzerland.
In1968, Sumitro was called back to Jakarta by President Soeharto, to the surpriseof someofhis political oppo-nents,tobecomeMinister forTradein Soeharto’s first ‘developmentcabinet’. In 1973 hewas appointed Minister of StateforResearchinSoeharto’ssecond ‘developmentcabinet’, a post he held until1978.
Inlateryears,attherequestof Presi-dent Soeharto and Pandji Soeroso, knownastheFatherofPublicServants’ Cooperatives,Sumitroassumedthepost of General Chairman of the Central BoardofCooperativesofPublicServants (Induk Ko perasi Pegawai N eger i, IKPN). He also continued to provide PresidentSoehartooccasionally,andon aninformalbasis,withanassessmentof economicconditionsandproblems,and suggestions onhowtodealwiththem. Butmorethanfromhiscareeras min-isterinvariouscabinets,Sumitro’sgreat reputation and lasting legacyderived fromhisconsiderableachievementsand contributions asthefounderofmodern economicstudiesinIndonesia,asa pro-lificscholarandasatirelesspublic ad-vocate ofsoundeconomic policies.He isrightlyconsideredthepioneerof eco-nomics education inIndonesia. While economicshadalreadybeentaughtasa separatedisciplineintheSchoolofLaw inJakartasince theearly1920s,afully
fledgeduniversityeducationin econom-icscould onlybe pursuedinthe Neth-erlands during the D utch colonia l period.Becauseoffinancialconstraints only a few Indonesian studentscould pursue such an education, including MohammadHatta,Aboetari,Sarosoand SumitroDjojohadikusumo.
Recognising theneed totrain quali-fied economists whowould beable to tackle theproblemsofIndonesia’s eco-nomic reconstruction, the Dutch au-thorities in 1948 established the first SchoolofEconomicsinMakasaraspart of the University of Indonesia. Dutch professors and lecturers made up the teachingstaffofthisSchool.Atthe revo-lutionary Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, economics was initially taughtintheFacultyofLaw,mainlyby law graduates who had takencourses ineconomicsofferedattheLawSchool beforethewar.However,aftertheDutch recognitionofIndonesia’sindependence inDecember1949,aseparateFacultyof Economics wasestablished in Septem-ber1950aspartoftheUniversityof In-donesia, and became knownas FEUI. Owing to the shortage of Indonesian economists, aprofessoroflaw,thelate ProfessorSunarjoKolopaking, was ap-pointed thefirstdean ofthenewly es-tablishedFacultyofEconomics.
longer a minister after the fall of the Natsir cabinet in 1951, Sumitro ac-cededtotheirrequestonconditionthat theyhelphiminadministrativematters. Sumitro held the deanshipof FEUI duringitsformativeyearsfrom1951to 1957,andwasabletodeveloptheyoung facultyintothecountry’sleading insti-tution for the professionaltraining of economists. Althoughthe shortage of academically trainedIndonesian econo-mistswasamajorprobleminbuilding up a strong teaching staff for FEUI, Sumitrowasable,throughhispast as-sociation with theNetherlands School of Economics in Rotterdam, torecruit Dutchprofessorsandlecturerstofillthe void.Meanwhilethetrainingofanew generationofeconomists, whohadhad theirentireuniversity educationin In-donesia,proceeded apace.During the academicyearof1953/54thefirsttwo I n d o n e s i an - ed u c a ted ec o n o m i s ts graduated from FEUI, followed by four more graduates during the fol-lowingtwoyears.Apeakoutputwas reachedin 1959–60,when209 econo-mistsgraduated.
In1953SumitrofoundedtheInstitute ofEconomicandSocialResearch,which became an integral part of FEUI. This institute, which became kno wn as LPEM-FEUI,wasestablishedtoprovide facultymembersandstudentswiththe opportunity toapplyand testthe eco-nomic theories they had taught and learnedinthecoursesatFEUI. LPEM-FEUI also bec ame a ‘kitchen’ for Sumitro,tohelphiminformulating eco-nomic policies duringthe periods he servedconcurrently ascabinetminister, becauseits research capability was su-perior tothatoftheresearchoutfitsof governmentdepartments.
Two yearslater Sumitroestablished the Association of Indonesian Econo-mists(IkatanSarjanaEkonomi Indone-sia, ISEI). Under his leadership ISEI
quicklygrewintothewellregarded pro-fessionalassociation itremainstoday.
During the early years, the major problemsfacingFEUIwerebuildingup astrongteachingstaff,findingadequate accommodationforlecturerooms,and establishing alibrary.ButSumitrosoon realisedtheneedforbasicchangesinthe economicscurriculum,whichwasbased largely onthecurriculaofthe faculties of economics in theNetherlands, and thereforenotentirelyappropriate tothe specific needsofIndonesiaasa devel-opingcountry.Themajorchangesinthe curriculum ofFEUI introducedduring theacademicyearof1955/56included theelimination ofcoursesinlawatthe undergraduate level,agreater empha-sisonmacroeconomics, inplaceofthe focusonmicroeconomics thathadbeen afeatureofthe‘continental’economics curriculum,andgreaterspecialisationat thegraduatelevel.Withastronger em-phasisonappliedthanonpure econom-ics, teaching and research were to be gearedtotheproblemsofeconomic de-velopmentfacingIndonesia.Inlinewith the changesin the economics curricu-lum, theDutch system of ‘free study’ was replaced by an American-style ‘guided system ’ of study, which included the regular schedulin g of obligatoryclasswork,assignments and examinations, and the direct relation-ship of examinations to the material taughtinlectures.
TheeKianWie 176
professorsandtoprovidescholarships toenableFEUI’steachingfacultyto pur-suepostgraduate studyatLSE.During hisstudentyearsinEurope,Sumitrohad takensomecoursesatLSEandhadbeen greatlyimpressedbyHaroldLaski’s so-cialistideas.Theplantoestablishan af-filiationprogramwithLSEcouldnotbe realised, however, becausethe British Council was not able to finance the project.
Sumitrothenturnedhis attentionto theUS,eventhoughasasocialisthewas lessattractedtoAmerica’scapitalist sys-tem.Bychance,duringthistimehemet Michael Harris, Representative of the FordFoundationinIndonesia,towhom he confided his plan for an affiliation projectwiththedepartmentof econom-ics ofa goodAmericanuniversity. Re-spondingpositively,Harrisapproached the University of California (UC) at Berkeley.AsSumitroalsohappenedto know Professor Andreas Papandreou well,whoatthetimewaschairmanof theDepartmentofEconomicsthere,an agreementon the proposed affiliation projectwas quickly reached,and duly signedon19July1956.
Ingeneral,theaffiliation projectwas successfulinfillingthetemporaryvoid caused by thedeparture of theDutch professors, andinbuildingupastrong teaching stafffor FEUI.TheAmerican faculty memberswhointhelate1950s replacedtheDutchincludedProfessors Bruce G la ssburner, Leon M ears, LeonardDoyle,DonaldBlake,andtwo postgraduate students, Hans Schmitt andRalphAnspach.Inthelate1950sand early1960s,anumberofFEUI’syoung faculty members, including Widjojo Nitisastro, M oham mad Sadli, Ali Wardhana,EmilSalim,Suhadi Mangku-suwondo,J.B.SumarlinandSalehAfiff, weresenttopursuepostgraduate study ineconomicsandbusiness administra-tion at UC Berkeleyand other
Ameri-canuniversities. DuringtheNewOrder period these FEUI economists,led by Widjojo, occupied senior positions in government.
Sumitrowasconcernednotonlywith buildingupFEUIasastronginstitution of economics education and research, whichhelikedtocallthe‘JakartaSchool ofEconomics’,butalsowithspreading andstrengtheningeconomicseducation in state universities that were estab-lishedduringthisperiodinother prov-inces, particularly outside Java. FEUI itselfundertookaffiliationprojects,like that between itself and UC Berkeley, withthefledglingfacultiesof econom-icsofthesenewuniversities, including Sriwijaya University in Palembang, Andalas University in Padang, Syah Kuala University in BandaAceh,and HasanuddinUniversityinMakasar.
The smallcore ofqualified teaching staff in these new economics faculties consisted ofgraduatesfrom FEUIand the otherolderfaculties of economics, suchasthatofGadjahMadaUniversity, whohadreturnedtotheirplacesof ori-ginupongraduation. Aspartofthe af-filiation projects with the new state universities, Sumitro initiated the ‘fly-ing lecturers’ (dosen terbang) system, under which selected young faculty membersof FEUIcommutedby air to the faculties of economics in Sumatra andSulawesionaperiodicbasis,to bol-ster thecore teaching staff there.This played asignificant rolein strengthen-ing the younger economics faculties duringtheirearlyyears.
After he left government in 1978, Sumitro resumed teaching atFEUI.In the ensuing years he wrote a large numberofbooks,severalofwhichwere basedontheinsightsandknowledgehe hadgainedasacabinetminister.Three ofthese—PersoalanEkonomidiIndonesia
[Economic Problems in Indonesia];
Economics]; andEkonomiUmum:
Asas-Asas Teori dan Kebijaksanaan [General
Economics: Principles of Theory and Policy]—were intendedtoprovide the economicsstudentswithreading mate-rialrelevanttotheeconomicproblems facingIndonesia,andwereusedinhis courseonEconomicAnalysisand Pub-licPolicy.This coursewasdesignedto bridgethegapbetweeneconomic analy-sisandpublicpolicy(Djojohadikusumo 1986:32).WhileSumitrorecognisedthe importanceofanalyticaltechniques, he also thoughtit importantthat his stu-dents know their country’s economic andsocialhistory,sinceeconomic analy-sis had tobe seen ina societal frame-work.Infact,thelinkbetweengeneral economic theory and development shouldbeprovidedbyatheoryof eco-nomic dynamics,that is, the study of economicphenomenaintheirhistorical perspective andatthesametimewitha viewtowardsthefuture.Forthisreason, hesawpioneeringstudiesoneconomic growth by great economists such as Simon Kuznets and Nicholas Kaldor, which succeeded in establishing a bridge betweenthe vantage points of economistsandhistorians,asrelevantto Indonesia’scurrentdevelopmentefforts as well as to historical studies of the economy(Djojohadikusumo1993:39).
InSumitro’sview,economic develop-mententailedacontinuouseffortto rec-tifystructuralrigiditiesandimbalances, especially with regard to resource en-dowments,theallocationofproductive resources,thedistributionofwealthand income,andtheprevailinginstitutional framework.Whileinstitutions couldbe impediments to modernisation, they shouldnotbetakenasconstants.Hence, accordingtoSumitro’sstructuralist per-spective, publicpolicies should aim at changingthesetofconditionsimposed bystructuralrigiditiesandimbalances. Asastructuralistandasocialist,Sumitro
wasmuchmoreinclinedtowards gov-ernmentinterventiontotacklestructural rigidities and imbalances, rather than relying onmarketforcestosolvethese problems. Three types of inter-related operational policieshadtobepursued, namelythoseaimedatachievingmore rapid growth intermsof value added (output), at generating more employ-mentopportunities,andatsafeguarding the balance of paym ents (D jo jo -hadikusumo1986:32).Inhislater writ-ings, Sumitro continued to emphasise the importance of these three inter-relatedoperational policyobjectives. In thecontextoftheeconomicefficiencyof the social system, policies intended to maximisevalueaddedgrowthby redi-rectingtheallocationofresourcesto par-ticular industries would have to take accountoftheirimpactonemployment andthebalanceofpayments.The pur-suit ofvalueaddedgrowthwitha dis-regard for expansionof employment opportunities wastantamountto invit-ing social unrest and internalpolitical instability.Neglectofthebalanceof pay-ments would also lead Indonesiainto thebondageofinternational indebted-ness(Djojohadikusumo1985:3).
TheeKianWie 178
(Djojohadikusumo1986:36;Kirkpatrick 1989:67–8),Sumitroheldthateconomic development in the developing coun-trieswashamperedbythe monopolis-ticsystems oftheindustrialcountries. With muchagricultural activity in the developingcountriesgearedto produc-ing raw materials for the industrial countries, which also controlled the tradeandtransportoftheseraw mate-rials,anemphasisonagricultural devel-opmentwouldinSumitro’sviewmerely perpetuatetheunbalancedstructureof theeconomyandtheweakeconomic po-sitionoftheIndonesianpeople.
Hence,onlybywideningthebasisof theeconomy throughindustrialisation couldthepeople’sincomesberaised.In thefirst instance,Indonesia’s industri-alisationwouldhavetobegearedto pro-ducing consumption goods for the domestic market (which in the early 1950swasstillcharacterised byagreat scarcity ofthese goods). Industrialisa-tion would not mean replacing the agrarian base ofthe country by an in-dustrial base, however. Instead, it shouldbeseenasanimportant comple-m ent to agriculture, which would achieve a stronger andmore balanced economic structure (Djojohadikusumo 1952).Buteffortswouldalsohavetobe made to assist small farmersto move into non-farm activities, inclu ding processingandtransport,byproviding themwithbettereducation,training, vo-cationalguidance,andcooperatives to strengthen their bargaining power (Djojohadikusumo1986:35).
Sumitroalsoarguedthatduringthe earlystagesofindustrialisation thestate would have to play a pioneeringrole, bymakingdirectinvestmentsinvarious industriesandphysicalinfrastructurein order toencourageinvestmentby pri-vateenterprise. Indiscussingtheroleof foreigndirectinvestment(FDI),Sumitro took issue with Sjafruddin, who held
thatwhateverindustrialisation was be-ing undertakenwould bebetterleft to foreignfirms,asdomesticdevelopment effortswouldfirsthavetofocuson ag-riculturaldevelopment. WhileSumitro didnotreject arole forFDI,he never-thelessfeltthatpursuingaliberalpolicy towards it would merely open up the countrytothemonopolisticforcesofthe advancedcountries.Forthisreason,he believedthatindustriesofvitaland stra-tegic interest tothe countryshould be established, oratleastbecontrolled,by thestate(Djojohadikusumo1952).
Two decades later, as Minister for Research,Sumitrowasabletoactonhis longfeltconcernaboutIndonesia’s long-termdevelopment, wheninlate1973he initiated and directly superviseda na-tionalresearchprojectentitledthe‘Study onIndonesia’sLong-TermGrowth Per-spectives’. Thiswas carried outbythe NationalInstituteofEconomicand So-cial Research, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, incooperation with other re-searchinstitutes, particularly the Insti-tute of Economicand Social Research, FacultyofEconomics,Universityof In-donesia, andtheInstituteforRegional EconomicResearch,Facultyof Econom-ics,AndalasUniversity.Itsobjectivewas to obtain a perspective of the various feasiblepatternsoflong-termeconomic growth,whichcouldbeusedasabasis forformulating governmentpolicies di-rectedatleadingthenationtowardsthe goal of a just and prosperous society (Theeetal.1978:1).
(Bappenas). InSumitro’sview,forward perspectivesto,say,2000wouldbe help-ful in envisaging future preconditions fora tolerablehuman existence.These wouldprovideaneededadditional di-mensiontothe presentcontext, ensur-ing that current actions would meet futurerequirements.Conversely,current policies and programs would have longer-term ramifications that might shapethedistantfuturetoanimportant degree(Djojohadikusumo1975:211).
Sumitro heldthatintheIndonesian settingpopulationwasthesinglemost importantfactoramonga rangeof so-cialandeconomicdynamics.Population growth would bethe given realityfor therestofthe20thcenturyandbeyond, whatevertheresultsevenofvigorously pursuedpopulationpolicies.Inthis con-text two‘routes ofvariables’ pertinent toIndonesia’sfutureweretobe consid-ered.These tworouteswouldbe inter-related, each using thesame variable, namelyIndonesia’spopulationgrowth, asapointofdeparture,andtheyear2000 asa ‘terminaldate’(Djojohadikusumo 1975:211–12).
Two sets of questions pertaining to thesetworoutesemerged.Thefirstset wouldrelate tothebasicrequirements ofthepopulationin theyear2000, ex-pressed in quantitative terms of food, habitation, clothing,health,and educa-tional facilities. Without thefuture ca-pacity to provide the people with a minimumquantumofthesebasic neces-sities,socialstabilityandpolitical viabil-ity would be seriously endangered (Djojohadikusumo1975:212).The sec-ondsetofquestionswouldstemfroma view ofthe structural patternof Indo-nesia’seconomicgrowthuptotheyear 2000.Thisgrowthwouldinvolvea struc-turalshift,withabroadeningofthe eco-nomic base,which would be reflected inchangesovertimeintherelative sec-tor contributions to GDP. This would
haveimportantramifications for devel-opment,openingupgreaterpossibilities forfuture growthandforstrengthening thebalanceofpayments,butwouldalso presentproblemsfromtheviewpointof population and employment (Djojo-hadikusumo1975:222).
Despite its merits, particularly asa useful inputtotheFive-Year Develop-ment Plans, this perspective study of Indonesia’slong-term growth was ter-minatedin1978whenSumitrowas re-placedbyDrB.J.HabibieasMinisterof StateforResearchandTechnology.
TheeKianWie 180
rectifiedsoon,Sumitrowarned,thishigh protection would onlyreinforce ineffi-ciency, and the perpetuation of exces-sivelyhighcostsinimicaltotheinterests ofthelower-income groupsthat consti-tutedthelargerpartofthepopulation. Inthefinalanalysisitwouldimpedethe development ofastrongindustrialbase for Indonesia(Djojohadikusumo 1985: 4–5).Hence,inordertoraise productiv-ity and promote the efficient use of scarceresources,andtoprevent power-fulvested interestsfrom beingunduly influential, commerce and industry wouldneedtobeexposed to competi-tion,whetherfrom domesticorforeign firms(Djojohadikusumo1985:7–8).
As Indo nesia entered the 1990s, Sumitro’sworriesaboutthecourseof Indonesia’s economic development andthe proliferationof ‘rent-seeking activities’steadilyincreased.Whenin 1996 the so-called ‘national car ’ pro-gram was launched, Sumitro openly ridiculedit,statingthatitwasa trav-estyof industrialpolicy.Bythistime Sumitro had given up hope of being a bl e to p er s ua d e th e n Pr es id en t Soeharto, even in a discreet way, to adheretosoundeconomic policies.
The steep rupiah depreciation that began in 1997, and Indonesia’s subse-quenteconomic meltdown, must not have come as too great a surprise to Sumitro.Inapublicwarningpublished
in The Jakarta Post daily of 12 January
1998,Sumitroattributedthelossof pub-lic confidence to a series of what he called‘institutionaldiseases’,suchas
ex-tensive corruption, collusion between governmentofficialsandbusinessmen, government-sanctionedmonopolies, le-galuncertainty,andaweakjudicial sys-tem.Hewarnedthatgettingoutofthe crisiswouldrequireimmediateandfirm action,specificallybyattackingthese in-stitutional diseasesin a more focused manner, despite the strong resistance thatcouldbeexpectedfromvested in-terests(Djojohadikusumo1998:1).
BesideshisconcernaboutIndonesia’s protractedeconomiccrisis,Sumitrowas also distressedabout the violent reli-giousandethnicconflictsinvarious re-gionsinIndonesia,whichhadcauseda humantragedyofunimaginablescaleas hundredsofthousandsofinnocent peo-plewereforcedtofleetheirhomes.Asa person free of any religious, ethnic or racialbigotry(asreflectedbythediverse religious,ethnicandracialcomposition of his own close-knit family),he was deeply worried about the unravelling cohesionofIndonesiansociety.
REFERENCES
The discussion of Sumitro’s role as the founder of modern economic studies in Indonesiaisbasedlargelyonmaterial con-tainedinthefollowingtwopublications: Katoppo,Aristides, etal. (2000), Sumitro Djojohadikusumo:JejakPerlawananBegawan Pejuang[SumitroDjojohadikusumo:The TrailofResistanceofaChampionFighter], PustakaSinarHarapan,Jakarta;and Thee K ian Wie (1979), ‘Economics’, in
Koentjaraningrat(ed.),TheSocialSciences inIndonesia,Vol.II,IndonesianInstitute ofSciences,Jakarta:225–86.
ThediscussionofSumitro’seconomic think-ingisbasedonhisownwritings,including: Djojoha dikusum o, Sumitro (195 2), ‘Indone sie’s E conomische O pbouw: Aantekeningen opdeBeschouwing van Mr Sjafruddin Prawiranegara [Indone-sia’sEconomicDevelopment:SomeNotes onMrSjafruddinPrawiranegara’sViews], inNieuwsgierdaily,17–22March.
______ (1975),‘Indonesia towards the Year
2000’,EconomicsandFinanceinIndonesia
XXIII(3):211–60.
______ (1985),Added Value, Productive
Em-ployment,Balance ofPayments:A Re-minderofGroundRules,Commencement Addresstothe IndonesianInstitute for Management Development at thefirst
graduation ceremony of itsMBA Pro-gram,Jakarta,22August.
______ (1986),‘Recollections of My Career’,
BulletinofIndonesianEconomicStudies22 (3):27–39.
______ (1993), ‘AnEconomist’sApproach to
Historical Perspectives: Some Random Thoughts’,Keynoteaddressdeliveredat theFirstConferenceonIndonesia’s Mod-ern Economic History(1815–1990), Ja-k arta, and publis hed in J. Thom as Lindblad(ed.),NewChallengesinthe Mod-ern Economic History of Indonesia, Pro-gramme of Indonesian Studies (PRIS), Leiden:37–46.
______ (1998), ‘Backsliding on Reforms Can
Cause Depression’, TheJakarta Post,12 January:1.
Otherreferencesinthetextareto:
