T
HEORY
: A R
EPLY
GRANTMICHELSON ANDMARKWESTCOTT*
C
onstructive discussion and debate about matters of theory in any field or discipline is a healthy sign. We therefore welcome the response by Braham Dabscheck to our paper (Michelson & Westcott 2001) which critiqued his general theory of (Australian) industrial relations or ‘orbits’ theory (see Dabscheck 1994, 1995). Our point of departure in writing the paper was to ask why, in spite of more recent interest in matters of a theoretical nature, had Dabscheck’s theory received so little public interest among, and commentary from, the aca-demic community. We concluded that the apparent intellectual indifference stemmed from the theory’s inability to provide new insights and understanding. A detailed analysis revealed that there were a number of shortcomings with the theory. These included the way in which the theory was constructed, problems with its underlying assumptions including the exaggeration of agency, the purpose of, and privilege ascribed to, ‘authority’, the equivocal distinction between ‘orbits’ and ‘interactors’, and the wholly descriptive nature of its empir-ical predictions.We were also interested in trying to account for why the theory had appeared when it had, believing that ‘history does matter’. Here we spent a not inconsider-able part of the paper (see Michelson & Westcott 2001: 309–317) tracing Dabscheck’s intellectual journey in the area of theory over the last 20 or so years. The historical expedition was fruitful because it revealed significant stages of con-ceptual development which pointed to the general theory. Moreover, it high-lighted the close relationship between changes in national industrial relations in Australia and how Dabscheck had sought to explain these changes. To claim, as he does, that the general theory ‘occurred by happenstance’, is unconvincing. In fact, this claim contradicts an earlier point where he notes ‘it is difficult to know how I, or anyone else for that matter, could not be influenced by Australian empirics’. By regularly modifying his theoretical explanations in light of the suc-cessive industrial relations changes observed, a pattern emerges which suggests that Dabscheck considers ‘good’ theory to be ahistorical. Perhaps this is one of the ‘crimes’ he confesses to having committed? One widely understood measure of ‘good’ theory is its ability to endure over time, irrespective of changes to the key phenomena of interest.
Before progressing we need to make one final point. Dabscheck is perturbed that we have not used more of his work in our analysis of his intellectual jour-ney. Specifically, he notes his Industrial Relations in Australiatext co-authored with
John Niland (1981), and research monograph, Arbitrator at Work (1983) are absent. From our reading, it is the latter omission which causes the most con-sternation so we will focus on this only. Our decision to omit Arbitrator at Work was a conscious one. As noted above, we sought to identify Dabscheck’s key con-ceptual pieces. We did in fact discuss an earlier article which actually provided the basis of chapter 1 of Arbitrator at Work(see Dabscheck 1981). It was more important for our purposes to examine when this particular line of thought first appeared, not when it was subsequently tested in the person of Sir William Raymond Kelly.
It was not our intention in Heading into Orbit? to offer an alternative; this brief was clearly beyond the purview of our immediate task of exposing the weaknesses of the general theory of (Australian) industrial relations. Dabscheck asserts that we have misrepresented him and ‘failed to understand various aspects of [his] work’. We respectfully disagree with Dabscheck on these issues and stand by our original analysis of his general theory.
Together with Dabscheck, we also share a concern with theoretical rigour of industrial relations analyses. What, then, is the general basis of our disagreement? Perhaps our major concern with Dabscheck’s general theory is the manner in which it conflates theory as a means of explaining social phenomena, and theory as a mechanism for defining a discipline. We clearly see the importance of the former but are less concerned about the latter. Indeed we would argue that to achieve the latter is to compromise the former. Clearly Dabscheck disagrees with this view. As we have shown, Somers (1969) warns of the dangers of developing a general theory (or a general conceptual framework). As Dabscheck points out, Somers contends that developing a general conceptual framework helps ensure ‘the survival of industrial relations as a separate discipline and its growth as a respectable field . . .’ Dabscheck conflates theories of industrial relations and theories inindustrial relations. A concern with the lack of theoretical rigour explaining social phenomena (that is, the lack of theories in industrial relations) is not the same as a concern about the lack of a general framework or theory that defines the discipline.
empirical investigation. The “activities at work” incorporated in the General Theoryare those that pertain to authority struggles’. Putting aside the a priori nature of identifying empirically those activities that pertain to authority struggles, this statement suggests to us that Dabscheck believes that there are industrial relations activities that can somehow be cordoned off from other social activities and consequently studied in isolation. While the concept of ‘interactors’ is broad, the scope of their (empirically defined) industrial relations activities pro-vides a boundary to the discipline.
For us, industrial relations activities cannot be adequately explained within these constraints. We take just two of Dabscheck’s proposed interactors to illustrate the point. In order to understand unions’ activities with respect to women’s groups it is necessary to understand gender roles more generally. As many writers have previously noted, ‘gender’ is a socially constructed variable. While the industrial relations activities of unions and women can be observed in order to understand these activities, there must be some reference to the domestic sphere, which arguably lies outside Dabscheck’s analysis (for a discussion of the impact of domes-tic work and family responsibilities on womens’ activism in unions, see Pocock 1995). While this is but one example, it does illustrate the problem of ‘fencing off’ a particular set of social relations. This leads us on to the related issue that the general theory simply does not further our understanding of industrial rela-tions phenomena.
The industrial relations activities of interactors is characterised by the ‘struggle for authority’. Putting to one side direct questions of cohesion and con-flict (although it appears that Dabscheck has missed our original point on both issues), Dabscheck presents an open system whereby all interactors are motivated by the same struggle for authority. We continue to ask: why do interactors struggle for authority? The answer to this seems to be––in order to achieve their interests. We then logically pose the question: but what are their interests? These, like the ‘various equilibriawhich result from (authority) struggles’, seem to be empirically identified. This is where the explanatory value of the theory falls down. Dabscheck presents an a priori statement for the motivation of his interactors but does not tie this to any systematic or structurally based group of interests that are empirically identifiable. The struggle for authority remains a constant in the context of changing interactors with changing interests operating in different orbits creating and destroying equilibria. For us this does not help us answer the ‘why’ questions.
1995: 17). But what is ‘the whole’ when it comes to industrial relations? Indeed, the general theory seems to say nothing that is exclusive to, or about, industrial relations as an area of intellectual study (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). For instance, one could presumably posit that human resource management––or its earlier variants––also comprise n interactors which interact in orbits of interaction. This theoretical obfuscation is unfortunate. We need to use constructs which are not historically or contextually bounded (if this is possible, see the following sen-tence) to more clearly define and articulate the terrain of industrial relations. We are cognisant that there may be significant differences in the various scholarships both within and between English-speaking and non-English-speaking countries. However, this does not negate the central task.
While ‘industrial relations’ implies the existence of a relationship (typically believed to be the worker-employer relationship), what are the fundamental con-structs that make up industrial relations? We acknowledge that there will be dif-ferences of opinion here, particularly as academic industrial relations rests heavily on its interdisciplinarity. Therefore, to advance the debate we draw briefly on the research of Giles (2000) and Fells (2001) to highlight what may be one more worthwhile theoretical path ‘through the mush which is industrial relations’. Of course, our overarching interest remains that of seeking out better explanations for the phenomena we observe.
Instead of focusing exclusively on the institutions of industrial relations or main-taining an obsession with formal labour-management relations (the decline of which, including trade unions and collective bargaining processes, has meant the demise of academic industrial relations according to some), we suggest one alter-native based around the notion of ‘work’. While arguably operating within dif-ferent paradigms, both Giles and Fells nonetheless point to the possibilities of drawing on ‘work’ and ‘work relations’ to provide a distinctive industrial rela-tions focus. They believe that such a focus may encourage scholars to engage in more thorough investigations of their major analytical categories. Specifically, this might allow more reflection on such themes as work goals including effi-ciency, productivity and fairness, the regulation of work, mobilisation, power and the control of work. It may also help overcome the high level of national speci-ficity or ethnocentrism that much industrial relations research currently exhibits (see Giles 2000: 62–6; Fells 2001).1
NOTE
1. In this context too, it will be necessary to examine unpaid as well as paid work (see Forrest 1998).
REFERENCES
Dabscheck B (1981) Theories of regulation and Australian industrial relations. Journal of Industrial Relations23(4), 430–446.
Dabscheck B (1994) A general theory of (Australian) industrial relations. Journal of Industrial Relations
36(1), 3–17.
Dabscheck B (1995) The Struggle for Australian Industrial Relations. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Fells R (2001) Industrial relations as an enduring contradiction. Paper presented to the Future Directions of Industrial Relations as a Field of Inquiry symposium, University of Sydney, 14 September.
Forrest A (1998) The industrial relations significance of unpaid work. Labour/Le Travail42, 199–225. Giles A (2000) Industrial relations at the millennium: Beyond employment? Labour/Le Travail46,
37–67.
Michelson G, Westcott M (2001) Heading into orbit? Braham Dabscheck and industrial relations theory. Journal of Industrial Relations43(3), 308–329.
Pocock B (1995) Gender and activism in Australian unions. Journal of Industrial Relations37(3), 377–400.
