Semlit 9 – The translation of accrual accounting and budgeting and the reconfiguration – Bungsu M

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The

translation

of

accrual

accounting

and

budgeting

and

the

reconﬁguration

of

public

sector

accountants’

identities

Sebastian

D. Becker

a,

_*,

_Tobias

_Jagalla

b

_,

_Peter

_Skærbæk

c,d

a_HEC_Paris,_Department_of_Accounting_and_Control,₁_rue_de_la_{Libe´ration,}₇₈₃₅₁_Jouy_en_Josas,_France

b_WHU_–_Otto_Beisheim_School_of_Management,_Institute_of_Management_Accounting_and_Control_(IMC),_Burgplatz_2,₅₆₁₇₉_Vallendar,

Germany

c_Copenhagen_Business_School,_Department_of_Accounting_and_Auditing,_Solbjerg_Plads_3,₂₀₀₀_{Frederiksberg,}_Denmark

d_Trondheim_Business_School,_{Jonsvannsveien}_82,₇₀₅₀_Trondheim,_Norway

1. Introduction

‘‘OurcashaccountinggoesbacktoorganisationalprinciplesofthePrussianState.[...]Itwastailor-madeforthepublic sectorandhasworkedforcenturies.Itisasuccessfulmodelinthepublicsector.[...]AsBeamte[i.e.Germanforcivil servants]wehaveallswornanoaththatwewillserveforthegoodofthenationandthatwewillhonourjusticeand law.Wewillthereforesupportthenewsystem.[...][However],thereisacertainscepticismamongmyselfandmy colleagues.’’(PSA-5)

ARTICLE INFO

Articlehistory:

Availableonline25May2013

Keywords:

NewPublicManagement Publicsector

Identity

Accrualaccountingandbudgeting Actor-Network-Theory

Motscle´s:

Secteurpublic

Nouvellegestionpublique

Palabrasclave:

SectorPu´blico NuevaGestio´nPu´blica

ABSTRACT

UndertheumbrellaofNewPublicManagement(NPM)andmanagerialism,thelastthree decadeshaveseenawidespreadtransformationofpublicsectoraccountingandbudgeting fromacashtoanaccrualbasis.Muchoftheensuingresearch,however,hasfocusedmore ontechnicalevaluationsoftheseprogrammesandlessoninformingourknowledgeofthe interactionbetweensuchprogrammesandaccountants. Aspublicsector accountants (PSAs)arecentralentitiesinsuchprogrammes,thepurposeofthispaperistofocusonthe reconﬁgurationoftheiridentities.UsingthetheoreticallensofActor-Network-Theory (ANT)anditsconceptoftranslation,thisstudyseekstoexplainhowPSAs’identitieswere transformedthroughtheintroductionofAccrualOutput-BasedBudgeting(AOBB)intwo German states.Our analysis showsthatthechangeof accountingregime was nota straightforwardone, but ratherinvolvedthat accountantsfaced particularchallenges respondingtoseveralinteressementdevicesthatwereusedtoenrolthemintothenew practices. We link this behaviour to a Weberian facet of the PSAs’ identity, which preventedseriousprojectstagnancyand‘strategiesoftotalresistance’,butalsoprecluded manyaccountantsfromenrollingeasilyintoAOBB,orevendevelopingenthusiasm.The papersuggeststhatseveralgroupsofaccountants,ratherthanone,experienceddifferent challenges in aligning with AOBB and that each assumed their compromises and investmentsindevelopingwithaccrualaccounting.

ß₂₀₁₃_Elsevier_Ltd._All_rights_reserved.

*Correspondingauthor.

E-mailaddresses:becker@hec.fr(S.D.Becker),Tobias.Jagalla@whu.edu(T.Jagalla),ps.acc@cbs.dk(P.Skærbæk).

ContentslistsavailableatSciVerseScienceDirect

Critical

Perspectives

on

Accounting

j our na l h ome p a ge : w ww . e l se v i e r . com / l oc a te / c pa

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TheabovethoughtswereexpressedinaninterviewwithaPSAwhohasworkedwithAOBB1_for_several_years_and_they

indicatethatreﬂectionsonhisoccupationaltraditionmakeithardtofullyacceptit.

TakingtheperspectiveofindividualPSAs,wecontributetotheliteratureonAOBBwhichreﬂectsacontroversialdebate. SeveralauthorsarguethatthetrackrecordofAOBBimplementationslagsbehindexpectations(e.g.Lapsley,2009),and others,suchasCarlin(2005)andGrootandBudding(2008),raiseatechnicaldebateabouttheprosandconsofAOBB comparedtocash-basedaccountingandbudgeting.LapsleyandPallot(2000),likeCacciaandSteccolini(2006),Horton (2006),andGuthrie(1998),questiontheunderlyingreasonsforthereformsandpointtoalimitedimpactofthereformin practice.However,howthereformposesachallengeforPSAshasnotbeenmuchexplored,norsufﬁcientlyunderstood.

Giventhispaucityofpriorresearch,wefollowanactor-centricviewinordertoenhanceourknowledgeoftheinteraction betweenAOBBandPSAsandseektodiscovercommonidentitypatternsamongkeyaccountingemployees.Tothisend,we borrowfromCallon’s(1986)workonthesociologyoftranslationtoanalysetheintroductionofAOBBintwoGermanstates, whichallowsustoexaminetheeffectsofthenewaccountingandbudgetingideasonaccountants’identities.Weplace particularemphasisonpracticingaccountantsandhowtheiridentitieswerefunnelled–sometimesquiteproblematically– throughtheobligatorypassagepoint(OPP)ofAOBBasitwasimplemented.Ourﬁndingsfromthetwostatesillustratethat PSAsarenotoneentitythatreactshomogeneouslytothereform,butratherthattheyconsistoffourdifferentgroupswhich varyaccordingtotheirreactionstowardsAOBB.Wefurtherdemonstratethatthesegroupshavedifferentcharacteristicsand thattheirageandpracticalexperiencewithAOBBareconditionsofthereconﬁgurationoftheiridentities.Throughour comparativeanalysisofthetwosites,wearefurtherabletodiscusstheroleofdevicesinsecuringtheenrolmentofPSAsinto AOBBandoutlinehowthesedependonthecomplexityandthetrajectoryofeachstate’sreformproject.

Thepaperisorganisedasfollows.Inthenextsection,wereviewtheliteratureonAOBBimplementations,lookatprevious studiesthattakeanidentityviewonNPMwhichmotivateourstudyofPSAs’identities,andpresentthechosentheoretical framework.Thethirdsectiondescribesourresearchmethod,andthefourthstructurestheﬁndingsofourempiricalstudy accordingtothefourmomentsoftranslation.Theﬁfthsectionoffersadiscussion,whilethesixthsectionconcludesthe paper.

2. Identityandpublicsectoraccountingreforms

ResearchexploringaspectsofAOBBreformshasbeenongoingforseveraldecades,andmanypublicationshavebeen dedicatedsolelytosummarisingthisdiscourse(e.g.BroadbentandGuthrie,2008).Empiricalresearchexploreswhatfactors facilitateorhindertheintroductionofAOBB(e.g.Anessi-PessinaandSteccolini,2007)andanalysethedegreetowhichthe expectationsofitseffectshavesofarmaterialisedinpractice(e.g.GrootandBudding,2008;Koberetal.,2010).Somestudies findthatthebenefitsofintroducingAOBBareratherunclearfortheaffectedemployeesandthatthenewinformationis neitherusednordesiredinpractice(e.g.ConnollyandHyndman,2006;JonesandPuglisi,1997).Otherstudiesarguethatthe usefulnessofaccrualaccountingtechniquesdependsontheusergroupsandtheirroles(e.g.Koberetal.,2010;Paulsson, 2006).Whilemostofthisliteraturedoesnotpinpointwhysuchviewsoccur,itdiscoversfurtherthatthereformentails various downsides,suchas intenseworkandmassivecost (Ezzamelet al.,2013;Connollyand Hyndman,2006). This resonateswithstudiesthatshowthatimplementationsofaccrualaccountingtechniquesareoftendifficult(e.g.Carlinand Guthrie,2003;Guthrie,1998)andthattheenvisagedeffectsofreformareonlyrealisedinpartornotatall(Ezzameletal., 2013;ConnollyandHyndman,2006;Mellett,1997,2002).Insum,researchoftenconcludesthat‘‘notmuchenthusiasm... [is]foundinfavourofaccrualaccounting’’(GrootandBudding,2008,p.10;similarlyLiguorietal.,2012).Thereasonsfor suchoutcomes,however,remainsomewhatunclear;i.e.questionssuchasWhyisacceptancelow?orWhyistheinformation notused?arerarelyanswered.Inlightoftheseresultsandtheperceivedpressingneedtoreformthepublicsector,thequest forthebestpublicsectoraccountingmethodisongoing.Whilethediscussioncontinuestobecontroversial,weassume–asa startingpoint–thatAOBBdoesnotintegrateintopublicorganisationsassmoothlyasexpected.

Againstthisbackground,intheaccountingliterature‘‘littleattentionhasbeenpaid[...]totherepercussionsarisingfrom the shapingand reshaping of identities’’(Skærbæk and Thorbjørnsen, 2007, p. 247; Haynes,2006)for organisational members.Fortheprivatesector,someresearchhasexploredtheidentityofmanagementaccountants(e.g.Ahrensand Chapman,2000)orpublicaccountants(e.g.GendronandSpira,2010).Givenitsfundamentalchangesinrecentyearsandthe traditionallystrong presenceofoccupationalgroups,identitytransformation isespeciallyrelevantin thepublicsector (ThomasandDavies,2005),whichisalsoreﬂectedinacademicinterest:Certainstudiesexaminehowreformsunderthe umbrellaofNPMwithitsshifttowards‘‘accountingization’’(PowerandLaughlin,1992)orbusiness-likeattitudes(TerBogt, 2008)haveaffectedtheidentityofindividualsinthepublicsector.Infact,somecommentatorsevenidentifythedeliberate reductionofautonomyasacentraltenetofNPMingeneral(BroadbentandLaughlin,1998;Hood,1995)andofaccounting systemsinparticular(AbernethyandStoelwinder,1995),orNPMasan‘‘identityproject’’aimingatreconﬁguringpublic sectoremployees’identities(DuGay,1996a,1996b).

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Indevelopingourstudy,wedrawonANTanditsdefinitionofidentity.Inthisapproach,identitiesareseentobein continuous‘‘translation’’andchange(Callon,1986,1998).Consequently,alsothearrivalofAOBBinPSAworkplacesleadsto areconfigurationofaccountants’identities.PSAs’occupationalidentityissubstantiallyinfluencedbythechangefromthe rathersimplecash-basedaccountingandbudgetingtothemorecomplexAOBB,whichbecomesthenewmainprinciplePSAs workwithonadailybasis.Inasimilarway,SkærbækandThorbjørnsen(2007)mobiliseANTwhenstudyingtheinterplay betweenDanishDefenceofficers’identity anda newperformancemeasurementsystem.ANThelpsthem identifythe troublestheofficershadwiththeiremergingidentityasmanagers,havingtoperformaccountingtaskswhichresultedin unexpectedadditionaleffortsbythechangeagentsinordertomaketheirenrolmentatleastsomehowpossible.Asweare alsointerestedintheinterplaybetween theprogrammeofAOBBandtheidentitiesofaccountants,wemobiliseANT’s definitionofidentity,whichemphasisesadynamicnatureandcontinuouschange:

‘‘In short, the actor’s[...] objectives, interests, will and thus identity are caught up in a process of continual reconﬁguration,aprocessthatisintimatelyrelatedtotheconstantreconﬁgurationofthenetworkofinteractionsin whichheorsheisinvolved.’’(Callon,1998,p.253)

InoperationalisingourexaminationofthetranslationprocessesofAOBBintwoGermanstates,wedrawuponCallon’s (1986) four moments of translation (problematization, interessement, enrolment, and mobilisation) to understand the dynamicsincurred when shapingthe PSAs’ identities.In examiningtheemerging identity of PSAs, i.e. theroles and responsibilitiesthathavebeendefinedasaresultofAOBB,themomentofproblematizationisdrawnupon.Problematization helpsexaminethesetofactorsoralliesthatemergesoutofanetworkconstructionandimpliesan‘‘interdefinitionofactors’’ (Callon,1986,p.204)involvingallsortsofrhetoricinconvincingtheentitiesoftherelevanceoftheOPP.AnOPPisanycore ideaorprogrammelikeAOBBtowhichtheactorsarerelated,asinourcasePSAs.Interessementdescribesagroupofactions thatacertainentityexertsinattemptstobringtheidentitiesdefinedintheproblematizationphasetolife.Itisinthis momentthatdevicesarebuiltandplacedbetweentherelatedsetofactorsinordertostabiliseor‘‘lockin’’theactor’s performanceoftheroleandresponsibilitiesdefinedontheirbehalf.Examplesofthesedevicesareanythingthatconfines actorssuchassystems,meetingswithcertainagendas,statisticalgraphs(Callon,1986),trainings,andpromotionsbutalso someoneelse,suchasconsultants,whoprovidematerial(e.g.powerpointsandguidelines)ornon-materialinstructionson howtocarryoutcertaintasksandwhy.Enrolmentiscloselylinkedtothelatterinthatitdescribesthefurtheractionsof interessementthatsecuresuccessfulenrolment,forinstanceofPSAsintoAOBB:

‘‘Todescribeenrolmentisthustodescribethegroupofmultilateralnegotiations,trialsofstrengthandtricksthat accompanytheinteressementsandenablethemtosucceed.’’(Callon,1986,p.211)

Uneasyenrolmentisfrequentlyaccompaniedbycompromisingandreﬁnedinteressementmeaningthatifchangeagents donotexperiencesufﬁcientenrolment,furtherinteressementdevicesarerequired,forinstanceadditionalguidanceor traininginnewjobtasks,asasortofcompromise.Thefourthmoment,mobilisation,buildsonthefactthatinnetworks,itis oftenafewrepresentativeswhospeakforandthusrepresentthe‘‘masses’’(Callon,1986,p.214),anditcomprisesthose methods that help actors ensure this representativeness. So, where initially problematization described ‘‘negotiable hypothesesonidentity,relationshipsandgoals’’(Callon,1986,p.218),mobilisationdescribesamorestableandconstraining networkinwhichtherepresentedmasses,likethePSAs,agreewithandaccepttheirspokespersonsaschangeagents.Inthis way,mobilisationisaboutexaminingfailureandcontroversyovertherepresentativityofthechangeagents,butisalsoan examinationof whether actorsdevelop intoactive supportersoftheprogramme, and theconditions thatallow such mobilisationtoeventuallytakeplace.AsthisshortsummaryofCallon’s(1986)ideashasshown,questionsofidentityare partandparceloftranslationprocesses:

‘‘Scienceandtechnology[i.e.accountingchange]aredramatic‘stories’inwhichtheidentityoftheactorsisoneofthe issuesathand.Theobserverwhodisregardstheseuncertaintiesriskswritingaslantedstorywhichignoresthefact thattheidentitiesofactorsareproblematic’’(Callon,1986,p.199;similarlyMunro,2009).

Inreality,theorderingandshapeofthefourmomentsislessorganisedandmessierthantheirchronologicaldescription maysuggesthere,andthusthemomentsmayalsooverlap.Forexample,asAOBBdevelops,newunexpectedevents,like obviouslywrongdatabeingissuedbytheaccountingsystem,mayhappenanddisturbtheenrolmentofthePSAs.Mobilising thisframeworkwithitsfocusonidentity,itisthepurposeofthisstudytodepictthedynamicprocessesofhowPSAs’ identitiesarenegotiatedanddelimited,thusmovingfromanuncertainanddisputableidentitytoamoreestablishedstate (Callon,1986).Consequently,weposethefollowingresearchquestion:Howdidthedevicesinvolvedintheintroductionof AOBBreconﬁgurePSAs’identities?

3. Researchmethod

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statesstartedfromasimilarinitialposition(seeSection4.1e.g.regardingtheoverallpoliticalenvironmentandsimilar habitualmindsetswithinadministration)andhadsimilarprojectaims(seeSection4.2e.g.toachieveamoreefﬁcientuseof resourcesandanincreasedserviceorientation)thetwostatesdifferedintheirchangetrajectories(Latour,1988).Regarding thecomponentsofitstrajectory(PollittandBouckaert,2011),anddiametricaltoHamburg,Hesseﬁrstfocusedonchanging thebudgetingprocessandonlyinasecondstepcreatedanopeningbalancesheet.Concerningtheprocessofimplementation (PollittandBouckaert,2011),Hessewasmorerigidandstrictinthetoneofitsprojectcommunicationandingeneralallowed lessdeviationsfromaonceadoptedpaththanHamburg.GiventhatHesseandHamburgofferlargesimilaritiesbutatthe sametimedifferedamongvariousdimensionswhicharerelevantforourtheoreticalinterestinthedataasregardsthe translationofPSAsidentitiesandthedifferentchoicesandeffectsofinteressementdevicestherein,weseethesetwostates wellsuitedforacomparativestudy.

TounderstandthereconfigurationofPSAs’identities,webuildontwodifferentsources.First,ourresearchreliesheavily onofficialdocuments(e.g.parliamentaryresolutions,reportsinformingthepublic)andarchivalsources(e.g.specificationof newaccountingrules,projectconcepts,guidelines)presentedtotheaccountantsinordertooutlinetheirresponsibilities whenperformingAOBBtasks.Second,weconducted36semi-structuredinterviewsfromearlyJanuary2007untillate February2009,aimedatreconstructingtheoverallprocessesoftranslation(seeTable1forasummary).Wemetwiththe intervieweesatatimewhenthecoreelementsofthenewsystemshadbeenimplemented,butintheirentiretyhadonly recentlybeencompletedorwerecompletedduringourpresenceinthefield.Giventhelongchangeprocessesandthefact thatsomeimportantelementsofthereformprojecthadbeenimplementedveryearlyintheprocess,theinterviewees thereforehadyearsofexposuretothenewsystembutwerenotyetfullyaccustomedtoit.23PSAswereinterviewedwith the objectiveof obtaining knowledgeabout their identity transformation. The interviewees wereeither employedin ministriesotherthanthefinanceministry,oratlowerlevelsinnon-ministrydomains(e.g.headofuniversitybudgeting). ThesePSAsaregenerallynotpartoftheprojectgroupthatcentrallydevelopsandrollsouttheAOBBconcepts.Theyare confrontedwiththenewdevicesandaskedtointegratethemintotheirworkandintotheirorganisation.Ourinterviews weresemi-structuredandrevolvedaroundquestionsregardingtheinterviewees’education,theirtenureatcurrentand previousemployers,thechangesAOBBcausedforthemandtheirco-workers,andhowtheyperceivedtheimplementation andeffectsofAOBB-relateddevices.Allinterviewsconductedweretranscribed.Thereafter,asynopsiswaswrittenforeach intervieweeinordertoobtainasynthesisedviewontheinterviewees’reflections.Thereafter,weworkedbackandforth betweentheempiricaldataandthetheory(AhrensandChapman,2006)whichwasaimedatreconstructingtheoverall processoftranslationaswellastheroleofthedifferentactorsanddeviceswithaparticularfocusontheinterviewees’ narrativesandhowtheyexperiencedtheirproblemswithidentitytransformations.Basedonourtranscriptsandtheactors’ demographicdata,Table2wascreated,whichprovidesanoverviewoftheindividualPSAswemet.Wealsoconducted interviewswithsixAOBBprojectgroupmemberswhowerepredominantlyemployedatthefinanceministryandwere responsible for designing, implementing, and promoting AOBB. We included their views becausethey designed and implementedAOBB(interessement)andpreparedandinstalledsubsequentdevicestofurtherconvincePSAsincaseof controversy(enrolment).Finally,wealsointerviewedsevenpoliticians,asthisgroupwasanimportantactorinthedecision tolaunchthereformproject.Politiciansmaymainlygivetheirviewsontheinitialphases(problematization,i.e.definingthe actorsnecessaryfortheprojectandtheiridentities,butalsointeressement)ofthechangeprocessaswellasoutlinethe expectedandachievedchangeswithinadministrationthroughAOBB.Alsotheinterviewswiththeprojectgroupmembers andthepoliticiansweresemi-structuredandweusedthesamemethodsasreportedaboveinanalysingthese.

4. ReconfigurationsofPSAidentitiesduringthetranslationofAOBB

In this section,the collected and synthesised empirical material is presented in accordance with Callon’s (1986) overlappingphasesofproblematization,interessement,enrolment,andmobilisationasoutlinedabove.Wereportonthe AOBBimplementationprojectsforbothstatestogetherandemphasisethedifferencesandsimilaritiesbetweenthem.We beginwithanoutlineofthemajorelementsaffectingthePSAs’identitybeforethereform.

4.1. ThesituationbeforetheintroductionofAOBB

TounderstandtheeffectsthattheAOBBtranslationshaveontheidentitiesofourinterviewees,wetakenoteofthefact thatinGermany,thepublicsectorissaidtobemovingfromWeberiantoneo-Weberianidealsofbureaucracy(e.g.Pollittand Bouckaert,2011).AnothernoteworthyGermanpeculiarityisthespecialkindofpublicsectoremployment(Beamte),which

Table1

Overviewofrespondentsinterviewed.

Function Hesse Hamburg Total

PSA 12 11 23

AOBBprojectgroup 2 4 6

Politician 2 5 7

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establishesalife-longrelationshipbetweenthestateandtheemployeeaswellasprovidesstatusprotection.Theresulting

Beamtenethosembodies values suchasimpartiality, neutrality,and a strong senseofduty. Further, thetradition of a

Rechtsstaatimpliesarigidhierarchywithgovernancethroughdirectives(Weisungsprinzip)aswellasanadministrationthat functionssolelyonthebasisoflaws(Legalita¨tsprinzip),whichrequiresastronglegalfocusinthetrainingsystem(Derlien, 2003).

Inthisenvironment,thereisprobablynootherentitywhoseidentitywasinﬂuencedmorebycash-basedaccountingand budgetingthanPSAs,asithadbeenthecentralinstrumentoftheirworkplaceforalongtime:Inthecash-basedaccounting andbudgetingworld,thePSAs’mainresponsibilitywasensuringthatthebudgetsapprovedbyparliamentweresetup properly,andthatvarianceanalyseswerecompleteandcorrect.Thus,thePSAs’coreactivitiesinthetraditionalsetupwere centredondocumentingthebudgetbeforeapprovalandreportingactuals.Thebudgetwasorganisedperministryin so-calledEinzelpla¨nen.EachEinzelplancontainedabout500pagesandbrokeupplannedspendingbychapter(Kapitel),title (Titel),andnumber(Nummer),withnoreportingontheoutputoftherespectiveorganisations.Insettingupthebudget,the PSAs’maintaskwastocollectallthepositionsandensurethattheywerecorrectlyenteredintothebudget.Similarly,inthe expenditureaccounting,individualexpenseshadtobebookedtotherespectivepositions(Einzelplan/Kapitel/Titel/Nummer) in orderto allowmonitoring of budget overruns.A prevailing Weberianhabitual mindset let thePSAs’ occupational identitiesbedominatedbytheobjectiveofexecutinginstructions:GoodPSAperformanceimpliedfollowingtherulestothe letter.Giventhiscontext,therewaslittleroomforindividualdecision-makingorempoweredthinking:

‘‘Beforetheintroductionof AOBB,allstaff costswerechargedtoone bigbudgetpot.Itwasimportantthat we submittedallaccountingrecordsbeforethecutoffdateandthattherewerenotyposoromissionsintherecords.[...] Nowthepublicmanagersandweassumecommercialresponsibilityfortheindividualpositionsofthepotanddiscuss alotwhethercertainstaffcostsareneededorallocatedcorrectly.’’(PSA-11)

Accordingtotheinterviewsweconductedinbothstates,thishabitualmindsetwassharedandacceptedbythemajority ofPSAs,whodidnotperceivemuchneedforchange.Asamajorargumentofourpaper,wewilldemonstrateinthefollowing sectionshowthismindsetwasinﬂuencedthroughtheintroductionofanewpractice.

Tofacilitateunderstandingofthebroadersettingofthesechanges,wewouldliketooutlineseveralGermanpeculiarities regardingPSAs’educationandtraining.Theexchangebetweenthepublicandprivatesectorjobmarketsisverylimitedin Germany.Ingeneral,fornon-managementjobs,workinginpublicadministrationisalifetimechoicethatusuallystartswith athree-yearperiodof‘generaladministrationtraining’(AusbildungzumVerwaltungsfachangestellten),whichincludesbasic accountingtrainingasoneoutof14modules.Forourstudy,allaccountantswhounderwentsuchtrainingwereclassiﬁedas ‘trainedinhouse’.Formanagementjobs(Ho¨hererDienst),auniversitydegreeisrequired,butthisdegreedoesnothavetobe inaparticularsubject.Suchemployeesmay,butdonothaveto,be‘trainedinhouse’.Inourstudyeveryonewhodidnoteven

Table2

2 Hesse 50 2 20 8 Yes Pol.science,law,business Yes Yes

3 Hesse 50 6 20 20 Yes Teaching,publicadmin. No No

4 Hesse 60 20 41 41 No – Yes No

5 Hesse 40 6 15 15 Yes Agriculturaleconomics,PhD Yes No

6 Hesse 65 30 38 38 Yes Business,PhD Yes No

7 Hesse 55 0 33 33 No – Yes No

8 Hesse 40 4 20 20 No – Yes No

9 Hesse 40 8 14 14 Yes Foresteconomics,PhD No No

10 Hesse 55 14 30 25 Yes Business No Yes

11 Hesse 35 10 15 15 No – Yes No

12 Hesse 60 24 30 30 Yes Law,PhD No No

13 Hamburg 50 6 20 20 Yes Law No No

14 Hamburg 40 2 20 20 Yes Pol.science,law,economics Yes No

15 Hamburg 30 4 4 4 Yes Business(FH) Yes No

16 Hamburg 45 10 20 20 Yes Socialeconomics No No

17 Hamburg 60 10 38 34 No – Yes Yes

18 Hamburg 55 12 35 35 No – Yes No

19 Hamburg 45 6 20 20 Yes Economics,PhD Yes No

22 Hamburg 60 2 40 30 No – No Yes

23 Hamburg 60 2 40 2 Yes Business No Yes

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undergo‘generaladministrationtraining’wasclassifiedas‘poorlyqualified’,whilePSAswithformaluniversitydegreesin e.g.economicsorbusinesswouldbeclassifiedas‘well-trained’.NoneofthePSAsinterviewedwasacharteredaccountantor thelike.

Asoutlinedabove,abouttwodecadesagoitwaswidelydebatedacrosstheglobe whetherandhowprivate sector ﬁnancialmanagementinstrumentsshouldbeimplementedinthepublicsector(Hood,1995;OsborneandGaebler,1992). AlsoinGermany,theNPM-programmereceivedattention,andthisledtoaparticularGermanvariantofNPMnamedNeues Steuerungsmodell,which foundgreat resonanceon thelocalgovernmentlevel, but lateralso on thestatelevel ofthe

Bundesla¨nder(Vogel,2009;Bogumiletal.,2006).Againstthisbackdrop,andregardingaccountingandbudgetingtechniques, a‘modernising’amendmenttothefederalBudgetaryPrinciplesAct(Haushaltsgrundsa¨tzegesetz)waspassedin1997(the BudgetingReformAct,Haushaltsrechtsfortentwicklungsgesetz),whichbasicallyestablishedthatinadditiontothecash-based system,anaccrual-basedsystemcouldbeused(DeutscherBundestag,1997).ThevariousGermanstateshavesincedealt withtheimplementationofAOBBindifferentmannersandatdifferentpaces,andHesseandHamburghavebeenmosteager. AnoverviewofthechronologicaleventsinthesestatesispresentedinFig.1.

Intheearly1990s,therewassufﬁcientpoliticalsupportforlaunchingAOBBpilotsinbothstates.Accordingtoourarchival search,thedecisionwasrelativelyuncontroversialinbothcases(HessischerLandtag,1998;Bu¨rgerschaftderFreienund HansestadtHamburg,2004).Oncetheintenthad beenformallyexpressedinparliament,anoperational projectgroup consistingofinternalemployeesandconsultantswassetup.Eventhoughthereweredifferencesastohowthereformwas implemented,accountingemployeeswereinbothcasesexposedtoasystemthatwasfairlypredeterminedinitsmost importantdimensions,andhadtointegratethisintotheiroccupationalenvironment.ThetasksthatPSAsaretoperform undertheAOBBregimediffersigniﬁcantlyfromthetraditionalcash-basedones.UsingAOBB,PSAshaveforexampleto maintainassetanddepreciationtablesorlinktheinputstoadministrativeoutputs.Whilethereaderisreferredtobasic accountingliteratureformoredetails,wewouldliketoemphasiseherethattheoperationalprocesseshavebeenchangedin manyways.

4.2. Problematizationandinteressement

When comparing project communication as thecentral element ofproblematization in Hamburg and Hesse, very differentapproachescanbeobserved.InHesse,theprojectcommunicationemphasisedthatthereformwasatruestep changefortheorganisation,whichwouldnecessarilyresultinresistance,especiallyby‘‘inefficient’’PSAs:Hesse’scentral projectgroupproblematisedAOBBbydiscreditingcash-basedaccountingandbudgetingandbypositioningitas‘‘antiquated cameralbudgeting’’;this isevidenced forexamplein aletterby theheadof thestatechancellerytostateemployees (HessischesMinisteriumderFinanzen,2003).ThePSAsweinterviewedclaimedthatverystrongrhetoricwasusedinorder to‘‘attack’’theoldsystem.SuchharshjuxtapositioncausedproblematicidentificationwiththeAOBBsystemanddisturbed accountantswhohadusedthesystemforquitesometime:VariousPSAsinHesseexpressedtheirlackofunderstandingof such‘‘doom-mongering’’.AccordingtoHesse’sprojectgroup,anideal‘‘AOBB-trainedPSA’’wasconsistentlypositionedasthe desiredoutcomeofthereformprojectandaspartandparcelof‘‘ensuringsustainableadministrativeactions’’(Hessisches MinisteriumderFinanzen,2003).Contrarytothisapproach,Hamburg’sofficialprojectcommunicationusedmorecautious andlessnegativelanguageinordertopromotetheintroductionofAOBB.Especiallyinthebeginningofthereformproject andinformalsettings,politiciansandprojectgroupmembersinHamburgestablishedapositivelinkbetweenAOBBandthe city’straditionofprudentHanseaticmerchants,thuspositioningAOBBasanaturalfit:

‘‘’PresenceoftradeimpliespresenceofHamburg’–thiscatchyquotesummarisesthetraditionofHanseaticmerchants precisely.Inthefaceofthisheritage,itisnotsurprisingthatHamburgtakestheopportunitytoputitspublicﬁnances onamoresustainablebasisandintroducesaccrualbudgetinganddouble-entrybookkeepingasoneoftheﬁrstfederal states.’’(StadtHamburg,2006)

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IncontrasttotheapproachinHesse,thisformalframingofthereformasanaturalcontinuationofthecity’sheritageand historywasaimedatmakingthechangesdemandedofthePSAslesstroublingandenablingsmootherprojectprogress.What wascommontotheproblematizationinHesseandHamburgrespectivelywasthegovernments’introductionofAOBBasa majorprogrammethatwouldenableamoreefﬁcientuseofresources,which,togetherwithincreasedserviceorientation, wasproposedasoneofthemajormotivationsfortheintroductionofNPMinGermany(Banner,2008).Thisproblematization waseffective,sincebothstateswerefacinghighdebtlevels.

Fig.2depictsthenetworkconstructedaroundAOBBasanobligatorypassagepointinthetwostates.Thegraphicsshow severalnoteworthysimilarities,especiallyregardingtheroleofthePSAs,butalsodifferencessuchastheimportanceof externalconsultantsduringimplementation.

Regardingthemomentofinteressement,weobservedthatpoliticiansinbothstatesmadePSAsthecentralentityofAOBB and thus responsible for increasing public sector efficiency, whereas they themselves seemed quite reluctant to acknowledgethattheyshouldalsobeaffectedbychange.InbothHesseandHamburg,politiciansrepeatedlyargued– despitethemorepositiveofficialcommunicationinthelatter–thatadministrativeemployeeswereinefficientandthatany conceptfrombusinesswouldnaturallybebetter:

‘‘Reformingpublicaccountingautomaticallygainsinacceptancesimplybecauseitimpliesusingsuperiorconcepts fromtheprivatesectorinthepublicsector.Inthebackground,thebottomlinealwaysis:Administrationisinefﬁcient.

Entities Public

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Thiswasalwaystheunderlyingassumptionthatmaynothavebeenspokenoutsoloudlybutwhichresonatesinthe debates.’’(Politician,Hamburg)

PresentingPSAswithsuchnegativeviewsontheiridentitiesaswellassuggestingthatitwasthePSAs’inefﬁciencywhich constrainedtheadministrationandthatresistingtheimplementationofAOBBwouldserveasevenfurtherevidenceofthis inefﬁciency,seemedtobeaneffectivedeviceofinteressement.

In addition,projectmanagementin bothstates offeredavision foranidealmanagerialidentitythat wouldbethe outcomeforPSAs.InHesse,forexample,anumberofofﬁcialprojectdocumentswithapositivepitchweredistributedwithin theorganisation. Theydeliberatelysoughttointeresse PSAsbyoutlining potentialmotivationsand ‘‘opportunities’’to supportAOBB:

‘‘[PSAswillget]moredirectresponsibility,morescopefordesign, moreﬂexibleworkprocesses,opportunityfor development,reductionofhierarchy,moremotivation.’’(HessischesMinisteriumderFinanzen,2003)

Clearly, such new and more managerial practices and identities that offer notions of empowerment and more responsibilitytoPSAsarealmosttheoppositeofthetraditionalPSApracticesandidentitiesoutlinedinSection4.1.Atthe sametime,thisformofseductioncanberegardedasaninteressementdevicethatservestoconvincePSAstosubscribeto AOBB.

To further stabilise the AOBB implementation, project management installed not only consultants but also other supporterswhereverpossible:

‘‘When theproject wasstarted, theylooked for people who knew aboutaccrual accounting. Ofcourse, a bank apprenticeshipisahugeadvantageinthisregard.SoIwasgiventhechancetoreactivatemyoldknowledge.[...]Iama realadvocateofthesystem,notonlybecauseIhaveagreatpassionforitfrommypreviousoccupation,butalso becauseIamconvincedofit.’’(PSA-1)

Inordertoaddressanylackofqualiﬁcation,onefocalpointoftheimplementationprojectsinthetwostates,andofNPM inGermanyingeneral(KlagesandLo¨fﬂer,1998),wasthereforetoensurethatthenecessaryskillswerebuiltthroughtraining (e.g.StadtHamburg,2003).Whiletheprogrammesincludedon-the-jobtrainingforPSAsindependentlyoftheirage,special focusinHamburgwasputontrainingtheyoungestcolleaguesinAOBB.Onemayviewthistobeadeviceoflong-term interessementaimingtoensurethatthenewhiresweremoreattunedtoAOBB.Eventhoughtrainingwasusedasacentral devicetodrivethereformforward,however,incertainunitsonlyratherlimitedtrainingwasavailable.

Insum,regardingproblematization,thetoneofprojectcommunication,thesignallingofcommitment,andthewaysof buildingcredibilitydifferedsubstantiallybetweenthestateswhilethesituationattheoutsetandtheexpressedaimsofthe reformwerealikeinthetwostates.Regardinginteressement,thereweremoresimilarities.WhileAOBBclearlyintroduced conﬂictswiththetraditionalPSAidentity,thenewtargetidentitywaspositionedasagreatopportunityinbothstates.Atthe sametimepoliticiansexpressedmistrusttowardsPSAs,ineitherformal(Hesse)orinformalways(Hamburg).

4.3. Enrolmentandmobilisation

WhilethetranslationofAOBBwasgenerallyproblematicinbothstates,PSAsencounteredmorechallengesinHesse. Accordingtotheintervieweeswemet,thecombinationofaverysophisticatedAOBBconceptandrigidprojectmanagement ledtomorefrustrationandirritationforthePSAsthere.Forexample,inHesseitwasinitiallyobligatoryforeverymajor organisationalunittouseBalancedScorecardsandtransferpricesforinternalservicesaswellastofrequentlyprovide detailedvarianceanalyses.TwoquotesillustratethattheselatterreportsgeneratedalotofextraworkforthePSAs,whilethe prevailingimpressionwasthatmanagementdidnotmakeuseofthesedocuments.

‘‘Inourquarterlyreportseverydeviationabove10%hastobecommentedon.The10%areirrespectiveofwhetherthe absoluteamountis600Euroorseveralmillions.Thatdoesnotmakeanysense!’’(PSA-3)

‘‘Ourreports,complexpilesofpapers,havetobeapprovedbyourmanagement.Theapprovalhappenswithinhours. However,Iguaranteeyouthattheyonlytouchedthepagesthatrequiresignatures.[...]Itfeelslikeworkingforthe trashcan.’’(PSA-6)

WehypothesisethatwhenmakingadecisioninfavourofacomplexAOBBconcept,trustinexternalconsultantsandERP providerswasstrongerthanwasfaithinthePSAs.Thefollowingquoteillustratesboththeperceivedmistrustandhow ‘over-engineered’thenewsystemwas:

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ThequotealsoshowshowPSAsare‘lockedin’ontheirnewroles,notonlybyconsultantsbutalsobyexternalauditors senttoensureproperuseofAOBB.AgainstthebackdropofheavycomplaintsbythePSAs,theprojectmanagementinHesse decidedtomakeconcessionsandrelaxcertainrequirementssuchastheBalancedScorecards,transferprices,anddetailed varianceanalysesthathadinitiallybeenlabelled‘‘obligatory’’.Webelievethatthisstepwastakentoavoidthatthereform gotoutofcontrol.

‘‘Wesuggestedoptimisingcertainconceptualissuesinourreformproject.[...]Webasicallyproposedtoadvance moreslowlyandincludelessobligatoryelements.Forexample,fromnowontheBalancedScorecardsareoptional.’’ (AOBBprojectgroup,Hesse)

AlsoinHamburgtherewereanumberofnegotiationsbetweendisturbedPSAsandprojectmanagement.Forexample,the PSAs’claimthatresourcesweretoofewwasintenselydiscussedbytheprojectmanagementandeveninparliamentarian committees.Thisledtofurtherresourcesbeingfreedforadditionaltrainingandstaffing.Nevertheless,asthefollowing quoteexemplifies,theAOBBconceptsmayhavealsobeentoocomplex,especiallyforpoorlyorlessqualifiedPSAs:

‘‘Wehadaccountantsinthedepartmentswhowerereallynotalltrainedwellenough;theysimplydidnotknowwhat todo.Someofthemwerenotevenabletocompleteasinglesetoftransactions!Andaftertheyhadtraining,theystill werenotabletodoit.’’(PSA-16)

Thisindicatesthat enrolmentwasimpeded bythecomplexity ofthesystem.Overall,includingconcessionsmade, enrolmentappeared to bemore troublesome in Hesse than in Hamburg,where theymore activelysought to install additionalinteressementdevicespromptingdoubtfulPSAstoatleastconsiderenrollingintoAOBB.

Ingeneral,wewereabletoidentifythreedevicesusedbythetwogovernmentsandtheprojectcommitteeswhichserved tobetterenrolPSAs.ThefirstofthesedevicesaimedatembeddingtheAOBBprogrammebetterintoorganisationalroutines and processes (i.e. through meetings and the circulation of cost centre reports). The following quote underpins our observationregardingtheintegrationofAOBBintoorganisationalpracticesasadeviceoffurtherenrolment.

‘‘Thisisamajoradvance![...]Nowcostcentremanagerscometousandobjectifinvoiceshavebeenincorrectly recorded.[...]Justthismorningwehadanappointmentwiththeministerwherewepresentedourreports![...]And beforeourmonthlymeetingswiththeministerwegetcallsfromdepartmentheadstoverifynumbersbecausethey areafraidthattheministerwillaskinconvenientquestions.’’(PSA-2)

Overall,respondentsfeltthatthis additionalorganisationalexposureimprovedtheirstandinginternally.Inorderto supportenrolment and mobilisation,also the seconddevice, ﬁnancial and/orcareer beneﬁts,appears appropriate.As intervieweesmentioned,theprospectsofreceivingadditionalfundingandmanpowergeneratedinterestandwillingnessto engageinAOBBalreadyatanearlystageofthereform.Inaddition,theenrolmentofPSAsintoAOBBwasfacilitatedforthose whohadopeneduptoAOBB,becausetherewereincreasedchancesofbeingpromoted:

‘‘Iamjustguessinghowoldheis.Around40.Thatmeanshehasanagewherehecanﬁgureouthimselfthatthistopic willbecomemoreimportant–irrespectiveofhisfuturerole.Thatiswhyheiscommittedtothesystem.’’(PSA-15)

Finally,thethirddeviceappliedwasthecreationofnewpositionsand/orreconﬁgurationofpreviouspositions,whichis signiﬁcantfortheinvolvedemployees.Asanexample,theprojectcommitteeinHamburgcreatedso-called‘‘BIChiefs’’:

‘‘TheBIChiefhastoknowbothcreditanddebitandalsobeanexpertonthetechnicalside.[...]Sothereisanewjob. [...]Someofthe‘cameralaccountants’becomemanagementaccountants,someBIchiefs,someassetaccountants, somecostaccountants.Theformerjobistransformedintooneormorejobs.’’(PSA-16)

Overall,thesethreetacticswereusedasadditionalinteressementdevicestosucceedinenrollingthePSAs,inparticular becausetheywereaimedatincreasingtheirstatus.

Astheevidencepresentedinvariousinstancesshows,therewerebroadpatternsinthePSAs’enrolmentandmobilisation, whichempiricallyhavealsobeenmentionedinotherstudiesofpublicsectorreformsuchasinNorway(e.g.Berg,2006).On theonehand,asmentionedabove,somePSAsconsentedimmediatelywithoutdiscussion.Others,whowereinfavourof AOBBfromthebeginningorbecamesooverthecourseofevents,evendevelopedproprietarytoolsthathelpedinthe implementationandwerethusmobilisedevenasactivesupportersofthereform.YetotherPSAswererathersceptical towardsthebenefitsofAOBBoragainstchangeingeneral,butneverthelessdidwhatwasaskedofthem.Atthispoint,we returntothequoteatthebeginningofthispaper,whichillustratesthiskindofnuancedsupportandalreadymakesitclear thatevenifenrolmenttakesplace,theimplicationsforPSAsmaybetroublesome.Further,asevidencedbyoneofour interviewees,therewerealsoPSAswhowerenotreadyorwillingtoadjusttothenewAOBBsystem.Ratherthanremaining intheirpositionsandobstructingthereform,theychangedtonewpositionsinordertoescapethereformandtoavoidthe stressfulreconfigurationoftheiridentities(forasimilarfindinginaFrenchcontext,seeJeannot,2006):

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IntermsofANT,theseemployeeswerenotsuccessfullyenrolledsincetheydepartedfromthenetwork.

Tosummarise,regardingenrolmentandmobilisation,thecasesofHesseandHamburgdifferincertaindimensions. Certainelements ofHesse’sinitiallysophisticatedAOBBconcept(e.g.BalancedScorecards,transferprices,anddetailed varianceanalyses)wereunsuccessfulasinteressementdevices.Thus,theywerenolongerdemandedasmandatoryinorder tocontinuewiththeimplementationofAOBBasthereformingactorsrealisedthattheirinitialintentionsmighthaveoverly strained theorganisation. Hamburghad toinvest intoadditional interessementdevices toensureenrolment,yet the consequenttraining andsupplementarystafﬁngwasputintoplaceasanadditiontotheoriginalsetup.Regardingthe mobilisationofactorsasactivesupportersandscepticsofthereformaswellconsideringthenumberofdefectors,Hesseand Hamburgwererathersimilar.ItisthesedifferingreactionsofindividualPSAstothesameprogrammethatencourageusto discusstheunderlyingreasonsbelow.

5. Discussion

Thispaper’sobjectiveistostudyPSAs’identityreconfigurationbasedonthetranslationofAOBBintwoGermanstates.To summarise,thecasesofHesseandHamburghaveshownthatneitherofthetwocasesofAOBBimplementationwassmooth andthatbothchangeprocessespresentedahugechallengetotheinvolvedentities,whichmirrorstheliteraturefromother contexts(e.g.TerBogt,2008fortheNetherlands).Further,thestrongrelianceonconsultants(e.g.Christensen,2007;Lapsley, 2009)andanincreasingworkloadwithdecreasinginternalresources(e.g.Berg,2006)arealsoissuesreportedfromother jurisdictions’NPMimplementations.InthetwoGermanstates,theinitialobjectiveswereonlymettosomeextent:It appears as if the more technical objectives, suchas the reflection of government’s long-term liabilities in financial statements,weremoreeasilyreachedthanweretheobjectivesrelatedtochangingbehaviouralormanagerialpatterns,such as establishing result-oriented thinking or increasing accountability (Stadt Hamburg, 2009). We saw that during problematizationandinteressement,politiciansandtheprojectcommitteepositionedPSAsasamajorentityoftheAOBB reform,havingtheimportantresponsibilitiesofperformingmanyofthebookkeepingtasksthataccountingandbudgeting relyon.Ouraccountsofthetwostates’translationsofAOBBdemonstratethatasaresultofthis,attemptstoreconfigure identitieshavebeendifferentfortheindividualsinvolved.Assuch,PSAshavedevelopedvariousattitudestowardsAOBB overthecourseofthetranslations.

ThissectiondiscussesthechallengesandoutcomesofthereconfigurationofthePSAs’identitiesthatwefoundacrossthe twotranslations.Wedemonstratehowactorsarenot‘‘atoms,butreceiv[e]identity[...]through[their]relationstoother (human and non-human)actors’’ (Justesen andMouritsen, 2011,p. 176)and thus highlightthedynamic relationship betweenthetranslationprocessesandchangesinPSAs’identity.Throughananalysisoftheaccountants’variousreactionsto the changes, we are able to derive common identity profiles based on interviewees’ educational, occupational, and organisationalhistories.Beforewedoso,wereporttwoconditionsofidentityreconfigurationwhichunderlietheseprofiles andwhichinfluencePSAs’interestinAOBBandthewaytheyenrolledintoAOBB.Overall,thederivedabstractionsofthe conditionsandthePSAidentityprofilesemergedinsimilarwaysinthetwostates.

Quiteintuitively,theageofanaccountantistheﬁrstobservedconditionthatseemstoinﬂuencetheaccountants’attitude towardsAOBB:

‘‘[Forolderemployees]thechangewilleithertakelongornothappenatall.Peoplewhohavepractisedcameralistics for20–30yearswon’tchangeintheirlastﬁveyears.[...]The25–30year-oldsoftodayhavegrownupwiththis, undergonedifferenttrainingandthushandlethetoolsdifferently.’’(PSA-3)

SimilartothisPSAfromHesse,counterpartsinHamburgalsorecognisedthefactthatanindividual’sageplaysamajor rolewhether PSAsenrolintoAOBBandareopentoreconﬁguretheir identitiesornot.Theintervieweequotedbelow, however,a60-year-oldPSAfromHamburg,illustratesthatanattitudemayactuallychangeovertheyears:

‘‘Iwasactuallynotveryconvincedthreetofouryearsago.ButasofnowIamratherconvincedthatalsointhepublic sectorweneedtoshowthingsliketheﬁnancialvalueweadd.’’(PSA-17)

TherelevanceofageintheconstructionoftheidentityofPSAstowardsAOBBisconsistentwithliterature(e.g.Skærbæk and Thorbjørnsen, 2007; Weick, 1995) that argues that younger employees welcome changes more since they see opportunitiesforpromotionand/ormayhavesufﬁcienteducationalbackgroundorwillingnesstoacquiretherequired knowledge.

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it,itseemslikelythatmorePSAswithsuchtrainingwillimprovetheoddsofsuccessfulenrolment.Ourﬁndingsresonate wellwiththeresultsofastudybyMeyerandHammerschmid(2006)conductedinAustria.Theyﬁndthatyoungageand previous experience in the private sector increase theprobability that public sectoremployees willembody a more managerialidentity,whereasabusinessdegreedoesnot.

Accordingtoourstudy,theabovementionedconditionsofidentityreconfiguration(age,experiencewithAOBB)areamong themostrelevantparametersinﬂuencingtheidentitiesofPSAstowardsAOBB.However,asoutlinedbelow,theprocessof theemergenceofidentityproﬁlesismorecomplexandmulti-faceted.

Duringimplementation,thesupportofAOBBemergeddifferentlyinvariousgroupsofaffectedPSAs.Toaccountforthis, wesearched forcomprehensive patterns intheir narratives andsaw fouridentityproﬁles emerge.These proﬁlesare describedinTable3.

TheprofileofaProvenAOBBAccountantstronglycorrelateswiththeamountofexperiencewithAOBBasoutlinedabove.To illustratethis,allofthemembersofourstudyhavingthisprofilehadhadintensepriorcontactwithAOBBeitherthrough formeremploymentintheprivatesectororingovernment-ownedcompanies,orbyhavingworkedasamemberoftheAOBB projectgroup beforetheywerehired for theircurrent position.In ourinterviews, ProvenAOBBAccountants claimed throughoutthattherewaslittleornodoubtthatintroducingAOBBinthelongrunwouldbeanetbenefitforthestateandthe administration,andtheircriticismwaslimitedtocertainsmallerimplementation-relatedissues.Somerespondentseven framedtheirsupporttoAOBBbysayingthatitallowedthemtomeetcertaintraditionaladministrativeprinciplessuchas efficientuseof resources.Weconcludefromthis thatfor them,therewasno conflict betweenadheringtoWeberian principlesandembracingAOBBpractices.AllProvenAOBBAccountantsopenlystatedthattheyfullysupportedAOBB.From anANTperspective,thisgroupofPSAsseemedtohavequiteeasilyacceptedtheirnewresponsibilitiesofAOBBorevenhave beenmobilisedasactivesupporters,andatthetimeofourinterviewstherewasnoperceivedneedforrefiningtheexisting devices,orcirculatingadditionalonestostabilisetheirroles.

LiketheProvenAOBBAccountants,AscendantAOBBAccountantsareinagreementwiththereformandstatethisclearly.In addition,theaccountantswemethadthecommontraitthattheystillhadnotreachedthepeakoftheircareer.Thosewho hadrecentlyleftuniversityreportedtohavebeeninfusedwithAOBBconceptions.Othershadleftschoolseveralyearsago and hadalready worked withcash-basedaccounting. In theinterviews, theyconveyedthe impressionthattheysaw favourablecareerprospectsinconsentingtoAOBB.RegardingthedevicessupportingtheirenrolmentintotheAOBBproject, theywereeitheralreadypromotedorsawpotentialcareerbeneﬁts.ItislikelythatAscendantAOBBAccountantshadnot beenexposedtoWeberianprinciplesforlongenoughtoperceiveanyconﬂictswithAOBB.

AlargenumberofPSAsfellintothecategoryofLukewarmAOBBSceptic.ThedescriptionborrowsfromMachiavelli(1950), whodescribedgroupsofpublicservantsconfrontedwithchange:

‘‘Itmustbeconsideredthatthereisnothingmoredifficulttocarryout[...]thantoinitiateaneworderofthings.For thereformerhasenemiesinallthosewhoprofitbytheoldorder,andonlylukewarmdefendersinallthosewhowould profitbytheneworder,thislukewarmnessarisingpartlyfromfearoftheiradversaries,whohavethelawsintheir favour;andpartlyfromtheincredulityofmankind,whodonottrulybelieveinanythingnewuntiltheyhavehadthe actualexperienceofit.’’(p.21)

ThesePSAs,inanalogytothecivilservantsatthetimeofMachiavelli,canbecharacterisedbyresistingtheintroductionof AOBBtosomedegreeandpassivelyfollowinginstructionsdoingnomorethanwhatisrequiredofthem,butintheendbeing tooweaktodefendtheirdoubtspubliclyandsubscribingtothesystemaftersometime.InourcategoryofLukewarmAOBB Sceptic,PSAsareinthesecondhalfoftheircareer,actlikechameleons–eitherfortacticalreasonstoavoidbeingpointedout asaproblemmakerorduetogenuineinsecuritytowardsabetterconcept–andavoidvoicingaclearopinionfororagainst AOBB.SomeindividualswhorepresentedLukewarmAOBBScepticsclearlypointedoutthattheywereagainstAOBB.Seen

Table3

IdentityproﬁlesofPSAs.

PSAidentityproﬁle Interests/objectives TherelevanceofAOBB Conduct AOBB experience itproducesalotofextraworkthat doesnotcomewithextra compensation

Doeswhatisrequiredinorderavoid conﬂictswithAOBB-proponents

Doeswhats/heisinstructedtodo buthasnofearofraising AOBB-criticismopenly

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fromanANTperspective,intheircasestheAOBBprojectmanagedtoenroltheminawaythatwouldkeepthemsilentand ‘‘dowhatisrequired[as]itisnotourjobtoquestionthereform’’(PSA-7).Sinceintervieweesweremorepronenottovoice criticismpubliclyinHessethantheywereinHamburg,itcanbearguedthattheprojectintheformermanagedtocirculate devicesthatexertedmorepressureonPSAstofollowthereform.TheLukewarmAOBBScepticsavoidtakingaclearstand. Dependingontheaudiencetheyaretalkingto,theywillspeakandactinfavourofonedirectionortheother.

Lastly, theOutspokenAOBB Scepticis theleast supportiveof thereform. S/heis a seasoned cash-basedaccounting professional,who–givenher/hisWeberianimprinting–hasconceptualdoubtswhetherAOBBiscompatiblewiththepublic sectoratall.Sos/heisseriouslydistressedtoreconfigurehisorheroccupationalidentityandenrolintoAOBB.TheOutspoken AOBBSceptic’santipathyisenforcedbyafearoflossofrecognitionforexpertknowledgeandthereform’sunfavourablecost/ benefit ratio.However, compared totheLukewarmAOBB Sceptic,the OutspokenAOBBScepticdoes not hideher/his concerns. For Outspoken AOBB Sceptics with responsibility for staff, however, this openness to voicing doubts will sometimes bring them into conflict with their management role if they assume one. Devices installed by project managementseemtobeunsuccessfulfortheenrolmentoftheOutspokenAOBBScepticands/hetakesaclearstandforthe traditionalcash-basedwayofdoingthings.Supportingherorhisviewwithnumerousconvincingexamples,s/hetriesto convinceherorhiscolleaguesandmanagementandthustodestabilisethereform.Whileperformingtheresponsibilitiess/ heonlydoeswhatisabsolutelynecessary.

TheaboveidentityprofilesshowthattheidentityofPSAsisquitefacetedwithrespecttotheirattitudestowardsthe AOBBreform.Thismaychallengepriorresearch,whichattimes,andmaybeinanoverlyreductionistmanner,assumesthat certainreformsaregenerallywelcomed(orrejected)acrosscertainprofessionsoroccupations(e.g.Potter,1999).Inour study,multipleidentitiesemergedevenamongmembersofthesameoccupationalprofile.Thus,ourstudydiffersfrom previousaccountingstudiesonidentityformations.Whereasextantstudiesanalysedhowcertainactorssuchasdoctors (Kurunma¨ki, 2004)anddefenceofficers(SkærbækandThorbjørnsen, 2007)weresoughttoperformtwojob related identities,andwhatresultedin‘‘hybrididentities’’,ourstudyexaminesinstanceswhereonetypeofidentitywassoughtto bereplacedbyanother.Eventhoughtheformerdonotexcludethepossibilityoftheemergenceofdifferentgroupsas particularlyin SkærbækandThorbjørnsens’(2007)studyofdefenceofficers,ourstudyshowshowin theprocessof replacingoneidentitywithanotheratleastfourdifferentsubgroupsofthegeneralgroupofaccountantsemerged.In additiontoLatour(1991),whoshowsgradualenrolmenttobeaneffectofmoreandmoredevicesbeingcirculated,we suggestherethatanemphasisondifferent(andperhapschanging)groupsandhowtheyreacttothevariousdevicescan deepenourinsightsintotheproblemsofenrolment.Thus,itisdifficulttotalkgenerallyaboutresistance,andithastobe acknowledgedthattherearetypicallydifferenttypesofactorswithdifferentviewstowardschange.Ourstudyaddstothe literaturethatseekstonuanceourunderstandingoftheeffectchangeshaveondifferentindividualseventhoughthey belongtotheverysamegroup.

6. Conclusion

Thisstudyhassetoutwiththepurposeofsheddinglightonthereasonsfordivergentandunexpectedoutcomesof accountingreformsinthepublicsectorgiventhattheextantliteratureandthepredominantlytechnicalperspectivesit adoptsproblematisethisinsufﬁciently.Indoingso,thisstudyhasfocusedontheinterplaybetweenpublicsectoraccounting changeandindividualPSAs.BystudyingthetranslationofAOBBintwofederalGermanstates,ourparticularinterestlay withthechallengesPSAsfacewhentheyaretoenrolintothereformandtherepercussionsthishasfortheiridentities.

ThisstudyshowsthatPSAshavefounddifferentwaysnottoperformtheirresponsibilitiestoperfection,andweattribute thispartlytothelongtraditionofcash-basedaccountingandtoastrongWeberiancivilservanthabitualmind-set,which includesfollowingrulesandinstructionstotheletter.Whileontheonehandthismindsetprovidedforthefactthatthere wasnoprojectstagnancyandthatAOBBwasnotopenlyresisted(forexampleinthecaseoftheLukewarmAOBBSceptics),it was,ontheotherhand,thismindsetthatalienatedPSAsregardingAOBBandpreventedmanyfromdevelopingenthusiasm orproactivity:asourfouridentityproﬁlesshow,onlysomeofthePSAscametosharetheproposedidentitiesutteredbythe reform which would haveimplied becoming motivated, entrepreneurial, andresponsible actorsof anefﬁcientuseof resourcesandanincreasedserviceorientationinthepublicsector.EvenfewerofthemintegratedAOBBasanopportunityfor theirpersonaldevelopment.ThemorescepticalPSAswerereluctanttosubscribetothereformbeingfrustratedbythelarge amountofadditionalworkandaperceptionofirrelevanceoftheAOBBreform.Inaddition,thePSAswereforcedintoavery constrainingset-upwithconsultantsandauditorswhocheckedtheirperformances,particularlysointhestateofHesse.This illustratesLatour’s (1991)pointabouthowcertaindevicescanmodifyandtransformanactor’sattitudefroma moral obligation(i.e.havingtodosomethingthatdoesnotcomenatural)intoonewhereactorssurrendertoaprogrammeandare ‘‘happy’’tocarryoutatask(p.104).TheconsultantsortheBalanced ScorecardsasamandatoryelementinHesse are examples ofhowseveral deviceswerenotableachievesuchtransformation.Byand large,wearenot abletoportray enrolmentofaccountantsasbeingoverlysuccessfuleventhoughinHamburgenrolmentamongaccountantswasmore successful thanin Hesse. Forinstance,certain PSAsin Hamburg,despitea longexposure tothecameralworld,were convincedbythereformers’referencetothecity’straditionofprudentHanseaticmerchantsandstatedthatAOBBmaybea moresuitableinstrumentforreducingpublicspendingthancash-basedaccountingandbudgeting.

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ProvenAOBBAccountant,theAscendantAOBBAccountant,theLukewarmAOBBSceptic,andtheOutspokenAOBBSceptic evidencethatchangewasnotasinitiallyplanned.WeproposethattheageofthePSAsandtheirindividualexperiencewith AOBBcanbeimportantvariablestounderstandingtheirdeviationfromprescribedidentitiesandillustratethecontinuous changeeffortsofthereformerstoenrolmorePSAsintoAOBB.

Ourstudyoffersseveralcontributionstotheliterature.First,initsmajorcontribution,ourstudyseekstomakevisible howPSAsarenotoneentitythatreactshomogeneouslytothereform,butratherthattheyconsistofatleastfourdifferent groupswithdifferentresponsesandcharacteristics.Whileseveralstudieshinttothisissueforotherprofessionalgroupsin thepublicsector,ourstudyprovidessuchevidenceforpublicsectoraccountantswhereidentitieswerenothybridisedbut instead,soughttobereplaced.

Second,weaddtoanunderstandingofdivergingoutcomestosimilaraccountingchangeprogrammesinpublicsector reform.Arecentstudy,forexample,showsthattheoutcomeoftwoaccountingreformsmaydifferbecauseoforganisational levelvariablessuchasthedispersionoftechnicalcapabilitiesortheconcentrationofpower(e.g.LiguoriandSteccolini, 2012).Withourinterestinthereconﬁgurationoftheidentitiesofanaccountingreform’scentralstakeholder,ourstudy offerstothisliteratureaperspectiveoftheindividuallevelwithanin-depthviewofthedifferingreactionsofindividual PSAs.

Third,bymobilisingActor-Network-Theoryanditsconceptoftranslation,wedemonstratehowandwithwhateffectsa numberofdeviceswereputintoplacebytheprojectmanagementinordertoachieveincreasedaccountantenrolmentinto thereform.Wetherebyhighlighttheroleofdevicesandtheirimportanceintryingtoachieveenrolmentofareform’s stakeholders.Thetheoreticalimplicationisthatwe,incontrasttootherstudiesonaccountingchange(e.g.Hyndmanetal., 2013;LiguoriandSteccolini,2012;Dent,1991),emphasiselesstheimportanceofexistingculturesbutmorehowdevices impacttheemergenceofgroupsofactorsandtheirreactionstowhattheyseeandhear.Thesereactionswereindifferent waysdealtwithinthetwostatesandpointtothedynamicsbetweenactorsandthedevicesthatcometosurroundthem. Fourth,ourstudysuggeststhatthesubscriptionofPSAstooneoftheprofilesmaychangeovertime,whichisevidenceof anongoingreconfigurationthatcaninterrupt,prevent,ordisturbasmoothreconfigurationofindividualsintothepositions constructedbytheOPP.Importantlytherefore,ourresultsalsopointtothefactthat continuousenrolmenteffortsby reformersmaybenecessarytoconvincestakeholderstosubscribetonewreforms;inotherwords,wederivefromour findingsalsothepotentialthatonceenrolledstakeholdersmayun-enrolfromareformundercertainconditions.

Lastly,and drawingmore onthecomparative insightsourstudyofferswithitsanalysisgrounded intwo different settings,weobservedinHessethataveryambitiousreformconceptincludingforexampleBalancedScorecardshadtobe simpliﬁedinordertoavoidthatthereformsituationgotoutofcontrol.ThisindicatesthatPSAscouldnotbeenticedbythe promiseofasophisticatednewsystem.Rather,andasseeninHamburg,theenrolmentofPSAswaspromotedbysimpler conceptsandanumberofvoluntaryelementswhichappearedmoreaccessibletotheindividualPSAs.Ourresultsalso provideevidenceforthefactthatenrolmentwaseasedbyamorepositiveandreconcilingcommunicationinHamburg. BecausewedonotknowwhetherAOBBis‘better’thancash-basedaccountingandbudgetingwearenotsuretobe entitledtoprovidechangeagentswithadviceonhowtoimprovethereform.Apracticalimplicationfromourstudyis, however,thatreformersandpolicymakersshouldnotconsideremployeesasjustonegroupofpeoplebutbemoresensitive toidentifyingdifferencesinsub-groupsoforganisationalentitiesbroughtaboutbyindividualcharacteristics.Inparticular, ourstudyofaccountingchangeinthepublicsectorshowedthattheageofaccountantsaswellastheleveloftheirpractical experienceisimportantinexplainingtheenrolmentofPSAs.Inaddition,wesuggestinvestingintothedesignandcirculation ofdeviceswhichcantransformactors’attitudefromamoralobligationintoonewheretheybecome‘‘happy’’(Latour,1991) subscribingtoAOBB.InHesseandHamburgthathasyettobereachedandinthatsensethereformisnotentirelystabilised orsuccessful.Whatitwouldtaketomakeaccountantsfeel‘‘happy’’abouttheirresponsibilitieswedonotknow,butaclose engagementwiththedifferentgroupsandtheirconcernswouldbeanempatheticeffortofreformers,anddespitepotentially highcostsitmayinthelongrunleadtoamorestabilisedprogrammeofAOBB.ThatHessereduceditsambitions(e.g. regardingtheBalancedScorecard)isjustoneexampleofhowreformerscaneasetheburdenonvariousentitiesbylistening tothemtosecurehigherlevelsofenrolment.Allthatwearesureofisthatingeneralaprogramme(likeAOBB)onlyexistsas longastheworkofgradualenrolmentiscontinued.Unexpectedeventsandproblemsmayoccuratanytimeandhavethe potentialtodecreaseenrolment.Intheaccountingchangeliteratureitcouldbewarrantedtofollow,perhapsinanevenmore systematicway,whatkindofsolutions,i.e.newsmarterdevices,canbesuccessfulintransformingsomemoralobligation intoonewherepeoplebecome‘‘happy’’performingtheirresponsibilities.

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exist.Wewanttostressthatatleastfourprofilesexistbutthattheremaywellbefurtherprofilesorsub-profilesinaddition totheoneswepropose.

Acknowledgements

ThisworkhasbeenfundedbyInterdisziplina¨reStudienzuPolitik,Recht,AdministrationundTechnologie(ISPRAT)e.V. TheauthorskindlythankJu¨rgenWeberaswellastwoanonymousreviewersandtheeditorsforhelpfulcommentsonearlier versionsofthispaper.

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