‘H
EADING INTO
O
RBIT
?’
BRAHAMDABSCHECK*
It appears that not only in social life, but wherever there is life, there is conflict.
(Dahrendorf 1959: 208)
What is required is both theoretically informed empirical analysis and empirically grounded theory.
(Hyman 1994: 172)
I
n the September 2001 issue of The Journal of Industrial RelationsMichelson and Westcott have presented a critical commentary on my writings on indus-trial relations theory; particularly my attempt to develop one possible version of a theory of industrial relations (Dabscheck 1994; 1995). They maintain that the development of my ideas was influenced by ‘historical specificities’ (Michelson and Westcott 2001: 309), and attempt to relate such events to the evolution of my ideas. In trying to develop a general theory of Australian industrial relations it is difficult to know how I, or anyone for that matter, could not be influenced by Australian empirics. They posit a simple linear relationship between ‘ideas’ and ‘specificities’. However, the connection between the two did not occur in the way that they suggest. Undoubtedly, the worst example of this is where Theories of Regulation (Dabscheck 1981) is linked to the end of wage indexation and the changed role of the Commission in 1981 (Michelson and Westcott 2001: 313–314). Such ‘ideas’ were used to inform research on an arbitrator long dead (Dabscheck 1983a). The evolution of the General Theorytook (too) many years. It occurred by happenstance being a function of my ability––or more correctly, inability––to discipline myself to think; to think in conceptual and abstract terms. The real world is confusing and chaotic. My life is no exception.At a number of points Michelson and Westcott pass comment on my reliance and use of Dahrendorf (1959). In examining An Analytical Model(Dabscheck 1980) they state the ‘choice of Dahrendorf’s relations of authority is left unexplained . . . and in the absence of any indication . . . it is necessary to surmise why this might be the case’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311). I, in fact, provided three major reasons for choosing Dahrendorf. They were: problems with Dunlop’s systems model (Dunlop 1958), the potential for developing motivational/behavioural
THEJOURNAL OFINDUSTRIALRELATIONS, VOL. 44, NO. 1, MARCH2002, 136–143
assumptions for various actors, and that the term could be applied to struggles within, as well as between, actors (Dabscheck 1980: 198–200). In subsequent para-graphs after the above quotation, Michelson and Westcott paraphrase the first and third reasons (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311–312). I have committed many crimes, but I have never been a person of straw.
In examining the General Theory,per se, they state: ‘It is not entirely trans-parent why “authority” has been privileged in the theory other than to give the framework its cohesion and coherence’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 322, my emphasis). In developing a theory based on abstract thought, is there anything more you can ask of a concept, than to give the said theory’s framework its cohesion and coherence?
Michelson and Westcott comment on, and seemingly question, why I drew on Dahrendorf in preference to materialist or Marxist theories of conflict (though see below their championing of a model which gives greater emphasis to coop-eration). They then present material concerning Dahrendorf which appears con-fusing. At one point they reproduce a statement from him that ‘Control over the means of production is but a special case of authority’ (Dahrendorf 1959: 136; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311). Compare this with their interpretation of him that ‘groups that contest authority are neither theoretically nor empirically determined by material conditions’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 312). They have obliterated Dahrendorf’s ‘special case’. Dahrendorf’s theory is capable of incor-porating Marxian class struggle if various groups and organisations marshalled themselves to pursue such a struggle. For Dahrendorf, the types of authority strug-gles which occur are questions of empirics.
Michelson and Westcott point out that Dahrendorf explored conditions neces-sary for the effective regulation of conflict (Dahrendorf 1959: 223–231; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 312–313). It, of course, follows that if such condi-tions are not present, conflict cannot be effectively regulated. They state that this aspect of Dahrendorf ‘goes unmentioned’ in my work (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 312). It was, in fact, examined in Industrial Relations in Australia (Dabscheck & Niland 1981: 53–56).
Michelson and Westcott draw attention to Theories of Regulation (Dabscheck 1981), which provided the basis of the first chapter of Arbitrator at Work
(Dabscheck 1983a). They did not refer to this latter work; presumably being unaware of its existence. In both I abandoned the survival thesis. In its stead I developed a theory of activist arbitration. Michelson and Westcott maintain that in Theories of RegulationI began ‘to move away from the rather crude explanation that tribunals are motivated only by survival, to a more sophisticated view that tribunals, while still largely motivated by survival, also pursue an activist regu-latory approach when performing their functions’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 314). The survival thesis denotes passivity, which is the opposite of activism.
Arbitrator at Work,to repeat, a work which they have not consulted, provided empirical proof1of an activist arbitrator, in the person of Sir William Raymond
Kelly. His activism was such, that those opposed to him brought about the destruc-tion of the tribunal over which he presided.
Scholars employ different theories to explain phenomena. Distinctions are drawn between micro, macro and general theories. Micro analysis is concerned with small parts, or particular aspects of social phenomena. For example, indus-trial relations scholars conduct research into unions/a particular union, firms/a particular firm, activities of various organs of the state, industrial disputes, nego-tiations and so on. Macro analysis is concerned with a national system as a whole, perceiving social phenomena in aggregated or monolithic terms. Broad statements will be made about unions (as a whole), employers (as a whole) and the state. General theories are an alternative to macro analysis. They make statements which incorporate all micro phenomena, explaining the inter-relationships and inter-connections therein. A general theory makes general statements about the totality of micro phenomena.
The reason I have returned to basics is the problems Michelson and Westcott have in understanding macro and general theories. At one point they state that I did not explain ‘what a macro model actually entails’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 321). I did, and moreover they could have consulted Of Mountains and Routes Over Them as well (Dabscheck 1983b; 1995: 12). They could have also asked some-one to explain to them what macro theories entail.
empiri-cism, Proposition 1 could be reformulated to state ‘Industrial relations in any country/nation state comprises n interactors’. Or, being truly ambitious, it could be reformulated again to ‘Global industrial relations comprises n interactors’.
Having concluded that I have not developed a general theory, Michelson and Westcott then proceed to contradict themselves. They say ‘the theory can be applied to any set of social interactors’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325. See p. 324 for a similar statement). The ability of a theory to explain more, rather than fewer, phenomena constitutes a strength, rather than a weakness, of the said theory.
Michelson and Westcott express misgivings about the notion of an authority struggle. They ask, ‘what benefit(s) do interactors derive from enhancing their authority in a given orbit?’ They also state that ‘a discussion of motivation is absent’ in the General Theory,and ‘the struggle for authority can be construed as both the dependent and independent variable’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 322). Before proceeding further it should be pointed out that Michelson and Westcott acknowledge the importance of general concepts, and abstraction, in construct-ing a theory which can potentially explain a ‘large amount’ of social phenomena. They approvingly quote or, alternatively, do not pass any (negative) comment on, Cooke who said, ‘The greater the set of phenomena that any theory attempts to explain, the more general will be its axioms and theorems, and the more simplified and abstract will be the catalyst(s) that drive the relationships’ (Cooke 1985: 224; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 317).
The benefits interactors derive from enhancing their authority––if, in fact, they do––is the realisation of some of their objectives. Alternatively, not seeking to realise objectives, or to defend achievements of the past, will mean the ceding of authority/objectives to others. A discussion of motivation is not absent from the
General Theory.Proposition 6 explicitly incorporates motivation. The desire to enhance authority is the ‘abstract catalyst’, per Cooke, that motivates interactors and ‘drives their relationships’. Michelson and Westcott want me to provide more specific, unique information concerning the motivation of (various) interactors. The actual manifestations of authority struggles, the actual goals and objectives of interactors are empirical questions, which will conceivably vary from case to case. It is unnecessary for a general theory to specify them. Authority struggles are the independent variable, and the various equilibria which result from such struggles are the dependent variable in the General Theory.
Michelson and Westcott maintain that the desire to prevail in interactions ‘may not be the pre-eminent motive’, and ‘that there are both competitive and
co-operative attributes within industrial relations’. Theories are developed to simplify and make sense of the confusion and chaos that is the real world. Theories comprise as ifstatements about the real world. In the case of the General Theory, what is being stated is that it is useful to view the behaviour of interactors as if
Michelson and Westcott lament over problems they have in knowing how to apply the General Theory; what they refer to as my failure ‘to specify the ter-rain . . . [the] theory attempts to cover’. In particular, they point to problems in ‘identifying when interactors are involved in activities that are within the province of industrial relations and when they are involved in activities that are not’. They refer to Flanders (1970: 86) and Hyman (1975: 9–11) who have apparently said that ‘industrial relations does not attempt to explain all activities at work’, while I have no such limitation (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324).
Interactors can simultaneously inhabit industrial relations and non industrial relations orbits. Such is life. The question of whether or not an interactor is involved in industrial relations, or what aspects of their ‘life’ involve industrial relations, is a matter for empirical investigation. The ‘activities at work’ incor-porated in the General Theory are those that pertain to authority struggles. The General Theory focuses on the ‘totality’ of interactions generated by such struggles.
Michelson and Westcott state that ‘interactors may deliberately “lose” in one orbit to increase their influence in another’. In doing so they refer to a particu-lar page of the General Theory as apparent support for the above statement (Dabscheck 1994: 13; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). I know I didn’t make such a statement, or write words to similar effect. This can be easily confirmed by examining their source. More generally, it is inconsistent with the logic of seeking to prevail in authority struggles. Furthermore, the General Theory
postulates that interactors will ‘activate’ other orbits to enhance their chances of success, and/or because of difficulties they experience in ‘winning’ in a particu-lar orbit.
They quote me correctly as saying, ‘To know the part it is necessary to know the whole, to know the whole it is necessary to know the parts’ (Dabscheck 1995: 17). They then state that ‘this [statement] is not reflected in the overall state-ment of the theory’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 323). How can they possibly say that something that was said in developing and explicating a theory was, at one and the same time, not said? They also claim that interactors forming into coalitions or cartels pose a problem for the General Theory. They say that ‘the essential nature of a coalition is that it entails mutual dependence among those involved’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). ‘Mutual dependence’ and authority struggles exist both between and within organisations/non-individual interactors.
A number of matters concerning the ‘explanatory value’ of the General Theory
are raised by Michelson and Westcott. First, they ask, ‘in what sense can some of the propositions (such as Propositions 1 and 3) be tested? What type of evi-dence is relevant? How can it be demonstrated that an interactor is important or not? Moreover, the difficulty with Proposition 2 is that it borders on the tauto-logical. Translation of some propositions into empirical measure appears highly problematic’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325).2
1 and 3 could be achieved by examining the real world. Moreover, support for the notion that Australian industrial relations comprises n, or a large number of interactors, could be obtained by examining the indexes of major industrial rela-tions works, such as textbooks. Proposition 2 is a tautology. Then, as Dahrendorf has said, ‘there are tautologies which are worth stating’ (Dahrendorf 1959: 173). An interactor, per se, will assume importance, in an industrial relations sense, when it becomes involved in industrial relations––to state another tautology. If by ‘importance’ they mean ‘something more’ than being involved in authority contests––such as ‘winning’ them––this is a matter for empirical investigation.
Michelson and Westcott ask: ‘As conflict or struggle is inherent in the theory, is it possible to empirically verify?’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325). Yes, it is. For empirical examples of industrial conflict they could consult reports of various industrial tribunals. They could begin, for example, with volume 1 of Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, if interested in the federal tribunal. They could also examine articles, books and monographs published on industrial rela-tions over the generarela-tions––starting with the seminal work of the Webbs (Webb & Webb 1897)––for countless examples of conflict. Scholars who write about work sans conflict, are pursuing scholarship in other disciplines, such as economics/econometrics and psychology (see Cappelli 1985).
They also state that ‘in the absence of statements about cause and effect (other than the general “struggle for authority”) the theory has little predictive value’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325). The causal, independent variable in the General Theory is the ‘struggle for authority’. The above quotation is another example of misrepresentation; of saying that the General Theorydoes not do that which in fact it does. The material in brackets is an attempt to rob the General Theoryof its ‘driving force’. The General Theoryis predictive. The various equi-libria, the results of various authority struggles, are the effects of the theory. The
General Theorydoes not provide specific predictions. The results of various author-ity struggles are a matter for empirical investigation.
In 1969 Somers edited a series of essays on industrial relations theory (Somers 1969a). In a chapter of his own he maintained ‘that the survival of industrial rela-tions as a separate discipline and its growth as a respectable field requires a broad conceptual framework’. He went on to add: ‘if it were not for this pressing need,
one would hardly venture onto such treacherous terrain, for to serve its integrating purpose, the conceptual framework must be very broad and, in attempting to explain everything a general theory runs the risk of explaining nothing’ (Somers 1969b). Michelson and Westcott reproduce the material italicised in the above sentence (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 320–321). They have misrepresented Somers. Their use of these words was simply a device to say that development of general theories is a waste of time and effort.
380–390). Michelson and Westcott have contradicted themselves. Alternatively, they don’t mind general theories per se; they just don’t like one in particular. Or again, the above quotation reveals a cavalier approach to scholarship; an approach which says ‘Dunlop will do’.3
Generations of industrial relations scholars have been concerned with the dis-cipline’s theoretical impoverishment. Such impoverishment will only be overcome, tautologically, by such scholars developing theories. My General Theoryis one such attempt. It constitutes a second generation general theory, following on from the pioneering work of Dunlop (1958). Michelson and Westcott are critical of my attempt, which is their right and privilege. While noting their inconsistent admiration of Dunlop, they are dismissive of general theory per se. They say ‘academics who study industrial relations may be better served by trying to develop more thorough explanations for the phenomena they observe’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 327). This is precisely what I have been attempting to do!––not that I needed such advice in the first place. For more time than I care to remem-ber I have been seeking ‘to develop [a] more thorough explanation’ of Australian industrial relations. For good or for bad I have developed a general theory of industrial relations based on Australian experience; a theory which can easily be adapted, applied, or generalised, to other countries nation/states.
Their critique is confused and contradictory. They have misquoted, misrep-resented and failed to understand various aspects of my work. Such problems result from their inability to understand and comprehend theory construction and the use of conceptual and abstract thought. I am particularly disturbed at their recommendation that certain types of research should not be pursued. Those who conduct research should follow their own intellectual interests. To do other-wise is to stifle initiative, creativity and the development of alternative, or new, insights and theories.
The saddest aspect of their critique is its academic nihilism. It contains nothing new; it offers no alternatives. As I approached their critique I hoped to encounter new insights and concepts concerning industrial relations theoretical discourse. I was sadly disappointed. The reason why Michelson and Westcott reached backwards to Dunlop, in a reflex action as it were, was because they could not go forward. An opportunity lost. Persons who are so limited in their under-standing of theoretical, conceptual and abstract thought––as Michelson and Westcott have demonstrated in their critique––are the least capable of develop-ing theories of their own.
NOTES
1. The usefulness of theories is dependent on their ‘fit’ with real world phenomena. Dabscheck (2001) examines how, in recent years, the Commission has embraced passivity in its approach to industrial relations regulation.
2. They also struggled with accepting the ‘idea’ of interactors interacting. They said ‘The test of the theory is whether interactors do in fact interact. Given the broad range of interactors and the blurring [not a term that I used] of interactors and orbits it is difficult to refute a claim that interactors do in fact interact’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325).
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