Index of /enm/images/dokumen

Revised Version, _{28 September 2009}

Note

on

Expanding

and Deepening the

Middle

Class

and Engendering

fnclusive

Growth in

the

ASEANi

Ponciano S.

fntal, Jr.,

ph.D.il Senior Researcher.

Economic Research _{Institute for ASEAN and East Asia @RIA)}

-We have the strategies and projects to drive the ten markets into one single entity with

575 million consumers and the growing and rising middle-class, which is not muiit less than the middle- class of china and not less than the middte class of India...lhe _fruits of economic development must be _{shared especially so that the middle clasi of ASEAN cin grow\nd expand}

and become the _{foundation of the market. rhe rise of the middle- class}

"o,

gri.

in each other,s

market and benefit _from the natural resources in theie markets.

Speech of the Secretary- General of ASEAN, Dr. Surin pitsuwan at the 200g ASEAN Business and _{Investment gumrnif, Bangkolq 26 February 2009}

I.

Who

belong

to

the

middle

class?

There

is

no

clear

cut definition

of

what

constitutes

the

..middle

following

are _{examples of empirical definitions of ..middle class":}

McKinsey @arrell,

et.al.,

2006):

households

with

_annual

incomes of (in 2000 prices)

class".

The

(disposable)

Poor less than 25,000 renminbi

Lowermiddleclass:

25,001

-

40,000 renminbi

Upper middle

class:

40,001

-

100,000 renminbi

Mass affluent: Global affluent

100,001

-

200,000 renminbi more than 200,000 renminbi

considering that

the

exchange rate

in

2005

was

g.rg

renminbi

(yuan)

per

uS

assuming

that the

average income

tax

rate

is

20

percent,

then

the

McKinsey

delineation can be converted into gross household income

in

US dollar

terms at 2005 prices as follows:

Poor Less than US $ 4,000

Lower middle

class

US $

4,000

-

US $ 6,500 Upper middle

class

US $

6,500

-

US $ 16,000

Mass affluent

Global affluent

us$16.000

-

us$31,500

more

than

US $ 31.500

Note that the

average

family

size

in

urban China (the focus

of

the

McKinsey

article) is about 3. This means that in 2005 the threshold per capita gross income to move up from being poor into the lower middle class is about US $

l,

300 per year

while the threshold per capita into the upper middle income class

is

about US $ 2, 200 per year.

Abhjit

Banerjee and Esther

Duflo:

Households

whose

daily

per

capita

expenditures valued at 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) is between US $ 2 andUS $

4

andbetween US $ 6 and US $

10'

Ineffect:

Lower middle

class:

US $

2

-

US $ 4

Upper middle

class:

US $

6

-

US $ 10

Note that assuming an average household size

of

5, the lower middle class boundaries on an annual basis

in

2005 PPP terms

will

be about

US $

3,650

-

US $ 7,300

in

2005

prices.

The corresponding upper

middle

class boundaries,

in

2005 PPP terms' on an annual basis are

about US $ 11,000 and US $ 18,300 in 2005 prices'

Easterly:

those that are

within

the 20ft and 80ft percentile

in

the consumption

distribution

Birdsall.GrahamandPettinato:

those between

75

%

and

125

%o

of

the

median per caPita income.

low income: _{per capita annual income of US $975 or less,}

lower

middle:

per capita annual income between US $ 976 and US $ 3,g55

upper

middle:

per capita annual income bet. US $3,856 and US $l1,905

It

may be noted from the above that the Banerjee and

Duflo cut-offpoints

are more generous

(lower)

than the

McKinsey cut-off

points.

Also,

the

McKinsey cut-off

points are lower than the

world

Bank

cut-offpoints,

except for the threshold point

from the poor into the ranks of the middle class.

Drawing from the discussion in the previous section,

two alternative

estimates

of

the size

of

the middle

in

the

ASEAN

are presented

in

the

note.

The alternative

estimates are defined as follows:

Alternative

A.

This follows closely the Banerjee and

Duflo definition.

Specifically, a househord

belongs to the

lower

middle

class US $

2

-

US $

4

per capita per day

in

2005 PPP

terms.

This is

roughly equivalent

to

US

$

750

-US $ 11500 per capita per year at 2005 prices.

For a household

of4,

this is equivalent to about US

$

3,000

-

US

$

6,000

household income per annum

in

2005 PPP

dollars.

For a household

of5.

this is equivalent to about US $ 3,500

-

US $ 7,500 household income per annum in 2005 PPP dollars. US $

4

-

US $

10

per capita per day in 2005 PPP

terms.

This is roughly equivalent

to

US $ 1,500

-US $ 31700 per capita per year at 2005 prices.

For a household

of

4, this is

about

US

$

6,000

-US $ 15, 000 household income per annum in 2005

PPP

dollars.

For

a

household

of

5,

this

is

equivalent

to

about

US

$7,500

-

US

$18,000

household income per annum in 2005 PPP dollars.

Alternative

B.

This

is

a somewhat more stringent empirical definition

of

the middle class,

with higher threshold per capita incomes for lower middle income and upper

middle

income. This

follows

more closely the McKinsey and

World

Bank threshold per capita income requirement

for

a

lower middle

class and the

McKinsey

threshold

per

capita income requirement

for

the upper middle

class. Alternative B, nonetheless, follows the Banerjee and

Duflo

ceiling

for

the upper middle income class, which is lower than the ceiling in McKinsey and the World Bank.

lower middle

class US $

3

-

US

$

6 per capita per day

in

2005 PPP

terms. This is roughly equivalent to US$

1'100

-US $ 2,200 per capita per year at 2005 prices. For a household of 4, this is equivalent to about US $ 4,500

-

US $ 9,000 household income per year

in

2005 PPP

dollars. For

a household

of

5,

this

is equivalent to about US $ 5,500

-US

$

11,000 household income per year

in

2005

PPP dollars.

US $ 6

-

US $ 10 per capita per day

in

2005 PPP terms. This is roughly equivalent

to

US$ 2'200

-US $ 3,700 per capita per year at 2005 prices'

For a household of 4, this is equivalent to about US

$ 9.000

-

US

$

15,000 household income per

yeir

in

2005 PPP dollars. For a household

of

5,

this

is equivalent

to

about

US

$

11,000

-

US

$

18,000

household income per year in 2005 PPP dollars.

il.

Size

of the

middle

class

in

ASEAN

Countries

The computation

of

the size

of

the middle class is based on the PovcalNet data

of

the World Bank, which allows for the estimation of "headcount poverty incidence" depending on altemative levels of poverty line. For the purpose of the presentation, the altemative "poverty lines" used are US $ 2 per day, US $ 3 per day, US $ 4 per day,

US

$

6

per day

and

US

$

10

per

day.

Note

that

I

minus

the

"poverty incidence"

will

give

the

incidence

of

the

"non-poor",

which given the

total population

will

allow for

an estimate

of

the "non-poor", either the middle class or

the

rich.

We

assume

the

same absolute

level

of

"poverty

lines"

across

all

the

ASEAN countries, for comparability. Note that the "poverty lines" and "non-poor" are in quotation marks because raising the poverty line

sigrificantly

beyond the US

$ 1.25 or US $ 2 per day is no longer realistic for poverfy analysis.

The computation of the size of the middle class was done for Cambodia, Indonesi4

Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viebram; here termed

ASEAN

7.

With

gross national income per capita in 2008 of $ 50,000 dollars and $ 47 _{,940 dollars} in PPP terms

for

Brunei

Darussalam and Singapore (the

fifth

and sixth highest

in

the world),

it

is best to consider both countries as high income. There is no data

for

Myanmar; nonetheless,

it

is preponderantly a

low

income country

with

a per capita income

in

2008 at $1, 290 dollars

in

PPP terms, lower than Cambodia's

$

1,820

dollars

in

PPP terms and

Laos'

$ 2,060 dollars

in

PPP terms

in

2008. Thus,

it

is

likely

that Myanmar has a

tiny

middle class only.

The results

of

the computations

for Alternative

A

are shown

in

Table

1.

The results show the remarkable transformation of the

ASEAN

region,

with

about 150

million

more people that moved out

of

poverty and

into

the ranks

of

the middle class from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s. By the mid-2000s, the majority (51%) of the population in the

ASEAN

7 developing countries is middle class, a sharp rise

from

the share

of

the

middle

class population

of

about 27 %o

in

the

early

1990s. Being the most populous country

in

the region, Indonesia has the largest number

and

percentage

share

(38

%)

of

the

middle

class

in

the

region,

albeit

preponderantly

lower middle

class.

Vietnam

and

Indonesia present

the

most remarkable stories

of

dramatic increases

in

the size

of

the middle class

dwing

the 1990s and the early 2000s, a reflection

of

the comparatively fast growth

of

their

economies (especially

Vietnam)

during the period. Nonetheless, even Cambodia

and Laos

experienced substantial increases

in

the

number

of

middle

class

population as

well

as the largest number

of

the affluent

in

the region by the

mid-2000s.

The

Philippines

has

the

most

modest performance,

with

the

country showing some increase

in

the level

of

the abject poor together

with

Cambodia

in

sharp contrast

to

the dramatic decreases

in

abject poverty

in

Indonesia, Thailand

and Vietnam.

(It

is

likely

that the

data overstates the comparatively poor performance

of

the Philippines because

ofthe

unique characteristic

ofthe

country having a substantial percentage

of

Filipinos working

abroad.

The basic

sources

of

data

for

the computations of the middle class are the

family

expenditures data of each country. Since the overseas

Filipino

workers stay abroad,

their

consumption expenditures

are not captured

in

the

family

income and expenditures surveys. Hence, compared to the ASEAN countries

with

far less number of their peoples working abroad, the

underestimation

of

family

expenditures

for

the

Philippines

is

particularly

substantial.

As

such. the number

of

the

middle

class

is

underestimated and the number of the poor overestimated for the Philippines.)

Table

2

presents the results

of

the

computations

for Alternative

B

which

has

higher threshold per capita incomes

for

both lower middle income class and the upper middle income class than under Alternative

A.

Not

surprisingly, the size

of

the middle class is lower under Altemative B than under Alternative

A.

Indeed. the

levels are much

lower

because

a

significant share

of

the lower middle

class in Altemative

A

is in the range of US $2.00 - US 3.00 dollars per capita in PPP terms.

Nonetheless, the changes

in

the levels and shares during

the

1990s and the early 2000s are as remarkable as

in

Alternative

A,

with Vietram

and Indonesia

still

showing

the

fastest increase. Thailand

is

also

worth

mentioning because

of

the large decline

in

the number

of

the

low

income group

while

most

of

the countries

still registered higher levels of low income people.

Based on the results in Tables

I

and2, and given the altemative definitions of what constitutes the middle class,

we

can

classiff

the

ASEAN

countries at present as

follows:

Largely affluent: Largely middle class:

Brunei Darussalam, Singapore Malaysia, Thailand

Transitioning into middle

class:

Indonesi4 Philippines, Vietnam

Largely low

income:

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar

largest number of people that entered the middle class (and the affluent) in so short

a time in the world ever. A more detailed look at the urban and rural components

of

China would indicate

two

Chinas: urban China is largely middle class, similar to Malaysia and Thailand while

rwal

China is transitioning to middle class similar to Indonesia or the Philippines.

It

is useful

to

compare the size

of

the

middle

class

in

the

ASEAN

with

those

of

India and China. In the mid-2000s.

Aflluent

population:

China

ASEAN

India

Middle

class

China

ASEAN India

around 52.0

million

around 25.7

million

around

5.7

million

Alternative

A

/ /

/

mllrlon

257

million

256

million

328

million

112

million

43

million

Alternative B

505

million

149

million

94

million

136

million

37

million

13

million

of which upper

middle

class:

China

ASEAN

India

Table 3 and the figures above show clearly that ASEAITI compares very

favorably

with India

up

until

the mid 2000s. The size

of

the middle class

in

the

ASEAN

is

the same as

that

of

India

under Alternative

A

(the more generous threshold per capita incomes)

but

about 50 percent higher than India under Altemative

B

(with

higher threshold per capita incomes). The size

of

the affluent class

in

the

ASEAN

is

four

and

half

times

that

of

India.

(Note that

in

the

computation,

the

whole

populations of Singapore and Brunei Darussalam are assumed to be

"affluent".)

m.

Expanding and deepening the ASEAN

middle

class

A

comparison

of

the Philippine experience

with

those

of

Vietram

and lndonesia

will

readily show that the best way

to

expand and deepen the middle class

in

the

ASEAN

countries

is

by

ensuring

that there

is

robust, better

yet high

rate

of

economic growth

in

the region together

with

a comparatively equal distribution

of

income. This is not surprising because the expansion and deepening

of

the middle

class necessitates

the rise

in

the

average incomes

of

households,

the

faster the better. Expanding the

middle

class means more

of

the hitherto poor households

have

joined

the middle class. Deepening the middle class means that the average

income of the middle class increases over time, thereby allowing for the movement from the lower middle income class to the upper middle class.

The importance of high and sustained growth

in

substantially reducing poverty and

in effect

lifting

more people into the ranks of the middle class can be illustrated

by

comparing the performance

of

Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines during the

1990s and the 2000s:

Sharp falls in poverty incidence tend to be in countries with high growth rate.

Drop in Poverty rate $ 1.25 PPP:

(1990t2-200s/6)

Vietnam:

43.2%

Indonesia

32.9

Phil

8.1

Ave GDP per cap g.r

(reeo

-2006)

s9%

4.8

1.4

The World Bank

Growth Report

summarizes the key factors that help explain the

high growth phase

of

a

few

developing countries during the past several decades.

They are:

.

Key ingredients (Growth

Report,pp.2l-26\z

Full

exploitation

of global economy: Openness

.

Import

knowledge ("ideas,

know how,

technology"): FDI;

measures to extract technology from

FDI;

foreign education

.

_Exploit global demand ("deep elastic

market')

Macroeconomic

stability

.

Modest

inflation

High

rates of investment and saving

:Future Orientation

.

public infrastructure critical

Let

markets

allocate resources (6'govts

did

not

deff

their

comparative advantage")

.

Prices guide resources

.

Resources

follow

prices

("labor

moves

rapidly from

sector to

sector; tumultous process of creative destruction in fast growing

economies)

Conmitted, credible and

capable governments: leadership

and

governance

("patiencel

long

planning

horizonl implicit or explicit

social

contract

re benefits")

.

_{Credible commitment to growth}

.

Credible commitment to inclusion

'

Capableadministration

In addition to, and most

likely

also in support of, robust growth is the prevention

of

large distortions

in

the labor market

to

prevent dualistic labor market and

in

the process

would

likely

lead

to

the

growth

of

steady,

well

paying

jobs that

as

Banerjee and

Duflo

suggest is a key defining characteristic

of

the middle class

in

developing countries.

The

experiences

of

Indonesia

(in

the

early 2000s) and

the

Philippines seem to suggest

that

large

price

distortions

in

the labor

market can

lead

to

less than satisfactory employment growth as

well

as

to

more

difficult

industrial adjustment

processes.

h

contrast, Vie0ram's

successful adjustment

to

its

emerging

comparative advantage

may

have been underpinned

by a

less distorted labor

market in addition to high investment rate (Intal and Borromeo,2009):

Indonesia:

Labor intensive manufactures struggled in 2000s with more rigid labor laws and sharp rise in minimum wage, leading to minimal

employment growth and rise in unemployment rate

Philippines: Reduction in ratio of manufacturing wages to per capita GDP, given

Vietnam: Successful adjustrnent to greater export market access,

with

sharp rise in labor intensive manufactures in tandem with robust asdcultural

exports

IV.

The middle class and

ASEAN

growth, competitiveness and

integration

From Banerjee and

Duflo,

the

following

are what differentiates the middle class

from the poor:

l.

"Compared

to

the

poor,

the middle

class

work

longer hours, on

more

stable and

higher

paying jobs, which they often had to go

to

some trouble

to find.

That,

ratler

than

their

propensity

to

take

risk

and

run

businesses,

seems to be at the core of their (relative) economic success" (p. 17)

2.

"T"he

middle

class

lives

in

smaller families, and has fewer

children,

compared with the

poor"

(p.17)

3.

'The

middle class is

more

likely to

send

their children

to

school than the poor:. (p.

l8)

4.

"The middle class spends more, often much more, per

child

educated than

the poor." (p.19)

5.

'Nothing

seems more

middle

class than the

fact

of

having

a

steady

well-paying

job....

If

the middle

class matters

for

growth,

it

is

probably not

because of its enffepreurial spirit." (p.21).

From the above characterization, the middle class has corollary characteristics that

contribute

to

the

strengthening

of

the

foundations

for

robust growth

and

competitiveness of ASEAN countries.

1.

The bias

of

the middle class

for

education increases

private

investment

in

education

which

provides

intemal

dynamic

to

human capital investment. Investment in human capital is a critical factor for the region's technological upgrading,

which is

needed

in

order

for

the

ASEAN

countries

to

remain

intemationally competitive (as

a

production base

and

as

an

investment

destination)

in

the face

of

relentless improvements

in

China and improving

2.

T\e

middle class tends to be a pressure

group

for

transparency and good governance. Thus, the rise

ofthe

middle class leads to rising call for greater transparency and less comrption

in

local and national govemance at least

in

countries

with

greater democratic space. Despite resulting societal conflicts

as a result, e.g., Thailand in recent years, the Philippines for nearly a decade, greater transparency,

less

comrption and

improved

govemance

can

be expected

to

contribute

to

improved investment climate

in

the region. The

best

example

of

this

of

course

is

Singapore

that

still

gets

the

bulk

of

investments

into

the region despite

its

extremely

high

wages vis-d-vis the

rest of the ASEAN countries.

Perhaps most importantly, the widening and deepening

of

the middle class

in

the

ASEAN is the

foundation

for

the

deepening

of

the

domestic

markets

in

the region, which in tum facilitates the growth and upgrading of domestic firms in the

ASEAN.

The middle

class consumption pattern (e.g., more processed

food

or better prepared

food, food

outside

the

home,

better

quality

garments, sturdier

homes

with

the

attendant

demand

for

better home fumishings and

home

equipment,

etc.)

provide

the

demand

impulse domestically

for

industrial

diversification

as

domestic

firms

establish, expand

or

reengineer

to

meet the

varying demands

of

the increasingly more demanding consumer market.

This

is

where and

how local

brands are developed

and

established.

The

growing

and

dynamic domestic

market can

likely

become

the

springboard

of

successful

domestic

firms

for

expansion into the regional and global markets. Note that the expansion

into

other countries need not be

in

the context

of

subcontractors as part

of

a regional production chain. Rather the regional expansion can be

in

terms

of

branches

or

franchises

for

unique products

or

processes; e.g., Singapore's Bread

Talk and Gardenia becoming established players in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Equally important, the widening and deepening of the middle class

in

the ASEAN

becomes an investment magnet by

itself, in

the same way that the foreign direct investment

into

China

in

recent years has been more and more

for

the booming domestic market rather than as a production base

for

exports

that

characterized much of Hong Kong and Taiwanese investments into China in the early 1990s,

for

example.

[n

short, as

the

domestic

ASEAN

market expands and becomes more variegated, domestic demands of a growing number of products and services would

likely

be better served through

the

establishment

of

ASEAN

production plants

rather than through imports;

hence, greater

foreign

direct

investment

into

the

ASEAN ensues.

The challenge remains however

of

making the ASEAN one huge home market

for

the

ASEAN firms

and not

just

a

collection

of

highly

disparate and segrnented national

or

even

local

markets. Reduction

in

the barriers

to

and costs

of

intra-ASEAN

trade

in

goods and services, improving logistics, as

well

as harmonizing standards and procedures

within the

region

would go

a

long way

toward

the creation of robust, dynamic and huge ASEAN home market that makes the region

a

highly

competitive destination

of

foreign direct investment

similar

to

the

"big

countries"

like

China and

India, as

well

as

a

dynamic breeding

ground for

intemationally competitive ASEAN firms.

V.

Engendering

inclusive growth

in

the

ASEAII

in

tandem

with

the

growth

of the middle class

At

the same timq" inclasive

growth

needs

to

be given emphasis as much as the

growth

of

the

middle

class

in

the

region.

The size

of

the poor

is still

large in Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam as

well

as

in

Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

Moreover,

the pursuit

of

inclusive growth

eases

the

process

of

expanding the

region's middle class. The purzuit

of

inclusive growth also makes high economic growth more sustainable.

The number of poor populafion

in

the

ASEAN

is

still

very substantial. Based on a US

$

1.25 per capita per day

in

2005 PPP dollars, the numbers are as follows

for

selected ASEAN countries:

Indonesia

(2005):

47.3

million

Philippines

(2006):

20.2

million

Vietnam

(2006)

l8.l

million

Cambodia

(2004)

5.5

million

Laos

(2002)

2.4 million

(Note:

There is no data for Myanmar in the PovcalNet. Myanmar's population is at

present about 55.4

million;

it

is probably safe

to

say that a preponderant portion

of

Myanmar's population is poor based on the US

$

1.25 per day per capita

in

2005 PPP _{dollars. )}

.

_{Substantial rise in gainful employment}

.

_{Substantial rise in real wages, given no labor slack}

.

Substantial

rise

in

labor productivity

in

non-agriculture, esp.

manufacturing

.

_{Moderate rise in labor productivity in agriculture}

The best ways

to

reduce

poverty are

sustained

high

growth,

expansion

of

employment

in

manufacturing and other high

payng jobs

relative

to

agdculture,

increase

in

agricultural

productivity

to

allow

for

the

_release

of

labor

_into

manufacturing and other better paying non-agricultural sectors, and significant rise in labor productivity in manufacturing (Intal and Borromeo, 2009).

Similarly, on the supply side of the labor market, the poor and disadvantaged labor tends

to

be

low

skilled

with

low

education.

It

is

clear therefore

that

special attention needs to be given to the provision of education and training to the poor in

order to make them more employable in better paying and more stable jobs. Health

services (and possibly health insurance) would also be useful to help alleviate the poor from poverty because health crises are a significant source of impoverishment

(as _{families sell offassets) drawing from the Philippine data.}

Given limited budgetary resowces,

it

is important that the anti-poverfy or poverty

alleviation

mea$ues such as

health

insurance

or

food

support

or

educational support

be

well targeted.

Leakages are

known

to

bedevil many

anti-poverty programs

in

developing countries.

In

this

regard, the experience

of

Community

Based

Monitoring

System

(CBMS)

is worth considering as a complemenl to the

growth enhancing measures discussed

above.

The experiences

in

a large number

of CBMS

sites

in

many provinces and municipalities

in

the Philippines show that

cBMS

can _{help improve the targeting of poor beneficiaries} and in the allocation

of

scarce

local

govemment

funds.

CBMS

also helps toward

greater

public

participation

in

budget and planning process. The result

is

greater

credibility

of

government progrurms. _{CBMS is now being} implemented on a

wider

scale

in

the

Philippines and

is

being

firmly

established

in

Cambodia, Indonesia,

Laos

and

Vietram.

Summary

In

short,

ASEAN

may

well

go

for

the

following

key

strategies

in

widening and deepening the middle class and at the same time engendering inclusive growth

in

the region :

i.

Pursuit

of

sustainably robust

and

high

economic

growth

in

member countries,

with

the attendant

key

factors discussed

in

the

World

Bank's

Growth Report and summarized earlier in the paper

ii.

Pursuit of regional integration for bigger market and robust competition

iii.

Prevention of major distortions in the factor markets (especially the labor market) in the region

iv.

Pwsuit

of

inclusive growth,

in

part

through

targeted

anti-poverty

measures

v.

Use

of

community based monitoring systems and similar approaches

for

improved targeting, greater transparency,

and better

govemance both local and national

The

end result

can

be

expected

to

be a

virtuous

cycle

of

an

expanding and

deepening middle class (and the elimination

of

abject poverty) that provides the

foundation

for

further growth through human capital

investrnent, growing domestic market, greater investment attraction and

capability

for

technological

adaptation

and

innovation.

Facilitating such virtuous

cycle are

improving

govemance, sfiengttrening institutions, open and integrating economies, business community

"...looking

at opportunities and taking more

risks"

(Pitsuwan,2009),

and general peace and security in the region.

Banerjee,

A.

and E.

Duflo

(2007),

Wat

is middle class about the middle classes

around the

world?

Massachussetts

Institute

of

Technology, Department

of

Economics. Accessed. http://econ-www.mit.edu/fileV3 I 07.

Farrell,

D., U.

Gersch and

E.

Stephenson (2006), The value

of

China's emerging

middle

class.

The McKinsey Quarterly.

Accessed.

http://www,mckinseyquarterly.com/Economic_Studies/Productivity_Performance/ The_value_of_China' s_emerging_middle_class_ 1 79 8 ? gp:

l

Intal, P. and M.R. Borromeo (2009), Globalization, Adjustment and the Challenge of Furthering Sustained, Robust and Inclusive Growth and

Industrial

Upgrading:

Insights,

Lessons

and Policy

Recommendations.

Power

point

presentation in

Manila, 14 August 2009.

' Prepared for the Camelot Brainstorming Meeting with the Secretary-Genoral of ASEAN, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, at the

ERIA Aanex Office, Jakarta, on 20 August 2009

" The author thanls Ms. Yunita Dora Nababan for research assistance.

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